The Negotiator

by George Mitchell

  Of course, there is no policy decision that is free of risk. But finding the middle ground is the only way to open up the possibility of movement toward normalization of relations between Israel and other countries in the region, many of whom share Israel’s deep concern about the threat from Iran and the extremist groups now menacing the region.

  The Palestinians also face serious hurdles, particularly the indefinite continuation of an occupation under which they do not have the right to govern themselves and therefore lack the dignity and freedom that come with self-governance. In 1947 the United Nations proposed a plan to partition the area and create two states. Israel accepted it; the Arabs rejected it. And the next year brought the first of several wars, all of them won by an increasingly strong Israel.

  Every sensible Arab leader today would gladly accept that 1947 plan if it were still available. But it is not—and it never will be available again. The circumstances on the ground have changed too dramatically. Since then serious Israeli negotiators have come to the conclusion, whether they admit it publicly or not, that the two-state solution will ultimately be based on the 1948 armistice lines, also known as the 1967 lines, with land swaps to be agreed by both parties, to accommodate large Israeli population centers.

  But as I told both Yasser Arafat during my first tour of service in the region and, later, President Abbas, there is no evidence to suggest that the end game is going to get any better in the future. The interests of the Palestinian people would be best served if their leaders participated in and stayed in direct negotiations to get the best deal they can, even if it’s not 100 percent of what they want. They must bring the occupation to an end. They’ve got to get their own state and build on it. They will achieve neither by staying out of negotiations.

  When he was prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, Salam Fayyad tried to lay the foundation by building the institutions needed for a viable, independent state. But Fayyad resigned in 2013, and his state-building efforts cannot be sustained in the absence of any progress on the political side. They are inextricably linked; there must be concurrent progress on both.

  For a quarter century the policy of the United States has been to encourage direct negotiations between Israelis and Arabs as the only feasible way to reach agreement on the issues that divide them.I As a necessary complement to that policy, the United States has consistently opposed any action by either side that could have the effect of predetermining those issues prior to negotiations. That is why the United States opposes Palestinian efforts to achieve recognition as a state at the United Nations, just as it opposes Israeli settlement construction. The United States contends that those issues, and all others that are contested, should be resolved in direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, not by unilateral action on either side.

  From the Palestinian (and Arab) perspective, however, the problem is that the United States has been more successful in opposing their efforts at the UN than it has been in restraining Israeli settlement construction. During the nearly seven decades of its existence, Israel has had the strong support of the United States. In international forums the United States has at times cast the only vote on Israel’s behalf. Yet even in such a close relationship there are some differences. Prominent among those is the U.S. government’s long-standing opposition to Israel’s policies and practices regarding settlements. As Secretary of State James A. Baker III commented on May 22, 1991:

  Every time I have gone to Israel in connection with the peace process, on each of my four trips, I have been met with the announcement of new settlement activity. This does violate United States policy. It’s the first thing that Arabs—Arab Governments, the first thing that the Palestinians in the territories—whose situation is really quite desperate—the first thing they raise when we talk to them. I don’t think there is any bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated but at an enhanced pace.18

  • • •

  The policy described by Secretary Baker, on behalf of the administration of President George H. W. Bush, has been, in essence, the policy of every U.S. administration since Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem in 1967.

  As far back as 1967, in the Johnson administration, an internal communication noted, “There can be little doubt among [government of Israel] leaders as to our continuing opposition to any Israeli settlements in the occupied areas.”19 In July 1969 President Nixon’s representative to the UN said, “The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests.”20 President Ford’s UN ambassador asserted in March 1976, “The presence of these settlements is seen by my government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbors.”21 On March 21, 1980, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, speaking on behalf of the Carter administration, stated, “U.S. policy toward the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories is unequivocal and has long been a matter of public record. We consider it to be contrary to international law and an impediment to the successful conclusion of the Middle East peace process.”22 On September 1, 1982, President Ronald Reagan announced what came to be known as the Reagan Plan for the Middle East: “The immediate adoption of a settlements freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidence needed for wider participation in these talks. Further settlement activity is in no way necessary for the security of Israel and only diminishes the confidence of the Arabs that a final outcome can be freely and fairly negotiated.”23 At a press conference on December 16, 1996, President Bill Clinton stated, “It just stands to reason that anything that preempts the outcome [of the negotiations] . . . cannot be helpful in making peace. I don’t think anything should be done that would be seen as preempting the outcome.” Asked if he viewed the settlements as an obstacle to peace, Clinton replied, “Absolutely. Absolutely.”24 In an April 2002 Rose Garden speech, President George W. Bush declared, “Israeli settlement activity in occupied territories must stop, and the occupation must end through withdrawal to secure and recognized boundaries.”25 Two months later, on June 24, Bush unveiled his “Roadmap” for peace. Phase 1 of the Roadmap not only had Israel “freez[ing] all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements)”; it also called on Israel to “immediately dismantle settlement outposts erected since March 2001.”26 The Bush administration secured full international backing for the Roadmap, including through the UN.

  While the stated policy of the government of Israel favors a two-state solution, the government’s actions on settlements are at times inconsistent with that policy.27

  The fighting in Gaza between Israel and Hamas ended on January 18, 2009, two days before Obama took the oath of office. A few days later I landed in the region for the first of many visits. In the fighting, somewhere between 1,166 (the Israeli figure) and 1,400 (the Palestinian figure) Palestinians were killed. Thirteen Israelis died (ten soldiers and three civilians). Massive destruction occurred in Gaza. Thousands of rockets had been fired into Israel from Gaza. Emotions were raw, hostility high. In Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had announced his resignation, and a close, hotly contested election campaign was drawing to a close. It would be two months before a new Israeli government took office, so even if the prospects had been less gloomy there was no possibility of an early resumption of negotiations.

  In that difficult circumstance President Obama sought to create a context within which the tensions could subside sufficiently to permit a resumption of direct negotiations at some point in the future. To encourage the parties to move in that direction, each of them was asked to contribute something: the Palestinians were asked to act more aggressively to prevent any acts of violence against Israel and to reduce incitement in its schools and mosques; the other Arab
states were asked to take steps toward normalization with Israel, including, for example, reopening of trade offices, permitting commercial air overflights, or opening lines of communications by mail and telephone; Israel was asked to freeze settlement construction.

  We tried hard to persuade each of the parties to make appropriate contributions to this approach, including a real effort to revive the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002. By the time the new government of Israel was ready to talk substantively with us, in May 2009, I had visited fifteen Arab countries and met with virtually every Arab ruler and foreign minister. Without exception they insisted on a full settlement freeze as a necessary first step.

  None of our requests was intended to be a precondition to negotiations, although that is how they were widely portrayed. While the policy itself is legitimately subject to debate, and indeed was debated within the Obama administration, what in retrospect seems to me not debatable is that we did not do a good job in announcing, explaining, and advocating for that policy, one of several mistakes we made. As a result, at least in the media in Israel and the United States, attention focused almost entirely on the request for a freeze on settlement construction. Obama was criticized for seeking a freeze, including by many who were silent when President George W. Bush made the identical request a few years earlier, when he included a full settlement freeze in his Roadmap.

  Abbas came to Washington and unhelpfully told the Washington Post that he had not been asked to do anything, and besides, there was nothing for the Palestinians to do, it was all up to the Israelis.28 That elicited a strong negative reaction from the Israelis, who soon made it clear that they would not agree to a total freeze on settlements, nor would they agree to include East Jerusalem in our discussions.II The Arab states said that they could not take even the most modest steps until Israel agreed to the freeze. The Palestinians were equally adamant that anything less than a total freeze that included East Jerusalem would be unacceptable to them. So the effort to help create an atmosphere in which meaningful negotiations could take place did not succeed. Attitudes hardened, and like the illusion of an oasis in the desert, the prospect of meaningful negotiations drifted further and further away from us.

  In addition to the issue of settlements, other aspects of the president’s effort to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian agreement were criticized; some of the criticism was valid and constructive, but some of it was unfounded. An example of the latter was the allegation that Obama blundered by not resuming negotiations in 2009 on the basis of the Olmert-Abbas discussions of 2008. This line of criticism appeared, for instance, in an article by the Washington Post columnist David Ignatius. On October 16, 2011, he wrote that Olmert had offered Abbas a “miraculous package” and that “in one of President Obama’s biggest mistakes, he decided to start negotiations all over.”29 If true, this indeed would have been a serious mistake by the president. But it is not true; it is contradicted by the facts, most of them a matter of public record.

  There appears to be little doubt that Abbas and Olmert did have serious discussions and that both felt they had made significant progress. But, unfortunately, they never reached an agreement. Their talks were held under the principle, agreed in advance by both sides, that nothing is final until everything is final. And nothing was final. “Saeb Erekat, a Palestinian negotiator, said the proposal was never written down and left too many details unsettled.”30

  The talks were hampered by Olmert’s legal problems, which ultimately led to his departure from government. Abbas was concerned about Olmert’s ability to obtain approval of an agreement based on their discussions. He later felt his concern was validated when, after Olmert made the substance of their discussions public just before the Israeli elections, Netanyahu repudiated them and no major candidate for prime minister supported them. “Less than a week before Israeli voters pick a new leader, the candidate most involved in the negotiations with the Palestinians [Tzipi Livni] is on the defensive over newly reported details of an interim peace accord offered months ago by outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. . . . [T]he disclosures last week prompted [Netanyahu] the hawkish front-runner to accuse her of agreeing to ‘surrender’ parts of Jerusalem for an independent Palestinian state. . . . Netanyahu seized on Israel’s proferred concessions to portray Livni as ‘weak on security.’ His party has plastered that slogan on buses and billboards in recent days.”31 The Olmert-Abbas negotiations ended abruptly, withot agreement, when violence erupted in Gaza in December 2008.

  I met with Olmert at his official residence in early February 2009; he told me about his discussions with Abbas, just before he made them public.32 Shortly thereafter I met with Abbas, and he related his version of those discussions. There were important differences in their recollections, especially on the issue of borders. Although it was not featured in the Israeli election campaign, as were security and Jerusalem, it is, of course, important to both sides. Olmert said he showed Abbas a map that included an offer by Israel on boundaries. Olmert wanted Abbas to agree and sign the map, then and there. Abbas wanted first to consult with his advisors. Olmert thought it unreasonable for Abbas not to promptly accept what Olmert felt was a fair, even generous offer. According to Olmert, Abbas promised to return the next day with experts, but he did not return. The Gaza conflict then broke out, and the discussions ended without a Palestinian reply to the offer.

  Abbas agreed that Olmert showed him a map and asked him to sign it, and that Abbas wanted to take it with him to study and to consult with his aides before signing. Abbas thought it unreasonable for Olmert to expect him to reach a binding agreement on the boundaries of a new Palestinian state on the basis of a single viewing of one map, without the opportunity to discuss and consider it with the other members of his leadership team. After Olmert refused his request and took the map back, Abbas left and met with his aides and tried to re-create the map from memory. He and other Palestinian leaders told me they then sent Olmert a typewritten list of questions seeking clarification on the map and other issues. According to Abbas, he never received a response to his questions. The Gaza conflict then broke out, and the discussions ended without an Israeli response.

  The criticism of Obama also completely overlooked the crucial fact that Prime Minister Netanyahu, who succeeded Olmert, was clear, in public and in private, with me and with others, that he was strongly opposed to the substance of Olmert’s discussions with Abbas and would not resume negotiations on that basis. As noted above, that position was part of his election campaign, and he has never deviated from it.33 Indeed when Netanyahu and Abbas later met in person, in September 2010, the only substantive issue Netanyahu would discuss was Israel’s security demands, and what he said to Abbas then went far beyond what Olmert had said two years earlier. In particular, Netanyahu regarded as dangerous for Israel that Olmert did not insist on a long-term Israeli military presence along a Palestinian state’s eastern border with Jordan. Whether one agrees or disagrees with Netanyahu, there can be no doubt that on this issue his position has been consistent and unchanging. There never was any chance that he would agree to resume negotiations on that basis, because he feels strongly that those earlier discussions were inadequate on the issue of security and wrong on Jerusalem. To blame Obama for the fact that negotiations did not resume on the basis of the Olmert-Abbas discussions is thus wholly unfounded and unfair.

  My discussions with the Israelis on settlements began at a meeting in London, after Netanyahu took office. We spent the summer months in negotiations. They would not agree to a total freeze, but by September we had reached agreement on a moratorium on new housing construction starts; it was to take effect in November and last ten months. It was much less than what we had asked for, but it was a very significant step. When the moratorium was announced, I held a press conference and was forthcoming about its shortfalls. I urged the international community to

  look at this issue in a broader context, particularly how it affects the situation on the ground and how it can contribute to
a constructive negotiating process that will ultimately lead to an end to the conflict and to a two-state solution. [The moratorium] falls short of a full settlement freeze, but it is more than any Israeli Government has done before, and can help move toward agreement between the parties. . . . For the first time ever, an Israeli Government will stop housing approvals and all new construction of housing units and related infrastructure in West Bank settlements.34

  During the ten months of the moratorium the Israelis were permitted to complete work on buildings that were already under construction, and East Jerusalem was not included. Just before the moratorium announcement, in a meeting in New York at which I and other American officials accompanied President Obama, Saeb Erekat, the Palestinian’s chief negotiator, criticized the moratorium on those two points. In the presence of President Abbas, he told President Obama that the moratorium was “worse than useless.”

  By the spring of 2010 we had been unable to persuade the parties to resume direct negotiations, despite an intense effort. To try to establish some traction we suggested, and the parties agreed, that we conduct “proximity talks,” in which I would meet separately with each side to discuss all relevant issues. There was no expectation that any issues would be resolved during these talks; rather they were to serve as a transition process that would lead to direct negotiations. Our hope was to get a clear understanding of the parties’ current positions on each of the major issues, which would enable more meaningful discussions as soon as we made the transition to direct negotiations. The Israelis agreed reluctantly because they preferred to go immediately to direct negotiations. The Palestinians, on the other hand, continued to refuse direct negotiations in the absence of a full settlement freeze and were more enthusiastic about the proximity talks. It enabled them to gain a bit in the never-ending public relations battle and in what I came to describe as the document dispute. It was a minor issue, notable only because it illustrates how both sides vigorously contested every aspect of the process, always (understandably) with a view toward the political effect at home.