The Negotiator

by George Mitchell

  From the beginning to the end of my tenure as special envoy, the Israelis took the public position that they wanted direct negotiations. Privately they insisted that those negotiations be entirely oral, with nothing in writing and no exchange of documents. They were reluctant, for example, to agree to adopt further terms of reference for the negotiations, terms that would have defined the issues to be resolved (itself a very contentious task).III The Palestinians regarded this as evidence that the government of Israel was not serious about negotiations; they believed the Israelis said they wanted negotiations only to placate the United States. So the proximity talks evolved into a one-sided affair in which the Palestinians provided me with detailed position papers on every disputed issue, while the Israelis, up to and including the prime minister, said little and made clear their disdain for the whole notion of proximity talks. On one occasion, for nearly an hour a midlevel Israeli official read aloud to me a document that his government had submitted in the previous round of negotiations (during the George W. Bush administration) and which I already had in my possession.

  Needless to say, this was unproductive. But I understood that the Israelis were making a point. Almost all of the many documents the Palestinians handed me were identical, or very nearly identical, to those they had submitted to the Israelis in earlier rounds of negotiations or had sent to other governments in the international community. And most of the positions the Palestinians took in the documents did not stray from their publicly stated positions. The Israelis already had all of those documents and knew the Palestinian positions; they didn’t want any documents in this round of talks, and certainly not copies of documents they already had in their possession. Just as the Palestinians felt the Israelis were play-acting in demanding direct negotiations, the Israelis felt the Palestinians were play-acting on the subject of documents.

  The document dispute reached a climax at a meeting in New York. Erekat insisted on handing the Palestinian position papers directly to Yitzhak Molho, Netanyahu’s trusted personal lawyer and the lead Israeli negotiator. Molho refused to accept the documents, or even to touch them. After holding them out at arm’s length for a few seconds, Erekat laid them on the table around which we sat. Both then turned to me to figure out what to do about the documents. I asked Molho to explain why he refused to accept documents that set forth the demands of the Palestinians on each of the relevant issues. All previous negotiations had involved exchanges of documents; surely the government of Israel could not expect to negotiate and reach a peace agreement with the Palestinians if nothing were ever written down. Molho replied that there were several ministers in the Israeli cabinet who were opposed to negotiations with the Palestinians, in part because they regarded the positions taken by the Palestinians to be so extreme that it was pointless to engage on them. If he came into possession of these documents in these discussions he would, if asked, have to turn them over to any minister who requested them. He knew what was in the documents; they were virtually identical, in some cases precisely identical to those that the government of Israel had received in the earlier negotiations (except that the dates were changed from 2008 to 2010).IV Now, Molho argued, if the opposition ministers saw that the Palestinian positions were unchanged, it would confirm their view of Palestinian unreasonableness, and they would demand an end to these and any other negotiations. It was, as presented, a somewhat complicated argument, but I thought Molho was arguing that by not accepting the documents now he was keeping open the possibility of later direct negotiations in which the two sides could engage seriously.

  It is an understatement to say that Erekat was not persuaded. He rejected Molho’s argument as an example of the Israeli tactic of saying in public that they wanted direct negotiations while in private erecting insurmountable barriers to any serious negotiations. Since it was obvious that Molho was not going to accept the documents no matter what I or anyone else said, I told them that I would take all of the documents into my possession and decide how they could be most effectively used at an appropriate time in the future. The problem wasn’t that the Israelis didn’t know the Palestinian positions or the contents of the papers. The problem was that they did know the positions and regarded them as unacceptable, and they didn’t believe the Palestinians were willing to negotiate in a way the Israelis regarded as serious; it was the mirror image of the Palestinian belief that the Israelis were not serious about negotiations.

  In several interviews, Abbas claimed he could not understand why the Israelis had not received the documents. To buttress his argument he insisted that the current Israeli government had never presented him with “a map” setting forth proposed boundaries. I shook off the bickering and criticism as part of the highly charged political process in which we were engaged.

  In March 2010 Vice President Biden visited Jerusalem. We had been assured by Israeli officials that there would be “no surprises” during his visit. But on the very day of his arrival, the government announced the approval of 1,600 housing units in East Jerusalem. A storm of controversy ensued, then abated, but it had an effect.

  By the summer it was clear that the proximity talks were not going to yield progress. In July Netanyahu traveled to Washington to meet with the president and the secretary of state. He strongly urged the United States to press Abbas to enter into direct negotiations. Netanyahu told the president that if he and Abbas could speak face-to-face, without the burden of negotiating terms or gestures, he thought he could convince Abbas of his desire to end the conflict and the two could reach enough common ground for meaningful negotiations. The president agreed to try. The moratorium, while far from perfect, had resulted in some reduction in settlement construction activity. More significant, although no formal or public decision had been made by the government of Israel, in the aftermath of the Biden visit there was very little new housing activity in East Jerusalem; in fact for months there had been almost no new actions.

  On instruction from the White House and the State Department I met with Abbas and his leadership team and urged a resumption of direct talks. An intense effort followed, in which we received invaluable assistance from President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan. Abbas liked and trusted both. They not only urged Abbas to attend; they themselves promised to join him, and they did. Finally, although with obvious reluctance, Abbas agreed. But he had a significant condition. The moratorium had gone into effect the previous November and was due to expire at the end of September. He would meet with Netanyahu but would continue beyond September only if the moratorium were extended. That, he said, was “absolutely necessary.” I never received from Abbas or Erekat an explanation of how, in less than nine months, the moratorium had gone from “worse than useless” to “absolutely necessary.”

  They met four times: once in Washington, twice in Egypt, then the fourth and last time at the prime minister’s residence in Jerusalem. Except for a brief period during their first meeting, when Netanyahu and Abbas were alone, Secretary Clinton and I accompanied them in all of the meetings. The first meeting, in Washington, was largely ceremonial; the next two, in Egypt, were general in nature. Abbas wanted to launch immediately into the specifics of their disagreement on borders, a subject he had discussed with Olmert two years earlier. Netanyahu insisted on discussing security issues first. He did so, finally, in the fourth meeting, in Jerusalem. It was my intention to put borders on the agenda for the fifth meeting, so that each side would have had a substantive discussion on an issue of their choice at the outset of what we hoped would become a serious and sustained negotiation. But we never got to a fifth meeting.

  Abbas had begun and ended each of the four meetings by saying that he could not continue meeting beyond September if the moratorium was allowed to expire. In a separate discussion we tried hard to persuade the Israelis to agree to an extension, but they refused our request as politically impossible. Netanyahu believed that they had not received sufficient international credit for the first moratorium nor any real politica
l benefit in their dealings with the Palestinians. The Israelis were highly aggravated that Abbas had waited until the ninth month of a ten-month moratorium to agree to direct negotiations.

  The fourth and last meeting was, as noted earlier, devoted to the issue of Israel’s security. Netanyahu read from a long typewritten statement, in which he insisted that Israel Defense Forces would have to be stationed within any Palestinian state, along its eastern border, “for many decades.” He repeated that phrase several times, with increasing emphasis. Abbas categorically rejected the proposal. He said that IDF forces could remain within the Palestinian state only during a transition period, which he first said could be “two to four years” but later described as “one to three years.” He added, however, that he would accept on the Palestinian state’s boundary an international force for an indefinite period, and that force could be stationed around the entire boundary, not just along the Jordan River in the east.

  In this meeting the second climax of the document dispute occurred. Netanyahu repeated the Israeli position that no documents should be exchanged. This obviously angered Abbas, who immediately reached into his briefcase, pulled out a full set of the Palestinian position papers, and extended them to the prime minister. For a brief, silent moment, Netanyahu hesitated. Abbas, arm extended, looked directly at him, and their eyes locked; Secretary Clinton and I silently watched. Then Netanyahu reached out, took the documents, and laid them on the floor next to his chair. Later, when the meeting concluded, we all stood and shook hands. Abbas went into the next room, where he joined Erekat and the other members of his entourage who were waiting. They all walked out the front door to their waiting cars. Thus ended the direct talks, the moratorium, and the document dispute. I never learned what happened to the documents on the floor.

  Over the next few months the process sputtered to a close, and the Arab world fell further into disarray. My two years were up, and as winter came to a close I decided to leave. On April 5, 2011, I submitted my resignation to Secretary Clinton and to Denis McDonough, then the principal deputy national security advisor and now the president’s chief of staff. He asked me to stay briefly to effect a smooth transition, and I agreed. On May 19, I returned to my family and to private life.

  Of course my interest in Middle East peace remains high, and I continue to search for reasons for hope.

  The Palestinians’ internal divisions are a complicated matter that keeps getting even more complicated. In 2014 the Palestinian Authority and Hamas announced that they had agreed to form a unity government and schedule elections. These discussions had been going on for several years; similar announcements of reconciliation were made in 2011 and 2012 and had subsequently collapsed. The 2014 round was interrupted by Israeli opposition and the fighting in Gaza, and by a change in government in Egypt, where the current regime is hostile to the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. As of this writing it appears that the latest agreement on reconciliation also will fail. But the effort may be resumed. That could provide a political opening for Hamas to move away from its prior positions as well as open an avenue for meaningful negotiation.

  When Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the United States joined the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia in a statement calling for Hamas to commit to nonviolence, to recognize the state of Israel, and to accept previous peace agreements. Hamas has so far shown no inclination to accept or even move toward these principles, and there is no assurance it ever will. Yet, as happened in South Africa and Northern Ireland, and with the PLO itself, persistent efforts to wean such groups from armed resistance and into a political process has, on occasion, succeeded. And, Hamas has consistently reaffirmed its willingness to accept any agreement that Abbas were to conclude with Israel, provided that agreement is approved in a referendum of the Palestinian people.

  The interim Palestinian government proposed in 2014 was composed of technocrats, all of whom reportedly were committed to President Abbas’s position on nonviolence. It was accepted by the Quartet—the United States, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—but rejected by Israel. Israel has every right to be wary, but the government of Israel itself has a long history of negotiating with Hamas through intermediaries, including when Israel secured the release of the captured soldier Gilad Shalit and in cease-fire negotiations. The situation is complex, and the odds may be long, but the door to peaceful political negotiation should not be forever closed.

  I had many meetings separately with Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas, and, as noted, I was present during the four meetings between the two leaders in September 2010. I also had many discussions with other officials, on both sides, about the two leaders. From those experiences I reached the conclusion that Netanyahu does not believe that Abbas has the personal or political strength necessary to gain approval of an agreement with Israel. Abbas believes that Netanyahu is not sincere or serious about getting an agreement with the Palestinians and does only as much as he deems necessary to placate the United States. Since both men assume that negotiations will not succeed, neither has any incentive to take the political risks that will inevitably be required to make possible a peace agreement.

  If this analysis is accurate, the reluctance of the leaders is understandable. But it does not serve the immediate or long-term interests of the people they represent. I believe those interests—on both sides—will be served best by an agreement that accepts Israel’s existence and provides Israelis with reasonable and sustainable security behind defensible borders and at the same time creates a sovereign, independent, viable, demilitarized Palestinian state. That has been the basis for and objective of U.S. policy for many decades. I believe in and support that policy.

  Rebuilding trust is a daunting challenge, not only between political leaders but also between two peoples with a long and bitter history of conflict. But the long-term interests of both societies are jeopardized by their continuing inability to reach agreement. It makes no sense for Israel to continue in a virtual state of war with most of its neighbors in a region where population and turmoil are increasing. It makes no sense for the Palestinians to spend the next sixty years as they have spent the past sixty, under occupation without the freedom or dignity that comes with self-governance. Both have much to lose in the absence of an agreement and much to gain if they can live side by side in peace. And it is in the best interests of the United States to help them succeed.

  The process in which I engaged as U.S. envoy to the Middle East was largely contentious and disappointing, one quarrel and setback after another. In Northern Ireland there had been a few rays of hope and then a final burst of success. In the Middle East there was neither. From beginning to end it was an unsuccessful effort to bring together two leaders who share a deep, mutual mistrust. At the same time, I believe it is becoming increasingly clear to the leadership on both sides that the current situation is not sustainable and that both societies will be better served if they reach an agreement. To wait until another costly outbreak of violence impels them to act would be a tragic and unnecessary delay.

  The Israeli-Palestinian challenge will continue to confound American leaders in the coming years, as it has for many decades. As much as I wish it were otherwise, it appears unlikely to be resolved in the immediate future. Indeed, there are ominous signs that both societies are on the brink of giving up on the pursuit of a two-state solution, or any other form of agreement. Among Palestinians and other Arabs, Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are increasingly seen as out of touch and ineffective; in the absence of any progress toward a state, support is crumbling for their approach of nonviolence and peaceful negotiation. They are therefore likely to concentrate on seeking international support for an independent Palestinian state. That almost certainly will draw a rebuke from the United States and retaliation from Israel, driving the parties even further apart, at least in the short term. The Hamas alternative is armed resistance. But a full-scale outbreak in the West Bank would be
highly destructive for the Palestinians and a military and political nightmare for Israel.

  In Israel, the recent rain of rockets from Gaza and the growing sense of isolation have generated frustration at the perceived inability of others, especially the Europeans, to comprehend the difficulty of their situation and the righteousness of their cause. The consequence is a political context that is increasingly conducive to the settler movement and its allies, who steadily push the government toward actions that make any agreement with the Palestinians less likely, and ultimately impossible.

  Failure to make progress will be a disappointment for President Obama, who, despite the doubts on both sides, tried twice to bring about peace. Yet we must continue the effort because it is in our national interest and because, despite many failures of the past, this conflict, like every conflict, must inevitably end.

  But it will take more than U.S. effort. As difficult and distant as it now seems, given current trends, Israelis and Palestinians themselves must cultivate constituencies for peace. Both societies need leaders who are able to convince their people that compromise is not a weakness but a virtue necessary to secure the well-being of future generations; leaders who will act boldly to halt and reverse the descent into a new round of violence that will be terribly harmful to both societies and could spread into a wider regional conflict. Over a very long period of time both societies have endured fear, anxiety, many deaths, and much destruction. While they have many differences, they should have in common an overriding desire to avoid such negative and destructive consequences in the future. Israelis and Palestinians may not be able to live together but they should be able to live separately, side by side, in peace. Over time, hopefully, they may come to see each other not as enemies but as shared custodians of stability and of a potentially vibrant regional economy where both societies and cultures can thrive.