In truth, the victorious Confederate ironclads were in less than pristine condition. Jones, his broken arm in a sling, took command of the Alabama, and the heartbreakingly battered Virginia limped for Gosport with some 200 of the squadron’s wounded aboard. The severely handled prize Minnesota went with it. Semmes, his engines repaired, reported to Jones that his vessel was ready for combat, hiding the fact that long stints at the pumps were required each hour to keep Hart afloat, and that, despite the efforts of his engineer, Hart’s steam plant could offer only 12 knots at best. Anchoring the St Lawrence, its cannon manned by gunners rapidly shipped from Gosport, to block entry to the harbor at Fortress Monroe, Jones left two gunboats to support it and steamed with the remainder of his squadron around the Peninsula and into the York River. For four weeks, his squadron reinforced by a trickle of Confederate gunboats converted from captured Union transports, Jones blockaded the James Peninsula. Daily skirmishes with Union gunboats took a toll on both sides, but few supplies arrived for the trapped Union army, and even fewer men were successfully withdrawn from the peninsula. Virginia, its worst injuries barely repaired and its guns replaced, rejoined the squadron in ten days. Jones returned to its deck in time to face a Union fleet hastily recalled from a planned invasion of New Orleans and intent on breaking the blockade and extricating the hungry and demoralized Army of the Potomac. In exchange for his right eye, lost to a cutlass when desperate Union sailors actually boarded Virginia, Jones won the Second Battle of the Capes.31
Meanwhile, in the fertile Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, Confederate General Jackson smashed the Union forces arrayed against him once Stanton shifted regiments and even brigades from that arena to defend Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York from a feared invasion. Then he entrained his battle-tested corps to support the Confederate siegelines at Yorktown. The hurried recall of Union troops from the western fields of battle to the east allowed Confederate forces to recover from the bloody struggle at Shiloh Church in early April and regain Nashville. On April 30, Commodore Buchanan led two new ironclads and a score of wooden warships down the Mississippi from New Orleans and soundly defeated its Union blockaders. Wiring Richmond that “The Father of Waters again runs unvexed to the sea,” he then directed his vessels in a lightning campaign that saw all significant Union naval presence driven from the Gulf of Mexico.
On May 15, President Abraham Lincoln slumped at his desk. Two messages rested between his outstretched arms. One, a request from McClellan to be allowed to surrender his starving army to the Confederacy, noted that General Robert E. Lee (the replacement for General Joseph E. Johnston, wounded by a Union sharpshooter in front of the Yorktown lines) offered most generous terms. The other, delivered that morning by the ambassador from Great Britain, declared that Britain would soon move to recognize the Confederate States of America formally as a sovereign nation with all the rights thereof. Her majesty’s ambassador had advised the president that where Britain led, the remainder of Europe would soon follow. Further, Union interference with British trade into ports where, obviously, a blockade no longer existed, would be met with far more than words. Three days later, McClellan surrendered his army to General Lee and Fortress Monroe to Captain Catesby ap R. Jones of the ironclad Virginia.
Aftermath
On June 30, 1862, representatives signed the treaty that officially ended the brief Civil War and recognized the Confederate States of America as a sovereign nation in its own right. Ten years later, June 30 would become an official holiday in the Confederacy: Navy Day, in honor of the service that had contributed so much to establish the new nation. That particular day would never be celebrated in the old Union, where flags still fly at half-mast and 26 forever empty seats in the senate chambers are draped in black each June 30—a silent protest at what Mallory and his navy once accomplished.
The Reality
Stephen Mallory, though he did much in creating a navy for the Confederacy, did not perform the miracles needed to win independence for his homeland. Be thankful for that. Victory would have meant the continuation of the institution of slavery, an institution that the South would not have willingly abandoned for generations (if at all). Even now, the lingering remnants of the mentality created by that old evil erodes much slower than one could wish.
Sherman, in his letter to David Boyd, had the right of it. The greater resources and mechanical might of the North created a basis for victory almost impossible for the weaker Confederacy to overcome, while the blockade discouraged the importation of war materials desperately needed in the South. Add to that the disorganized and sometimes almost inexplicable actions of the Confederate state and national governments, and the miracle is that the rebellion continued into 1865. Nowhere was the disorganization of the Confederacy more apparent than in its attempts to construct a navy.
The Confederacy laid the keels for over 20 ironclads (in almost as many locations as there were warships built). Often constructed in cornfields instead of proper yards, this haphazard collection of vessels was meant to challenge the offensive might of the ever-strengthening Union Navy. Unsurprisingly, the challenge failed. Built of often sub-standard materials by unskilled labor, the ironclads were invariably underpowered. Strive as bravely as they might, the inexperienced crews of Confederate ironclads were unable to resist Northern incursions, especially those supported by concentrations of Union ironclads, much less break the blockade of Confederate ports.
Yet control of the sea offered the best chance for the South to win the Civil War. Its ports kept open for European imports and a denial of Union amphibious capability would have concentrated more resources in Southern armies. Perhaps with more resources, the talented commanders of Confederate armies could have won the key struggles ashore. Or, perhaps, had Mallory been a true Southern Themistocles, the Confederate States Navy could have won the war for them.
Bibliography
Denny, Robert E., The Civil War Years: A Day-by-Day Chronicle of the Life of a Nation (Sterling Publishing, New York, 1992).
Foote, Shelby, The Civil War: A Narrative, Fort Sumter to Perryville (Random House, New York, 1986).
Miller, Nathan, The U.S. Navy: A History, 3d ed. (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1997).
Morrill, Dan, The Civil War in the Carolinas (Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, Charleston, 2002).
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1894–1927).
Still, William N., Jr., Iron Afloat: The Story of the Confederate Armorclads (University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1985).
Symonds, Craig L., The Naval Institute Historical Atlas of the U.S. Navy (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995).
Notes
*1.
Norfolk Courier, April 18, 1862.
2.
As cited in Denny, The Civil War Years, pp. 19–20.
*3.
Letter from Angela S. Mallory to Stephen Mallory, March 21, 1861. Stephen R. Mallory Collection, Jones Library, CSA Naval Academy, New Bern, NC.
4.
A “Letter of Marque and Reprisal” allowed a civilian vessel to function as an auxiliary warship (or privateer) of the issuing nation within clearly defined parameters. Great Britain, with its far-flung maritime empire, felt that such civilian sailors were little better than pirates—especially after the War of 1812, during which American privateers had taken numerous prizes from the British merchant fleet. As a final act in the negotiations in Paris to end the Crimean War, European powers signed the Declaration of Paris of 1856, declaring privateering illegal in the eyes of signatory nations. Though the United States never approved the document, it did bow to international opinion. The Confederacy, on the other hand, issued a number of letters of marque—a grave error in initial foreign diplomacy that undermined its hope of international support.
*5.
Cabinet Notes, March 15, 1861, Jefferson Davis Presidential Library, Richmond, VA.
&n
bsp; *6.
Congressional Records, March 17, 1861, Government Archives, Richmond, VA.
*7.
In 482 BC, Themistocles convinced the Athenians to use silver from the new mines at Laurium to expand the Athenian fleet. Two years later, the new Athenian triremes formed the core of the fleet that defeated Persian invaders at the battle of Samos. Mallory obviously forgot the eventual fate of Themistocles (exiled in 471 after accusations of taking bribes) or, as a consummate politician, he would have used another example in his speech.
8.
Denny, The Civil War Years, p.32.
*9.
Sam Clemens, Stone Soup, Wooden Guns, and Ragged Fellows: Good Times in the Navy (Twain Press, Hannibal, 1876), 6–24.
*10.
Virginia State Papers, National Archives (Richmond), v. 12, series 111; P. T. Saurian, Intelligence Failures of the United States Navy (Naval Press, Washington, 1991), pp. 3–14, 53.
*11.
Norfolk Courier, April 20, 1861.
*12.
Billy Steele, Iron Afloat: Birth of the Confederate Ironclads (ECC Press, Greenville, NC, 1971), pp. 9–10.
13.
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of Rebellion, Ser. II, Vol. II, p. 51.
*14.
Wade Dudley, Alma Mater Dear!: A University at War (Beeler Press, Tuscaloosa, AL, 1999), p. 49.
*15.
The rapid buildup of Southern facilities seems amazing until one considers the availability of slave labor in the Deep South. Though used only for manual labor (skilled work, such as using turning lathes, was believed to “demoralize” slaves—i.e., to make them feel equal to free men and thus rebellious), the unwilling contribution of slaves played a major role in the establishment of the Confederacy as a nation.
*16.
Eventually, all of these state vessels would be incorporated into the Confederate Navy. Both Mallory and Jefferson considered them a drain on vital manpower resources.
*17.
New Orleans Picayune, June 6, 1861. The aggressive Buchanan, having resigned from the Union Navy in mid-May and arrived as senior officer commanding, New Orleans Station, on June 3, wasted no time in testing his new command. What the newspaper did not reveal, however, was that two of his ships suffered heavy damage in the attack while the third did not participate at all due to engine failure. Buchanan wrote to Mallory that “the crews served bravely, but with so little experience that they died bravely as well.” He also complained that his sidewheelers were far more vulnerable to propulsion damage than the screw-sloop and even the sailing sloop that he had, fortunately, overcome. Buchanan to Mallory, June 14, 1861, Captain’s Papers, Jones Library, CSA Naval Academy, New Bern, NC.
*18.
Steele, Iron Afloat, pp. 18–30.
*19.
As befit a fast ship, its very name, Hart (a stag, or male deer), evoked images of both speed and battle.
*20.
Steele, Iron Afloat, pp. 30–32.
*21.
On November 8, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes’s U.S.S. San Jacinto stopped and boarded the British steamer Trent, seizing Confederate diplomatic agents John Slidell and James M. Mason, as well as two members of their entourage. Public outcry in Great Britain at this abuse of their neutral flag led the British government to deliver several shiploads of previously ordered goods (including the engines) to the South under armed escort. This less than subtle posturing convinced Lincoln to act quickly to release the four men and to apologize formally for the incident.
*22.
The denizens of western Virginia scarcely resembled their slave-owning brethren in the east of that state. Given the opportunity by early Union successes, they seceded from secessionist Virginia and applied for statehood in the United States. Admitted to the Union after the end of the war (in June 1862), West Virginia’s stubborn residents lived up to their state motto, “Mountaineers are Always Free”—or at least so troublesome that Virginia let them go with small complaint.
*23.
F.A. Steddy, They Were Expendable: Confederate Raiders of the Civil War (Time Blythe Press, New York, 1941). The stodgy Steddy’s stilted studies do reveal that Rebel raiders seldom tried to return through the blockade; rather, they sold their vessels at Bermuda or Nassau, then took passage on blockade runners to return home.
*24.
Ibid., p. 113.
*25.
Conversion of the old United States required extensive reworking of the ship’s original bow, restructured and strengthened to withstand the explosive force of its own spar torpedoes as well as to carry a ram. Its internal space, far less capacious than that of the much larger Alabama, challenged the Southern engineers who installed the workings of a modern steam plant. The resulting warship was fast, deadly, and seaworthy, but it would prove to be a hot, crowded hell for its crew.
*26.
R. Butler, Hammer, Tongs, and a Twist: A Fighting Carpenter at Hampton Roads (Red Shirt Press, Richmond, VA, 1876).
*27.
The ensign also forgot to duck, and the resulting blast tossed him a considerable distance into the brackish water of the channel. The crew of Teaser fished him out an hour later. Palmer lived to be 102 years old and had an astounding reputation for punctuality for the last 86 years of his life.
*28.
From a speech given by Admiral Jones at the Confederate Naval Academy, May 21, 1881.
29.
Unless one has been on a simulated black powder era battlefield, it is difficult to imagine the cloud of smoke that surrounded naval battles of that period, especially in the early decades of steam power. Smoke from the large broadside armament of the day combined with that of coal and smoke from burning vessels to reduce visibility to near zero on a windless day. With wind, the constant replenishment of the smoke created artificial fogbanks, and made local visibility highly variable.
*30.
The account of the Second Battle of Hampton Roads is compiled from the numerous reports contained in the Naval Archives in Richmond, as well as the dozens of memoirs written by veterans from both nations.
*31.
Ironically, the failure of the British fleet in the First Battle of the Capes, during the American Revolution, led to the surrender of a British army at Yorktown, and to the emergence of a new nation.
3
“WHAT WILL THE
COUNTRY SAY?”
Maryland Destiny
David M. Keithly1
Following his victories in the summer campaign of 1862, at Cedar Mountain on August 9, at the Battle of Second Manassas on August 29–30, and Chantilly on September 1, General Robert E. Lee pondered the question how best to follow up the defeats inflicted upon the Federal forces. He hesitated to batter his veteran army against the formidable defenses of Washington, D.C., so skillfully constructed during the past year. The Army of Northern Virginia lacked the heavy artillery required for a siege and supplies for the troops were running low, notwithstanding the capture of large amounts of stores at Manassas Junction. The Northern response to the Confederate victory at the Battle of Second Manassas was analogous to the bitter defeat suffered in June 1861 on the identical field of conflict. The long roll of drums marked the deployment of yet further additional Federal troops to the various Union armies.
The Track of a Storm
At the onset of secession, press viewpoints in Great Britain exhibited considerable sympathy with the North. Newspaper editors initially supposed that the conflict on American soil involved slave manumission, a goal most Britons had advocated for decades. Yet, during the first year-and-a-half of war, the Lincoln administration was unable to capitalize on this weighty moral issue. The crucial border states of Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and Delaware, in which slavery still existed, would probably have been thrust out of the Union had the Federal government proclaimed it was waging war to free the slaves. For domestic political reasons, President Lincoln was thus left with little choice but to declare o
n various occasions that the North was not fighting for manumission but only for the preservation of the Union.
On the other hand, some members of the British nobility displayed a visceral animosity toward the North. Socially, the landed gentry had a close affinity to the plantation aristocracy of the American South. To cultured Europeans, those American Southerners whom they had met were for the most part to be regarded as gentlemen, in sharp contrast to the prototypical boastful and vulgar Yankees. To be sure, additional, somewhat more rational, explanations for the disapproving attitude of the British ruling class presented themselves also. Contempt for American institutions was in part a shroud for trepidation. Union victory would prompt the disenfranchised in Britain to appeal even more loudly for greater democratization, it was feared. Contesting democracy abroad was a means to disparage it at home, and thus the prevalent contentment on the part of the British gentry for the self-destruction of the United States should not be surprising. By the same token, the United States represented a formidable competitor, a waxing rival in various spheres and a potential threat to Canada and other British possessions.
Accordingly, British luminaries quickly gained an appreciation for the salient political issues, both domestic and foreign, associated with the conflict in North America. Men like Lord Robert Cecil and Beresford Hope harbored no illusions about the attendant high stakes, and lobbied the country’s governing class to avail itself of the golden opportunity that beckoned. Their best interests and hence Britain’s wellbeing would be served by buttressing the South, acquiring in the process a crucial ally. With Southern independence would come a rejuvenation of the British economy, and the collapse of the United States would in all likelihood thwart the pending domestic reform the aristocracy dreaded. Nurturing an innate distrust of republicanism, the British gentry often evinced such a revulsion against American professions of egalitarianism that many were willing to throw in their lot with the Confederate states, tarnished as they were with their “peculiar institution.”
Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War Page 9
