Seddon began the meeting by suggesting a massive move north into Kentucky, similar to the invasion that Bragg had initiated in 1862. Such a move, he felt, would outflank Nashville, force Grant out of Tennessee altogether and into a battle where he could be defeated. Once Grant had been dealt with, Longstreet could take all of Kentucky, opening the state for supply and recruits, and threaten Ohio, identical goals to Bragg’s purposes the previous year.17 The politician even suggested crossing into the Union state.
Longstreet objected, citing the problems Bragg had encountered in Kentucky and the lack of support for the South in the Bluegrass State. He also pointed out that Grant was no Don Carlos Buell. Longstreet knew Grant very well—they had been best friends at West Point and had served together in the Mexican War. “We cannot afford to underestimate him,” he told the others, “He will fight us every day and every hour until the end of the war.”18 He felt that Grant would be more likely to dig in and threaten his supply line than pull up stakes and follow. The others had to agree with Longstreet’s logic. Grant’s tenacity in overcoming obstacles and multiple failures finally to succeed in taking Vicksburg worried them.
Robert E. Lee concurred with his former subordinate, stating that the Confederacy was in no condition to take and hold new territory, especially hostile or even neutral ground. Citing massive Union manpower, he reminded Davis that over 120,000 militia had been mustered in July 1863 when John Morgan’s small force had invaded Indiana and Ohio. However, he felt the initiative had to be theirs. The Confederate forces should “alarm and embarrass [the enemy] to some extent and thus prevent his undertaking anything of magnitude against us.”19
The plan resulting from the meeting called for Longstreet to pre-empt any Union move by feinting an advance into Kentucky to disguise the real goal of flanking and taking Nashville. For that purpose, he received two more divisions from Johnston. In addition to the reinforcements, Longstreet, soured by Polk’s failure near Decherd, asked that William Hardee come back east with the new troops to replace Polk. Forrest’s command also went to Mississippi at that general’s request after he argued that he could be more effective there. More to the point, though, he did not get along with his cavalry “superior” Joe Wheeler.
As spring approached, Longstreet had essentially four corps and eleven divisions. Hardee commanded the divisions of Major Generals Benjamin F. Cheatham, Thomas C. Hindman and A.E Stewart (17,000 men) at Shelbyville. Hood commanded the divisions of McLaws, Brigadier General Evander M. Law and Walker (19,500 troops) at Wartrace. D.H. Hill commanded the divisions of Major General John C. Breckinridge, Cleburne and Liddell (16,500 men) at Manchester. Major Generals Carter L. Stevenson’s and William W. Loring’s divisions stayed with Longstreet in Tullahoma. On either flank was one of Wheeler’s cavalry divisions, each with about 3,500 horsemen.
For the Union, the winter of 1863–64 was a time of reassessment as well. Reversals in Tennessee had muted the euphoria of the mid-year advances and victories. Just when it looked like the South might be collapsing, Longstreet’s advance showed that expectation to be premature. It gave Lincoln’s political opponents more ammunition.
Lincoln’s overall goals had not changed: build up loyal governments, arm freed Southern slaves, and defeat the south politically and psychologically with military and economic pressure.20 But one immediate political requirement focused on East Tennessee. The Unionists in the region had emerged when Burnside’s forces took Knoxville and the surrounding territory. In fact they had emerged with a vengeance against their pro-Confederacy neighbors who had subjugated them for three years. Burnside’s retreat and the return of Confederate forces had turned the tables and a fratricidal bloodbath resulted. Lincoln had pledged much of his political future on restoring East Tennessee and its loyal inhabitants to the Union and he meant to see that pledge upheld.
With the political necessities identified, Grant and Meade met with General-in-Chief Henry Halleck to discuss their plans. Both field commanders were experienced enough to accept the limitations they were facing. First, they operated on exterior lines, making coordination slower than for their opponent, who would be able to shift troops by rail. Second, annihilating an enemy army in battle appeared to be nearly impossible because of the power of the defensive and the constraints of moving at the same speed as a retreating enemy—slower if the railroads had to be repaired. Grant’s success in smashing Pemberton’s army at Vicksburg stood more as a function of the Southern mistake of being trapped against a river than Grant’s maneuvers. With these factors in mind, Grant favored a strategy of destroying the South’s logistical base with simultaneous advances on several fronts to stretch the Rebel resources. Any Confederate troop shift would weaken their lines somewhere, allowing the Union to advance. Even if a Union army was pushed back, the destruction it left in its wake would be beneficial to the Union cause. His recommendations stressed this approach.
Halleck disagreed, stating that they had not been able to defeat a Southern army completely as yet and would not be able to if they spread their resources. He told both men to concentrate on defeating their opposing armies.
Meade’s responsibility would be Lee’s army, along with the security of Washington and Maryland. He would try to maneuver to advantage and hurt the Army of Northern Virginia if at all possible. He had 100,000 men, organized in three corps, in his Army of the Potomac to work with.
Grant had Longstreet’s army as his primary target, along with responsibility to support Major General James Schofield, who replaced the cashiered Burnside, in his bid to retake East Tennessee. Schofield’s XXIII and IX Corps consisted of 30,000 troops, with 3,000 cavalry. Under his direct command, Grant had his favorite lieutenant, William Sherman and three corps of the Army of the Tennessee. Major General John Logan commanded four divisions of XV Corps (12,200 men); Major General Greenville Dodge commanded XVI Corps with two divisions and 10,700 men and Major General Frank Blair commanded XVII Corps with two divisions and 8,700 men. Most of these troops were stationed near Columbia, Tennessee, on the Duck River, threatening Longstreet’s left flank.
Grant also commanded Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland. The two generals did not particularly like one another, a strained relationship stemming from the Mississippi campaigns when Halleck played the two against each other. Their personalities were far different as well. While both stood solid on defense, Thomas tended to be slower and more methodical than Grant in offensive operations. Grant improvised with whatever he had on hand to do the job. Thomas would decide what was needed to do the job and would not budge until he had it. Grant had been in favor of removing Thomas as well as Rosecrans from command following the retreat from Chattanooga, but he realized the depths of the army’s admiration for their Rock of a general who had “saved” them at Chickamauga.21
Under Grant, Thomas commanded three corps: Major General John M. Palmer’s XIV Corps with three divisions and 22,700 men, Major General Gordon Granger’s IV Corps with three divisions and 20,500 men, and Hooker’s XX Corps with three divisions and 20,600 men. These three corps spread out with divisions covering the important gaps. Nearly 9,000 cavalry supported both Sherman and Thomas. Major General John Buford arrived in late winter after recovering from pneumonia to assume command of the three cavalry divisions. He had proved his worth on the first day at Gettysburg when his division stopped Lee long enough for Union infantry to close up.
The Dance Begins
Union troops opened the ball early in February with a raid into Mississippi, targeting the town of Meridian. In early March, another 40,000 Union troops began moving up the Red River in Louisiana, supported by naval forces, with the goal of capturing cotton. Confederate forces attacked the vanguard at Mansfield, and despite numerical superiority the Union withdrew. And on May 4, 1864, Meade sent his Army of the Potomac across the Rapidan River and into the dense and tangled woods known as the Wilderness. Lee’s hard marching troops met him there and held on against multiple assaults. Over the next week marches and co
unter-marches, interspersed with bitter clashes, failed to break through the Confederates. The armies suffered another 30,000 combined casualties during the battle.
In the west, Grant had planned to coordinate his advance with Meade’s movement forward. His plan: pin Longstreet’s troops (and attention) to the Highland Rim Gaps and move Sherman’s troops against the Confederate left from Columbia. But Longstreet moved first.
On May 1, 1864, D.H. Hill began moving his corps from Manchester toward McMinnville, while Hood’s corps replaced him. To cover Hood’s redeployment, Longstreet moved onto the Wartrace lines with Stevenson’s division. Wheeler moved north with Martin’s cavalry division with the goal of advancing through Sparta and on to Carthage. Longstreet hoped Wheeler’s troopers would make Grant think he was attempting a major flanking attack on Nashville. Grant did in fact delay his response when word of the Confederate troop movements reached him.
A week later battle erupted in various locales. Hardee sent Cheatham’s division against the Union defenders at Guy’s Gap in a spirited demonstration. The battle got out of hand, though, when the Confederates actually broke through into the fortifications, only to have the Union reserves counterattack heavily. Caught on the wrong side of the fortifications, Brigadier General George Maney’s brigade was savaged before it could withdraw. Further east, Law’s division demonstrated against Hoover Gap, but neither side suffered much in a very controlled fight.
To the north Wheeler charged through Carthage, raising havoc in the town and generating panicked telegraph signals of a “massive Reb attack” going out to other stations in Tennessee and Kentucky. Confederate sympathizers soon warned Wheeler about Union cavalry approaching. Wheeler traded charge and counter-charge with Brigadier General Kenner Garrard’s cavalry division, but ran afoul of Wilder’s Lightning Brigade. The brigade’s repeating rifles shredded Wheeler’s charge, wounding the Confederate leader and killing division commander William Martin. The arrival of John Buford and Brigadier General Edward M. McCook’s division of cavalry sealed the fight and sent Wheeler’s decimated troopers into flight.
But D.H. Hill emerged from the wooded hills of the Highland Rim to surround the village of Smithville and caught its garrison, the 52d Indiana Volunteer Regiment, by surprise. Clearly outnumbered, the 52d’s commander, Colonel Zalmon S. Main, did what he could to delay the Confederates by arguing surrender terms with Hill. Cavalry vedettes spurred outward to warn Grant and the rest of the Union force.
Grant reacted by moving two divisions from Granger’s corps northward to extend his line and cover the eastern approach toward Nashville. News of the attacks at Carthage and Smithville made him assume that Nashville was indeed the target. He also saw an opportunity in the Confederate action and sent Sherman orders to start moving toward Shelbyville.
However, Longstreet had no real intention of attacking Nashville, as tempting a political target as it might be. Sympathizers had given him detailed information on its fortifications and he realized the city was too strong for him to attack directly. So, after taking Smithville and sending Breckinridge’s division toward Alexandria to continue the diversion, Hill turned with Liddell’s and Cleburne’s troops southwest toward Woodville, where Granger’s remaining division, the 1/IV under Brigadier General William Grose, guarded the McMinnville road. Hood with two of his three divisions moved on the lone division as well. When the two forces joined up, they would attack toward Murfreesboro, flanking and uncovering the Gap defenses as they went and allowing more Confederate troops to join them. Longstreet reasoned if he could get into Murfreesboro and destroy the supplies there, any Union move would be severely disrupted.
Unfortunately, terrain and weather delayed Hood’s march over the rugged terrain so Hill arrived first and began skirmishing with Grose’s troops. Outnumbered already, the Union general started his withdrawal before Hood joined up. The division pulled back and joined Hooker’s 1/XX under Brigadier General Alpheus S. Williams, digging in near Peak’s Hill, ten miles east of Murfreesboro.
George Thomas arrived to take command of the two divisions, intending to slow the Confederates and buy time for Grant to concentrate more forces. On May 17, Hill and Hood, now with Longstreet in direct command, launched their attack, pitting 20,000 troops against the Union’s 13,000. Hood’s troops were tired from their arduous march, which disrupted the coordination of the attack and allowed Thomas’s troops to hold throughout the day. The 2/1/IV’s epic stand on the Union left aided the defense by holding off Cleburne’s whole division.22 As dusk fell, Confederate numbers began to tell and the two Union divisions fell back toward their supply depot.
Impatiently, Longstreet ordered his two corps out of their post-battle camps early to press the enemy hard the next day. At mid-morning, May 18, the four Confederate divisions, now numbering less than 18,000, ran headlong into the new Union line along Cripple Creek. Thomas had been busy, reinforcing the 1/XX and 1/IV and their remaining 10,000 troops with the 3/XX under Major General Daniel Butterfield, pulled out of Hoover Gap, and the 2/XIV under a Union brigadier general named Jefferson Davis. The two new units added 14,000 troops to the Union total. Longstreet’s initial attack was stopped and he did not press the assault, knowing full well, he had no men to spare. But Davis’s fresh troops, screaming the battle cry of “Chattanooga!” did not let him disengage cleanly. The Union counterattack forced the Confederates back, but suffered heavy casualties in doing so. Fighting raged until night fell.
To the north of the battle site, Granger’s two divisions had engaged Breckinridge, who held a line along the Clear Fork to the east of Alexandria. Grant himself ordered Granger to attack. Inexplicably, the corps commander got himself fully involved in the preliminary artillery barrage, even going so far as to take charge of a single cannon and direct its fire while two divisions of infantry stood idle. Grant waited for something to happen, then rode to find out the source of the delay. Finding Granger at his gun, the commander snapped, “If you will leave that gun to its captain and take command of your Corps, it will be better for all of us.”23
Once it got moving, the Union attack by Brigadier General John Newton’s and Thomas J. Wood’s divisions pushed Breckinridge back easily despite the terrain. The Kentuckian withdrew and moved south, marching through the night to rejoin Longstreet. The arrival of Breckinridge let the Confederate commander know he faced two more Union divisions on his flank and he made the sensible decision to withdraw from the battlefield. When the Union forces stood to the following morning, it was to face abandoned Confederate breastworks.
Grant, joining Thomas at noon, ordered a pursuit, but Thomas took his time to sort his troops out and get them in motion. By the time he approached the Gaps, Longstreet had withdrawn through them, leaving a division at Woodbury and at Hoover Gap to hold the Union out. Thomas decided not to attempt to force the issue but Grant ordered an attack anyway. Hooker’s 3/XX moved forward and ran into defenders commanded by Patrick Cleburne. In two hours of fighting, Butterfield’s troops made no headway while losing more that 500 men in the process. Cleburne’s losses were fewer than 200.
With the abortive action at Hoover Gap on May 19, Longstreet’s offensive and what came to be called the Second Battle of Murfreesboro drew to a close. He had failed to take the Union supply depot, but had disrupted Grant’s plans for an advance. Both sides lost heavily; Longstreet some 11,000 of his 53,000 and Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland, 14,000 of 63,000. But the respite gained by disrupting Grant proved minimal. Elsewhere Union forces stayed on the move. The following day, as Cleburne was holding off Hooker, Longstreet had to dispatch Stevenson’s division from Wartrace and Loring’s from Tullahoma to aid Simon Buckner in East Tennessee.
Reinforcing Buckner created a major gamble for Longstreet because, while he engaged Thomas and Grant, Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee had advanced from Columbia toward Longstreet’s left flank, opposed only by John Kelly’s Rebel cavalry. The western troops advanced to within 20 miles of Hardee’s headquarters at Shelb
yville. Fortunately, Sherman was not advancing along a railroad, which limited his supply to vulnerable wagon trains. Confederate cavalry and guerrillas did their best to impede the advance. Grant finally halted Sherman at Lewisburg while Thomas reformed his army after their battles.
The Battle of the Gaps
A frustrated and impatient U.S. Grant finally saw his advance against Longstreet begin on June 20. Despite repeated urgings, George Thomas did not begin moving until he believed the Army of the Cumberland ready, which included replacing all the casualties incurred during Longstreet’s May attacks. All in all some 90,000 Union troops prepared to move. Longstreet could muster some 49,000, having made up only half his losses.
Grant’s plan stayed similar to the one that he had chosen in May. Buford’s cavalry would attack from the north, moving with a single division from IV Corps toward McMinnville. The rest of IV Corps, now commanded by Major General David Stanley, would demonstrate against the Confederate line in Hoover Gap. Hooker’s XX Corps would also feint against Liberty Gap to make Longstreet think the attack from the north was the main assault. Once those attacks began to develop, Sherman would advance on Shelbyville with Palmer’s full XIV Corps assaulting out of Guy’s Gap against Hardee’s flank. Grant fully expected Sherman’s and Palmer’s 50,000 troops to take Shelbyville and roll up the Confederate line. Longstreet held Liberty and Hoover Gaps with brigades in multiple lines and erected fortifications at the exits of Bell Buckle and Guy’s Gap to contain any Union excursion. He had no real reserve for this battle—Stevenson and Loring were still in East Tennessee with Buckner.
Dixie Victorious: An Alternate history of the Civil War Page 25
