by Tamim Ansary
Table of Contents
Title Page
CAST OF CHARACTERS
Introduction
PART I: AFGHANISTAN BECOMES A COUNTRY
Chapter 1 - Founding Father
Chapter 2 - Ahmad Shah’s Afghanistan
Chapter 3 - Farangis on the Horizon
Chapter 4 - Between the Lion and the Bear
Chapter 5 - Auckland’s Folly
Chapter 6 - The Second Coming of Dost Mohammed
Chapter 7 - Eight or Ten Good Years
Chapter 8 - Interrupted Again
PART II: ONE COUNTRY, TWO WORLDS
Chapter 9 - A Time of Blood and Iron
Chapter 10 - Starting Fresh
Chapter 11 - King of the Radicals
Chapter 12 - King’s Law Versus God’s Law
Chapter 13 - Things Fall Apart
PART III: KABUL RULES
Chapter 14 - After the Storm
Chapter 15 - Nonaligned Nation
Chapter 16 - Development, No Brakes
Chapter 17 - The Democracy Era
Chapter 18 - Rise of the Left
Chapter 19 - Change by Decree
Chapter 20 - The Soviet Occupation
PART IV: OLD AFGHANISTAN ERUPTS
Chapter 21 - The Mujahideen
Chapter 22 - Cold War Endgame
Chapter 23 - From Horror to Chaos
Chapter 24 - Out of the Camps
Chapter 25 - Taliban Versus Mujahideen
Chapter 26 - Al Qaeda
Chapter 27 - America Enters the Picture
PART V: THE STRUGGLE RESUMES
Chapter 28 - The Bonn Project
Chapter 29 - Kabul Spring
Chapter 30 - The Persistence of Trouble
Chapter 31 - Drugs and Corruption
Chapter 32 - Talibanism
Chapter 33 - The Tipping Point
Chapter 34 - Obama’s Surges
Chapter 35 - All That Glitters
Postscript - The Big Picture
Acknowledgments
NOTES
GLOSSARY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
Copyright Page
Afghanistan
Night and day our people’s lamentations reached the skies
and no one asked “Whose voice is that, uttering those cries?”
KHALILULLAH KHALILI
FROM “HOUSE OF LAMENTATION”
CAST OF CHARACTERS
Abdul Haq Pushtoon Mujahideen leader, killed by the Taliban 2001.
Abdul Majid Zabuli Afghan entrepreneur, founded National Bank.
Abdul Rashid Dostum Uzbek leader, affiliated with both Communists and Mujahideen.
Abdul Rasool Sayyaf Prominent Islamist, head of a major Mujahideen party.
Abdullah Abdullah Ahmad Shah Massoud’s top aide, presidential candidate 2004, 2009.
Ahmad Shah Baba Founder of the Afghan empire, first Durrani king, head of the Sadozai clan, “father” of Afghanistan, ruled 1747–1773.
Ahmad Shah Massoud Military commander of the Mujahideen party Jamiat Islam, minister of defense 1994–1996.
Ahmad Zahir Influential Afghan pop singer of the 1960s and ’70s, often called “the Elvis Presley of Afghanistan.”
Alexander Burnes Macnaghten’s political agent in Kabul, 1839–1841.
Amir Abdu’Rahman, “the Iron Amir” Dost Mohammed’s grandson, Sher Ali’s nephew, reigned 1880–1901.
Amir Amanullah Son of Habibullah, grandson of Abdu’Rahman, ruled Afghanistan 1919–1929.
Amir Habibullah Abdu’Rahman’s son and successor, reigned 1901–1919.
Amir Sher Ali Son and successor of Dost Mohammed, ruled twice: 1863–1866, 1868–1879.
Babrak Karmal Afghan Communist president, 1980–1986, headed Parcham faction of the PDPA.
Bachey Saqao (Habibullah Kalakani) Tajik bandit, deposed Amanullah, reigned February to September 1929.
Burhanuddin Rabbani Islamist professor, founder and head of Mujahideen party Jamiat-i-Islam, president of Afghanistan 1994–1996, assassinated 2011.
Charkhi family Staunch allies of Amanullah, crushed by the Musahibbans after the fall of Amanullah.
Dost Mohammed the Great First king of the Mohammedzai clan, reigned twice: 1826–1839, 1843–1863.
Durranis Ahmad Shah Baba’s tribe, Durrani monarchs ruled Afghanistan from 1746–1978 except for the nine-month reign of Habibullah Kalakani (Bachey Saqao).
Frederic Roberts Commanded British forces in the Second Anglo-Afghan War, 1878–1880.
Ghilzais Major Afghan tribal confederation, long-standing rivals of the Durranis.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Radical Islamist, founder and head of Hezb-i-Islam.
Hafizullah Amin Khalq Party leader, architect of the 1978 coup, Taraki’s right-hand man, president of Afghanistan September to December, 1979.
Hamid Karzai President of Afghanistan, 2004–2014.
Hashim Khan Nadir Shah’s brother and prime minister, ruled Afghanistan from behind the throne 1933–1946.
Hazrats of Shor Bazaar Revered leading members of the religious Mujadeddi family.
Hezb-i-Islam Islamist party founded and led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
ISI (InterServices Intelligence) Pakistani military intelligence agency through whom the United States funneled arms and money to the Mujahideen.
Ivan Vitkevich Russian agent in Kabul 1837–1838, claimed to be the czar’s envoy.
Jalaludin Haqqani Prominent Mujahideen warlord of the 1980s, affiliated with the Taliban after 2002.
Jamaluddin-i-Afghan Radical Islamic modernist intellectual, Sher Ali’s tutor.
Jamiat-i-Islam Islamist party led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Khalq One faction of PDPA after the party split in 1967.
Lord (George Eden) Auckland Governor general of India 1836–1842, launched first British invasion of Afghanistan, 1838.
Lord (Edward Bulwer) Lytton Governor general of India 1876–1880, launched second British invasion of Afghanistan 1878.
Louis Napoleon Cavagnari Headed up British mission in Kabul, 1879.
Mahmoud Tarzi Prominent modernist intellectual at Amir Habibullah’s court.
Malalai Iconic Afghan heroine, rallied the troops at Maiwand.
Malalai Joya Feminist activist, elected to Afghan Parliament 2004.
Massouma Esmatey-Wardak Pioneering feminist intellectual, head of Afghan Women’s Council, 1979–1990.
Mohammedzais Dost Mohammed’s clan, the royal branch of the Durranis, ruled Afghanistan 1826–1978.
Mujaddedis Noted religious family.
Mujahideen Islamic resistance groups who fought the Soviets in the 1980s.
Mullah Akhtar Osmani Prominent Talibanist insurgent and drug lord in Helmand province, killed by NATO 2007.
Mullah Baradur Leading Talibanist insurgent, southern Afghanistan, arrested and imprisoned by Pakistan in 2010.
Mullah Dadullah Insurgent leader of southern Afghanistan, associated with Taliban, killed 2007.
Mullah Farooq Insurgent leader in Ghazni Province, active after 2002.
Mullah Omar Reclusive one-eyed cleric considered to head up the Taliban.
Musahibbans Ruling family of Afghanistan 1929–1978, descended from Dost Mohammed’s brother.
Nadir Shah Head of the Musahibban family, king of Afghanistan 1929–1933, won military victories against the British in the Third Anglo-Afghan War.
Najibullah, “the Ox” Member of Parcham, head of the secret police organization KhAD, president of Afghanistan 1988–1992.
Nasee
rullah Babar Pakistan interior minister under Benazir Bhutto, one architect of the Taliban.
Northern Alliance Confederation of Mujahideen parties opposed to the Taliban; organized by Ahmad Shah Massoud.
Nur Mohammed Taraki Afghan Communist president 1978–1979, head of Khalq faction of the PDPA.
Osama Bin Laden Radical Jihadist, founder of al-Qaeda.
Parcham One faction of the PDPA after the party split in 1967.
PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) Afghanistan’s main Communist Party, founded in 1965.
Qasim Fahim Led Northern Alliance after Ahmad Shah Massoud’s death.
Queen Soraya Tarzi’s daughter, Amanullah’s wife, leading Afghan feminist.
Quetta Shura Taliban leaders loyal to Mullah Omar, operating from Quetta, Pakistan after 2002.
Sadozais Ahmad Shah Baba’s clan, a branch of the Durranis. Sadozai kings ruled from 1747 to 1826.
Sardar Ayub Sher Ali’s son, beat the British at the Battle of Maiwand.
Sardar Daoud Nadir Shah’s nephew, ruled Afghanistan as prime minister 1953–1963, and then as president 1973–1978.
Sardar Na’eem Nadir Shah’s nephew, foreign minister 1953–1963.
Shah Mahmoud Nadir Shah’s brother, ruled as prime minister, 1950–1953.
Shah Shuja Ahmad Shah’s grandson, reigned twice (1803–1809, 1839–1842). Installed by the British in 1839.
Sher Agha Mujadeddi Leading opponent of Amanullah’s reforms in the 1920s.
Siddiq Barmaq Filmmaker, directed the film Osama.
Wazir Akbar Khan Son of Dost Mohammed; leading Afghan general during First Anglo-Afghan War, 1839–1842.
William Hay Macnaghten Headed the British mission in Kabul, 1839–1841.
Yaqub Khan Sher Ali’s son, installed as king by the British, 1879.
Zahir Shah Nadir Shah’s son, king of Afghanistan 1929–1973.
Zalmay Khalilzad Afghan neoconservative intellectual and diplomat, advisor to the Reagan and Bush administrations on Afghan affairs.
INTRODUCTION
FIVE TIMES IN THE LAST TWO CENTURIES, SOME GREAT POWER HAS TRIED to invade, occupy, conquer, or otherwise take control of Afghanistan. Each intervention has led to a painful setback for the intervening power, and the curious thing is, these interventions have all come to grief in much the same way and for much the same reasons—as if each new power coming into Afghanistan has vowed to take no lessons from its predecessors.
The British invaded Afghanistan in 1839, suffered a disaster, and yet invaded the country again some forty years later only to make nearly the same mistakes. The predecessor from whom these folks failed to learn was themselves! Forty years later still, a third war broke the British grip on the country entirely. Sixty years after that, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and ended up in the same tar pit as the British. Now, the United States and NATO are mired in Afghanistan, and the familiar patterns have emerged again.
What accounts for this historical amnesia?
I think back to an interchange I had in Kazakhstan a couple of years ago. I was there to promote a book I had written about world history as seen through Islamic eyes, but, everywhere I went, the conversation quickly narrowed down to Afghanistan—which was natural, I supposed, for I was an American citizen born and raised in Afghanistan, and the US intervention in my original homeland was hitting a critical stage just then. The topic had, however, a special urgency for Kazakhs, as I came to realize, because their country had been part of the Soviet Union, and many of the men in my audience had been in Afghanistan with the Soviet army of occupation during the 1980s.
One open-ended question kept coming up. How would I compare the US involvement in Afghanistan to the Soviet one? I gave the answer I had given often in America: I saw disturbing parallels. The United States seemed to be sinking into the same morass as the Soviets. The United States had made commitments it could not easily keep for practical reasons and could not easily back out of for political reasons. The United States was squandering lives and money in Afghanistan without being able to explain exactly why. The United States was able to control the cities but could not seem to quell a rural insurgency carried out by people who believed themselves to be acting in defense of Islam.
This answer failed to satisfy. One guy, I recollect, kept pressing me for follow-ups with questions so vague, I couldn’t tell what he wanted. Finally I said, “Look: I can see you’ve got some answer of your own in mind. What am I not seeing?”
“You keep talking about the similarities,” he complained. “What about the differences?”
“What differences? Tell me.”
“Well, sir, we went into Afghanistan because we were invited. Afghans were in trouble and they turned to a neighbor for help. We didn’t just send troops, we sent expert advisors in to help the progressive forces of the country. With you Americans, it’s just a military invasion. That seems like a pretty big difference to me.”
I could only shake my head and sigh. “Really? You think the Soviets went into Afghanistan because they were invited? To help progressives save the country from reactionaries? In that case you’ve just articulated another parallel between the US and the Soviet involvements, because that’s pretty much how many Americans would describe what we’re doing in Afghanistan today. Afghans needed help, the United States came to drive out the thugs, not to conquer Afghans, and the United States is still there today to support development and bring about progressive change.”
The whole interaction got me to thinking about how the story from the outside looking in contrasts with the story from the inside looking out. From the inside, the various foreign powers and their intentions seem pretty much the same. Out in the countryside, where the fighting is hot right now, the insurgents make scant distinction between the Americans, the Russians, and the British.
From the outside perspective, it is Afghanistan that seems never changing, Afghanistan that presents ever the same challenge, the same terrain of rugged mountains, burning deserts, and endless steppes, the same warlike people who are always thought to be religious, xenophobic, and “tribal”—the very word conjuring up images of turbans, beards, robes, scimitars, and horses, as if membership in a tribe precludes wearing a three-piece suit or playing in a heavy metal band.
Actually, Afghans have a story of their own, the story of a zigzag journey toward some end point despite regular interruptions by foreign interventions. And what is this Afghan story apart from its many interruptions?
There is a game called buzkashi that is played only in Afghanistan and the central Asian steppes. It involves men on horseback competing to snatch a goat carcass off the ground and carry it to each of two designated posts while the other players, riding alongside at full gallop, fight to wrest the goat carcass away. The men play as individuals, each for his own glory. There are no teams. There is no set number of players. The distance between the posts is arbitrary. The field of play has no boundaries or chalk marks. No referee rides alongside to whistle plays dead and none is needed, for there are no fouls. The game is governed and regulated by its own traditions, by the social context and its customs, and by the implicit understandings among the players. If you need the protection of an official rule book, you shouldn’t be playing.
Two hundred years ago, buzkashi offered an apt metaphor for Afghan society. The major theme of the country’s history since then has been a contention about whether and how to impose rules on the buzkashi of Afghan society. Over these same centuries, however, Afghan territory has also provided the field of play for another game entirely, what British author Rudyard Kipling disingenuously called “the Great Game,” which involves world superpowers tussling for strategic position. Like all jockeying among sovereign nations, this too is a game without rules and it is not about Afghanistan per se; the stakes are global. Afghanistan is involved only because it happens to be situated on the line of scrimmage.
Inevitably, when two unrelated games are in progress on the same field, the play
ers crash into each other and the action gets intertwined. This has been happening in Afghanistan since the early days of the nineteenth century. Each game affects and complicates the other, but if you don’t realize there are two different games going on, the action is apt to seem inexplicable.
The great power interventions in Afghanistan truly make a compelling story, to be sure; but the intervened-upon have a story of their own as well, which keeps unfolding between interventions as well as during. In this story the interventions are not the main event but interruptions of the main event. And if the foreign interventions tend to follow the same course, it’s partly because they keep interrupting the same story, a story that never quite gets resolved before the next intervention disrupts the progress made.
This is not to rehash the old “graveyard of empires” lament, the conventional wisdom that great-power interventions in Afghanistan are doomed to fail because this place is impossible to conquer. The tough terrain and the fractious people do present a special challenge to would-be conquerors, and yet Afghanistan has in fact been conquered many times. The Aryans did it three or four thousand years ago, which is why this area was originally called Ariana. The Persians conquered this country in ancient times, which is why Persian (a.k.a. Farsi, a.k.a. Dari) is the lingua franca of Afghanistan, spoken at least as a second language by 90 percent of the people. The Greeks conquered it, which is why Hellenic kingdoms flourished here for two centuries and green-eyed blonds still sometimes pop up in pockets of the country. Even Buddhists conquered this territory, which is why the unique art style known as Greco-Buddhist originated and flourished only here.
The Arabs conquered Afghanistan, which is why 99 percent of Afghans are now Muslims. The Turks conquered Afghanistan, again and again. The Mongols swept across this land, and it didn’t prove to be the graveyard of their empire—quite the opposite: they made this land a graveyard for countless Afghans. In the fifteenth century, a Turko-Mongol conqueror took over Kabul just before driving on into India to found the Moghul Empire. Afghanistan is not really impossible to conquer. It’s just that all the successful conquerors are now called “Afghans.”
