TO J. M., ESQ. * * * * * * * *, STAFFORDSHIRE.
DEAR SIR,
YOU request from me, with infinitely more importunity than the thing is worth, a copy of the short comparison between Mr. Fox’s India Bill and Mr. Pitt’s, which I read in my place in the House of Commons in the last day’s debate upon the Declaratory Act. I now send it to you, with a number of notes or observations, which I have been induced to add to it, from a desire of complying more fully with what I conceive to be your object in asking for the paper. I have been led into more length than I intended on the subject, and this must be my apology for not having obeyed your commands sooner.
You will perceive, however, that I have not, in these remarks, paid your judgment so ill a compliment as to have endeavoured to engage your attention by laboured arguments; still less by any attempt at ornament. I have endeavoured merely to be intelligible, and to confine the illustrations I adopt, to facts. If, upon the whole, you should be of opinion that these papers contain a fair statement of the true meaning of the two Bills, and some just comments upon that meaning, they are at your disposal to be put into any person’s hands you please, or to be given to the public, if it is thought worth while to do so.
The comparison itself I wrote in the House of Commons during the debate, from feeling it, I confess, a teazing circumstance to hear gentlemen of the most respectable abilities day after day arguing upon, and drawing parallels between, the provisions of the two Bills, upon which it was perfectly obvious they had not condescended to bestow any very minute degree of attention: and conceiving it to be no very difficult task to reduce the discussion to a plain and concise statement of fact. With regard to Mr. Fox’s Bill, I do venture peremptorily to assert, that there never was a legislative measure so little examined, so generally misunderstood, and so confidently misrepresented.
You acknowledge yourself to be one of those who have been in some degree of error on the subject; and you confess that you now begin to see the measure itself, as well as the conduct of those who opposed it, in a new point of view; and that you meet with many who confess the same. Nay, some even of those who were formerly most violent on this topic, have in your hearing acknowledged, you say, (and you seem to expect me to triumph in the intelligence), that “Mr. Pitt’s Bill is very like, if not quite as bad as Mr. Fox’s.” — You will forgive my saying, however, that this is a compromise which we never shall accept, even as the overture of returning confidence from those whose good opinion we most regretted to lose. In fact, there is no resemblance between the two Bills in any circumstance, excepting only the little ceremony with which they both treated the Charter of the Company; nor could any person who supported Mr. Fox’s Bill, and still approves the measure, give his countenance to Mr. Pitt’s, with the smallest degree of consistency. — But examine the subject fairly yourself upon the plain ground of fact. — I will not attempt to bias your opinion by any previous argument.
You will receive with this a copy of the other Bill brought in by Mr. Fox, (which you say you never saw) intitled, “A Bill for the better Government of the Territorial Possessions and Dependencies in India.” This Bill accompanied what is usually called “Mr. Fox’s India Bill,” but is seldom mentioned, altho’ it formed a very essential part of the plan; and the consideration of it is extremely necessary to the understanding the principle, and main object of the system.
I send you also a copy of Mr. Pitt’s Bill, as it came out of the Committee, when it was re-printed, with its alterations and amendments. In looking it over, I do not desire you to take notice of the ludicrous manner in which it is pieced and patched, and corrected and altered, almost from the beginning to the end, merely to convince you of the sad slovenly style in which the act was framed, but in order that you may compare the spirit and obvious purpose of some of these alterations, with the text as it first stood; by doing which you will be much better enabled to judge of the true meaning of the original Act, than by any thing you can learn from the Declaratory Law.
As to the Declaratory Law itself, and the plea which was made for it, — we seem to be perfectly agreed upon that subject. The papers laid before the House of Commons, certainly contain, as you observe, a complete refutation of all the pretences upon which the sending out the four regiments to India was defended as a measure of necessity. And still more strongly do I agree with you in your remarks upon Declaratory Acts in general, and upon the nature of this Declaratory Act in particular. It is indeed an alarming and an unfortunate event in the History of Parliament — for it is one that shakes the foundation of that security which all men hope from Law, and of that respect which all men owe to it — to see the Representatives of the people persuaded to intercept the ordinary course of justice, to assume themselves a judicial character, and, upon the suggestion of the King’s Ministers, to determine a question of property, in favour of the servants of the Crown, against the claims of the subject!
Nor can our apprehensions of the consequences of this precedent be diminished, by reflecting upon the manner in which the measure was carried thro’ the House of Lords; by reflecting, that the supreme court of judicature in this country should have been induced by any influence or by any eloquence, or upon any plea of necessity, pretended or real, to decide — with unparalleled precipitation, — upon a construction of law — in the absence of the Judges of the land, and without granting a hearing to the parties interested in their decision!
Yet possibly you will be surprised when I add, that it is because I perfectly and cordially agree with you in your observations upon these proceedings, that I do not so readily adopt the conclusion you have drawn with regard to the advantage which, “the ex-party” (I use your own phrase) is supposed to have obtained in consequence of the weak conduct of the Administration in this business.
If this party, — whose general principles, fidelity of attachment, and openness of conduct, you own you respect — but own it with the splenetic reluctance of one who has been in vain endeavouring to look for system, uninion, or plain dealing elsewhere — If this party had no other object but to retort popular invectives, to detect the sinister views of political adversaries, to lessen the confidence of Parliament in their measures, or to shake the opinion of their consequence in another quarter, there undoubtedly was cause for considerable triumph in the late events: — and of still fairer triumph, perhaps, in the opportunity afforded of vindicating their own characters under circumstances of great advantage, and upon grounds the most embarrassing to their opponents. But understanding, as I trust I do, the terms and conditions upon which alone that party will ever seek to obtain, or consent to hold, ministerial situations in this country, I never shall admit that their cause can be essentially advanced by any legislative measure which tends to lower the House of Commons in the public estimation, and to deprive Parliament of the respect and confidence of the country.
Upon such occasions, whatever advantage this or that set of men may gain in debate, or in public opinion, — Their’s only is the triumph, who love not the popular part of our Constitution, whose credit and whose principles prosper in the abasement of all popular character, and who would at any time be content to participate in the reproach of an odious measure, provided it reflected superior disgrace on Parliament, as the instrument of effecting it. — But I am getting upon ground which may lead us from the subject I wish to press to your more immediate attention. — I shall therefore only add, that I am,
With great truth and regard, Your sincere, And obedient servant, RICHARD BRINSLEY SHERIDAN.
Bruton-street, March 24th, 1788.
COPY of a PAPER read by Mr. Sheridan in the HOUSE OF COMMONS, on Friday the 14th Day of March, 1788.
THE PROFESSED OBJECT of the Two Bills for the better Government of the British Possessions in India, brought into Parliament, the one by Mr. FOX, in 1783, and the other by Mr. PITT, in 1784, was to relieve the Natives of that Country, from the many evils which they had experienced under the Dominion of, or in consequence of their Connec
tion with, the Government of the Company of the United Merchants trading to the East-Indies. It was assumed by the Framers of both Bills, that this Relief was not to be expected from the Government of the Company, constituted as it then was; and it was admitted by both, that the Patronage and Influence of the Company ought not to be transferred to the Crown.
(A)
MR. FOX’s BILL “discontinued” the powers and authorities of the Company for the term of four years, and transferred those powers, and no more, or others, for the said term, to seven Directors, named by Parliament, to be by them exercised “in trust for, and for the benefit of the said Company.”
(B)
Mr. Fox’s Bill did not affect to separate the right of nominating and appointing the persons to be entrusted and employed in executing the measures of Government in India, from the right of originating and directing the measures themselves.
(C)
Mr. Fox’s Bill did not pretend at once to divide the commercial from the political interests, or the trade from the revenues of the Company; and did therefore provide, that nine “Assistant Directors,” nominated by Parliament “from among the Proprietors of East India Stock,” should form “a Board for the sole purpose of ordering and managing the commerce of the said united Company,” under, and subject to the orders and directions of the said Superior Board.
(D)
Mr. Fox’s Bill did not pretend to be founded in any respect upon the consent of the Company, nor to produce a system of reform agreeable to, or concerted with, those whose abuse of power it professed to remedy.
(E)
Mr. Fox’s Bill established no fourth estate, nor gave any one power to the Directors therein named, which did not before exist in the Company; but on the contrary, did limit and restrain the said Directors, so appointed by Parliament, in various particulars in which the Company’s Directors were not before restrained.
(F)
Mr. Fox’s Bill, so far from placing the Directors named by Parliament, above the executive Government of the Country, and out of the reach of its inspection and controul, did expresly and distinctly place them under the same obligation to communicate their transactions to his Majesty’s Ministers for the time being, and did expressly and distinctly make them subordinate and amenable to his Majesty’s pleasure, and to the directions of his Ministers, in the same manner, and upon the same footing, and “under the same limitations and restrictions,” as the Regulating Act of 1773, and the Act of 1781, and various other Acts, had placed the Court of Directors, chosen, and appointed by the Company.
(G)
Earl Fitzwilliam, and the other Directors under Mr. Fox’s Bill, could neither have had transactions with any of the country powers in the East Indies, nor have directed hostilities against, nor have concluded treaties with, any state or power, but subject to the orders of his Majesty; and his Royal will and pleasure, signified to them by the Secretary of State, they were bound by law to obey.
(H)
Mr. Fox’s Bill placed the whole of the powers taken from the Company in the New Government established at home, in order that they might be executed under the inspection and controul of the Legislature and of the public.
(I)
Mr. Fox’s Bill established no system of mystery and concealment in the management of affairs, of any sort; but, on the contrary, did expressly provide, that the conduct of the Board, established by that Bill, should be clear and open; that their opinions should “be given in no covert manner,” and, that their motives of conduct, as well as their measures, should stand “recorded on their journals, signed with the name of each Director;” thereby making them responsible to Parliament and to their Country, by the best pledge and security for responsibility, — an explicit avowal of their purposes, at the time they resolved on their measures.
(K)
Mr. Fox’s Bill avowed its object clearly and distinctly; and was worded with such plainness and precision, as to leave no room for misconstruction, nor need of explanation, in the minds of any but of those who would not take the trouble to examine it, or who chose to misunderstand it, or who were incapable of understanding any thing.
(L)
Mr. Fox’s Bill was a measure of experiment; the term of duration limited to four years; and during that period the affairs of the Company were placed so immediately and intelligibly under the eye of Parliament, that a permanent and well digested system for the future government of those valuable possessions might reasonably have been expected from the wisdom of the Legislature, before that term should have been expired. A system that might have restored to the Company all rights and privileges, which consistently with the ends of good Government they could posses, and have provided and effectual securities to the Constitution, wherever the judgment of Parliament should have found it necessary to add to the power and influence of the Crown.
(A)
MR. PITT’s BILL continues the form of the Company’s Government, and professes to leave the patronage under certain conditions, and the Commerce without condition, in the bands of the Company; but places all matters relating to the Civil and Military government and Revenues, in the hands of six Commissioners, to be nominated and appointed by his Majesty, under the title of “Commissioners for the Affairs of India;” which Board of Commissioners is invested with the “superintendance and controul over all the British territorial possessions in the East Indies, and over the affairs of the United Company of Merchants trading thereto.”
(B)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill denies to his Commissioners any right of nominating, or appointing to any office. Civil or Military; but it reserves to them the power of annulling every appointment of the Company, in a right of recalling every person, Civil or Military, in the Company’s service; as well as an exclusive right to censure or approve, suspend or reward, according to their judgment and discretion.
(C)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill professes to divide the political and commercial interests of the Company between the Board of Controul, and the Directors, but denies to the Directors the right to manage, order, or direct their commercial concerns in India, unless their dispatches shall have received the sanction of the signatures of the Members of the Board of Controul; and in case the said Board should directly interfere in the Commerce of the Company, the remedy provided for the Directors is “an appeal to the King in Council.” against the decision of his Majesty’s Ministers; and “his Majesty’s decision, in Council, is final, and conclusive.” It also gives to the Board of Controul, while it professes to leave the trade of the Company independent, an absolute power over the territorial revenues of the Company in India, “the clear profits arising from which, after defraying the charges and expences attending the same,” form the principal, if not the sole fund upon which their trade with India is now carried on.
(D)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill was avowedly communicated to the Directors of the Company, and to the Proprietors; its several provisions discussed by them, and many material alterations were made in the plan after it had been brought into Parliament, declaredly for the purpose of according to the suggestions, and granting the explanations required by the Company. Upon this ground the Bill passed; and since that time there is scarce any one right or power which the Company conceived to have been secured to them, which, in the opinion of the Court of Directors, has not been broken in upon by the Board of Controul, — the Commissioners supporting their own construction of the law, against the fruitless expostulations and remonstrances of the Directors.
(E)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill has established a fourth, or new estate, or department of Government, with powers infinitely exceeding those possessed by the Court of Directors or Court of Proprietors at the time when the said Board of Controul was established.
(F)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill has expressly repealed all the provisions in the said Acts, which gave to his Majesty any right, power, or authority, to interfere in any matter or concern of the British Government in India, and has
made the Board of Controul wholly independent in the exercise of their offices of the general executive government of the country; they being neither bound to abide by his Majesty’s will and pleasure, or even to communicate with his Majesty upon any one measure or matter relating to India, of any sort whatever.
(G)
Mr. Dundas, with any two more Commissioners, may transact matters of any sort with the country powers; may treat with, or ally with, or declare war against, or make peace with all or any of the Powers or Princes of India; may levy armies there to any extent, and command the whole revenues of all our possessions for their support, without taking his Majesty’s pleasure upon any of the subjects in any shape, and without acting in his name, or under his authority; and these things he may do against the will of the Directors, and without the knowledge of Parliament; so that in truth, the present Board of Controul have, under Mr. Pitt’s Bill, separated and usurped those VERY IMPERIAL PREROGATIVES FROM THE CROWN, which were FALSELY said to have been given to the new board of Directors under Mr. Fox’s Bill.
(H)
Mr. Pitt’s Bill, assisted by the explanatory Act of , beside the new and powers given to the Board of Controul at home, has given to the Governors and Presidents abroad the most and extravagant authorities: — unlike any thing that could have been supposed to originate in a free state, and utterly irreconcilable to the spirit of the British Constitution; by virtue of which despotic authority, among other enormities which, under the name of Government, may be committed, the Governor or President of the Council may, upon his single pleasure, seize and secure any British subject in India, of whatever rank or situation, and upon the accusation only of any one person cause him to be thrown on shipboard, or imprisoned until there shall be “a convenient opportunity of sending him to England,” where, by the same Bill — a new tribunal and proceeding — equally unheard of in the Constitution — are provided for his trial.
Delphi Complete Works of Richard Brinsley Sheridan Page 67
