The Muslim Brotherhood portrayed as a "liberation movement"
The Muslim Brotherhood began organizing when, in March 1928, six companions, fired with enthusiasm by al-Banna's preaching, sought him out to ask him to launch a political campaign in the name of Islam: "We have listened to your message, we are aware of where we stand, we are committed, but we do not know what practical steps to take to reinforce Islam and bring betterment to Muslims."23 The Guide was at last to have the opportunity to demonstrate his gift for organization. He began with a piece of advice that would provide the Muslim Brotherhood with the means to survive the obstacles that repression was to bring-and to counter its critics: the cult of the informal. "One of his companions asked: `By what name shall we be called?' And al-Banna replied: `None ofthat; leave aside appearances and officialdom. Let the principle and priority of our union be thought, morality, and action. We are brothers in the service of Islam, so we are the Muslim Brotherhood.-24 A judicious piece of advice. Al-Banna had understood that a movement that could not be pinned down would be indestructible. In giving his movement a name that was both a title and an expression currently employed in Arabic, in which believers often address each other as "brother," he created a means of identification that was discreet. From its birth on, the Brotherhood was both an official movement and a school of thought that one could claim to belong to, or deny being part of, according to circumstances. On the other hand, the watchword was clear and unambiguous: "Our motto will forever be: God is our objective. God's messenger is our guide. The Koran is our constitution. Struggle is our path. Death on the road that leads to God is our ultimate desire."25
In other words, it was never al-Banna's intention to advocate a rationalist, secular Islam; on the contrary, he wanted to organize a movement capable of putting pressure on Egypt, and then on the rest of the world, to adopt a fundamentalist social order destructive of freedom. As proof, one has only to read the political and social program drawn up by al-Banna in 1936, a program entitled "Fifty Demands," which was the Muslim Brotherhood's manifesto for "concrete reform." The manifesto spelt out in detail the steps to be taken to establish legislation, and subsequently a social, political and economic system based on the sharia. Throughout the manifesto, it is said that individual liberties must yield to dictatorship by divine right. As to method, the Brotherhood intended to "go beyond political differences and direct the energies of the "umma" [the worldwide community of Muslims] towards one sole aim': the attainment of a political Islam. The organization defined its objectives as "reforming the laws in conformity with Islamic legislation, particularly as regards the definition of offenses and the punishments for crimes '1126 and spreading "the spirit of Islam throughout all the branches of government so that all citizens consider it their duty to put Islamic precepts into effect." In the meantime, in their everyday dealings, the Brothers intended "to initiate respect for morality among the people and make everyone aware of the regulations set down by the law," which meant that "the punishments for violations of the code of morality should be strictly applied." This objective, which was central to the program, involved several provisions, namely "eradicating prostitution," "treating fornication, whatever the circumstances, as a serious crime punishable by law," but also "forbidding co-education," "considering all private contact between members of the different sexes as a punishable crime," "closing down dance halls and other centers of debauch, as well as outlawing dancing and any form of physical contact between a man and a woman." And that is only a brief resume of the contents.
The manifesto was, for many years, available only in Arabic, until the journal Islam de France decided to publish it in French, so as to enlighten all those who, misled by the angelic presentation ofthe text given by Tariq Ramadan, were ignorant of the basically fundamentalist and reactionary nature of the Muslim Brotherhood. The publication of this program, which proved to be quite different from the version that Ramadan had spread among the antiglobalization leftists, was by no means welcomed by al-Banna's grandson. Michel Renard (born a Christian, but a convert to Islam), one of the founders of Islam de France, recalls having been the target of the latter's anger: "It's then that I realized that he practiced doublespeak: you cart believe in a secular society and in Hassan al-Banna at the same time."27 This affront to the founder's dignity resulted in the closure of the journal. Al-Bouraq, the house that published the journal, but that also publishes Tariq Ramadan, all of a sudden canceled its contract after the publication of the issue in question, bringing to a close one of the most stimulating editorial initiatives devoted to Islam in France.
For Tariq Ramadan, it is essential that the movement that inspired him be seen in terms ofhis own particular perspective. For someone who is aware of the harm done by the Muslim Brotherhood's fundamentalism-and I am referring not only to the violence but also to the fanaticism that Tariq Ramadan considers to be wholly legitimate-it is frightening to hear him explain to European Muslims that the "extremely critical remarks" made concerning his grandfather are to be accounted for by the fact that his "national liberation movement" was a thorn in the side of Westerners.28 He points to the fact that the Anglo-Saxon press presented the movement in 1936 in favorable terms, until the day when the Muslim Brotherhood stood up against "the Zionist presence in Palestine": "It is quite clear that once it became evident that there was popular support for the Brotherhood's stance, they began to cast suspicions on Hassan al-Banna's activities, to spread rumors about him, and disparage the movement as a whole."29 This was a way of implying that all the criticisms made of al-Banna and the Brotherhood were the result of a campaign of lies designed to protect the Zionist interests. In fact, what we can conclude from all of this is that Time magazine-which was to designate Ramadan as one of the "innovators" in the year 2ooo-was not particularly perspicacious ...
It is true that, during al-Banna's time, the British government and King Farouk thought they could make use of the Muslim Brotherhood as a counterweight to the Egyptian Left and the Wafd Party. According to Olivier Carre and Michel Seurat, they even received a formal grant of Soo Egyptian pounds from the Suez Canal Company, a building permit for a first meeting place, as well as a mosque under their control. These findings emerged in the course of research into the first bulletins published by the Brotherhood, in which alBanna attempted to explain things to his companions. According to Carre and Seurat: "Banna, who would subsequently deny the gifts from the Canal Company, began by trying to justify what he had done in the eyes of his companions, who expressed their indignation, and took leave of him."3° Subsequently, al-Banna would simply state that he had never received any such gifts. A Muslim Brother, then, is free to lie or change what he has said, if it serves his purpose. At any rate, that's one aspect of the Muslim Brotherhood's past that Tariq Ramadan is by no means eager to remember when he speaks to an anti-globalist audience-or even to an audience of Islamists that he wants to convince of the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has always, right from the very beginning, been a movement of resistance to colonialism. The Muslim Brotherhood did, in fact, take part in the putsch organized by the army officers that liberated Egypt from the yoke of colonialism, but this liberation was only a phase dictated by the immediate context. Egyptian independence was never, for the Brotherhood, an end in itself, but rather a prelude to the setting up of an Islamic dictatorship.
The Brotherhood's participation in the struggle for independence has, in addition, been considerably exaggerated by the movement's propaganda. But even in the course of their attempts to falsify history, certain partisans of the Brotherhood revealed the extent to which al-Banna was, above all, obsessed by the idea of re-instituting Islamic values. To that end, he was prepared to negotiate with any government whatsoever. In 1946, for instance, he was in the thick of negotiations to obtain the right to publish a daily, and to acquire land on which to construct his propaganda centers, when the communists sparked off a massive wave of strikes in the Cairo textile industry in order to force the British to lea
ve the country. The communist "Committee to Liberate the Nation' asked al-Banna to send his troops to join in the general strike scheduled for February 21, but al-Banna refused, partly because he did not want to jeopardize the ongoing negotiations, but also out of deep-rooted suspicion ofthe communists. On the appointed day, a number of Brothers disregarded instructions, and joined up anyway with the strikers. Bypassed by the rank and file, al-Banna finally consented to call for a strike on the following days, but refused to join in the collective movement, which then fell apart.31 It was not until 1948 that al-Banna decided in earnest to organize joint demonstrations with the communists against the British occupying forces. It was an alliance dictated by the circumstances-and one that did not last for long. In the same year (1948), al-Banna still included the communists in the lengthy list of enemies who were conspiring against the Brothers: "Worldwide Judaism, and international Communism, the colonial powers, and the advocates of atheism and moral degeneracy-they all, from the very first day, considered the Brothers and their message as major obstacles." 32
A step-by-step strategy of conquest
Tariq Ramadan has always made a point of presenting the Brotherhood as a "social movement."33 If you listen to him, you can end up thinking that political power was never really of interest to the organization. It must be said that it was in terms of actual practice that the Brothers were awesomely effective. Their unrelenting day-by-day fundamentalism succeeded in damaging, little by little, the social and cultural fabric of the country chosen as its target; but this did not mean they had given up the idea of one day taking power, once conditions were ripe. The fact that they concentrated first of all on "grassroots Islamization," to quote Gilles Kepel, did not mean that al-Banna had abandoned his offensive in the higher spheres. Olivier Carre and Michel Seurat have amply demonstrated that he was ready to negotiate with practically all of Egypt's political components-including the Wafd (the nationalist populist party), the throne, and even the British themselves-in order to gain political influence. He was even a candidate for election to the legislature in December 1941, an initiative that took some of his companions by surprise. He was to explain why, three years later, in the Brotherhood's journal: "I have been asked: Did this taking part in elections not mean that the Brotherhood was abandoning the field of religion to engage in politics, and thereby transforming what had, up to then, been a religious movement into a political organization? Our reply is that Islam recognizes no such distinction concerning the affairs of the nation: an Islamic religious institution is duty bound to give the Islamic viewpoint in every area of life, and the parliament is the shortest and the best road to this end."34
At this time, al-B anna, encouraged by the rapid success ofhis movement, really did think it possible to institute an Islamic regime by means of the ballot box. But lobbying and political representation were only one aspect of commitment to the Islamization of society. Tariq Ramadan is perfectly explicit in this regard: the pursuit of political power through elections was only one step-a step that should not be taken in haste: "In such matters, any nation that attempts to go against the rules of nature will inevitably fail," alBanna would say. This is a piece of advice for today's Islamists to meditate on-especially those who may have made the mistake of forcing the pace in Algeria, running the risk of a counteroffensive. On the strength of this experience, Tariq Ramadan has called on European Islamists to be astute in the way they apply his grandfather's "methodology," in particular his strategy of graduated conquest. One section of his lecture on "contemporary Muslim thought," edited as a cassette by Tawhid, stresses the importance of respecting the rhythm that his grandfather had insisted on:
The Muslim Brotherhood's program is made up of a series of stages that are closely controlled and clearly defined. We know perfectly well what we want and the means we should use to attain our objectives. Consider the three stages; they are well known and solidly anchored in a methodology that takes social issues as a point of departure:
i. We want first of all human beings that are Muslim, that is to say individual human beings who are Muslim in their thoughts, in their faith, their morality, their feelings, their activities and their initiatives. That is our program for individuals.
2. Then we want Muslim families, that is to say families that are Muslim in their thoughts and beliefs, in their morality and feelings, in their activities and initiatives; and here we are thinking of women as well as men. That is our program for the family.
3. And then we want there to be a Muslim people, formed in the same manner; and that is why we want our message to reach inside all homes, our voice to be heard everywhere, and our way of thinking to pervade every region, every village, every town, city, capital and metropolis.35
This first part of the program (three sections out of a total of seven) is enough to send shivers up and down one's spine. However, for Tariq Ramadan, the fact that Hassan al-Banna intended people to be indoctrinated before an Islamic regime is established is enough for him to claim that the program is a model of open-mindedness and democracy. In the same lecture that served as an introduction to Hassan al-Banna's philosophy, he specifies: "Note that it is only after these first three stages that al-B anna mentions an `Islamic government,' which, according to the reform program proposed by his organization, represents the logical outcome of the process of renewal initiated on the individual level. A government is not, then, simply a superstructure that is foisted on society; it is the end product of a reform process which, at a certain stage in its evolution, takes shape as a political model that harnesses its basic drive. Here we are a long way from any formalism."36 So we needn't be worried .... It is not a question of "formalism," but of "drive." But where is this drive to lead us? Ramadan is sufficiently prudent to keep from rushing his audience through the later stages; he alludes only briefly to what remains in store for us, namely the setting up of an Islamic empire. Here are the following four points of al-Banna's program that Tariq Ramadan takes pains not to discuss:37
Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan Page 3
