by Philip Dwyer
The Perak War , 1875–1876
Before the Perak War of 1875–1876, British policy had been one of ‘liberal non-intervention’ on the Malay Peninsula. 4 However, a series of local disputes and dynastic quarrels in the region led the Colonial Office to consider an increased role in the states surrounding the Straits Settlements. Internal conflicts were having a detrimental effect on the trade of British and Chinese merchants and as a result a petition was sent to the British government requesting action against this perceived ‘anarchy’. 5 On 20 September 1873, Lord Kimberley , the Secretary of State for the Colonies, decided to send the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Andrew Clarke, to Perak—a state on the northwest of the Malay Peninsula—with instructions to report back on the situation. 6 However, Clarke went beyond his mandate of reporting and the result of his visit was the Pangkor Engagement of 1874, 7 which established a British Residents System, arranged a peace settlement between warring Chinese factions and attempted to settle the succession dispute in Perak that had been ongoing since the death of Sultan Ali in 1871. 8 At the election in 1871 there had been three potential successors to consider: Rajas Abdullah, Ismail and Yusuf. The last was the son of the late Sultan, but he was passed over due to his unpopularity as a ‘ruthless commander’; Abdullah was considered ‘an opium-smoker and a coward’ and hence Ismail was elected. 9 However, Abdullah continued to dispute this outcome and wrote to the British in an attempt to gain their favour. 10 To settle this and other outstanding issues, Clarke summoned a meeting at Pangkor Island, just off the coast of Perak, on 20 January 1874. At the meeting, Clarke decided upon Abdullah as the new Sultan and neither Ismail nor Yusuf were in attendance and by electing Abdullah, Clarke created a highly ambiguous situation in which ‘the settlement recognised one of the three claimants without securing his acceptance by the other two’. 11 Clarke also introduced a system of residential ‘advice’, which meant that the new Sultan was subject to British advice that ‘must be asked and acted upon on all questions other than those touching Malay Religion and Custom’. 12 This system was to prove highly problematic given the ambiguous role of the Residents and the extent to which the chiefs were obligated to act on this ‘advice’.
The actions of Perak’s first Resident, James Birch, both contradicted Clarke’s instructions and further antagonised Perak’s various chiefs and the new Sultan. The chiefs were particularly disgruntled by Birch’s attempts to change laws regarding taxation and the practice of debt-slavery. 13 As one scholar has pointed out, by ‘striking at the chiefs’ means of livelihood, Birch managed to create a common resistance among men who agreed, perhaps, in nothing else’. 14 Frustrated by Abdullah’s refusal to cooperate, Birch viewed him with contempt and threatened to have him removed from the throne. 15 In September 1875, Governor William Jervois (Clarke’s successor) travelled to Perak to investigate the growing tensions among the chiefs. 16 Rather than address their grievances, British powers were to be increased in the form of a new Proclamation introducing a new system in which two British officers would be appointed as Queen’s Commissioners to carry out the administration of the country in the name of the Sultan, with the assistance of a Malay Council. However, Jervois failed to consult with the Colonial Office regarding his plans. 17 At this time, Birch received several death threats, but did not inform Jervois. 18 Instead, he began to distribute the new Proclamation throughout Perak and although Birch had been warned that the posting of the Proclamation would not be allowed in the village of Pasir Salak, he went ahead regardless and was murdered there on 2 November 1875. 19
In the immediate aftermath of Birch’s murder a garrison was sent to carry out a surprise assault on the village. As a result of the hasty and disorganised manner in which the attack was arranged, it was unsuccessful and 17 officers and men were killed, including the Commissioner in charge. 20 P.B. Maxwell, the former Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements described how rumours now circulated of a general rising across the Malay Peninsula by ‘fanatical Malays’. 21 The need for further violence to suppress Indigenous opposition to British influence was typically justified in the British press thus: ‘The ferocity of the native broke out, and there was nothing to hold it in check. The result was the outrage at [Pasir Salak] and the war of chastisement which has been triumphantly pursued.’ Furthermore, it was stated that ‘It would be absurd to suppose that we have finally tamed the most turbulent of races by a few sharp defeats in jungle skirmishes and by the burning of a dozen stockades.’ 22 Consequently, further violence was deemed necessary because of the ‘nature’ of the ‘natives’.
In the aftermath of the failed attack at Pasir Salak, Jervois now planned for a military campaign to find and punish those culpable for Birch’s murder and suppress any potential resistance. Jervois communicated his objective to the Colonial Office: ‘it is most advisable to make a display of power, and that difficulties present and future will cease by the adoption of such a course’. 23 However, Lord Carnarvon (Kimberley’s successor), warned Jervois against a prolonged conflict stating, ‘I am anxiously expecting to hear further of the proceedings of the forces. I assume that military operations will not be unnecessarily extended.’ 24 Nonetheless, Jervois went on to order a naval blockade of the Perak coastline, 25 and colonial troops were instructed to show an ‘imposing display of force’. 26 On their return to Pasir Salak, the colonial troops indiscriminately burned down houses and the village, which had been deserted, was destroyed on arrival 27 —it was reported that ‘the village was fired, and the banks for a mile and a half were ablaze’. 28 This policy of scorched earth was undertaken in order to ‘make an example’ of the villages and to exact punishment on potential resisters to British colonial rule. 29 The suffering of the general population was compounded by the blockading of the coastline, which soon resulted in a scarcity of rice amongst the inhabitants. Ismail, the ex-Sultan who was suspected of complicity in Birch’s murder, and his people were effectively held hostage by Jervois who stated that ‘If no opposition is shown to our troops, and there is a pacific settlement of the affairs of the country, food will be allowed to come in as usual.’ 30 As Major J.F.A. McNair confirmed, when Ismail surrendered ‘he was in a destitute condition, his people emaciated, many of them ill while many more had been left behind in the jungle and had died off’. 31 The village of Kota Lama was also repeatedly targeted for destruction by colonial troops, 32 and on 3 January 1876 a village in Kuala Kangsar was the scene of a summary execution in which troops were sent to identify three alleged outlaws, with instructions that ‘the officer in command will at once hang [the outlaws] opposite or near their house and set fire to the buildings. The men are to be left hanging.’ 33 Only one of these men was found and hanged.
The British also undertook punitive expeditions in nearby Sungei Ujong in 1874 and 1875, although there was no direct connection between these actions and events in Perak. 34 British tactics were very similar in each case: in Sungei Ujong, Lieutenant Hinxman concluded on 9 December 1875 that, ‘The enemy were now in full retreat up the hill at E. I formed up my men and poured effective valleys into them. We now gave three cheers and burnt the village.’ 35 While the British campaign in Perak resulted in the large-scale destruction of the area, looting and suffering as a result of the naval blockade, more often than not British troops were met with deserted villages rather than heavy resistance. 36 Jervois was central to these events and his desire to suppress any potential resistance played a key role in the escalation of the campaign. Ten days after Birch’s murder Jervois acknowledged that ‘Disaffection most likely restricted to small portion of the country; wise, nevertheless, to act as if not so.’ 37
Changes to the Residents system were minimal in the aftermath of the war and clearly British military intervention made this uncertain system of government tenable. 38 All those found guilty of involvement in Birch’s death were either hanged or deported, resulting in a situation which ‘cleared Perak of both Sultans and nearly every chief of the first and second rank’. 3
9 However, the circumstances in which the trials of the alleged collaborators were carried out were highly questionable. 40 The documentation regarding the trials is incomplete and most of the accused were not even formally charged or questioned; their guilt had been predetermined. 41
The ‘Hut Tax’ War, Sierra Leone, 1898
In the British Protectorate in the hinterland of the Colony of Sierra Leone the ‘Hut Tax’ War broke out in 1898. 42 Similar to the circumstances which led to the Perak War , Indigenous dissatisfaction in the face of increased British colonial rule was met with obstinance on the part of the man on the spot, which escalated the situation and led to prolonged violence and the destruction of the local area. The newly declared Protectorate Ordinance, 43 which would establish British power in the region, included the introduction of a tax that each household had to pay. 44 This section will focus on the conflict which broke out in the North of the Protectorate against the Temne chief, Bai Bureh, although a second conflict led by the Mende tribe broke out in the South of the Protectorate at the end of April. The two conflicts were very different in nature, although they did overlap. 45 British involvement beyond the boundaries of the Colony 46 had increased in recent years and included the introduction of the controversial Frontier Police Force in 1890, which was known for its arbitrary violence. The introduction of the tax under the new Governor of Sierra Leone, Frederic Cardew, came at a time when local chiefs were becoming increasingly disgruntled at the loss of their sovereignty as a result of a series of treaties with the British colonial administration after 1807, which were achieved with increasing force. 47
Cardew was determined to enforce his policies despite the chiefs’ opposition, as well as the misgivings of the Colonial Office—which criticised Cardew’s policies for being ‘too ambitious and premature’. 48 Cardew toured the country to explain his policies, although ‘the terms were dictated, not negotiated’. 49 As J. D. Hargreaves argues, the colonial administrators took little time to try and understand the customs and traditions of the local population. 50 Initially, the chiefs’ protests were voiced through peaceful means in the form of petitions and while the administration had ample chance to revise or withdraw the taxes in light of the chiefs’ objections, only slight revisions were made. Cardew was not interested in negotiating and in a meeting with the chiefs on 15 November 1897 he provided an explanation for his policies but then refused to discuss the matter further. 51 While the chiefs came away from this meeting dejected, Cardew optimistically stated: ‘I was glad to have the opportunity of showing them how they had been misled and how unfounded their grievances were.’ 52
Tax collections began with force on 1 January 1898 by the Frontier Police who dealt harshly with those who refused to pay or endorse the tax. The administration’s methods of punishment included arresting chiefs and punishing them by flogging, as well as handing out sentences of hard labour; although the chiefs’ actions were not actually illegal. 53 Throughout this time, rumours were circulating that the Temne chief Bai Bureh—a signatory of the Temne petition—was planning a revolt. 54 Captain W.S. Sharpe, the District Commissioner of Karene—Bai Bureh’s district—had written to the chief announcing his intention to visit him and collect the tax from him personally; the letter was returned unsigned and Sharpe perceived this action as a clear affront, although Bai Bureh later claimed not to have received the letter. 55 Cardew decided that a show of force was needed and a group of Frontier Police was sent out on orders to have the chief arrested, as a result of his having ‘defied’ Sharpe. 56 However, as the Frontier Police set out to arrest him, they were met with a group of the chief’s ‘warboys’ who threw stones and jeered at the troops. Inspector General Major A.F. Tarbet ordered the force to open fire on the crowd and hence the first shots of the campaign were fired. 57
After hostilities broke out, Bai Bureh undertook a campaign of guerrilla warfare against the British. He retained the initiative from 23 February until 1 April 1898, during which time the British only took the offensive once, 58 and the West India Regiment was left demoralised and exhausted. 59 Although Bai Bureh’s tactics inflicted few casualties, 60 the British struggled to fight an enemy they could not see and were forced to adapt their strategy. As General F. M. Carleton reported: ‘You can do nothing in return unless you happen to catch the enemy in the open which is very seldom. All you can do is burn their villages and occupy the country.’ 61 Flying columns were then sent out, which as Lieutenant C. Foulkes stated, ‘took the enemy by surprise and inflicted serious casualties on them for the first time’. 62 The British now initiated a policy of scorched earth in which they systematically burnt down towns, villages, food stores and crops; this destruction was accompanied by looting . 63 The military reports provide lists of the villages they burnt down as the forces traversed the country. 64 Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall later acknowledged that the towns were destroyed in order to ‘make an example’ of them and to ‘intimidate the other states’ and therefore deter further unrest. 65 Through these practices the local population was forced into a state of submission and left to fend for themselves in an area wrought by devastation. It has been claimed that Cardew was very ‘alarmed’ by the systematic destruction of the area, although he did endorse the burning of areas linked to Bai Bureh. 66 However, Major Buck, who commanded a flying column, justified the large-scale destruction as necessary ‘though it may seem hard on the women and children’. 67
After the rainy season, from November 1898 until April 1899, punitive expeditions were carried out for the ‘re-establishment of authority’ across the Protectorate. 68 Bai Bureh was captured on 12 November 1898 and deported to the Gold Coast. Nevertheless, Cardew expressed his desire to reassert British authority in the region due to a lack of British presence in the remoter areas of the Protectorate, stating: ‘the natives have had no evidence of the power and resources of Her Majesty’s Government other than the presence of isolated posts here and there…’. 69 The punitive expeditions had their intended effect and the tax was continued; the Indigenous population realised that for now they would have to accept a British colonial presence. 70
The Anglo-Egyptian War of Reconquest in Sudan, 1896–1899
The tactics used by the Anglo-Egyptian forces in the reconquest of the Sudan under the command of the Sirdar of the Egyptian Army‚ Herbert Kitchener ‚ were particularly extreme, even if the circumstances of the war were also very different to the two cases discussed above. The reconquest took place over a longer period from 1896 until 1899. The background to the reconquest is the fall of Khartoum in 1885, the death of General Charles Gordon at the hands of the Mahdists and the humiliating withdrawal of British and Egyptian forces. 71 British objectives in the Sudan campaign were clear and they sought to defeat the Khalifa ‘Abdallahi Muhammad (the Mahdi Muhammed Ahmad’s successor after his death in 1885) and occupy the country. This and the desire to avenge the death of Gordon had much support in Britain. 72 The need to avenge Gordon’s death was also effectively impressed upon the troops by Kitchener who reminded them that they should ‘Remember Gordon’. 73 The Mahdia was presented as a brutal regime with horrendous tales, which were undoubtedly exaggerated, while the Sudanese were portrayed as a ‘savage race’. 74 These accounts, suggests P.M. Holt, ‘should be regarded primarily as war-propaganda’ used to justify the reconquest. 75
A number of small battles took place in the reconquest campaign prior to the final battle at Omdurman, notably at the Atbara on Good Friday (8 April 1898). This battle was particularly brutal and one participant described it as a ‘chaotic dogfight’ in which ‘it was almost impossible to take prisoners’. 76 British tactics here included the killing of the enemy wounded 77 ; it was a telling precursor of the devastation which was to result five months later in the final major clash of the campaign in Omdurman. In contrast to the other two cases discussed, the Mahdists fought the British in open battle and the results were devastating for the Mahdist troops. The final battle took place on 2 September 1898 and 11,000 of the Kha
lifa’s army were killed and 16,000 wounded—although the number of actual fatalities would have been significantly higher due to the neglect and killing of the wounded. 78 In contrast, Anglo-Egyptian forces lost just 48 men and 382 were wounded. 79 Once again, many of the enemy wounded were killed by the Anglo-Egyptian troops. Winston Churchill, who served at Omdurman as both a war correspondent and soldier, argued that Kitchener’s failure to reissue a statement regarding the sparing of the enemy wounded contributed to ‘a very general impression that the fewer the prisoners, the greater would be the satisfaction of the commander’. 80 Furthermore, contemporary accounts of the aftermath of Omdurman describe the enemy wounded lying unaided on the battlefield waiting to die, days after the battle. 81 Henry Keown-Boyd has argued that the tactics of killing the enemy wounded were a normal part of Anglo-Sudanese warfare and their treatment certainly needs to be viewed within the wider context of practices of British colonial violence. 82 Various elements of Kitchener’s campaign received public criticism in Britain; aside from the slaughter and neglect of the enemy wounded, there was also the bombing of the Mahdist’s tomb and the looting of Omdurman after the battle. 83 As well as the looting of the belongings of the dead Mahdist troops, homes in Omdurman were looted on the evening of 2 September and acts of revenge were carried out. 84 As one British soldier stated, there were ‘desperate dervishes hidden away in the town and a good deal of promiscuous shooting went on, especially after dark’. 85
