But Judge Bates dismissed the case on December 7, 2010, on procedural grounds, ruling that Anwar’s father, Nasser, did not have standing to file suit on behalf of his son and that the case would not have survived a review of the “political questions” it raised regarding the president’s authority to wage war. Judge Bates concluded that “the serious issues regarding the merits of the alleged authorization of the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen overseas must await another day.”
Awlaki’s lawyers were disappointed but not surprised by the ruling. The CCR and ACLU had spent eight years fighting the Bush administration on the very same issues, though they asserted that this case was more far-reaching in its implications. “If the court’s ruling is correct, the government has unreviewable authority to carry out the targeted killing of any American, anywhere, whom the president deems to be a threat to the nation,” said the ACLU’s Jameel Jaffer after the ruling was announced. “It would be difficult to conceive of a proposition more inconsistent with the Constitution or more dangerous to American liberty.” In a way, the Awlaki case was a microcosm of President Obama’s evolving approach to counterterrorism, which was remarkably similar to that of his predecessor: the president can write his own rules.
Al Qaeda’s “Foothold in Somalia Has Probably Been Facilitated”
SOMALIA, 2010 —While the legal battle played out over whether the United States could assassinate one of its own citizens, the White House’s counterterrorism team was not just concerned with Awlaki or AQAP in Yemen. It was also confronting an increasingly broad-based threat in Somalia, thanks to a newly emboldened and unified Islamist movement there. The militant group al Shabab had signed an “agreement for unification” with Hassan Turki’s Ras Kamboni militia, with the explicit aim of “establishing an Islamic state that will implement Shariah law.” But it was the last point of their agreement that mattered most in US counterterrorism circles. “In order to restore the damaged dignity of Muslims, their political power, economic strength and military might, all Muslims in the region should be united and end the hostility among them created by colonial powers,” the statement declared. “To prevent invasion by the international crusaders and the attacks they have carried out against our Muslim people, the Jihad in the Horn of Africa must be combined with the international Jihad led by the Al-Qaeda network and its Amir Sheikh Osama bin-Laden.”
Al Shabab, in justifying its alliance with al Qaeda, conflated its embrace of the terror group with resistance against foreign aggression. The opportunity to paint itself that way was a gift that Osama bin Laden could only have dreamed of in the 1990s. And Washington’s missteps and miscalculations had helped to deliver it. “The United States has launched air strikes to target high-level members of al-Shabab it believes have links to Al Qaeda. But experts say these air strikes have only increased popular support for al-Shabab. In fact, they argue that two of the only actions that could galvanize al-Shabab and increase its support within Somalia are additional air strikes by the United States, or a return of Ethiopian troops,” a report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concluded in early 2010. “Al Qaeda is now a more sophisticated and dangerous organization in Africa,” the report asserted, noting that al Qaeda’s “foothold in Somalia has probably been facilitated by the involvement of Western powers and their allies.”
Although al Shabab’s jihad had, to that point, been confined to the borders of Somalia, the group would soon mark its formal declaration of unity with al Qaeda by hitting its enemies on their own territory.
SOMETHING HAPPENED to the Somali militia leader Ahmed Madobe during his two years in Ethiopian custody after JSOC nearly killed him in 2007. After reaching an agreement in 2009 with the Ethiopian and Somali governments that he would renounce al Shabab and actively fight them, Madobe was back in his region of Somalia. As he tells it, he had planned to go back to Jubba and try to figure out the best deal he could make. If it was with the Somali government, so be it. If it wasn’t, well, once a guerrilla, always a guerrilla.
But when he returned to his region, Madobe discovered that it was no longer his. Madobe’s mentor, Hassan Turki, had merged Ras Kamboni with al Shabab and pledged allegiance to al Qaeda. Madobe was given a choice by his former comrades: with us or against us. Madobe says he tried to negotiate a power-sharing agreement for the region, but al Shabab rejected it. So Madobe chose the only real option available to him. At least that is how he prefers to tell it. “The view I had about Ethiopia greatly changed, as did the one I had about international policy on Somalia,” he told me. In early 2010, Madobe announced his forces were at war with al Shabab and supporting Somalia’s government; and it was clear that he had forged a new relationship with the Ethiopians, who had long funded various Somali warlords and political figures. “We were fighting against the Ethiopians and the Americans and considered them enemies,” he asserted. “But these guys from al Shabab are worse than them because they spoiled the image of Islam and our peoples’ values. So now, the differences between me, the Ethiopians and the US are small in contrast with the differences I have with al Shabab.”
Turki’s alliance with al Shabab was of particular concern to the United States, as it gave the alliance ownership of the key port town of Kismayo. Control of that port, along with “the secondary ports of Marka and Baraawe...emerged as the most important source of income for [al Shabab],” according to a UN report. Al Shabab “generates between $35 million and $50 million per year from port revenues, of which at least $15 million is based on trade in charcoal and sugar.” The United States wanted that cash flow cut off. So, the Americans began backing Ahmed Madobe, a former member of the Islamic Courts Union whom JSOC had tried to kill in 2007. Madobe had once been an ally of both al Shabab and Hasan Turki’s Ras Kamboni militia. Madobe and his men began receiving “training and support” from US-backed Kenyan military forces. They rode around in new technicals and, during battles with al Shabab forces, received artillery backup from Kenyan forces, including military helicopters providing air support. Madobe would become one of the new generation of US-backed warlords drawn from the rubble of the Islamic Courts Union. He would not be the last.
IN 2010, THE WORLD CUP—the most famous sporting event in the world—was hosted by South Africa. It was the first time the final would be played in Africa, and the entire continent was transformed into one huge arena. Large screens were set up in fields and stadiums and every bar, restaurant and café broadcast the games. Uganda was no exception. On July 11, 2010, in the neighborhood of Kabalagala in the capital, Kampala, scores of people were watching the World Cup Final between the Netherlands and Spain at the Ethiopian Village restaurant. As the match reached halftime, the score was tied 0–0. Boom! An explosion rocked the restaurant, which was packed with mostly foreigners. Fifteen people were killed and scores wounded, including six Mennonite missionaries. With the match approaching its ninetieth minute, a few miles north at the Kyadondo Rugby Club in Nakawa, a second blast went off. It was followed by an explosion right at the base of the large screen where people were crowded around watching the match. In all, sixty-four people died from the Nakawa bombing, most of them Ugandans. A twenty-five-year-old US aid worker was also killed. A severed head found at the scene was reportedly that of a Somali national, believed by Ugandan authorities to be a suicide bomber. Another suicide vest was later found undetonated.
Immediately after the double bombings, speculation pointed toward al Shabab. But the group had never struck beyond its borders. Lower-ranking al Shabab members praised the attacks, with one saying he was “very happy,” though they stopped short of taking responsibility. But on July 12, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage, al Shabab’s spokesman, boldly proclaimed the group was behind the bombings. “We will carry out attacks against our enemy wherever they are,” he said. “No one will deter us from performing our Islamic duty.” He added: “We thank the mujahideens that carried out the attack. We are sending a message to Uganda and Burundi, if they do not take out their AMISOM troops from Som
alia, blasts will continue and it will happen.” While Uganda and Somalia’s neighbors went on a state of high alert, back in Mogadishu al Shabab was preparing for a major campaign to take down the weak government AMISOM was protecting.
THE FIRST TWO YEARS of the Obama administration’s foreign policy were largely centered on Afghanistan and Iraq—and embroiled in controversy over the prison camp at Guantánamo—but by 2010, Somalia was becoming a major area of concern. JSOC had conducted a handful of operations in the country, most notably the operation that had killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, the head of al Qaeda in East Africa. But as the United States escalated its attacks, al Shabab seemed to become more daring. Every week, the group took more territory. Al Shabab controlled the largest swath of land of any al Qaeda affiliate in the world. Somalia received the dubious honor of being named the terrorism capital of the world in Maplecroft’s Global Terrorism Risk Index for 2010, with a harrowing 556 terrorist attacks between June 2009 and June 2010, which killed 1,437 people. The White House’s rhetoric against al Shabab began to turn markedly more bellicose, as Obama issued Executive Order 13536, declaring a “national emergency to deal with [the Somalia] threat.” Among the most serious concerns identified by the US counterterrorism community was the issue of foreign fighters, particularly those from the United States who had been used as suicide bombers.
On August 5, 2010, Attorney General Eric Holder announced the unsealing of the indictments of fourteen US-based individuals accused of giving material support to al Shabab. “These indictments and arrests—in Minnesota, Alabama, and California—shed further light on a deadly pipeline that has routed funding and fighters to al Shabab from cities across the United States,” Holder said. “While our investigations are ongoing around the country, these arrests and charges should serve as an unmistakable warning to others considering joining or supporting terrorist groups like al Shabab: if you choose this route you can expect to find yourself in a U.S. jail cell or a casualty on the battlefield in Somalia.” Mogadishu residents began reporting seeing surveillance planes regularly hovering over the capital.
The Obama administration was ratcheting up its operations. But so, too, was al Shabab.
On August 22, 2010, al Shabab launched what the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea called “its most significant military campaign since May 2009.” Sheikh Rage held a press conference on August 23 to announce a “massive war” to wipe out the US-backed Somali government once and for all.
Al Shabab had been mobilizing for months, in anticipation of a much-touted AMISOM offensive that would not materialize until much later. With a force numbering between 2,500 and 5,000 militants, al Shabab mounted direct assaults on Villa Somalia and other seats of government power and attempted to beat back Somali government and AMISOM forces in key districts of Mogadishu. At least eighty people were killed and scores wounded during the week of intense violence from August 23 to August 30. Other major incidents included an attack on the Presidential Palace on August 30 and a deadly roadside bomb the next day. Two days into this “Ramadan Offensive,” on August 24, three antigovernment militiamen disguised as Somali government soldiers laid siege to the Muna Hotel, which lies a few hundred yards from Villa Somalia. The attack, which involved two suicide bombers, killed at least thirty-three people, including several parliamentarians. Following the attack, Somali government forces tied the remains of one of the al Shabab attackers to the back of a vehicle and drove it through the town.
“This is a particularly outrageous act during the Islamic month of Ramadan,” said John Brennan, Obama’s top counterterrorism adviser, on the day of the hotel attack. “The United States will continue to partner with those who oppose terrorism, extremism and violence in all forms, and will continue to work very closely with those in Africa, particularly in the Horn of Africa in Somalia.”
Two weeks later, on September 9, 2010, the airport was hit by a dual car bombing during a visit from an international delegation that included the UN special representative for the secretary general and the special representative of the African Union’s chairman. These high-level officials were unscathed, though the bombings—and ensuing fighting—claimed the lives of two AMISOM troops and at least five civilians. According to the terror monitoring group Critical Threats, 23,000 Mogadishu residents had been displaced by the fighting by the end of September.
Serious battles continued throughout Mogadishu in September. Al Shabab made impressive gains in the opening salvos of the offensive, although the operation ultimately spurred AMISOM to deploy 2,000 additional troops. The offensive was eventually repelled. A significant factor in al Shabab’s failure, according to the UN Monitoring Group, may have been “the overdependence of [al Shabab] on child soldiers who were unable to hold their own against AMISOM troops or, to a lesser degree,” Somali government forces and pro-government militias. Al Shabab reportedly suffered major casualties, both foot soldiers and higher-ranking commanders, and in some cases lost territory to the pro-government forces. In the end, the al Shabab offensive partially succeeded in further destabilizing a Somali government that was already in critical condition. It also spurred an internal debate within the nexus of al Shabab and al Qaeda about tactics and the wisdom of trying to hold territory or overrun the capital city. In the meantime, the CIA was expanding its presence in Mogadishu.
“Anwar Awlaki... Definitely Has a Missile in His Future”
YEMEN, 2011 —In January 2011, Yemeni journalist Abdulelah Haider Shaye was convicted of terrorism-related charges by a Yemeni court and sentenced to five years in prison, followed by two years of restricted movement and government surveillance. Throughout his trial, Shaye refused to recognize the legitimacy of the court and declined to present a legal defense. Human Rights Watch said the specialized court where Shaye was tried “failed to meet international standards of due process,” and his lawyers argued that the little “evidence” that was presented against him relied overwhelmingly on fabricated documents. “What happened was a political not judicial decision. It has no legal basis,” said Abdulrahman Barman, Shaye’s lawyer, who boycotted the trial. “Having witnessed his trial I can say it was a complete farce,” said Iona Craig, the Times of London journalist.
Several international human rights groups condemned the trial as a sham and an injustice. “There are strong indications that the charges against [Shaye] are trumped up and that he has been jailed solely for daring to speak out about US collaboration in a cluster munitions attack which took place in Yemen,” said Amnesty International’s Philip Luther.
There is no doubt that Shaye was reporting on stories that both the Yemeni and US governments wanted to suppress. He was also interviewing people Washington was hunting, namely, Anwar Awlaki. Although the US and Yemeni governments alleged that he was a facilitator for al Qaeda propaganda, close observers of Yemen disagreed. “It is difficult to overestimate the importance of his work,” said Gregory Johnsen, the Yemen scholar at Princeton University who had been communicating with Shaye since 2008. He told me, “Without Shaye’s reports and interviews we would know much less about Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula than we do, and if one believes, as I do, that knowledge of the enemy is important to constructing a strategy to defeat them, then his arrest and continued detention has left a hole in our knowledge that has yet to be filled.”
After Shaye was convicted and sentenced, tribal leaders pressured President Saleh to issue a pardon. “Some prominent Yemenis and tribal sheikhs visited the president to mediate in the issue and Saleh agreed to release and pardon him,” recalled Barman. “We were waiting for the release of the pardon—it was printed out and prepared in a file for the president to sign and announce the next day.” Word of the impending pardon leaked in the Yemeni press. That day, February 2, 2011, President Saleh received a call from President Obama. The two discussed counterterrorism cooperation and the battle against AQAP. At the end of the call, Obama “expressed concern” over the release of Shaye, whom Obama said “had been sentenc
ed to five years in prison for his association with AQAP.” In fact, Shaye had not yet been released at the time of the call, but Saleh did have the pardon for him prepared and was ready to sign it. It would not have been unusual for the White House to express concern about Yemen’s allowing AQAP suspects to go free. Suspicious prison breaks of Islamist militants in Yemen had been a regular occurrence over the preceding decade, and Saleh had been known to exploit the threat of terrorism to leverage counterterrorism dollars from the United States. But this case was different: Abdulelah Haider Shaye was not an Islamist militant or an al Qaeda operative. He was a journalist. After the call from Obama, Saleh ripped up the pardon.
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