EUTHYPHRO: I think, Socrates, that on this subject no gods would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty.
[c] SOCRATES: Well now, Euthyphro, have you ever heard any man maintaining that one who has killed or done anything else unjustly should not pay the penalty?
EUTHYPHRO: They never cease to dispute on this subject, both elsewhere and in the courts, for when they have committed many wrongs they do and say anything to avoid the penalty.
SOCRATES: Do they agree they have done wrong, Euthyphro, and in spite of so agreeing do they nevertheless say they should not be punished?
EUTHYPHRO: No, they do not agree on that point.
SOCRATES: So they do not say or do just anything. For they do not venture to say this, or dispute that they must not pay the penalty if they have [d] done wrong, but I think they deny doing wrong. Is that not so?
EUTHYPHRO: That is true.
SOCRATES: Then they do not dispute that the wrongdoer must be punished, but they may disagree as to who the wrongdoer is, what he did, and when.
EUTHYPHRO: You are right.
SOCRATES: Do not the gods have the same experience, if indeed they are at odds with each other about the just and the unjust, as your argument maintains? Some assert that they wrong one another, while others deny [e] it, but no one among gods or men ventures to say that the wrongdoer must not be punished.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that is true, Socrates, as to the main point.
SOCRATES: And those who disagree, whether men or gods, dispute about each action, if indeed the gods disagree. Some say it is done justly, others unjustly. Is that not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed.
[9] SOCRATES: Come now, my dear Euthyphro, tell me, too, that I may become wiser, what proof you have that all the gods consider that man to have been killed unjustly who became a murderer while in your service, was bound by the master of his victim, and died in his bonds before the one who bound him found out from the seers what was to be done with him, and that it is right for a son to denounce and to prosecute his father on [b] behalf of such a man. Come, try to show me a clear sign that all the gods definitely believe this action to be right. If you can give me adequate proof of this, I shall never cease to extol your wisdom.
EUTHYPHRO: This is perhaps no light task, Socrates, though I could show you very clearly.
SOCRATES: I understand that you think me more dull-witted than the jury, as you will obviously show them that these actions were unjust and that all the gods hate such actions.
EUTHYPHRO: I will show it to them clearly, Socrates, if only they will listen to me.
[c] SOCRATES: They will listen if they think you show them well. But this thought came to me as you were speaking, and I am examining it, saying to myself: “If Euthyphro shows me conclusively that all the gods consider such a death unjust, to what greater extent have I learned from him the nature of piety and impiety? This action would then, it seems, be hated by the gods, but the pious and the impious were not thereby now defined, for what is hated by the gods has also been shown to be loved by them.” So I will not insist on this point; let us assume, if you wish, that all the gods consider this unjust and that they all hate it. However, is this the [d] correction we are making in our discussion, that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they all love is pious, and that what some gods love and others hate is neither or both? Is that how you now wish us to define piety and impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: What prevents us from doing so, Socrates?
SOCRATES: For my part nothing, Euthyphro, but you look whether on your part this proposal will enable you to teach me most easily what you promised.
EUTHYPHRO: I would certainly say that the pious is what all the gods [e] love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious.
SOCRATES: Then let us again examine whether that is a sound statement, or do we let it pass, and if one of us, or someone else, merely says that something is so, do we accept that it is so? Or should we examine what the speaker means?
EUTHYPHRO: We must examine it, but I certainly think that this is now a fine statement.
SOCRATES: We shall soon know better whether it is. Consider this: Is the [10] pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: I don’t know what you mean, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I shall try to explain more clearly: we speak of something carried and something carrying, of something led and something leading, of something seen and something seeing, and you understand that these things are all different from one another and how they differ?
EUTHYPHRO: I think I do.
SOCRATES: So there is also something loved and—a different thing—something loving.
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Tell me then whether the thing carried is a carried thing [b] because it is being carried, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.
SOCRATES: And the thing led is so because it is being led, and the thing seen because it is being seen?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: It is not being seen because it is a thing seen but on the contrary it is a thing seen because it is being seen; nor is it because it is something led that it is being led but because it is being led that it is something led; nor is something being carried because it is something carried, but it is something carried because it is being carried. Is what I want to say clear, [c] Euthyphro? I want to say this, namely, that if anything is being changed or is being affected in any way, it is not being changed because it is something changed, but rather it is something changed because it is being changed; nor is it being affected because it is something affected, but it is something affected because it is being affected.2 Or do you not agree?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: Is something loved either something changed or something affected by something?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: So it is in the same case as the things just mentioned; it is not being loved by those who love it because it is something loved, but it is something loved because it is being loved by them?
EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily.
[d] SOCRATES: What then do we say about the pious, Euthyphro? Surely that it is being loved by all the gods, according to what you say?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is it being loved because it is pious, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: For no other reason.
SOCRATES: It is being loved then because it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Apparently.
SOCRATES: And yet it is something loved and god-loved because it is being loved by the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Then the god-loved is not the same as the pious, Euthyphro, nor the pious the same as the god-loved, as you say it is, but one differs from the other.
[e] EUTHYPHRO: How so, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because we agree that the pious is being loved for this reason, that it is pious, but it is not pious because it is being loved. Is that not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that the god-loved, on the other hand, is so because it is being loved by the gods, by the very fact of being loved, but it is not being loved because it is god-loved.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: But if the god-loved and the pious were the same, my dear Euthyphro, then if the pious was being loved because it was pious, the [11] god-loved would also be being loved because it was god-loved; and if the god-loved was god-loved because it was being loved by the gods, then the pious would also be pious because it was being loved by the gods. But now you see that they are in opposite cases as being altogether different from each other: the one is such as to be loved because it is being loved, the other is being loved because it is such as to be loved. I’m afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is, you did not wish to make its nature clear to me
, but you told me an affect or quality of it, that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not [b] yet told me what the pious is. Now, if you will, do not hide things from me but tell me again from the beginning what piety is, whether being loved by the gods or having some other quality—we shall not quarrel about that—but be keen to tell me what the pious and the impious are.
EUTHYPHRO: But Socrates, I have no way of telling you what I have in mind, for whatever proposition we put forward goes around and refuses to stay put where we establish it.
SOCRATES: Your statements, Euthyphro, seem to belong to my ancestor, Daedalus. If I were stating them and putting them forward, you would [c] perhaps be making fun of me and say that because of my kinship with him my conclusions in discussion run away and will not stay where one puts them. As these propositions are yours, however, we need some other jest, for they will not stay put for you, as you say yourself.
EUTHYPHRO: I think the same jest will do for our discussion, Socrates, for I am not the one who makes them go round and not remain in the same place; it is you who are the Daedalus; for as far as I am concerned [d] they would remain as they were.
SOCRATES: It looks as if I was cleverer than Daedalus in using my skill, my friend, in so far as he could only cause to move the things he made himself, but I can make other people’s move as well as my own. And the smartest part of my skill is that I am clever without wanting to be, for I would rather have your statements to me remain unmoved than possess the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus. But enough [e] of this. Since I think you are making unnecessary difficulties, I am as eager as you are to find a way to teach me about piety, and do not give up before you do. See whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.
EUTHYPHRO: I think so.
SOCRATES: And is then all that is just pious? Or is all that is pious just, but not all that is just pious, but some of it is and some is not? [12]
EUTHYPHRO: I do not follow what you are saying, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yet you are younger than I by as much as you are wiser. As I say, you are making difficulties because of your wealth of wisdom. Pull yourself together, my dear sir, what I am saying is not difficult to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what the poet said who wrote:
You do not wish to name Zeus, who had done it, and who made all things grow, for where there is fear there is also shame.3 [b]
I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?
EUTHYPHRO: Please do.
SOCRATES: I do not think that “where there is fear there is also shame,” for I think that many people who fear disease and poverty and many other such things feel fear, but are not ashamed of the things they fear. Do you not think so?
EUTHYPHRO: I do indeed.
SOCRATES: But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there anyone [c] who, in feeling shame and embarrassment at anything, does not also at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?
EUTHYPHRO: He is certainly afraid.
SOCRATES: It is then not right to say “where there is fear there is also shame,” but that where there is shame there is also fear, for fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is a part of fear just as odd is a part of number, with the result that it is not true that where there is number there is also oddness, but that where there is oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Surely.
SOCRATES: This is the kind of thing I was asking before, whether where [d] there is piety there is also justice, but where there is justice there is not always piety, for the pious is a part of justice. Shall we say that, or do you think otherwise?
EUTHYPHRO: No, but like that, for what you say appears to be right.
SOCRATES: See what comes next: if the pious is a part of the just, we must, it seems, find out what part of the just it is. Now if you asked me something of what we mentioned just now, such as what part of number is the even, and what number that is, I would say it is the number that is divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or do you not think so?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
[e] SOCRATES: Try in this way to tell me what part of the just the pious is, in order to tell Meletus not to wrong us any more and not to indict me for ungodliness, since I have learned from you sufficiently what is godly and pious and what is not.
EUTHYPHRO: I think, Socrates, that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.
SOCRATES: You seem to me to put that very well, but I still need a bit of [13] information. I do not know yet what you mean by care, for you do not mean the care of the gods in the same sense as the care of other things, as, for example, we say, don’t we, that not everyone knows how to care for horses, but the horse breeder does.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do mean it that way.
SOCRATES: So horse breeding is the care of horses.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor does everyone know how to care for dogs, but the hunter does.
EUTHYPHRO: That is so.
SOCRATES: So hunting is the care of dogs.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes. [b]
SOCRATES: And cattle raising is the care of cattle.
EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.
SOCRATES: While piety and godliness is the care of the gods, Euthyphro. Is that what you mean?
EUTHYPHRO: It is.
SOCRATES: Now care in each case has the same effect; it aims at the good and the benefit of the object cared for, as you can see that horses cared for by horse breeders are benefited and become better. Or do you not think so?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: So dogs are benefited by dog breeding, cattle by cattle raising, and so with all the others. Or do you think that care aims to harm the [c] object of its care?
EUTHYPHRO: By Zeus, no.
SOCRATES: It aims to benefit the object of its care?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: Is piety then, which is the care of the gods, also to benefit the gods and make them better? Would you agree that when you do something pious you make some one of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: By Zeus, no.
SOCRATES: Nor do I think that this is what you mean—far from it—but that is why I asked you what you meant by the care of gods, because I did not believe you meant this kind of care. [d]
EUTHYPHRO: Quite right, Socrates, that is not the kind of care I mean.
SOCRATES: Very well, but what kind of care of the gods would piety be?
EUTHYPHRO: The kind of care, Socrates, that slaves take of their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand. It is likely to be a kind of service of the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.
SOCRATES: Could you tell me to the achievement of what goal service to doctors tends? Is it not, do you think, to achieving health?
EUTHYPHRO: I think so.
SOCRATES: What about service to shipbuilders? To what achievement is [e] it directed?
EUTHYPHRO: Clearly, Socrates, to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: And service to housebuilders to the building of a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, my good sir, to the achievement of what aim does service to the gods tend? You obviously know since you say that you, of all men, have the best knowledge of the divine.
EUTHYPHRO: And I am telling the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, by Zeus, what is that excellent aim that the gods achieve, using us as their servants?
EUTHYPHRO: Many fine things, Socrates.
[14] SOCRATES: So do generals, my friend. Nevertheless you could easily tell me their main concern, which is to achieve victory in war, is it not?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: The farmers too, I think, achieve many fine things, but the main point of their efforts is to produce food from the earth.
EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.
; SOCRATES: Well then, how would you sum up the many fine things that the gods achieve?
EUTHYPHRO: I told you a short while ago, Socrates, that it is a considerable [b] task to acquire any precise knowledge of these things, but, to put it simply, I say that if a man knows how to say and do what is pleasing to the gods at prayer and sacrifice, those are pious actions such as preserve both private houses and public affairs of state. The opposite of these pleasing actions are impious and overturn and destroy everything.
SOCRATES: You could tell me in far fewer words, if you were willing, the [c] sum of what I asked, Euthyphro, but you are not keen to teach me, that is clear. You were on the point of doing so, but you turned away. If you had given that answer, I should now have acquired from you sufficient knowledge of the nature of piety. As it is, the lover of inquiry must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him. Once more then, what do you say that piety and the pious are? Are they a knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray?
EUTHYPHRO: They are.
SOCRATES: To sacrifice is to make a gift to the gods, whereas to pray is to beg from the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Definitely, Socrates.
[d] SOCRATES: It would follow from this statement that piety would be a knowledge of how to give to, and beg from, the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: You understood what I said very well, Socrates.
SOCRATES: That is because I am so desirous of your wisdom, and I concentrate my mind on it, so that no word of yours may fall to the ground. But tell me, what is this service to the gods? You say it is to beg from them and to give to them?
EUTHYPHRO: I do.
SOCRATES: And to beg correctly would be to ask from them things that we need?
EUTHYPHRO: What else?
[e] SOCRATES: And to give correctly is to give them what they need from us, for it would not be skillful to bring gifts to anyone that are in no way needed.
EUTHYPHRO: True, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Piety would then be a sort of trading skill between gods and men?
EUTHYPHRO: Trading yes, if you prefer to call it that.
SOCRATES: I prefer nothing, unless it is true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods derive from the gifts they receive from us? What they give us is obvious to all. There is for us no good that we do not receive from them, [15] but how are they benefited by what they receive from us? Or do we have such an advantage over them in the trade that we receive all our blessings from them and they receive nothing from us?
Complete Works Page 6
