Yes.
Then if something smaller comes to be, it will come from something larger before, which became smaller? [71]
That is so, he said.
And the weaker comes to be from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower?
Certainly.
Further, if something worse comes to be, does it not come from the better, and the juster from the more unjust?
Of course.
So we have sufficiently established that all things come to be in this way, opposites from opposites?
Certainly.
There is a further point, something such as this, about these opposites: between each of those pairs of opposites there are two processes: from the [b] one to the other and then again from the other to the first; between the larger and the smaller there is increase and decrease, and we call the one increasing and the other decreasing?
Yes, he said.
And so too there is separation and combination, cooling and heating, and all such things, even if sometimes we do not have a name for the process, but in fact it must be everywhere that they come to be from one another, and that there is a process of becoming from each into the other?
Assuredly, he said.
[c] Well then, is there an opposite to living, as sleeping is the opposite of being awake?
Quite so, he said.
What is it?
Being dead, he said.
Therefore, if these are opposites, they come to be from one another, and there are two processes of generation between the two?
Of course.
I will tell you, said Socrates, one of the two pairs I was just talking about, the pair itself and the two processes, and you will tell me the other. [d] I mean, to sleep and to be awake; to be awake comes from sleeping, and to sleep comes from being awake. Of the two processes one is going to sleep, the other is waking up. Do you accept that, or not?
Certainly.
You tell me in the same way about life and death. Do you not say that to be dead is the opposite of being alive?
I do.
And they come to be from one another?
Yes.
What comes to be from being alive?
Being dead.
And what comes to be from being dead?
One must agree that it is being alive.
Then, Cebes, living creatures and things come to be from the dead?
[e] So it appears, he said.
Then our souls exist in the underworld.
That seems likely.
Then in this case one of the two processes of becoming is clear, for dying is clear enough, is it not?
It certainly is.
What shall we do then? Shall we not supply the opposite process of becoming? Is nature to be lame in this case? Or must we provide a process of becoming opposite to dying?
We surely must.
And what is that?
Coming to life again.
[72] Therefore, he said, if there is such a thing as coming to life again, it would be a process of coming from the dead to the living?
Quite so.
It is agreed between us then that the living come from the dead in this way no less than the dead from the living, and, if that is so, it seems to be a sufficient proof that the souls of the dead must be somewhere whence they can come back again.
I think, Socrates, he said, that this follows from what we have agreed on.
Consider in this way, Cebes, he said, that, as I think, we were not wrong to agree. If the two processes of becoming did not always balance each [b] other as if they were going round in a circle, but generation proceeded from one point to its opposite in a straight line and it did not turn back again to the other opposite or take any turning, do you realize that all things would ultimately be in the same state, be affected in the same way, and cease to become?
How do you mean? he said.
It is not hard to understand what I mean. If, for example, there was such a process as going to sleep, but no corresponding process of waking up, you realize that in the end everything would show the story of Endymion7 to have no meaning. There would be no point to it because everything [c] would have the same experience as he and be asleep. And if everything were combined and nothing separated, the saying of Anaxagoras8 would soon be true, “that all things were mixed together.” In the same way, my dear Cebes, if everything that partakes of life were to die and remain in that state and not come to life again, would not everything ultimately have [d] to be dead and nothing alive? Even if the living came from some other source, and all that lived died, how could all things avoid being absorbed in death?
It could not be, Socrates, said Cebes, and I think what you say is altogether true.
I think, Cebes, said he, that this is very definitely the case and that we were not deceived when we agreed on this: coming to life again in truth exists, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead exist. [e]
Furthermore, Socrates, Cebes rejoined, such is also the case if that theory is true that you are accustomed to mention frequently, that for us learning is no other than recollection. According to this, we must at some previous time have learned what we now recollect. This is possible only if our soul [73] existed somewhere before it took on this human shape. So according to this theory too, the soul is likely to be something immortal.
Cebes, Simmias interrupted, what are the proofs of this? Remind me, for I do not quite recall them at the moment.
There is one excellent argument, said Cebes, namely that when men are interrogated in the right manner, they always give the right answer of their own accord, and they could not do this if they did not possess the [b] knowledge and the right explanation inside them. Then if one shows them a diagram or something else of that kind, this will show most clearly that such is the case.9
If this does not convince you, Simmias, said Socrates, see whether you agree if we examine it in some such way as this, for do you doubt that what we call learning is recollection?
It is not that I doubt, said Simmias, but I want to experience the very thing we are discussing, recollection, and from what Cebes undertook to say, I am now remembering and am pretty nearly convinced. Nevertheless, I should like to hear now the way you were intending to explain it.
[c] This way, he said. We surely agree that if anyone recollects anything, he must have known it before.
Quite so, he said.
Do we not also agree that when knowledge comes to mind in this way, it is recollection? What way do I mean? Like this: when a man sees or hears or in some other way perceives one thing and not only knows that thing but also thinks of another thing of which the knowledge is not the same but different, are we not right to say that he recollects the second thing that comes into his mind?
[d] How do you mean?
Things such as this: to know a man is surely a different knowledge from knowing a lyre.
Of course.
Well, you know what happens to lovers: whenever they see a lyre, a garment or anything else that their beloved is accustomed to use, they know the lyre, and the image of the boy to whom it belongs comes into their mind. This is recollection, just as someone, on seeing Simmias, often recollects Cebes, and there are thousands of other such occurrences.
Thousands indeed, said Simmias.
Is this kind of thing not recollection of a kind, he said, especially so [e] when one experiences it about things that one had forgotten, because one had not seen them for some time?—Quite so.
Further, he said, can a man seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre recollect a man, or seeing a picture of Simmias recollect Cebes?—Certainly.
Or seeing a picture of Simmias, recollect Simmias himself?—He certainly can.
[74] In all these cases the recollection can be occasioned by things that are similar, but it can also be occasioned by things that are dissimilar?—It can.
When the recollection is caused by similar things, must one not of necessity also experience this: to cons
ider whether the similarity to that which one recollects is deficient in any respect or complete?—One must.
Consider, he said, whether this is the case: we say that there is something that is equal. I do not mean a stick equal to a stick or a stone to a stone, or anything of that kind, but something else beyond all these, the Equal itself. Shall we say that this exists or not?
Indeed we shall, by Zeus, said Simmias, most definitely. [b]
And do we know what this is?—Certainly.
Whence have we acquired the knowledge of it? Is it not from the things we mentioned just now, from seeing sticks or stones or some other things that are equal we come to think of that other which is different from them? Or doesn’t it seem to you to be different? Look at it also this way: do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one to be equal and to another to be unequal?—Certainly they do.
But what of the equals themselves? Have they ever appeared unequal [c] to you, or Equality to be Inequality?
Never, Socrates.
These equal things and the Equal itself are therefore not the same?
I do not think they are the same at all, Socrates.
But it is definitely from the equal things, though they are different from that Equal, that you have derived and grasped the knowledge of equality?
Very true, Socrates.
Whether it be like them or unlike them?
Certainly.
It makes no difference. As long as the sight of one thing makes you think of another, whether it be similar or dissimilar, this must of necessity be recollection? [d]
Quite so.
Well then, he said, do we experience something like this in the case of equal sticks and the other equal objects we just mentioned? Do they seem to us to be equal in the same sense as what is Equal itself? Is there some deficiency in their being such as the Equal, or is there not?
A considerable deficiency, he said.
Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be [e] like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?
Necessarily.
Well, do we also experience this about the equal objects and the Equal itself, or do we not?
Very definitely.
We must then possess knowledge of the Equal before that time when we first saw the equal objects and realized that all these objects strive to [75] be like the Equal but are deficient in this.
That is so.
Then surely we also agree that this conception of ours derives from seeing or touching or some other sense perception, and cannot come into our mind in any other way, for all these senses, I say, are the same.
They are the same, Socrates, at any rate in respect to that which our argument wishes to make plain.
[b] Our sense perceptions must surely make us realize that all that we perceive through them is striving to reach that which is Equal but falls short of it; or how do we express it?
Like that.
Then before we began to see or hear or otherwise perceive, we must have possessed knowledge of the Equal itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to be like it, but were inferior.
That follows from what has been said, Socrates.
But we began to see and hear and otherwise perceive right after birth?
Certainly.
[c] We must then have acquired the knowledge of the Equal before this.
Yes.
It seems then that we must have possessed it before birth.
It seems so.
Therefore, if we had this knowledge, we knew before birth and immediately after not only the Equal, but the Greater and the Smaller and all such things, for our present argument is no more about the Equal than about [d] the Beautiful itself, the Good itself, the Just, the Pious and, as I say, about all those things which we mark with the seal of “what it is,” both when we are putting questions and answering them. So we must have acquired knowledge of them all before we were born.
That is so.
If, having acquired this knowledge in each case, we have not forgotten it, we remain knowing and have knowledge throughout our life, for to know is to acquire knowledge, keep it and not lose it. Do we not call the losing of knowledge forgetting?
[e] Most certainly, Socrates, he said.
But, I think, if we acquired this knowledge before birth, then lost it at birth, and then later by the use of our senses in connection with those objects we mentioned, we recovered the knowledge we had before, would not what we call learning be the recovery of our own knowledge, and we are right to call this recollection?
Certainly.
[76] It was seen to be possible for someone to see or hear or otherwise perceive something, and by this to be put in mind of something else which he had forgotten and which is related to it by similarity or difference. One of two things follows, as I say: either we were born with the knowledge of it, and all of us know it throughout life, or those who later, we say, are learning, are only recollecting, and learning would be recollection.
That is certainly the case, Socrates.
Which alternative do you choose, Simmias? That we are born with [b] this knowledge or that we recollect later the things of which we had knowledge previously?
I have no means of choosing at the moment, Socrates.
Well, can you make this choice? What is your opinion about it? A man who has knowledge would be able to give an account of what he knows, or would he not?
He must certainly be able to do so, Socrates, he said.
And do you think everybody can give an account of the things we were mentioning just now?
I wish they could, said Simmias, but I’m afraid it is much more likely that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do so adequately.
So you do not think that everybody has knowledge of those things? [c]
No indeed.
So they recollect what they once learned?
They must.
When did our souls acquire the knowledge of them? Certainly not since we were born as men.
Indeed no.
Before that then?
Yes.
So then, Simmias, our souls also existed apart from the body before they took on human form, and they had intelligence.
Unless we acquire the knowledge at the moment of birth, Socrates, for that time is still left to us.
Quite so, my friend, but at what other time do we lose it? We just now [d] agreed that we are not born with that knowledge. Do we then lose it at the very time we acquire it, or can you mention any other time?
I cannot, Socrates. I did not realize that I was talking nonsense.
So this is our position, Simmias? he said. If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just [e] as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born. If these realities do not exist, then this argument is altogether futile. Is this the position, that there is an equal necessity for those realities to exist, and for our souls to exist before we were born? If the former do not exist, neither do the latter?
I do not think, Socrates, said Simmias, that there is any possible doubt that it is equally necessary for both to exist, and it is opportune that our argument comes to the conclusion that our soul exists before we are born, [77] and equally so that reality of which you are now speaking. Nothing is so evident to me personally as that all such things must certainly exist, the Beautiful, the Good, and all those you mentioned just now. I also think that sufficient proof of this has been given.
Then what about Cebes? said Socrates, for we must persuade Cebes also.
He is suffi
ciently convinced I think, said Simmias, though he is the most difficult of men to persuade by argument, but I believe him to be fully convinced that our soul existed before we were born. I do not think myself, [b] however, that it has been proved that the soul continues to exist after death; the opinion of the majority which Cebes mentioned still stands, that when a man dies his soul is dispersed and this is the end of its existence. What is to prevent the soul coming to be and being constituted from some other source, existing before it enters a human body and then, having done so and departed from it, itself dying and being destroyed?
[c] You are right, Simmias, said Cebes. Half of what needed proof has been proved, namely, that our soul existed before we were born, but further proof is needed that it exists no less after we have died, if the proof is to be complete.
It has been proved even now, Simmias and Cebes, said Socrates, if you are ready to combine this argument with the one we agreed on before, that every living thing must come from the dead. If the soul exists before, [d] it must, as it comes to life and birth, come from nowhere else than death and being dead, so how could it avoid existing after death since it must be born again? What you speak of has then even now been proved. However, I think you and Simmias would like to discuss the argument more fully. You seem to have this childish fear that the wind would really dissolve [e] and scatter the soul, as it leaves the body, especially if one happens to die in a high wind and not in calm weather.
Cebes laughed and said: Assuming that we were afraid, Socrates, try to change our minds, or rather do not assume that we are afraid, but perhaps there is a child in us who has these fears; try to persuade him not to fear death like a bogey.
You should, said Socrates, sing a charm over him every day until you have charmed away his fears.
[78] Where shall we find a good charmer for these fears, Socrates, he said, now that you are leaving us?
Greece is a large country, Cebes, he said, and there are good men in it; the tribes of foreigners are also numerous. You should search for such a charmer among them all, sparing neither trouble nor expense, for there is nothing on which you could spend your money to greater advantage. You must also search among yourselves, for you might not easily find people who could do this better than yourselves.
Complete Works Page 14
