Complete Works
Page 22
HERMOGENES: Indeed, Socrates, you do seem to me to be exactly like a prophet who has suddenly been inspired to deliver oracles.
SOCRATES: Yes, Hermogenes, and I, for my part, mostly blame Euthyphro, of the deme of Prospalta,17 for its coming upon me. I was with him at dawn, lending an ear to his lengthy discussion. He must have been inspired, because it looks as though he has not only filled my ears with his superhuman wisdom but taken possession of my soul as well. So it seems to me that this is what we ought to do: Today, we’ll use this wisdom and finish [e] our examination of names, but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we’ll exorcise it and purify ourselves, as soon as we’ve found someone—whether priest or wise man—who is clever at that kind of purification. [397]
HERMOGENES: That’s fine with me. I’d be very glad to hear what remains to be said about names.
SOCRATES: Then that’s what we must do. Since we now have some sort of outline to follow, which names do you want us to begin with, in order to find out whether names themselves will testify to us that they are not given by chance, but have some sort of correctness? The names that heroes and men are said to have might perhaps deceive us. After all, as we saw [b] at the beginning, they are often given because they are the names of ancestors, and some of them are wholly inappropriate. Many, too, are given in the hope that they will prove appropriate, such as ‘Eutychides’ (‘Son-of-good-fortune’), ‘Sosias’ (‘Saviour’), ‘Theophilus’ (‘God-beloved’), and many others. In my view, we must leave such names aside. We are most likely to find correctly given names among those concerned with the things that by nature always are, since it is proper for their names to be given with the greatest care, and some may even be the work of a more [c] than human power.
HERMOGENES: I think that’s sensible, Socrates.
SOCRATES: So isn’t it right to begin by seeing why the name ‘theoi’ (‘gods’) is itself one that the gods are correctly called?
HERMOGENES: It probably is.
SOCRATES: I suspect something like this. It seems to me that the first inhabitants of Greece believed only in those gods in which many foreigners [d] still believe today—the sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. And, seeing that these were always moving or running, they gave them the name ‘theoi’ because it was their nature to run (thein). Later, when they learned about the other gods, they called them all by that name. Does that seem likely—or am I talking nonsense?
HERMOGENES: It’s very likely.
SOCRATES: What shall we investigate next? Clearly, it’s daemons,18 then heroes, then humans, isn’t it?19
[e] HERMOGENES: Yes, daemons are next.20
SOCRATES: And what is the correct meaning of the name ‘daemons’, Hermogenes? See if you think there’s anything in what I’m about to say.
HERMOGENES: Say it, and I will.
SOCRATES: Do you know what Hesiod says daemons are?
HERMOGENES: No, I don’t remember.
SOCRATES: Do you remember that he speaks of a golden race, which was the first race of human beings to be born?
HERMOGENES: Yes, I remember that.
SOCRATES: He says this about it:
Since this race has been eclipsed by fate,
[398] They are called sacred daemons;
They live on earth and are good,
Warding off evil and guarding mortal men.21
HERMOGENES: So what?
SOCRATES: Well, I don’t think he’s saying that the golden race is by nature made of gold, but that it is good and fine. I consider it a proof of this that he calls us a race of iron.
HERMOGENES: That’s true.
SOCRATES: So don’t you think that if someone who presently exists were [b] good, Hesiod would say that he too belonged to the golden race?
HERMOGENES: He probably would.
SOCRATES: Are good people any different from wise ones?
HERMOGENES: No, they aren’t.
SOCRATES: It is principally because daemons are wise and knowing (daēmones), I think, that Hesiod says they are named ‘daemons’ (‘daimones’). In our older Attic dialect, we actually find the word ‘daēmones’. So, Hesiod and many other poets speak well when they say that when a good man dies, he has a great destiny and a great honor and becomes a ‘daemon’, [c] which is a name given to him because it accords with wisdom. And I myself assert, indeed, that every good man, whether alive or dead, is daemonic, and is correctly called a ‘daemon’.
HERMOGENES: And I think that I completely agree with you, Socrates. But what about the name ‘hero’ (‘hērōs’)? What is it?
SOCRATES: That one isn’t so hard to understand because the name has been little altered. It expresses the fact that heroes were born out of love (erōs).
HERMOGENES: How do you mean?
SOCRATES: Don’t you know that the heroes are demigods?
HERMOGENES: So what?
SOCRATES: So all of them sprang from the love of a god for a mortal woman or of a mortal man for a goddess. And if, as before, you investigate [d] the matter by relying on old Attic, you will get a better understanding, since it will show you that the name ‘hero’ (‘hērōs’) is only a slightly altered form of the word ‘love’ (‘erōs’)—the very thing from which the heroes sprang. And either this is the reason they were called ‘heroes’ or else because they were sophists, clever speech-makers (rhētores) and dialecticians, skilled questioners (erōtan)—for ‘eirein’ is the same as ‘legein’ (‘to speak’). And therefore, as we were saying just now, in the Attic dialect, the heroes turn out to be speech-makers and questioners. Hence the noble [e] breed of heroes turns out be a race of speech-makers and sophists. That isn’t hard to understand. But can you tell me why members of the human race are called ‘humans’ (‘anthrōpoi’)? That’s much harder to understand.
HERMOGENES: How could I do that, Socrates? I wouldn’t strain myself to find it even if I could, because I think you’re much more likely to find it than I am.
SOCRATES: You really do have faith in Euthyphro’s inspiration, it seems. [399]
HERMOGENES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And you’re certainly right to have faith in it. Indeed, I seem to have had such a clever insight just now, that, if I’m not careful, I’ll be in danger of becoming altogether too wise before the day is out. So pay attention. First of all, we must bear in mind the following point about names: we often add letters or take them out and change the accents as well, thus swerving aside from what we want to name. For instance, take ‘Dii philos’ (‘Friend-to-Zeus’). In order for us to have a name instead of a phrase, we took out the second ‘i’, and pronounced the second syllable [b] with a grave accent instead of an acute (‘Diphilos’). In other cases, we do the opposite, inserting letters and pronouncing a syllable with an acute accent instead of a grave.
HERMOGENES: That’s true.
SOCRATES: Now, I think our name for human beings is a case of just this sort. It was a phrase but became a name. One letter—‘a’—has been taken away and the accent on the final syllable has become a grave.
HERMOGENES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: The name ‘human’ signifies that the other animals do not [c] investigate or reason about anything they see, nor do they observe anything closely. But a human being no sooner sees something—that is to say, ‘opōpe’—than he observes it closely and reasons about it. Hence human beings alone among the animals are correctly named ‘anthrōpos’—one who observes closely what he has seen (anathrōn ha opōpe).
HERMOGENES: What comes next? May I tell you what I’d like to have explained?
SOCRATES: Of course.
[d] HERMOGENES: It seems to me to be next in order. We speak of the body and soul of a human being.
SOCRATES: Certainly.
HERMOGENES: Then let’s try to analyze their names as we did the previous ones.
SOCRATES: Are you saying that we should investigate whether soul and then body are reasonably named?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Speaki
ng off the top of my head, I think that those who gave soul its name had something like this in mind. They thought that when the soul is present in the body, it causes it to live and gives it the power [e] to breathe the air and be revitalized (anapsuchon), and that when this revitalization fails, the body dies and is finished. It’s for this reason, I think, that they called it ‘soul’ (‘psuchē). But hold on a minute, if you don’t mind, for I imagine that the followers of Euthyphro would despise this [400] analysis and think it crude. But I think I glimpse one they will find more persuasive. Have a look and see whether it pleases you.
HERMOGENES: Tell it to me and I will.
SOCRATES: When you consider the nature of every body, what, besides the soul, do you think sustains and supports it, so that it lives and moves about?
HERMOGENES: There isn’t anything.
SOCRATES: What about when you consider the nature of everything else? Don’t you agree with Anaxagoras that it is ordered and sustained by mind or soul?
HERMOGENES: I do.
[b] SOCRATES: So a fine name to give this power, which supports and sustains (ochei kai echei) the whole of nature (phusis), would be ‘nature-sustainer’ (‘phusechē’). This may also be pronounced more elegantly, ‘psuchē’.
HERMOGENES: Absolutely, and I also think this is a more scientific explanation than the other.
SOCRATES: Yes, it is. Nevertheless, it sounds funny when it’s named in the true way, with its actual name (i.e., ‘phusechē’).
HERMOGENES: What are we going to say about the next one?
SOCRATES: Are you referring to the name ‘body’?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: There’s a lot to say, it seems to me—and if one distorted the name a little, there would be even more. Thus some people say that the [c] body (sōma) is the tomb (sēma) of the soul, on the grounds that it is entombed in its present life, while others say that it is correctly called ‘a sign’ (‘sēma’) because the soul signifies whatever it wants to signify by means of the body. I think it is most likely the followers of Orpheus who gave the body its name, with the idea that the soul is being punished for something, and that the body is an enclosure or prison in which the soul is securely kept (sōzetai)—as the name ‘sōma’ itself suggests—until the penalty is paid; for, on this view, not even a single letter of the word needs to be changed.
HERMOGENES: I think we’ve adequately examined these names, Socrates. [d] But could we investigate the names of the other gods along the lines of your earlier discussion of ‘Zeus’, to see with what kind of correctness they have been given?
SOCRATES: By Zeus, we certainly can, Hermogenes. The first and finest line of investigation, which as intelligent people we must acknowledge, is this, that we admit that we know nothing about the gods themselves or about the names they call themselves—although it is clear that they call themselves by true ones. The second best line on the correctness of names is to say, as is customary in our prayers, that we hope the gods are pleased by the names we give them, since we know no others. I think this is an excellent custom. So, if it’s all right with you, let’s begin our investigation [401] by first announcing to the gods that we will not be investigating them—since we do not regard ourselves as worthy to conduct such an investigation—but rather human beings, and the beliefs they had in giving the gods their names. After all, there’s no offense in doing that.
HERMOGENES: What you say seems reasonable to me, Socrates, so let’s proceed as you suggest.
SOCRATES: Shall we begin, as is customary, with Hestia?22 [b]
HERMOGENES: All right.
SOCRATES: What do you think the person who gave Hestia her name had in mind by naming her that?
HERMOGENES: That’s no easy question to answer, in my opinion.
SOCRATES: At any rate, Hermogenes, the first name-givers weren’t ordinary people, but lofty thinkers and subtle reasoners.
HERMOGENES: What of it?
SOCRATES: Well, it’s obvious to me that it was people of this sort who gave things names, for even if one investigates names foreign to Attic Greek, it is equally easy to discover what they mean. In the case of what [c] we in Attic call ‘ousia’ (‘being’), for example, some call it ‘essia’ and others ‘ōsia’. First, then, it is reasonable, according to the second of these names, to call the being or essence (ousia) of things ‘Hestia’. Besides, we ourselves say that what partakes of being ‘is’ (‘estin’), so being is also correctly called ‘Hestia’ for this reason. We even seem to have called being ‘essia’ in ancient times. And, if one has sacrifices in mind, one will realize that the namegivers themselves understood matters in this way, for anyone who called [d] the being or essence of all things ‘essia’ would naturally sacrifice to Hestia before all the other gods. On the other hand, those who use the name ‘ōsia’ seem to agree pretty much with Heraclitus’ doctrine that the things that are are all flowing and that nothing stands fast—for the cause and originator of them is then the pusher (ōthoun), and so is well named ‘ōsia’. But that’s [e] enough for us to say about this, since we know nothing. After Hestia, it is right to investigate Rhea and Cronus, though we’ve already discussed the latter’s name. Now, maybe what I’m about to tell you is nonsense.
HERMOGENES: Why do you say that, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Because I’ve got a whole swarm of wisdom in my mind!
HERMOGENES: What sort of wisdom?
SOCRATES: It sounds completely absurd, yet it seems to me to have something [402] very plausible about it.
HERMOGENES: How so?
SOCRATES: I seem to see Heraclitus spouting some ancient bits of wisdom that Homer also tells us—wisdom as old as the days of Cronus and Rhea.
HERMOGENES: What are you referring to?
SOCRATES: Heraclitus says somewhere that “everything gives way and nothing stands fast,” and, likening the things that are to the flowing (rhoē) of a river, he says that “you cannot step into the same river twice.”23
HERMOGENES: So he does.
SOCRATES: Well, then, don’t you think that whoever gave the names ‘Rhea’ and ‘Cronus’ to the ancestors of the other gods understood things [b] in the same way as Heraclitus? Or do you think he gave them both the names of streams (rheumata) merely by chance?24 Similarly, Homer speaks of
Ocean, origin of the gods, and their mother Tethys;25
I think Hesiod says much the same. Orpheus, too, says somewhere that
Fair-flowing Ocean was the first to marry,
[c] And he wedded his sister, the daughter of his mother.26
See how they agree with each other, and how they all lean towards the doctrines of Heraclitus.
HERMOGENES: I think there’s something in what you say, Socrates, but I don’t understand what the name ‘Tethys’ means.
SOCRATES: But it practically tells you itself that it is the slightly disguised name of a spring! After all, what is strained (diattōmenon) and filtered [d] (ēthoumenon) is like a spring, and the name ‘Tethys’ is a compound of these two names.
HERMOGENES: That’s elegant, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Indeed, it is. But what comes next? We’ve already talked about Zeus.
HERMOGENES: Yes, we have.
SOCRATES: So let’s discuss his brothers, Posidon and Pluto (whether we call him ‘Pluto’ or by his other name).
HERMOGENES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that whoever first gave Posidon his name, gave it to him because he saw that the force of the waves stopped him from walking and prevented him from going any further, just like a shackle [e] around his feet (desmos tōn podōn). So he called this god, who is the ruler of the sea’s power, ‘Posidon’, because his ‘feet were shackled’ (‘posidesmon’)—the ‘e’ was probably added for the sake of euphony. But perhaps this isn’t what it says. Perhaps, instead of the ‘s’ the name was originally pronounced with a double ‘l’, because many things are known (poll’ eidōs) to the god. Or maybe he was called ‘The Shaker’ (‘ho seiōn’)
, because he [403] shook (seiein) the earth, and the ‘p’ and ‘d’ were added on. As for Pluto, he was given that name because it accords with his being the source of wealth (ploutos), since wealth comes up from below the ground. It seems to me that most people call him by the name ‘Pluto’, because they are afraid of what they can’t see (aeides), and they assume that his other name, ‘Hades’, associates him with that.
HERMOGENES: And what do you think yourself, Socrates? [b]
SOCRATES: I think people have lots of mistaken opinions about the power of this god and are unduly afraid of him. They are afraid because once we are dead we remain in his realm forever. They are terrified because the soul goes there stripped of the body. But I think that all these things, together with the name and office of the god, point in the same direction.
HERMOGENES: How so?
SOCRATES: I’ll tell you how it looks to me. But first answer me this: Of [c] the shackles that bind a living being and keep him in a place, which is stronger, force or desire?
HERMOGENES: Desire is far stronger, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Don’t you think then that many people would escape from Hades, if he didn’t bind those who come to him with the strongest of shackles?
HERMOGENES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: So, if he is to bind them with the strongest of shackles, rather than holding them by force, he must, it seems, bind them with some sort of desire.
HERMOGENES: Evidently.
SOCRATES: Now, there are lots of desires, aren’t there?
HERMOGENES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, if he is really going to hold them with the greatest shackles, he has to bind them with the greatest desire. [d]