VISITOR: The most important kinds we’ve just been discussing are that which is, rest, and change.
THEAETETUS: Yes, by far.
VISITOR: And we say that two of them don’t blend with each other.
THEAETETUS: Definitely not.
VISITOR: But that which is blends with both of them, since presumably both of them are.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: We do have three of them.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So each of them is different from two of them, but is the same as itself.
THEAETETUS: Yes. [e]
VISITOR: But what in the world are the same and the different that we’ve been speaking of? Are they two kinds other than those three but necessarily always blending with them? And do we have to think of them all as being five and not three? Or have what we’ve been calling the same and the [255] different turned out, without our realizing it, to be among those three?
THEAETETUS: Maybe.
VISITOR: But change and rest are certainly not different or the same.
THEAETETUS: Why not?
VISITOR: Whatever we call change and rest in common can’t be either one of them.
THEAETETUS: Why not?
VISITOR: Then change would rest and rest would change. In both cases, if either change or rest comes to be either same or different, then it will force the other to change to the contrary of its own nature, since it will [b] share in its contrary.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: And both do share in the same and in the different.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Then anyway let’s not say that change is the same or the different, nor that rest is.
THEAETETUS: All right.
VISITOR: But do we have to think of that which is and the same as one thing?
THEAETETUS: Maybe.
VISITOR: But if that which is and the same don’t signify distinct things, [c] then when we say that change and rest both are, we’ll be labeling both of them as being the same.
THEAETETUS: But certainly that’s impossible.
VISITOR: So it’s impossible for the same and that which is to be one.
THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
VISITOR: Shall we take the same as a fourth in addition to the other three forms?
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: Well then, do we have to call the different a fifth? Or should we think of it and that which is as two names for one kind?
THEAETETUS: Maybe.
VISITOR: But I think you’ll admit that some of those which are are said by themselves, but some are always said in relation to other things.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
[d] VISITOR: But the different is always said in relation to another, isn’t it?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: But it wouldn’t be if that which is and the different weren’t completely distinct. If the different shared in both kinds the way that which is does, then some of the things that are different would be different without being different in relation to anything different. In fact, though, it turns out that whatever is different definitely has to be what it is from something that’s different.
THEAETETUS: That’s exactly the way it is.
[e] VISITOR: And we do have to call the nature of the different a fifth among the forms we’re choosing.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: And we’re going to say that it pervades all of them, since each of them is different from the others, not because of its own nature but because of sharing in the type of the different.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: Let’s take up each of the five one by one and say this.
THEAETETUS: What?
VISITOR: First let’s say that change is completely different from rest. Shall we say that?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So it is not rest.
THEAETETUS: Not at all.
[256] VISITOR: But it is, because it shares in that which is.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Then again change is different from the same.
THEAETETUS: Pretty much.
VISITOR: So it is not the same.
THEAETETUS: No.
VISITOR: But still it was the same, we said,22 because everything has a share of that.
THEAETETUS: Definitely.
VISITOR: We have to agree without any qualms that change is the same and not the same. When we say that it’s the same and not the same, we aren’t speaking the same way. When we say it’s the same, that’s because [b] it shares in the same in relation to itself. But when we say it’s not the same, that’s because of its association with the different. Because of its association with the different, change is separated from the same, and so becomes not it but different. So that it’s right to say that it’s not the same.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: So if change itself ever somehow had a share in rest, there would be nothing strange about labeling it resting?
THEAETETUS: That’s absolutely right, as long as we admit that some kinds will blend with each other and some won’t.
VISITOR: That, though, we demonstrated earlier, before we came to this [c] point, and we showed that by nature it has to be so.23
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: To repeat,24 change is different from different, just as it’s other than both the same and rest.
THEAETETUS: It has to be.
VISITOR: So in a way it is different and not different, according to what we’ve said.
THEAETETUS: Right.
VISITOR: So what next? Are we going to say that change is different from the first three but not from the fourth, in spite of the fact that we’ve agreed that there were five things we were going to investigate? [d]
THEAETETUS: How could we do that? We can’t admit that there are fewer of them than there appeared to be just now.
VISITOR: So shall we go on fearlessly contending that change is different from that which is?
THEAETETUS: Yes, we should be absolutely fearless.
VISITOR: So it’s clear that change really is both something that is not, but also a thing that is since it partakes in that which is?
THEAETETUS: That’s absolutely clear.
VISITOR: So it has to be possible for that which is not to be, in the case of change and also as applied to all the kinds. That’s because as applied to [e] all of them the nature of the different makes each of them not be, by making it different from that which is. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in this same way. And on the other hand we’re also going to be right if we call them beings, because they have a share in that which is.
THEAETETUS: It seems that way.
VISITOR: So as concerning each of the forms that which is is extensive, and that which is not is indefinite in quantity.
THEAETETUS: That seems right.
[257] VISITOR: So we have to say that that which is itself is different from the others.
THEAETETUS: Necessarily.
VISITOR: So even that which is is not, in as many applications as there are of the others, since, not being them, it is one thing, namely itself, and on the other hand it is not those others, which are an indefinite number.
THEAETETUS: I suppose so.
VISITOR: So then we shouldn’t even be annoyed about this conclusion, precisely because it’s the nature of kinds to allow association with each other. And if somebody doesn’t admit that, then he needs to win us over from our earlier line of argument for it, in order to win us over from its consequences.
THEAETETUS: That’s entirely fair.
[b] VISITOR: Now let’s look at this.
THEAETETUS: What?
VISITOR: It seems that when we say that which is not, we don’t say something contrary to that which is, but only something different from it.
THEAETETUS: Why?
VISITOR: It’s like this. When we speak of something as not large, does
it seem to you that we indicate the small rather than the equal?
THEAETETUS: Of course not.
VISITOR: So we won’t agree with somebody who says that negation [c] signifies a contrary. We’ll only admit this much: when “not” and “non” are prefixed to names that follow them, they indicate something other than the names, or rather, other than the things to which the names following the negation are applied.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
VISITOR: If you don’t mind, though, let’s think about this.
THEAETETUS: What?
VISITOR: The nature of the different appears to be chopped up, just like knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Why?
VISITOR: Knowledge is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that has to do with something is marked off and has a name peculiar to itself. That’s why there are said to be many expertises and many kinds [d] of knowledge.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And so the same thing happens to the parts of the nature of the different, too, even though it’s one thing.
THEAETETUS: Maybe. But shall we say how?
VISITOR: Is there a part of the different that’s placed over against the beautiful?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Shall we say that it’s nameless, or does it have a name?
THEAETETUS: It has a name. What we call not beautiful is the thing that’s different from nothing other than the nature of the beautiful.
VISITOR: Now go ahead and tell me this.
THEAETETUS: What? [e]
VISITOR: Isn’t it in the following way that the not beautiful turns out to be, namely, by being both marked off within one kind of those that are, and also set over against one of those that are?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: Then it seems that the not beautiful is a sort of setting of a being over against a being.
THEAETETUS: That’s absolutely right.
VISITOR: Well then, according to this account, is the beautiful more a being than the not beautiful?
THEAETETUS: Not at all.
VISITOR: So we have to say that both the not large and the large [258] equally are.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So we also have to put the not just on a par with the just, in that neither is any more than the other.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And we’ll speak about the others in the same way too, since the nature of the different appeared as being one of those that are. And because it is, we have to posit its parts as no less beings.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: So it seems that the setting against each other of the nature of a part of the different and the nature of that which is is not any less being—if [b] we’re allowed to say such a thing—than that which is itself. And it does not signify something contrary to that which is but only something different from it.
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
VISITOR: So what shall we call it?
THEAETETUS: Obviously that which is not—which we were looking for because of the sophist—is just exactly this.
VISITOR: Then does it have just as much being as any of the others, as you said it did? Should we work up the courage now to say that that which is not definitely is something that has its own nature? Should we say that [c] just as the large was large, the beautiful was beautiful, the not large was not large, and the not beautiful was not beautiful, in the same way that which is not also was and is not being, and is one form among the many that are? Do we, Theaetetus, still have any doubts about that?
THEAETETUS: No.
VISITOR: You know, our disbelief in Parmenides has gone even farther than his prohibition.
THEAETETUS: How?
VISITOR: We’ve pushed our investigation ahead and shown him something even beyond what he prohibited us from even thinking about.
THEAETETUS: In what way?
[d] VISITOR: Because he says, remember,
Never shall it force itself on us, that that which is not may be;
Keep your thought far away from this path of searching.
THEAETETUS: That’s what he says.
VISITOR: But we’ve not only shown that those which are not are. We’ve also caused what turns out to be the form of that which is not to appear. [e] Since we showed that the nature of the different is, chopped up among all beings in relation to each other, we dared to say that that which is not really is just this, namely, each part of the nature of the different that’s set over against that which is.
THEAETETUS: And what we’ve said seems to me completely and totally true.
VISITOR: Nobody can say that this that which is not, which we’ve made to appear and now dare to say is, is the contrary of that which is. We’ve [259] said good-bye long ago to any contrary of that which is, and to whether it is or not, and also to whether or not an account can be given of it. With regard to that which is not, which we’ve said is, let someone refute us and persuade us that we’ve made a mistake—or else, so long as he can’t do that, he should say just what we say. He has to say that the kinds blend with each other, that that which is and the different pervade all of them and each other, that the different shares in that which is and so, because of that sharing, is. But he won’t say that it is that which it shares in, but that it is different from it, and necessarily, because it is different from that which [b] is, it clearly can be what is not. On the other hand that which is has a share in the different, so, being different from all of the others, it is not each of them and it is not all of the others except itself. So that which is indisputably is not millions of things, and all of the others together, and also each of them, are in many ways and also are not in many ways.
THEAETETUS: True.
VISITOR: And if anyone doesn’t believe these contrarieties, he has to think about them himself and say something better than what we’ve said. But if he thinks he’s recognized a problem in it and enjoys dragging the [c] argument back and forth, then he’s been carried away by something that’s not worth much of anyone’s attention—to go by what we’ve just been saying, anyway. A thing like that isn’t clever or hard to discover, but the other thing is both difficult and at the same time beautiful.
THEAETETUS: What other thing?
VISITOR: The thing we said earlier. That is, we should leave pointless things like this alone. Instead we should be able to follow what a person says and scrutinize it step by step. When he says that what’s different is the same in a certain way or that what’s the same is different in a certain way, we should understand just what way he means, and the precise [d] respect in which he’s saying that the thing is the same or different. But when someone makes that which is the same appear different in just any old way, or vice versa, or when he makes what’s large appear small or something that’s similar appear dissimilar—well, if someone enjoys constantly trotting out contraries like that in discussion, that’s not true refutation. It’s only the obvious new-born brain-child of someone who just came into contact with those which are.25
THEAETETUS: Definitely.
VISITOR: In fact, my friend, it’s inept to try to separate everything from everything else. It’s the sign of a completely unmusical and unphilosophical [e] person.
THEAETETUS: Why?
VISITOR: To dissociate each thing from everything else is to destroy totally everything there is to say. The weaving together of forms is what makes speech possible for us.
THEAETETUS: That’s true.
VISITOR: Think about what a good moment we picked to fight it out [260] against people like that, and to force them further to let one thing blend with another.
THEAETETUS: Why a good moment?
VISITOR: For speech’s being one kind among those that are. If we were deprived of that, we’d be deprived of philosophy—to mention the most important thing. Besides, now we have to agree about what speech is, but we’d be able to say nothing if speech were taken away from us and weren’t [b] anything at all. And it would be
taken away if we admitted that there’s no blending of anything with anything else.
THEAETETUS: This last thing is right, anyway. But I don’t understand why we have to agree about speech.
VISITOR: Well, perhaps you’ll understand if you follow me this way.
THEAETETUS: Where?
VISITOR: That which is not appeared to us to be one kind among others, but scattered over all those which are.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: So next we have to think about whether it blends with belief and speech.
THEAETETUS: Why?
[c] VISITOR: If it doesn’t blend with them then everything has to be true. But if it does then there will be false belief and false speech, since falsity in thinking and speaking amount to believing and saying those that are not.
THEAETETUS: Yes.
VISITOR: And if there’s falsity then there’s deception.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: And if there’s deception then necessarily the world will be full of copies, likenesses, and appearances.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
VISITOR: We said that the sophist had escaped into this region, but that [d] he denied that there has come to be or is such a thing as falsity. For he denied that anyone either thinks or says that which is not, on the ground that that which is not never in any way has a share in being.
THEAETETUS: That’s what he said.
VISITOR: But now it apparently does share in that which is, so he probably wouldn’t still put up a fight about that. Perhaps, though, he might say that some forms share in that which is not and some don’t, and that speech and belief are ones that don’t. So he might contend again that copy-making [e] and appearance-making—in which we said he was contained—totally are not. His ground would be that belief and speech don’t associate with that which is not, and that without this association falsity totally is not. That’s why we have to search around for speech, belief, and appearance, and first discover what they are, so that when they appear we see their association [261] with that which is not clearly. Then when we’ve seen that clearly we can show that falsity is, and when we’ve shown that we can tie the sophist up in it, if we can keep hold of him—or else we’ll let him go and look for him in another kind.
THEAETETUS: What you said at the start seems absolutely true. The sophist is a hard kind to hunt down. He seems to have a whole supply of roadblocks, and whenever he throws one down in our way we have to fight through it before we can get to him. But now when we’ve barely gotten through the one about how that which is not is not, he’s thrown another [b] one down and we have to show that falsity is present in both speech and belief. And next, it seems, there will be another and another after that. A limit, it seems, never appears.
Complete Works Page 46
