Complete Works
Page 89
Suppose one of the gods asked you, “Alcibiades, would you rather live with what you now have, or would you rather die on the spot if you weren’t permitted to acquire anything greater?” I think you’d choose to die. What then is your real ambition in life? I’ll tell you. You think that as soon as you present yourself before the Athenian people—as indeed [b] you expect to in a very few days—by presenting yourself you’ll show them that you deserve to be honored more than Pericles or anyone else who ever was. Having shown that, you’ll be the most influential man in the city, and if you’re the greatest here, you’ll be the greatest in the rest of Greece, and not only in Greece, but also among the foreigners who live on the same continent as we do.
And if that same god were then to tell you that you should have absolute power in Europe, but that you weren’t permitted to cross over into Asia [c] or get mixed up with affairs over there, I think you’d rather not live with only that to look forward to; you want your reputation and your influence to saturate all mankind, so to speak. I don’t think you regard anybody as ever having been much to speak of, except perhaps Cyrus and Xerxes.2 I’m not guessing that this is your ambition—I’m sure of it.
Since you know that what I say is true, maybe you’ll say, “Well then, [d] Socrates, what’s this got to do with your point? You said you were going to tell me why you haven’t given up on me.”3 Yes, I will tell you, my dear son of Clinias and Dinomache. It is impossible to put any of these ideas of yours into effect without me—that’s how much influence I think I have over you and your business. I think this is why the god hasn’t allowed me to talk to you all this time; and I’ve been waiting for the day he allows me.
[e] I’m hoping for the same thing from you4 as you are from the Athenians: I hope to exert great influence over you by showing you that I’m worth the world to you and that nobody is capable of providing you with the influence you crave, neither your guardian nor your relatives, nor anybody else except me—with the god’s help, of course. When you were younger, before you were full of such ambitions, I think the god didn’t let me talk [106] to you because the conversation would have been pointless. But now he’s told me to, because now you will listen to me.
ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, now that you’ve started talking you seem much more bizarre to me than when you followed me in silence, though you were very bizarre to look at then, too. Well, on the question of whether or not these are my ambitions, you seem to have made up your mind already, and no denial of mine will do anything to convince you otherwise. Fine. But supposing I really do have these ambitions, how will you help me achieve them? What makes you indispensable? Have you got something to say?
[b] SOCRATES: Are you asking if I can say some long speech like the ones you’re used to hearing? No, that sort of thing’s not for me. But I do think I’d be able to show you that what I said is true, if only you were willing to grant me just one little favor.
ALCIBIADES: Well, as long as you mean a favor that’s not hard to grant, I’m willing.
SOCRATES: Do you think it’s hard to answer questions?
ALCIBIADES: No, I don’t.
SOCRATES: Then answer me.
ALCIBIADES: Ask me.
SOCRATES: My question is whether you have in mind what I say you have in mind.
[c] ALCIBIADES: Let’s say I do, if you like, so I can find out what you’re going to say.
SOCRATES: Right then; you plan, as I say, to come forward and advise the Athenians some time soon. Suppose I stopped you as you were about to take the podium and asked, “Alcibiades, what are the Athenians proposing to discuss? You’re getting up to advise them because it’s something you know better than they do, aren’t you?” What would you reply?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, I suppose I would say it was something that I know [d] better than they do.
SOCRATES: So it’s on matters you know about that you’re a good adviser.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: Now the only things you know are what you’ve learned from others or found out for yourself; isn’t that right?
ALCIBIADES: What else could I know?
SOCRATES: Could you ever have learned or found out anything without wanting to learn it or work it out for yourself?
ALCIBIADES: No, I couldn’t have.
SOCRATES: Is that right? Would you have wanted to learn or work out something that you thought you understood?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: So there was a time when you didn’t think you knew what [e] you now understand.
ALCIBIADES: There must have been.
SOCRATES: But I’ve got a pretty good idea what you’ve learned. Tell me if I’ve missed anything: as far as I remember, you learned writing and lyre-playing and wrestling, but you didn’t want to learn aulos-playing.5 These are the subjects that you understand—unless perhaps you’ve been learning something while I wasn’t looking; but I don’t think you have been, either by night or by day, on your excursions from home.
ALCIBIADES: No, those are the only lessons I took.
SOCRATES: Well then, is it when the Athenians are discussing how to [107] spell a word correctly that you’ll stand up to advise them?
ALCIBIADES: Good God, I’d never do that!
SOCRATES: Then is it when they’re discussing the notes on the lyre?
ALCIBIADES: No, never.
SOCRATES: But surely they’re not in the habit of discussing wrestling in the Assembly.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: Then what will they be discussing? I presume it won’t be building.
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Because a builder would give better advice on these matters than you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes. [b]
SOCRATES: Nor will they be discussing divination, will they?
ALCIBIADES: No.
SOCRATES: Because then a diviner would be better at giving advice than you.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Regardless of whether he’s tall or short, or handsome or ugly, or even noble or common.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.6
SOCRATES: And when the Athenians are discussing measures for public [c] health, it will make no difference to them if their counsellor is rich or poor, but they will make sure that their adviser is a doctor.
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: I suppose that’s because advice on any subject is the business not of those who are rich but of those who know it.
ALCIBIADES: Quite reasonably so.
SOCRATES: Then what will they be considering when you stand up to advise them, assuming you’re right to do so?
ALCIBIADES: They’ll be discussing their own business, Socrates.
SOCRATES: You mean their shipbuilding business—what sorts of ships they should be building?
ALCIBIADES: No, Socrates, I don’t.
SOCRATES: I suppose that’s because you don’t understand shipbuilding. Am I right, or is there some other reason?
ALCIBIADES: No, that’s it.
[d] SOCRATES: So what kind of ‘their own business’ do you think they’ll be discussing?
ALCIBIADES: War, Socrates, or peace, or anything else which is the business of the city.
SOCRATES: Do you mean they’ll be discussing who they should make peace with and who they should go to war with and how?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But shouldn’t they do that with the ones with whom it’s better to?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
[e] SOCRATES: And when it’s better?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And for as long a time as it’s better?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Now supposing the Athenians were discussing who they should wrestle with and who they should spar with and how, who would be a better adviser, you or the trainer?
ALCIBIADES: The trainer, I guess.
SOCRATES: And can you tell me what the trainer has in view when he advises you w
ho you should or shouldn’t wrestle with, and when, and how? I mean, for example, that one should wrestle with those with whom it’s better to wrestle, isn’t that right?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And as much as is better? [108]
ALCIBIADES: That’s right.
SOCRATES: And when it’s better, right?
ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Let’s take another example: when you’re singing, you should sometimes accompany the song with lyre-playing and dancing.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, you should.
SOCRATES: You should do so when it’s better to, right?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And as much as is better.
ALCIBIADES: I agree.
SOCRATES: Really? Since you used the term ‘better’ in both cases—in [b] wrestling and in playing the lyre while singing—what do you call what’s better in lyre-playing, as I call what’s better in wrestling ‘athletic’? What do you call that?
ALCIBIADES: I don’t get it.
SOCRATES: Then try to follow my example. My answer was, I think, ‘what is correct in every case’—and what is correct, I presume, is what takes place in accordance with the skill, isn’t it?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Wasn’t the skill athletics?
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: I said that what’s better in wrestling, was ‘athletic’. [c]
ALCIBIADES: That’s what you said.
SOCRATES: Wasn’t that well said?
ALCIBIADES: I think so, anyway.
SOCRATES: Come on then, it’s your turn; it’s partly up to you, surely, to keep our conversation going well. First of all, tell me what the skill is for singing and dancing and playing the lyre correctly. What is it called as a whole? … Aren’t you able to tell me yet?
ALCIBIADES: No, I can’t.
SOCRATES: Well, try it this way. Who are the goddesses to whom the skill belongs?
ALCIBIADES: Do you mean the Muses, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I do indeed. Don’t you see? What’s the name of the skill that’s [d] named after them?
ALCIBIADES: I think you mean music.
SOCRATES: Yes, I do. Now what is “correctly” for what takes place in accordance with this skill? In the other case I told you what “correctly” is for what takes place in accordance with the skill, so now it’s your turn to say something similar in this case. How does it take place?
ALCIBIADES: Musically, I think.
SOCRATES: A good answer. Come on now, what do you call what’s better in both going to war and keeping the peace? In these last two examples you [e] said that what was better was more musical and more athletic, respectively. Now try to tell me what’s better in this case, too.
ALCIBIADES: I really can’t do it.
SOCRATES: But surely it’s disgraceful if when you’re speaking and giving advice about food—saying that a certain kind is better than another, and better at a certain time and in a certain quantity—and someone should ask you, “What do you mean by ‘better’, Alcibiades?” you could tell him in that case that ‘better’ was ‘healthier’, though you don’t even pretend [109] to be a doctor; and yet in a case where you do pretend to understand and are going to stand up and give advice as though you knew, if you aren’t able, as seems likely, to answer the question in this case, won’t you be embarrassed? Won’t that seem disgraceful?
ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly.
SOCRATES: Then think about it, and try to tell me what the better tends towards, in keeping the peace or in waging war with the right people.
ALCIBIADES: I’m thinking, but I can’t get it.
SOCRATES: But suppose we’re at war with somebody—surely you know what treatment we accuse each other of when we enter into a war, and what we call it.
[b] ALCIBIADES: I do—we say that they’re playing some trick on us, or attacking us or taking things away from us.
SOCRATES: Hold on—how do we suffer from each of these treatments? Try to tell me how one way differs from another way.
ALCIBIADES: When you say ‘way’, Socrates, do you mean ‘justly’ or ‘unjustly’?
SOCRATES: Precisely.
ALCIBIADES: But surely that makes all the difference in the world.
SOCRATES: Really? Who will you advise the Athenians to wage war on? Those who are treating us unjustly, or those who are treating us justly?
[c] ALCIBIADES: That’s a hard question you’re asking. Even if someone thought it was necessary to wage war on people who were treating us justly, he wouldn’t admit it.
SOCRATES: Because I think that wouldn’t be lawful.
ALCIBIADES: It certainly wouldn’t.
SOCRATES: Nor would it be considered a proper thing to do.
ALCIBIADES: No.7
SOCRATES: So you would also frame your speech in these terms.
ALCIBIADES: I’d have to.
SOCRATES: Then this ‘better’ I was just asking you about—when it comes to waging war or not, on whom to wage war and on whom not to, and when and when not to—this ‘better’ turns out to be the same as ‘more just’, doesn’t it?
ALCIBIADES: It certainly seems so.
[d] SOCRATES: But how could it, my dear Alcibiades? Don’t you realize that this is something you don’t understand? Or perhaps, when I wasn’t looking, you’ve been seeing some teacher who taught you how to tell the difference between the more just and the less just. Have you? … Well, who is he? Tell me who he is so that you can sign me up with him as well.
ALCIBIADES: Stop teasing me, Socrates.
SOCRATES: I’m not—I’ll swear by Friendship,8 yours and mine. I’d never perjure myself by him. So tell me who he is, if you can.
ALCIBIADES: And what if I can’t? Don’t you think I might know about [e] justice and injustice some other way?
SOCRATES: Yes, you might—if you found it out.
ALCIBIADES: Well, don’t you think I might find it out?
SOCRATES: Yes, of course—if you investigate the matter.
ALCIBIADES: And don’t you think I might investigate it?
SOCRATES: Yes, I do—if you thought you didn’t know.
ALCIBIADES: And didn’t I once think that?
SOCRATES: A fine answer. Can you tell me when this was, when you didn’t think you knew about justice and injustice … Well, was it last year [110] that you were looking into it and didn’t think you knew? Or did you think you knew? … Answer me truthfully, or else our conversation will be a waste of time.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, I thought I knew.
SOCRATES: Didn’t you think the same thing two years ago, and three years ago, and four?
ALCIBIADES: I did.
SOCRATES: But surely before that you were a boy, weren’t you?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well now, at that point I’m sure you thought you knew.
ALCIBIADES: How can you be sure of that?
SOCRATES: When you were a boy I often observed you, at school and [b] other places, and sometimes when you were playing knucklebones or some other game, you’d say to one or another of your playmates, very loudly and confidently—not at all like someone who was at a loss about justice and injustice—that he was a lousy cheater and wasn’t playing fairly. Isn’t that true?
ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when somebody cheated me like that?
SOCRATES: Do you mean, what should you have done if you didn’t actually know then whether or not you were being cheated?
ALCIBIADES: But I did know, by Zeus! I saw clearly that they were cheating [c] me.
SOCRATES: So it seems that even as a child you thought you understood justice and injustice.
ALCIBIADES: Yes, and I did understand.
SOCRATES: At what point did you find it out? Surely it wasn’t when you thought you knew.
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Then when did you think you didn’t know? Think about it—you won’t find any such time.
/> ALCIBIADES: By Zeus, Socrates, I really can’t say.
[d] SOCRATES: So it isn’t by finding it out that you know it.
ALCIBIADES: That’s not very likely.
SOCRATES: But surely you just finished saying that it wasn’t by being taught, either, that you knew it. So if you neither found it out nor were taught it, how and where did you come to know it?
ALCIBIADES: Maybe I gave you the wrong answer when I said I knew it by finding it out myself.
SOCRATES: Then how did it happen?
ALCIBIADES: I suppose I learned it in the same way as other people.
SOCRATES: That brings us back to the same argument: from whom? Do tell me.
[e] ALCIBIADES: From people in general.
SOCRATES: When you give the credit to ‘people in general’, you’re falling back on teachers who are no good.
ALCIBIADES: What? Aren’t they capable of teaching?
SOCRATES: No, they can’t even teach you what moves to make or not make in knucklebones. And yet that’s a trivial matter, I suppose, compared with justice … What? Don’t you agree?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: So although they can’t teach trivial things, you say they can teach more serious things.
ALCIBIADES: I think so; at any rate, they can teach a lot of things that are more important than knucklebones.
SOCRATES: Like what?
[111] ALCIBIADES: Well, for example, I learned how to speak Greek from them; I couldn’t tell you who my teacher was, but I give the credit to the very people you say are no good at teaching.
SOCRATES: Yes, my noble friend, people in general are good teachers of that, and it would be only fair to praise them for their teaching.
ALCIBIADES: Why?
SOCRATES: Because they have what it takes to be good teachers of the subject.
ALCIBIADES: What do you mean by that?
SOCRATES: Don’t you see that somebody who is going to teach anything must first know it himself? Isn’t that right?
[b] ALCIBIADES: Of course.
SOCRATES: And don’t people who know something agree with each other, not disagree?
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
SOCRATES: If people disagree about something, would you say that they know it?
ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Then how could they be teachers of it?
ALCIBIADES: They couldn’t possibly.