Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  CALLICLES: As a painful thing. But for a hungry man to eat is pleasant.

  [d] SOCRATES: I agree. I understand. But the hunger itself is painful, isn’t it?

  CALLICLES: So I say.

  SOCRATES: And thirst is, too?

  CALLICLES: Very much so.

  SOCRATES: Am I to ask any further, or do you agree that every deficiency and appetite is painful?

  CALLICLES: I do. No need to ask.

  SOCRATES: Fair enough. Wouldn’t you say that, for a thirsty person, to drink is something pleasant?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I would.

  SOCRATES: And in the case you speak of, “a thirsty person” means “a person who’s in pain,” I take it?

  [e] CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And drinking is a filling of the deficiency, and is a pleasure?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now, don’t you mean that insofar as a person is drinking, he’s feeling enjoyment?

  CALLICLES: Very much so.

  SOCRATES: Even though he’s thirsty?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I agree.

  SOCRATES: Even though he’s in pain?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Do you observe the result, that when you say that a thirsty person drinks, you’re saying that a person who’s in pain simultaneously feels enjoyment? Or doesn’t this happen simultaneously in the same place, in the soul or in the body as you like? I don’t suppose it makes any difference which. Is this so or not?

  CALLICLES: It is.

  SOCRATES: But you do say that it’s impossible for a person who’s doing [497] well to be doing badly at the same time.

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: Yet you did agree that it’s possible for a person in pain to feel enjoyment.

  CALLICLES: Apparently.

  SOCRATES: So, feeling enjoyment isn’t the same as doing well, and being in pain isn’t the same as doing badly, and the result is that what’s pleasant turns out to be different from what’s good.

  CALLICLES: I don’t know what your clever remarks amount to, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: You do know. You’re just pretending you don’t, Callicles. Go just a bit further ahead.

  CALLICLES: Why do you keep up this nonsense?

  [b] SOCRATES: So you’ll know how wise you are in scolding me. Doesn’t each of us stop being thirsty and stop feeling pleasure at the same time as a result of drinking?

  CALLICLES: I don’t know what you mean.

  GORGIAS: Don’t do that, Callicles! Answer him for our benefit too, so that the discussion may be carried through.

  CALLICLES: But Socrates is always like this, Gorgias. He keeps questioning people on matters that are trivial, hardly worthwhile, and refutes them!

  GORGIAS: What difference does that make to you? It’s none of your business to appraise them, Callicles. You promised Socrates that he could try to refute you in any way he liked.

  CALLICLES: Go ahead, then, and ask these trivial, petty questions, since [c] that’s what pleases Gorgias.

  SOCRATES: You’re a happy man, Callicles, in that you’ve been initiated into the greater mysteries before the lesser. I didn’t think it was permitted. So answer where you left off, and tell me whether each of us stops feeling pleasure at the same time as he stops being thirsty.

  CALLICLES: That’s my view.

  SOCRATES: And doesn’t he also stop having pleasures at the same time as he stops being hungry or stops having the other appetites?

  CALLICLES: That’s so.

  SOCRATES: Doesn’t he then also stop having pains and pleasures at the [d] same time?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: But, he certainly doesn’t stop having good things and bad things at the same time, as you agree. Don’t you still agree?

  CALLICLES: Yes I do. Why?

  SOCRATES: Because it turns out that good things are not the same as pleasant ones, and bad things not the same as painful ones. For pleasant and painful things come to a stop simultaneously, whereas good things and bad ones do not, because they are in fact different things. How then could pleasant things be the same as good ones and painful things the same as bad ones?

  Look at it this way, too, if you like, for I don’t suppose that you agree with that argument, either. Consider this. Don’t you call men good because [e] of the presence of good things in them, just as you call them good-looking because of the presence of good looks?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: Well then, do you call foolish and cowardly men good? You didn’t a while ago; you were then calling brave and intelligent ones good.

  Or don’t you call these men good?

  CALLICLES: Oh yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: Well then, have you ever seen a foolish child feel enjoyment?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I have.

  SOCRATES: But you’ve never yet seen a foolish man feel enjoyment?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I suppose I have. What’s the point?

  SOCRATES: Nothing. Just answer me.

  CALLICLES: Yes, I’ve seen it. [498]

  SOCRATES: Well now, have you ever seen an intelligent man feel pain or enjoyment?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I daresay I have.

  SOCRATES: Now who feels pain or enjoyment more, intelligent men or foolish ones?

  CALLIGLES: I don’t suppose there’s a lot of difference.

  SOCRATES: Good enough. Have you ever seen a cowardly man in combat?

  CALLICLES: Of course I have.

  SOCRATES: Well then, when the enemy retreated, who do you think felt enjoyment more, the cowards or the brave men?

  [b] CALLICLES: Both felt it, I think; maybe the cowards felt it more. But if not, they felt it to pretty much the same degree.

  SOCRATES: It makes no difference. So cowards feel enjoyment too?

  CALLICLES: Oh yes, very much so.

  SOCRATES: Fools do too, evidently.

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now when the enemy advances, are the cowards the only ones to feel pain, or do the brave men do so too?

  CALLICLES: They both do.

  SOCRATES: To the same degree?

  CALLICLES: Maybe the cowards feel it more.

  SOCRATES: And when the enemy retreats, don’t they feel enjoyment more?

  CALLICLES: Maybe.

  SOCRATES: So don’t foolish men and intelligent ones, and cowardly men [c] and brave ones feel enjoyment and pain to pretty much the same degree, as you say, or cowardly men feel them more than brave ones?

  CALLICLES: That’s my view.

  SOCRATES: But surely the intelligent and brave men are good and the cowardly and foolish are bad?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Hence the degree of enjoyment and pain that good and bad men feel is pretty much the same.

  CALLICLES: I agree.

  SOCRATES: Now are good and bad men pretty much equally both good and bad, or are the bad ones even better?

  [d] CALLICLES: By Zeus! I don’t know what you mean.

  SOCRATES: Don’t you know that you say that the good men are good and the bad men bad because of the presence of good or bad things in them, and that the good things are pleasures and the bad ones pains?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: Aren’t good things, pleasures, present in men who feel enjoyment, if in fact they do feel it?

  CALLICLES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Now aren’t men who feel enjoyment good men, because good things are present in them?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Well then, aren’t bad things, pains, present in men who feel pain?

  CALLICLES: They are.

  [e] SOCRATES: And you do say that it’s because of the presence of bad things that bad men are bad. Or don’t you say this any more?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: So all those who feel enjoyment are good, and all those who feel pain are bad.

  CALLICLES: Yes, that’s right.

  SOCRATES: And those feeling them more are more so, th
ose feeling them less are less so, and those feeling them to pretty much the same degree are good or bad to pretty much the same degree.

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Now aren’t you saying that intelligent men and foolish ones, and cowardly and courageous ones, experience pretty much the same degree of enjoyment and pain, or even that cowardly ones experience more of it?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I am.

  SOCRATES: Join me, then, in adding up what follows for us from our agreements. They say it’s an admirable thing to speak of and examine [499] what’s admirable “twice and even thrice.” We say that the intelligent and brave man is good, don’t we?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And that the foolish and cowardly man is bad?

  CALLICLES: Yes, that’s right.

  SOCRATES: And again, that the man who feels enjoyment is good?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: And the one experiencing pain is bad?

  CALLICLES: Necessarily.

  SOCRATES: And that the good and the bad man feel pain and enjoyment to the same degree, and that perhaps the bad man feels them even more?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Doesn’t it then turn out that the bad man is both good and bad to the same degree as the good man, or even that he’s better? Isn’t this what follows, along with those earlier statements, if one holds that [b] pleasant things are the same as good things? Isn’t this necessarily the case, Callicles?

  CALLICLES: I’ve been listening to you for quite some time now, Socrates, and agreeing with you, while thinking that even if a person grants some point to you in jest, you gladly fasten on it, the way boys do. As though you really think that I or anybody else at all don’t believe that some pleasures are better and others worse.

  SOCRATES: Oh, Callicles! What a rascal you are. You treat me like a child. [c] At one time you say that things are one way and at another that the same things are another way, and so you deceive me. And yet I didn’t suppose at the beginning that I’d be deceived intentionally by you, because I assumed you were a friend. Now, however, I’ve been misled, and evidently have no choice but to “make the best with what I have,” as the ancient proverb has it, and to accept what I’m given by you. The thing you’re saying now, evidently, is that some pleasures are good while others are bad. Is that right?

  [d] CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: Are the good ones the beneficial ones, and the bad ones the harmful ones?

  CALLICLES: Yes, that’s right.

  SOCRATES: And the beneficial ones are the ones that produce something good while the bad ones are those that produce something bad?

  CALLICLES: That’s my view.

  SOCRATES: Now, do you mean pleasures like the ones we were just now mentioning in connection with the body, those of eating and drinking? Do some of these produce health in the body, or strength, or some other bodily excellence, and are these pleasures good, while those that produce [e] the opposites of these things are bad?

  CALLICLES: That’s right.

  SOCRATES: And similarly, aren’t some pains good and others bad, too?

  CALLICLES: Of course.

  SOCRATES: Now, shouldn’t we both choose and act to have the good pleasures and pains?

  CALLICLES: Yes, we should.

  SOCRATES: But not the bad ones?

  CALLICLES: Obviously.

  SOCRATES: No, for Polus and I both thought, if you recall, that we should, surely, do all things for the sake of what’s good.15 Do you also think as we do that the end of all action is what’s good, and that we should do all [500] other things for its sake, but not it for their sake? Are you voting on our side to make it three?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I am.

  SOCRATES: So we should do the other things, including pleasant things, for the sake of good things, and not good things for the sake of pleasant things.

  CALLICLES: That’s right.

  SOCRATES: Now, is it for every man to pick out which kinds of pleasures are good ones and which are bad ones, or does this require a craftsman in each case?

  CALLICLES: It requires a craftsman.

  SOCRATES: Let’s recall what I was actually saying to Polus and Gorgias.16 [b] I was saying, if you remember, that there are some practices that concern themselves with nothing further than pleasure and procure only pleasure, practices that are ignorant about what’s better and worse, while there are other practices that do know what’s good and what’s bad. And I placed the “knack” (not the craft) of pastry baking among those that are concerned with pleasure, and the medical craft among those concerned with what’s good. And by Zeus, the god of friendship, Callicles, please don’t think that you should jest with me either, or answer anything that comes to mind, contrary to what you really think, and please don’t accept what you get from me as though I’m jesting! For you see, don’t you, that our [c] discussion’s about this (and what would even a man of little intelligence take more seriously than this?), about the way we’re supposed to live. Is it the way you urge me toward, to engage in these manly activities, to make speeches among the people, to practice oratory, and to be active in the sort of politics you people engage in these days? Or is it the life spent in philosophy? And in what way does this latter way of life differ from the former? Perhaps it’s best to distinguish them, as I just tried to do; [d] having done that and having agreed that these are two distinct lives, it’s best to examine how they differ from each other, and which of them is the one we should live. Now perhaps you don’t yet know what I’m talking about.

  CALLICLES: No, I certainly don’t.

  SOCRATES: Well, I’ll tell you more clearly. Given that we’re agreed, you and I, that there is such a thing as good and such a thing as pleasant and that the pleasant is different from the good, and that there’s a practice of each of them and a procedure for obtaining it, the quest for the pleasant on the one hand and that for the good on the other—give me first your assent to this point or withhold it. Do you assent to it? [e]

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do.

  SOCRATES: Come then, and agree further with me about what I was saying to them too, if you think that what I said then was true. I was saying, wasn’t I, that I didn’t think that pastry baking is a craft, but a knack, whereas medicine is a craft. I said that the one, medicine, has [501] investigated both the nature of the object it serves and the cause of the things it does, and is able to give an account of each of these. The other, the one concerned with pleasure, to which the whole of its service is entirely devoted, proceeds toward its object in a quite uncraftlike way, without having at all considered either the nature of pleasure or its cause. It does so completely irrationally, with virtually no discrimination. Through routine and knack it merely preserves the memory of what customarily [b] happens, and that’s how it also supplies its pleasures. So, consider first of all whether you think that this account is an adequate one and whether you think that there are also other, similar preoccupations in the case of the soul. Do you think that some of the latter are of the order of crafts and possess forethought about what’s best for the soul, while others slight this and have investigated only, as in the other case, the soul’s way of getting its pleasure, without considering which of the pleasures is better or worse, and without having any concerns about anything but mere gratification, whether for the better or for the worse? For my part, Callicles, [c] I think there are such preoccupations, and I say that this sort of thing is flattery, both in the case of the body and that of the soul and in any other case in which a person may wait upon a pleasure without any consideration of what’s better or worse. As for you, do you join us in subscribing to the same opinion on these matters or do you dissent from it?

  CALLICLES: No, I won’t dissent. I’m going along with you, both to expedite your argument and to gratify Gorgias here.

  [d] SOCRATES: Now is this the case with one soul only, and not with two or many?

  CALLICLES: No, it’s also the case with two or many.

  SOCRATES: Is
n’t it also possible to gratify a group of souls collectively at one and the same time, without any consideration for what’s best?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I suppose so.

  SOCRATES: Can you tell me which ones are the practices that do this? Better yet, if you like I’ll ask you and you say yes for any which you think [e] falls in this group, and no for any which you think doesn’t. Let’s look at fluteplaying first. Don’t you think that it’s one of this kind, Callicles? That it merely aims at giving us pleasure without giving thought to anything else?

  CALLICLES: Yes, I think so.

  SOCRATES: Don’t all such practices do that, too? Lyreplaying at competitions, for example?

  CALLICLES: Yes.

  SOCRATES: What about training choruses and composing dithyrambs? Doesn’t that strike you as being something of the same sort? Do you think that Cinesias the son of Meles gives any thought to saying anything of a sort that might lead to the improvement of his audience, or to what is [502] likely to gratify the crowd of spectators?

  CALLICLES: Clearly the latter, Socrates, at least in Cinesias’ case.

  SOCRATES: What about his father Meles? Do you think he sang to the lyre with a regard for what’s best? Or did he fail to regard even what’s most pleasant? For he inflicted pain upon his spectators with his singing. But consider whether you don’t think that all singing to the lyre and composing of dithyrambs has been invented for the sake of pleasure.

  CALLICLES: Yes, I do think so.

  [b] SOCRATES: And what about that majestic, awe-inspiring practice, the composition of tragedy? What is it after? Is the project, the intent of tragic composition merely the gratification of spectators, as you think, or does it also strive valiantly not to say anything that is corrupt, though it may be pleasant and gratifying to them, and to utter in both speech and song anything that might be unpleasant but beneficial, whether the spectators enjoy it or not? In which of these ways do you think tragedy is being composed?

  [c] CALLICLES: This much is obvious, Socrates, that it’s more bent upon giving pleasure and upon gratifying the spectators.

  SOCRATES: And weren’t we saying just now that this sort of thing is flattery?

  CALLICLES: Yes, we were.

  SOCRATES: Well then, if one stripped away from the whole composition both melody, rhythm, and meter, does it turn out that what’s left is only speeches?