Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  I myself, Meno, am as poor as my fellow citizens in this matter, and I [b] blame myself for my complete ignorance about virtue. If I do not know what something is, how could I know what qualities it possesses? Or do you think that someone who does not know at all who Meno is could know whether he is good-looking or rich or well-born, or the opposite of these? Do you think that is possible?

  MENO: I do not; but, Socrates, do you really not know what virtue is? [c] Are we to report this to the folk back home about you?

  SOCRATES: Not only that, my friend, but also that, as I believe, I have never yet met anyone else who did know.

  MENO: How so? Did you not meet Gorgias when he was here?

  SOCRATES: I did.

  MENO: Did you then not think that he knew?

  SOCRATES: I do not altogether remember, Meno, so that I cannot tell you now what I thought then. Perhaps he does know; you know what he used [d] to say, so you remind me of what he said. You tell me yourself, if you are willing, for surely you share his views.—I do.

  SOCRATES: Let us leave Gorgias out of it, since he is not here. But Meno, by the gods, what do you yourself say that virtue is? Speak and do not begrudge us, so that I may have spoken a most unfortunate untruth when I said that I had never met anyone who knew, if you and Gorgias are shown to know.

  [e] MENO: It is not hard to tell you, Socrates. First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man [72] or a slave. And there are very many other virtues, so that one is not at a loss to say what virtue is. There is virtue for every action and every age, for every task of ours and every one of us—and, Socrates, the same is true for wickedness.

  SOCRATES: I seem to be in great luck, Meno; while I am looking for one virtue, I have found you to have a whole swarm of them. But, Meno, to [b] follow up the image of swarms, if I were asking you what is the nature of bees, and you said that they are many and of all kinds, what would you answer if I asked you: “Do you mean that they are many and varied and different from one another in so far as they are bees? Or are they no different in that regard, but in some other respect, in their beauty, for example, or their size or in some other such way?” Tell me, what would you answer if thus questioned?

  MENO: I would say that they do not differ from one another in being bees.

  SOCRATES: If I went on to say: “Tell me, what is this very thing, Meno, [c] in which they are all the same and do not differ from one another?”Would you be able to tell me?

  MENO: I would.

  SOCRATES: The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one is asked to make clear what virtue is. Or do you not understand what I mean? [d]

  MENO: I think I understand, but I certainly do not grasp the meaning of the question as fully as I want to.

  SOCRATES: I am asking whether you think it is only in the case of virtue that there is one for man, another for woman, and so on, or is the same true in the case of health and size and strength? Do you think that there is one health for man and another for woman? Or, if it is health, does it have the same form everywhere, whether in man or in anything else whatever? [e]

  MENO: The health of a man seems to me the same as that of a woman.

  SOCRATES: And so with size and strength? If a woman is strong, that strength will be the same and have the same form, for by “the same” I mean that strength is no different as far as being strength, whether in a man or a woman. Or do you think there is a difference?

  MENO: I do not think so.

  SOCRATES: And will there be any difference in the case of virtue, as far as being virtue is concerned, whether it be in a child or an old man, in a [73] woman or in a man?

  MENO: I think, Socrates, that somehow this is no longer like those other cases.

  SOCRATES: How so? Did you not say that the virtue of a man consists of managing the city well, and that of a woman of managing the household?—I did.

  SOCRATES: Is it possible to manage a city well, or a household, or anything else, while not managing it moderately and justly?—Certainly not.

  SOCRATES: Then if they manage justly and moderately, they must do so [b] with justice and moderation?—Necessarily.

  SOCRATES: So both the man and the woman, if they are to be good, need the same things, justice and moderation.—So it seems.

  SOCRATES: What about a child and an old man? Can they possibly be good if they are intemperate and unjust?—Certainly not.

  SOCRATES: But if they are moderate and just?—Yes.

  SOCRATES: So all human beings are good in the same way, for they become [c] good by acquiring the same qualities.—It seems so.

  SOCRATES: And they would not be good in the same way if they did not have the same virtue.—They certainly would not be.

  SOCRATES: Since then the virtue of all is the same, try to tell me and to remember what Gorgias, and you with him, said that that same thing is.

  MENO: What else but to be able to rule over people, if you are seeking [d] one description to fit them all.

  SOCRATES: That is indeed what I am seeking, but, Meno, is virtue the same in the case of a child or a slave, namely, for them to be able to rule over a master, and do you think that he who rules is still a slave?—I do not think so at all, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: It is not likely, my good man. Consider this further point: you say that virtue is to be able to rule. Shall we not add to this justly and not unjustly?

  MENO: I think so, Socrates, for justice is virtue.

  [e] SOCRATES: Is it virtue, Meno, or a virtue?—What do you mean?

  SOCRATES: As with anything else. For example, if you wish, take roundness, about which I would say that it is a shape, but not simply that it is shape. I would not so speak of it because there are other shapes.

  MENO: You are quite right. So I too say that not only justice is a virtue but there are many other virtues.

  [74] SOCRATES: What are they? Tell me, as I could mention other shapes to you if you bade me do so, so do you mention other virtues.

  MENO: I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others.

  SOCRATES: We are having the same trouble again, Meno, though in another way; we have found many virtues while looking for one, but we cannot find the one which covers all the others.

  [b] MENO: I cannot yet find, Socrates, what you are looking for, one virtue for them all, as in the other cases.

  SOCRATES: That is likely, but I am eager, if I can, that we should make progress, for you understand that the same applies to everything. If someone asked you what I mentioned just now: “What is shape, Meno?” and you told him that it was roundness, and if then he said to you what I did: “Is roundness shape or a shape?” you would surely tell him that it is a shape?—I certainly would.

  [c] SOCRATES: That would be because there are other shapes?—Yes.

  SOCRATES: And if he asked you further what they were, you would tell him?—I would.

  SOCRATES: So too, if he asked you what color is, and you said it is white, and your questioner interrupted you, “Is white color or a color?” you would say that it is a color, because there are also other colors?—I would.

  SOCRATES: And if he bade you mention other colors, you would mention [d] others that are no less colors than white is?—Yes.

  SOCRATES: Then if he pursued the argument as I did and said: “We always arrive at the many; do not talk to me in that way, but since you call all these many by one name, and say that no one of
them is not a shape even though they are opposites, tell me what this is which applies [e] as much to the round as to the straight and which you call shape, as you say the round is as much a shape as the straight.” Do you not say that?—I do.

  SOCRATES: When you speak like that, do you assert that the round is no more round than it is straight, and that the straight is no more straight than it is round?

  MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Yet you say that the round is no more a shape than the straight is, nor the one more than the other.—That is true.

  SOCRATES: What then is this to which the name shape applies? Try to tell me. If then you answered the man who was questioning about shape or color: “I do not understand what you want, my man, nor what you [75] mean,” he would probably wonder and say: “You do not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all these cases?” Would you still have nothing to say, Meno, if one asked you: “What is this which applies to the round and the straight and the other things which you call shapes and which is the same in them all?” Try to say, that you may practice for your answer about virtue.

  MENO: No, Socrates, but you tell me. [b]

  SOCRATES: Do you want me to do you this favor?

  MENO: I certainly do.

  SOCRATES: And you will then be willing to tell me about virtue?

  MENO: I will.

  SOCRATES: We must certainly press on. The subject is worth it.

  MENO: It surely is.

  SOCRATES: Come then, let us try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept that it is this: Let us say that shape is that which alone of existing things always follows color. Is that satisfactory to you, or do you look for it in some other way? I should be satisfied if you defined virtue [c] in this way.

  MENO: But that is foolish, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: How do you mean?

  MENO: That shape, you say, always follows color. Well then, if someone were to say that he did not know what color is, but that he had the same difficulty as he had about shape, what do you think your answer would be?

  SOCRATES: A true one, surely, and if my questioner was one of those clever and disputatious debaters, I would say to him: “I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it is your job to refute it.” Then, if they are friends as you and I are, and want to discuss with each other, they must answer [d] in a manner more gentle and more proper to discussion. By this I mean that the answers must not only be true, but in terms admittedly known to the questioner. I too will try to speak in these terms. Do you call something “the end?” I mean such a thing as a limit or boundary, for all [e] those are, I say, the same thing. Prodicus1 might disagree with us, but you surely call something “finished” or “completed”—that is what I want to express, nothing elaborate.

  MENO: I do, and I think I understand what you mean.

  SOCRATES: Further, you call something a plane, and something else a [76] solid, as in geometry?

  MENO: I do.

  SOCRATES: From this you may understand what I mean by shape, for I say this of every shape, that a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.

  MENO: And what do you say color is, Socrates?

  SOCRATES: You are outrageous, Meno. You bother an old man to answer [b] questions, but you yourself are not willing to recall and to tell me what Gorgias says that virtue is.

  MENO: After you have answered this, Socrates, I will tell you.

  SOCRATES: Even someone who was blindfolded would know from your conversation that you are handsome and still have lovers.

  MENO: Why so?

  SOCRATES: Because you are forever giving orders in a discussion, as spoiled people do, who behave like tyrants as long as they are young. And [c] perhaps you have recognized that I am at a disadvantage with handsome people, so I will do you the favor of an answer.

  MENO: By all means do me that favor.

  SOCRATES: Do you want me to answer after the manner of Gorgias, which you would most easily follow?

  MENO: Of course I want that.

  SOCRATES: Do you both say there are effluvia of things, as Empedocles2 does?—Certainly.

  SOCRATES: And that there are channels through which the effluvia make their way?—Definitely.

  [d] SOCRATES: And some effluvia fit some of the channels, while others are too small or too big?—That is so.

  SOCRATES: And there is something which you call sight?—There is.

  SOCRATES: From this, “comprehend what I state,” as Pindar said;3 for color is an effluvium from shapes which fits the sight and is perceived.

  MENO: That seems to me to be an excellent answer, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: Perhaps it was given in the manner to which you are accustomed. At the same time I think that you can deduce from this answer [e] what sound is, and smell, and many such things.—Quite so.

  SOCRATES: It is a theatrical answer so it pleases you, Meno, more than that about shape.—It does.

  SOCRATES: It is not better, son of Alexidemus, but I am convinced that the other is, and I think you would agree, if you did not have to go away before the mysteries as you told me yesterday, but could remain and be initiated.

  MENO: I would stay, Socrates, if you could tell me many things like [77] these.

  SOCRATES: I shall certainly not be lacking in eagerness to tell you such things, both for your sake and my own, but I may not be able to tell you many. Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me and tell me the nature of virtue as a whole and stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever someone breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole [b] and sound, and tell me what it is, for I have given you examples.

  MENO: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, “to find joy in beautiful things and have power.” So I say that virtue is to desire beautiful things and have the power to acquire them.

  SOCRATES: Do you mean that the man who desires beautiful things desires good things?—Most certainly.

  SOCRATES: Do you assume that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Do you not think, my good man, that [c] all men desire good things?

  MENO: I do not.

  SOCRATES: But some desire bad things?—Yes.

  SOCRATES: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and nevertheless desire them?—I think there are both kinds.

  SOCRATES: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, nevertheless desires them?—I certainly do.

  SOCRATES: What do you mean by desiring? Is it to secure for oneself?—What else?

  SOCRATES: Does he think that the bad things benefit him who possesses [d] them, or does he know they harm him?

  MENO: There are some who believe that the bad things benefit them, others who know that the bad things harm them.

  SOCRATES: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know that they are bad?

  MENO: No, that I cannot altogether believe.

  SOCRATES: It is clear then that those who do not know things to be bad do not desire what is bad, but they desire those things that they believe [e] to be good but that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge of these things and believe them to be good clearly desire good things. Is that not so?—It is likely.

  SOCRATES: Well then, those who you say desire bad things, believing that bad things harm their possessor, know that they will be harmed by them?—Necessarily.

  SOCRATES: And do they not think that those who are harmed are miserable [78] to the extent that they are harmed?—That too is inevitable.

  SOCRATES: And that those who are miserable are unhappy?—I think so.

  SOCRATES: Does anyone wish to be miserable and unhappy?—I do not think so, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: No one then wants what is bad, Meno, unless he wants to be such. For what else is being miserable but to desire bad things and secure them?

  MENO: You are probably right, Socrates, and n
o one wants what is bad. [b]

  SOCRATES: Were you not saying just now that virtue is to desire good things and have the power to secure them?—Yes, I was.

  SOCRATES: The desiring part of this statement is common to everybody, and one man is no better than another in this?—So it appears.

  SOCRATES: Clearly then, if one man is better than another, he must be better at securing them.—Quite so.

  SOCRATES: This then is virtue according to your argument, the power of [c] securing good things.

  MENO: I think, Socrates, that the case is altogether as you now understand it.

  SOCRATES: Let us see then whether what you say is true, for you may well be right. You say that the capacity to acquire good things is virtue?—I do.

  SOCRATES: And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

  MENO: Yes, and also to acquire gold and silver, also honors and offices in the city.

  SOCRATES: By good things you do not mean other goods than these?

  MENO: No, but I mean all things of this kind.

  [d] SOCRATES: Very well. According to Meno, the hereditary guest friend of the Great King, virtue is the acquisition of gold and silver. Do you add to this acquiring, Meno, the words justly and piously, or does it make no difference to you but even if one secures these things unjustly, you call it virtue none the less?

  MENO: Certainly not, Socrates.

  SOCRATES: You would then call it wickedness?—Indeed I would.

  SOCRATES: It seems then that the acquisition must be accompanied by [e] justice or moderation or piety or some other part of virtue; if it is not, it will not be virtue, even though it provides good things.

  MENO: How could there be virtue without these?

  SOCRATES: Then failing to secure gold and silver, whenever it would not be just to do so, either for oneself or another, is not this failure to secure them also virtue?

  MENO: So it seems.

  SOCRATES: Then to provide these goods would not be virtue any more [79] than not to provide them, but apparently whatever is done with justice will be virtue, and what is done without anything of the kind is wickedness.