[b] So when a man has drawn his lot, he must take over his holding on the terms stated.10 It would have been an advantage if no one entering the colony had had any more property than anyone else; but that’s out of the question, and some people will arrive with relatively large fortunes, others with relatively little. So for a number of reasons, and especially because the state offers equality of opportunity, there must be graded property-classes, to ensure that offices and taxes and grants may be arranged on the basis of what a man is worth. It’s not only his personal virtues or his ancestors’ that should be considered, or his physical strength or good [c] looks: what he’s made of his wealth or poverty should also be taken into account. In short, the citizens must be esteemed and given office, so far as possible, on exactly equal terms of ‘proportional inequality’, so as to avoid ill-feeling. For these reasons four permanent property-classes must be established, graded according to wealth: the ‘first’, ‘second’, ‘third’, and ‘fourth’ classes, or whatever other names are employed. A man will either keep his original classification, or, when he has grown richer or poorer [d] than he was before, transfer to the appropriate class.
In view of all this, the next law I’d pass would be along the following lines. (We maintain that if a state is to avoid the greatest plague of all—I mean civil war, though civil disintegration would be a better term—extreme poverty and wealth must not be allowed to arise in any section of the citizen-body, because both lead to both these disasters. That is why the legislator must now announce the acceptable limits of wealth and poverty.) The lower limit of poverty must be the value of the holding [e] (which is to be permanent: no official nor anyone else who has ambitions to be thought virtuous will ever overlook the diminution of any man’s holding). The legislator will use the holding as his unit of measure and allow a man to possess twice, thrice, and up to four times its value. If anyone acquires more than this, by finding treasure-trove or by gift or by a good stroke of business or some other similar lucky chance which presents [745] him with more than he’s allowed, he should hand over the surplus to the state and its patron deities, thereby escaping punishment and getting a good name for himself.
4. If a man breaks this law,
anyone who wishes may lay information and be rewarded with half the amount involved, the other half being given to the gods; and besides this the guilty person must pay a fine equivalent to the surplus out of his own pocket.
The total property of each citizen over and above his holding of land should be recorded in a public register kept in the custody of officials legally appointed for that duty, so that lawsuits on all subjects—in so far [b] as they affect property—may go smoothly because the facts are clear.
After this, the legislator’s first job is to locate the city as precisely as possible in the center of the country, provided that the site he chooses is a convenient one for a city in all other respects too (these are details which can be understood and specified easily enough). Next he must divide the country into twelve sections. But first he ought to reserve a sacred area for Hestia, Zeus and Athena (calling it the ‘acropolis’), and enclose its boundaries; he will then divide the city itself and the whole country into [c] twelve sections by lines radiating from this central point. The twelve sections should be made equal in the sense that a section should be smaller if the soil is good, bigger if it is poor. The legislator must then mark out five thousand and forty holdings, and further divide each into two parts; he should then make an individual holding consist of two such parts coupled so that each has a partner near the center or the boundary of the state as the case may be. (A part near the city and a part next to the boundary should form one holding, the second nearest the city with the [d] second from the boundary should form another, and so on.) He must apply to the two parts the rule I’ve just mentioned about the relative quality of the soil, making them equal by varying their size. He should also divide the population into twelve sections, and arrange to distribute among them as equally as possible all wealth over and above the actual holdings (a comprehensive list will be compiled). Finally, they must allocate [e] the sections as twelve ‘holdings’ for the twelve gods, consecrate each section to the particular god which it has drawn by lot, name it after him, and call it a ‘tribe’. Again, they must divide the city into twelve sections in the same way as they divided the rest of the country; and each man should be allotted two houses, one near the center of the state, one near the boundary. That will finish off the job of getting the state founded.
But there’s a lesson here that we must take to heart. This blueprint as a whole is never likely to find such favorable circumstances that every [746] single detail will turn out precisely according to plan. It presupposes men who won’t turn up their noses at living in such a community, and who will tolerate a moderate and fixed level of wealth throughout their lives, and the supervision of the size of each individual’s family as we’ve suggested. Will people really put up with being deprived of gold and other things which, for reasons we went into just now, the legislator is obviously going to add to his list of forbidden articles? What about this description of a city and countryside with houses at the center and in all directions round about? He might have been relating a dream, or modeling a state [b] and its citizens out of wax. The ideal impresses well enough, but the legislator must reconsider it as follows (this being, then, a reprise of his address to us).11 ‘My friends, in these talks we’re having, don’t think it has escaped me either that the point of view you are urging has some truth in it. But I believe that in every project for future action, when you are displaying the ideal plan that ought to be put into effect, the most satisfactory procedure is to spare no detail of absolute truth and beauty. [c] But if you find that one of these details is impossible in practice, you ought to put it on one side and not attempt it: you should see which of the remaining alternatives comes closest to it and is most nearly akin to your policy, and arrange to have that done instead. But you must let the legislator finish describing what he really wants to do, and only then join him in considering which of his proposals for legislation are feasible, and which [d] are too difficult. You see, even the maker of the most trivial object must make it internally consistent if he is going to get any sort of reputation.’
Now that we’ve decided to divide the citizens into twelve sections, we should try to realize (after all, it’s clear enough) the enormous number of divisors the subdivisions of each section have, and reflect how these in turn can be further subdivided and subdivided again until you get to 5040.12 This is the mathematical framework which will yield you your brotherhoods, local administrative units, villages, your military companies and marching-columns, as well as units of coinage, liquid and dry measures, [e] and weights. The law must regulate all these details so that the proper proportions and correspondences are observed. And not only that: the legislator should not be afraid of appearing to give undue attention to detail. He must be bold enough to give instructions that the citizens are not to be allowed to possess any equipment that is not of standard size. He’ll assume it’s a general rule that numerical division in all its variety [747] can be usefully applied to every field of conduct. It may be limited to the complexities of arithmetic itself, or extended to the subtleties of plane and solid geometry; it’s also relevant to sound, and to motion (straight up or down or revolution in a circle). The legislator should take all this into account and instruct all his citizens to do their best never to operate outside that framework. For domestic and public purposes, and all professional [b] skills, no single branch of a child’s education has such an enormous range of applications as mathematics; but its greatest advantage is that it wakes up the sleepy ignoramus and makes him quick to understand, retentive and sharpwitted; and thanks to this miraculous science he does better than his natural abilities would have allowed. These subjects will form a splendidly appropriate curriculum, if by further laws and customs you [c] can expel the spirit of pettiness and greed from the souls of
those who are to master them and profit from them. But if you fail, you’ll find that without noticing it you’ve produced a ‘twister’ instead of a man of learning—just what can be seen to have happened in the case of the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races whose approach to wealth and life in general shows a narrowminded outlook. (It may have been an incompetent legislator who was to blame for this state of affairs, or some stroke of bad luck, or even some natural influences that had the same effect.) [d]
And that’s another point about the choice of sites, Clinias and Megillus, that we mustn’t forget. Some localities are more likely than others to produce comparatively good (or bad) characters, and we must take care to lay down laws that do not fly in the face of such influences. Some sites are suitable or unsuitable because of varying winds or periods of heat, others because of the quality of the water; in some cases the very food grown in the soil can nourish or poison not only the body but the soul as [e] well. But best of all will be the places where the breeze of heaven blows, where spirits hold possession of the land and greet with favor (or disfavor) the various people who come and settle there. The sensible legislator will ponder these influences as carefully as a man can, and then try to lay down laws that will take account of them. This is what you must do too, Clinias. You’re going to settle a territory, so here’s the first thing you have to attend to.
CLINIAS: Well said, sir. I must follow your advice.
1. The first rank has been given to the gods (726e–727a).
2. A pun: the Greek nomos means both ‘tune’ and ‘law’. Cf. 722d–e.
3. See 728b–c.
4. See 684d–e.
5. Reading posous in d1 with accent on the second syllable.
6. There were sites of prestigious oracles of Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Dodona in northwest Greece, and the Egyptian god Ammon at the oasis of Siwa in the Libyan desert.
7. In this translation the laws making up the legal code proposed for Clinias’ city are set off from the surrounding text and numbered consecutively.
8. I.e., as well as on ‘neutral’ objects.
9. I.e., when he makes money (by dishonest means).
10. See 741b–c.
11. See 739a ff.
12. 5040 = 12 × 420. A ‘section’ (420) has many divisors (including all numbers from 1 to 7), and several (e.g. 12, 15, 20) can be conveniently subdivided. Division of all the 12 sections, if carried far enough, will ultimately give you 5040. The brotherhoods and units mentioned just below would be subdivisions of the tribes (a tribe = 420 citizens).
Book VI
[751] ATHENIAN: Well then, now that I’ve got all that off my chest, your next job will be to appoint officials for the state.
CLINIAS: It certainly will.
ATHENIAN: There are two stages involved in organizing a society.1 First you establish official positions and appoint people to hold them: you decide how many posts there should be and how they ought to be filled. Then [b] each office has to be given its particular laws: you have to decide which laws will be appropriate in each case, and the number and type required. But before we make our choice, let’s pause a moment and explain a point that will affect it.
CLINIAS: And what’s that?
ATHENIAN: This. It’s obvious to anyone that legislation is a tremendous task, and that when you have a well constructed state with a well-framed legal code, to put incompetent officials in charge of administering the code is a waste of good laws, and the whole business degenerates into farce. [c] And not only that: the state will find that its laws are doing it damage and injury on a gigantic scale.
CLINIAS: Naturally.
ATHENIAN: Now let’s notice the relevance of this to your present society and state. You appreciate that if your candidates are to deserve promotion to positions of power, their characters and family background must have been adequately tested, right from their childhood until the moment of [d] their election. Furthermore, the intending electors ought to have been well brought up in law-abiding habits, so as to be able to approve or disapprove of the candidates for the right reasons and elect or reject them according to their deserts.2 But in the present case we are dealing with people who have only just come together and don’t know each other—and they’re uneducated too. So how could they ever elect their officials without going wrong?
CLINIAS: It’s pretty well impossible.
ATHENIAN: But look here, ‘once in the race, you’ve no excuses’, as the saying is. That’s just our predicament now: you and your nine colleagues, [e] you tell us, have given an undertaking to the people of Crete to turn your [752] energies to founding this state; I, for my part, have promised to join in with this piece of fiction I’m now relating. Seeing that I’ve got on to telling a story, I’d be most reluctant to leave it without a head: it would look a grim sight wandering about like that!
CLINIAS: And a fine story it’s been, sir.
ATHENIAN: Surely, but I also intend to give you actual help along those lines, so far as I can.
CLINIAS: Then let’s carry out our program, certainly.
ATHENIAN: Yes, we shall, God willing, if we can keep old age at bay for long enough.
CLINIAS: ‘God willing’ can probably be taken for granted. [b]
ATHENIAN: Of course. So let’s be guided by him and notice something else.
CLINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: That we’ll find we’ve been pretty bold and foolhardy in launching this state of ours.
CLINIAS: What’s made you say that? What have you in mind?
ATHENIAN: I’m thinking of the cheerful way we’re legislating for people who’ll be new to the laws we’ve passed, without bothering how they’ll ever be brought to accept them. It’s obvious to us all, Clinias, even if we’re [c] not very clever, that at the start they won’t readily accept any at all. Ideally, we’d remain on the spot long enough to see people getting a taste of the laws while they’re still children; then when they’ve grown up and have become thoroughly accustomed to them, they can take part in the elections to all the offices of the state. If we can manage that (assuming acceptable ways and means are available), then I reckon that the state would have a firm guarantee of survival when its ‘schooldays’ are over.
CLINIAS: That’s reasonable enough. [d]
ATHENIAN: So let’s see if we can find ways and means. Will this do? I maintain, Clinias, that of all the Cretans, the citizens of Cnossus have a special duty. They must not be content with simply doing all that religion demands for the mere soil of your settlement: they must also take scrupulous care to see that the first officials are appointed by the best and safest methods. And it’s absolutely vital to give your best attention to choosing, [e] first of all, Guardians of the Laws. (Less trouble need be taken over the other officials.)
CLINIAS: So can we find a reasonable way of going about it?
ATHENIAN: Yes. ‘Sons of Crete’ (I say), ‘as the Cnossians take precedence over your many cities, they should collaborate with the newly arrived settlers in choosing a total of thirty-seven men from the two sides, nineteen from the settlers, the rest from Cnossus itself’—the gift of the Cnossians [753] to this state of yours, Clinias. They should include you in the eighteen, and make you yourself a citizen of the colony, with your consent (failing which, you’ll be gently compelled).
CLINIAS: But why on earth, sir, haven’t you, and Megillus too, enrolled as joint administrators?
ATHENIAN: Ah, Clinias, Athens is a high and mighty state, and so is Sparta; besides, they’re both a long way off. But it’s just the right thing for you and the other founders, and what I said a moment ago of you [b] applies equally to them. So let’s take it we’ve explained how to deal with the present situation. But as time goes on and the constitution has become established, the election of these officials should be held more or less as follows. Everyone who serves in the cavalry or infantry, and has fought in the field while young and strong enough to do so, should participate. [c] They must proceed to election in the tem
ple which the state considers to be the most venerable; each elector should place on the altar of the god a small tablet on which he has written the name of the person he wishes to vote for, adding the candidate’s father, tribe, and deme; and he should append his own name with the same details. For at least thirty days anyone who wishes should be allowed to remove any tablet bearing a name he finds objectionable and put it on display in the market-place. Then the [d] officials must exhibit to the state at large the three hundred tablets that head the list; on the basis of this list the voters must then again record their nominations, and the hundred names that lead this second time must be publicly displayed as before. On the third occasion anyone who wishes should walk between the victims of a sacrifice and record which of these three hundred he chooses. The thirty-seven who receive most votes must then submit to scrutiny and be declared elected.
Complete Works Page 217
