Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  ATHENIAN: So I’ve described one cause: let’s treat this obsession as the first obstacle that prevents states from following an adequate course of training, either for military or for any other purposes: naturally decent folk are turned into traders or merchant-venturers or just plain servants, [832] and bold fellows are made into robbers and burglars, and become bellicose and overbearing. Quite often, though, they are not naturally corrupt: they’re simply unlucky.

  CLINIAS: How do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: Well, if you have to live out your life with a continual hunger in your soul, aren’t you ‘unlucky’ to a degree? What other term could I use?

  CLINIAS: Very well, that’s one reason. What’s your second, sir?

  ATHENIAN: Ah, yes, thank you for jogging my memory.

  [b] CLINIAS:4 According to you, one cause is the insatiable and lifelong acquisitive urge which obsesses us all and stops us undertaking military training in the proper way. All right—now tell us the second.

  ATHENIAN: I dare say it looks as if I’m putting off getting round to it because I don’t know what to say?

  CLINIAS: No, but you do seem to be such a ‘good hater’ of this sort of character that you’re berating it more than the subject in hand requires.

  ATHENIAN: That’s a very proper rebuke, gentlemen. So you’re all ready for the next point, it seems.

  CLINIAS: Just tell us, that’s all!

  [c] ATHENIAN: The cause I want to put forward are those ‘non-constitutions’ that I’ve often mentioned earlier in our conversation—democracy, oligarchy and tyranny. None of these is a genuine political system: the best name for them all would be ‘party rule’, because under none of them do willing rulers govern willing subjects: that is, the rulers are always willing enough, but they never hold power with the consent of the governed. They hold it by constant resort to a degree of force, and they are never prepared to allow any of their subjects to cultivate virtue or acquire wealth or strength or courage—and least of all will they tolerate a man who can fight. So much for the two main roots of pretty nearly all evil, and certainly the main roots of the evils we’re discussing. However, the political system which we are now establishing by law has avoided both of them. Our [d] state enjoys unparalleled leisure, the citizens live free of interference from each other, and I reckon these laws of ours are quite unlikely to turn them into money-grubbers. So it’s a reasonable and natural supposition that a political system organized along these lines will be unique among contemporary constitutions in finding room for the military training-cum-sport that we’ve just described—and described in the detail it deserves, too.

  CLINIAS: Splendid.

  ATHENIAN: The next thing we have to bear in mind about any athletic contest is this: if it helps us to train for war we must go in for it and put [e] up prizes for the winners, but leave it strictly alone if it does not. Isn’t that right? It will be better to stipulate from the start the contests we want, and provide for them by law. First, I take it we should arrange races, and contests of speed in general?

  CLINIAS: Yes, we should.

  ATHENIAN: At any rate, what makes a man a fine soldier more than anything else is general agility, a ready use of his hands as well as his feet. If he’s a good runner, he can make a capture or show a clean pair of [833] heels, and versatile hands will stand him in good stead in tangling with the enemy in close combat, where strength and force are essential.

  CLINIAS: Certainly.

  ATHENIAN: But if he hasn’t any weapons, neither ability will help him as much as it might.

  CLINIAS: Of course not.

  ATHENIAN: So in our contests the first competitor our herald will summon will be (as now) the single-length runner, and he will come forward armed; we shan’t put up any prizes for competitors who are unarmed. So, as I say, the competitor who intends to run one length will come on first, carrying his arms; second will come the runner over two lengths, and third the middle-distance runner; the long-distance man will come on fourth. [b] The fifth competitor we shall call the ‘heavy-armed’ runner, from his heavier equipment. We shall start by sending him in full armor over a distance of sixty lengths to some temple of Ares and back. His course will be over comparatively level ground, whereas the other runner,5 an archer in full archer rig, will run a course of 100 lengths over hills and constantly [c] changing terrain to a temple of Apollo and Artemis. While we’re waiting for these runners to return, we’ll hold the other contests and finally award the prizes to the winners of each event.

  CLINIAS: Fine.

  ATHENIAN: Let’s arrange these contests in three groups, one for boys, one for youths, and one for men. When youths and boys compete as archers and heavy-armed runners, we shall make the course for youths two-thirds of the full distance and for the boys one-half. As for females, girls below [d] the age of puberty must enter (naked) for the single-length, double-length, middle and long-distance races, their competition being confined to the stadium. Girls from thirteen till the marriage-age must enter till they are at least eighteen, but not beyond the age of twenty. (They, however, must put on some suitable clothing before presenting themselves as competitors in these races.)

  So much for men’s and women’s races; now to deal with trials of strength. Instead of wrestling and other he-man contests that are the fashion nowadays, [e] we’ll have our citizens fight each other armed—man to man, two a side, and any number per team up to ten. We ought to take our cue from the authorities in charge of wrestling, who have established criteria which will tell you whether a wrestler’s performance is good or bad. We must call in the leading exponents of armed combat and ask them to assist us in framing rules about the blows one needs to avoid or inflict to win in [834] this sort of of contest, and similarly the points we need to look for to decide the loser. The same set of rules should also apply to the female competitors (who must be below the age of marriage). To replace the pancration6 we shall establish a general contest of light-infantry; the weapons of the competitors are to be bows, light shields, javelins, and stones cast by hand and sling. Here too we’ll lay down rules, and give the honor of victory to the competitor who reaches the highest standard as defined by the regulations.

  The next thing for which we must provide rules is horse-racing. In Crete, [b] of course, horses are of rather limited use and you don’t find very many of them, so that the comparatively low level of interest in rearing and racing them is inevitable. No one in this country keeps a team of horses for a chariot, nor is ever likely to covet such a thing, so that if we established contests in something so foreign to the local customs, we’d be taken for [c] idiots (and rightly). The way to modify this sport for the local Cretan terrain is to put up prizes for skill in riding the animals—as foals, when half-grown, and when fully grown. So our law should provide for contests in which jockeys can compete with each other in these categories; Tribe-Leaders and Cavalry-Commanders should be entrusted with the job of deciding the actual courses and deciding which competitor has won (in full armor, of course: just as in the athletic events, if we established contests for unarmed competitors we’d be failing in our duty as legislators). And since your Cretan is no fool at archery and javelin-throwing in the saddle, [d] people should amuse themselves by competing in this sort of contest too. As for women, there’s no point in making it legally compulsory for them to join in all this, but if their previous training has got them into the habit, and girls and young women are in good enough shape to take part without hardship, then they should be permitted to do so and not discouraged.

  That brings us to the end of our discussion of competitions and the teaching of physical training, and we’ve seen what strenuous efforts are [e] involved in the contests and the daily sessions with instructors. In fact, we’ve also dealt pretty thoroughly with the role of the arts, although arrangements about reciters of poetry and similar performers, and the chorus-competitions obligatory at festivals, can wait till the gods and the minor deities have had their days and months and years alloca
ted to them; then we can decide whether festivals should be held at two-year or four-year intervals, or whether the gods suggest some other pattern. On these [835] occasions we must also expect the various categories of competitions in the arts to be held. This is the province of the stewards of the games, the Minister of Education and the Guardians of the Laws, who should all meet as an ad hoc committee and produce their own regulations about the date of each chorus-competition and dance, and specify who should compete and who may watch. The original legislator has often enough explained the sort of thing each of these performances should be, and has dealt with [b] the songs, the spoken addresses and the musical styles that accompany the rhythmical movements of the dancers. His successors must emulate his example in their own legislation and match the right contests with the right sacrifices at the right times, and so provide festivals at which the state may make merry.

  ATHENIAN: It’s not difficult to see how to cast these and similar matters in the form of a law, and making this or that alteration won’t help or harm the state very much. But now for something which is not a triviality at all. It’s a point on which it is difficult to convince people, and God himself is really the only person to do it—supposing, that is, we could in fact [c] somehow get explicit instructions from him. Since that’s impossible, it looks as if we need some intrepid mortal, who values frankness above all, to specify the policy he believes best for the state and its citizens, give a firm ‘no’ to our most compelling passions, and order his audience of corrupted souls to observe standards of conduct in keeping with, and implied by, the whole organization of the state. There will be no one to back him up. He’ll walk alone, with reason alone to guide him.

  CLINIAS: What new topic is this, sir? We don’t see what you’re getting at. [d]

  ATHENIAN: That’s not surprising. Well, I’ll try to put the point more explicitly. When I came to discuss education, I envisaged young men and women associating with each other on friendly terms. Naturally enough, I began to feel some disquiet. I wondered how one would handle a state like this, with everyone engaged on a life-long round of sacrifices and festivals and chorus-performances, and the young men and women well-nourished [e] and free of those demanding and degrading jobs that damp down lust so effectively. Reason, which is embodied in law as far as it can be, tells us to avoid indulging the passions that have ruined so many people. So how will the members of our state avoid them? (Actually, most [836] desires may well be kept in check by the regulations we have already framed. If so, we needn’t be surprised. After all, the law against excessive wealth will do a great deal to encourage self-control, and the educational curriculum is full of sound rules designed for the same purpose. The officials too, who have been rigorously trained to watch this point closely, and to keep the young people themselves under constant surveillance, will do something to restrain ordinary passions, as far as any man can.) But [b] there are sexual urges too—of boys and girls and heterosexual love among adults. What precautions should one take against passions which have had a such a powerful effect on public and private life? What’s the remedy that will save us from the dangers of sex in each? It’s a great problem, Clinias. We’re faced with the fact that though in several other respects Crete in general and Sparta give us pretty solid help when we frame laws that flout common custom, in affairs of the heart (there’s no one listening, [c] so let’s be frank) they are totally opposed to us. Suppose you follow nature’s rule and establish the law that was in force before the time of Laius.7 You’d argue that one may have sexual intercourse with a woman but not with men or boys. As evidence for your view, you’d point to the animal world, where (you’d argue) the males do not have sexual relations with each other, because such a thing is unnatural. But in Crete and Sparta your argument would not go down at all well, and you’d probably persuade nobody. However, another argument is that such practices are incompatible with what in our view should be the constant aim of the [d] legislator—that is, we’re always asking ‘which of our regulations encourages virtue, and which does not?’ Now then, suppose in the present case we agreed to pass a law that such practices are desirable, or not at all undesirable—what contribution would they make to virtue? Will the spirit of courage spring to life in the soul of the seduced person? Will the soul of the seducer learn habits of self-control? No one is going to be led astray by that sort of argument—quite the contrary. Everyone will censure the [e] weakling who yields to temptation, and condemn his all-too-effeminate partner who plays the role of the woman. So who on earth will pass a law like that? Hardly anyone, at any rate if he knows what a genuine law really is. Well, how do we show the truth of this? If you want to get these [837] things straight, you have to analyze the nature of friendship and desire and ‘love’, as people call it. There are two separate categories, plus a third which is a combination of both. But one term covers all three, and that causes no end of muddle and confusion.

  CLINIAS: How’s that?

  ATHENIAN: When two people are virtuous and alike, or when they are equals, we say that one is a ‘friend’ of the other; but we also speak of the poor man’s ‘friendship’ for the man who has grown rich, even though they are poles apart. In either case, when the friendship is particularly ardent, we call it ‘love’.

  CLINIAS: Yes, we do. [b]

  ATHENIAN: And a violent and stormy friendship it is, when a man is attracted to someone widely different to himself, and only seldom do we see it reciprocated. When men are alike, however, they show a calm and mutual affection that lasts a lifetime. But there is a third category, compounded of the other two. The first problem here is to discover what this third kind of lover is really after. There is the further difficulty that he himself is confused and torn between two opposing instincts: one tells him to enjoy his beloved, the other forbids him. The lover of the body, [c] hungry for his partner who is ripe to be enjoyed, like a luscious fruit, tells himself to have his fill, without showing any consideration for his beloved’s character and disposition. But in another case physical desire will count for very little and the lover will be content to gaze upon his beloved without lusting for him—a mature and genuine desire of soul for soul. That body should sate itself with body he’ll think outrageous; his reverence and respect for self-control, courage, high principles and good judgment will make him want to live a life of purity, chaste lover with chaste beloved. [d] This combination of the first two is the ‘third’ love we enumerated a moment ago.

  So there’s your list of the various forms love can take: should the law forbid them all, and keep them out of our community? Or isn’t it obvious that in our state we’d want to see the virtuous kind spring up—the love that aims to make a young man perfect? It’s the other two we’ll forbid, if we can. Or what is our policy, Megillus, my friend?

  MEGILLUS: Indeed, sir, I heartily endorse what you’ve said on the subject. [e]

  ATHENIAN: So it looks as if I’ve won you over, my dear fellow, as I guessed I would, and there’s no call for me to inquire what line the law of Sparta takes on this topic: it is enough to note your assent to my argument. Later on I’ll come back to the subject and try to charm Clinias also into agreeing with me. Let’s assume you’ve both conceded my point, and press on with our laws without delay.

  MEGILLUS: Fair enough.

  ATHENIAN: I want to put the law on this subject on a firm footing, and [838] at the moment I’m thinking of a method which is, in a sense, simplicity itself. But from another point of view, nothing could be harder.

  MEGILLUS: What are you getting at?

  ATHENIAN: We’re aware, of course, that even nowadays most men, in spite of their general disregard for the law, are very effectively prevented from having relations with people they find attractive. And they don’t refrain reluctantly, either—they’re more than happy to.

  MEGILLUS: What circumstances have you in mind?

  ATHENIAN: When it’s one’s brother or sister whom one finds attractive. [b] And the same law, unwritten though it is, is
extremely effective in stopping a man sleeping—secretly or otherwise—with his son or daughter, or making any kind of amorous approach to them. Most people feel not the faintest desire for such intercourse.

  MEGILLUS: That’s perfectly true.

  ATHENIAN: So the desire for this sort of pleasure is stifled by a few words?

  MEGILLUS: What words do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: The doctrine that ‘these acts are absolutely unholy, an abomination in the sight of the gods, and that nothing is more revolting’. We [c] refrain from them because we never hear them spoken of in any other way. From the day of our birth each of us encounters a complete unanimity of opinion wherever we go; we find it not only in comedies but often in the high seriousness of tragedy too, when we see a Thyestes on the stage, or an Oedipus or a Macareus, the clandestine lover of his sister.8 We watch these characters dying promptly by their own hand as a penalty for their crimes.

  [d] MEGILLUS: You’re right in this, anyway, that when no one ventures to challenge the law, public opinion works wonders.

  ATHENIAN: So we were justified in what we said just now. When the legislator wants to tame one of the desires that dominate mankind so cruelly, it’s easy for him to see his method of attack. He must try to make everyone—slave and free, women and children, and the entire state without any exception—believe that this common opinion has the backing of religion. [e] He couldn’t put his law on a securer foundation than that.

  MEGILLUS: Very true. But how on earth it will ever be possible to produce such spontaneous unanimity—

  ATHENIAN: I’m glad you’ve taken me up on the point. This is just what I was getting at when I said I knew of a way to put into effect this law of ours which permits the sexual act only for its natural purpose, procreation, and forbids not only homosexual relations, in which the human race is deliberately murdered, but also the sowing of seeds on rocks and stone, [839] where it will never take root and mature into a new individual; and we should also have to keep away from any female ‘soil’ in which we’d be sorry to have the seed develop. At present, however, the law is effective only against intercourse between parent and child, but if it can be put on a permanent footing and made to apply effectively, as it deserves to, in other cases as well, it’ll do a power of good. The first point in its favor is that it is a natural law. But it also tends to check the raging fury of the sexual instinct that so often leads to adultery; it discourages excesses in [b] food and drink, and inspires men with affection for their own wives. And there are a great many other advantages to be gained, if only one could get this law established.