Complete Works

by Plato, Cooper, John M. , Hutchinson, D. S.

  [d] ATHENIAN: Now, for heaven’s sake, hold on a minute. I suppose you’d be prepared to recognize three elements in any given thing?

  CLINIAS: What do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: The first point is what the object actually is, the second is the definition of this, and the third is the name. And in addition there are two questions to be asked about every existing thing.

  CLINIAS: Two?

  ATHENIAN: Sometimes we put forward the mere name and want to know the definition, and sometimes we put forward the definition and ask for the name.

  CLINIAS: I take it the point we want to make at the moment is this.

  ATHENIAN: What?

  [e] CLINIAS: In general, things can be divided into two, and this is true of some numbers as well. Such a number has the name ‘even’ and its definition is ‘a number divisible into two equal parts’.

  ATHENIAN: Yes, that’s the sort of thing I mean. So surely, in either case—whether we provide the name and ask for the definition or give the definition and ask for the name—we’re referring to the same object? When we call it ‘even’ and define it as ‘a number divisible into two’, it’s the same thing we’re talking about.

  CLINIAS: It certainly is.

  [896] ATHENIAN: So what’s the definition of the thing we call the soul? Surely we can do nothing but use our formula of a moment ago: ‘motion capable of moving itself’.

  CLINIAS: Do you mean that the entity which we all call ‘soul’ is precisely that which is defined by the expression ‘self-generating motion’?

  ATHENIAN: I do. And if this is true, are we still dissatisfied? Haven’t we got ourselves a satisfactory proof that soul is identical with the original source of the generation and motion of all past, present and future things and their contraries? After all, it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion in everything. [b]

  CLINIAS: Dissatisfied? No! On the contrary, it has been proved up to the hilt that soul, being the source of motion, is the most ancient thing there is.

  ATHENIAN: But when one thing is put in motion by another, it is never thereby endowed with the power of independent self-movement. Such derived motion will therefore come second, or as far down the list as you fancy relegating it, being a mere change in matter that quite literally ‘has no soul’.

  CLINIAS: Correctly argued.

  ATHENIAN: So it was an equally correct, final and complete statement of the truth, when we said that soul is prior to matter, and that matter [c] came later and takes second place. Soul is the master, and matter its natural subject.

  CLINIAS: That is indeed absolutely true.

  ATHENIAN: The next step is to remember our earlier admission that if soul were shown to be older than matter, the spiritual order of things would be older than the material.

  CLINIAS: Certainly.

  ATHENIAN: So habits, customs, will, calculation, right opinion, diligence [d] and memory will be prior creations to material length, breadth, depth and strength, if (as is true) soul is prior to matter.

  CLINIAS: Unavoidably.

  ATHENIAN: And the next unavoidable admission, seeing that we are going to posit soul as the cause of all things, will be that it is the cause of good and evil, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice and all the opposites.

  CLINIAS: Of course.

  ATHENIAN: And surely it’s necessary to assert that as soul resides and [e] keeps control anywhere where anything is moved, it controls the heavens as well.

  CLINIAS: Naturally.

  ATHENIAN: One soul, or more than one? I’ll answer for you both: more than one. At any rate, we must not assume fewer than two: that which does good, and that which has the opposite capacity.

  CLINIAS: That’s absolutely right.

  ATHENIAN: Very well, then. So soul, by virtue of its own motions, stirs into movement everything in the heavens and on earth and in the sea. The names of the motions of soul are: wish, reflection, diligence, counsel, [897] opinion true and false, joy and grief, cheerfulness and fear, love and hate. Soul also uses all related or initiating motions which take over the secondary movements of matter and stimulate everything to increase or diminish, separate or combine, with the accompanying heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, roughness and smoothness, white and black, bitter and sweet. These are the instruments soul uses, whether it cleaves to divine reason [b] (soul itself being, if the truth were told, a divinity), and guides everything to an appropriate and successful conclusion, or allies itself with unreason and produces completely opposite results. Shall we agree this is the case, or do we still suspect that the truth may be different?

  CLINIAS: By no means.

  ATHENIAN: Well then, what kind of soul may we say has gained control of the heavens and earth and their entire cycle of movement? Is it the rational and supremely virtuous kind, or that which has neither advantage? [c] Would you like our reply to run like this?

  CLINIAS: How?

  ATHENIAN: ‘If, my fine fellow’ (we should say) ‘the whole course and movement of the heavens and all that is in them reflect the motion and revolution and calculation of reason, and operate in a corresponding fashion, then clearly we have to admit that it is the best kind of soul that cares for the entire universe and directs it along the best path.’

  CLINIAS: True.

  ATHENIAN: ‘If however these things move in an unbalanced and disorganized [d] way, we must say the evil kind of soul is in charge of them.’

  CLINIAS: That too is true.

  ATHENIAN: ‘So what is the nature of rational motion?’ Now this, my friends, is a question to which it is difficult to give an answer that will make sense, so you’re justified here in calling me in to help with your reply.

  CLINIAS: Good.

  ATHENIAN: Still, in answering this question we mustn’t assume that mortal eyes will ever be able to look upon reason and get to know it adequately: let’s not produce darkness at noon, so to speak, by looking at [e] the sun direct. We can save our sight by looking at an image of the object we’re asking about.

  CLINIAS: How do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: What about selecting from our list of ten motions the one which reason resembles, and taking that as our image? I’ll join you in recalling it, and then we’ll give a joint answer to the question.

  CLINIAS: Yes, that’s probably your best method of explanation.

  ATHENIAN: Do we still remember at any rate this from the list of points we made earlier, that all things are either in motion or at rest?

  CLINIAS: Yes, we do.

  ATHENIAN: And some of those in motion move in a single location, others [898] in a succession of locations?

  CLINIAS: That is so.

  ATHENIAN: Of these two motions, that taking place in a single location necessarily implies continuous revolution round a central point, just like wheels being turned on a lathe; and this kind of motion bears the closest possible affinity and likeness to the cyclical movement of reason.

  CLINIAS: What do you mean?

  ATHENIAN: Take reason on the one hand, and motion in a single location on the other. If we were to point out that in both cases the motion was determined by a single plan and procedure and that it was (a) regular, (b) [b] uniform, (c) always at the same point in space, (d) around a fixed center, (e) in the same position relative to other objects, and were to illustrate both by the example of a sphere being turned on a lathe, then no one could ever show us up for incompetent makers of verbal images.

  CLINIAS: You’re quite right.

  ATHENIAN: Now consider the motion that is never uniform or regular or at the same point in space or round the same center or in the same relative position or in a single location, and is neither planned nor organized nor systematic. Won’t that motion be associated with every kind of unreason?

  CLINIAS: Absolutely true, it will.

  ATHENIAN: So now there’s no difficulty in saying right out that since we [c] find that the entire cycle of events is to be attributed to soul, the heavens that we see revolving must neces
sarily be driven round—we have to say—because they are arranged and directed either by the best kind of soul or by the other sort.

  CLINIAS: Well, sir, judging from what has been said, I think it would be rank blasphemy to deny that their revolution is produced by one or more souls blessed with perfect virtue.

  ATHENIAN: You’ve proved a most attentive listener, Clinias. Now attend to this further point. [d]

  CLINIAS: What?

  ATHENIAN: If, in principle, soul drives round the sun, moon and the other heavenly bodies, does it not impel each individually?

  CLINIAS: Of course.

  ATHENIAN: Let’s take a single example: our results will then obviously apply to all the other heavenly bodies.

  CLINIAS: And your example is…?

  ATHENIAN: …the sun. Everyone can see its body, but no one can see its soul—not that you could see the soul of any other creature, living or dying. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for believing that we are in fact held in the embrace of some such thing though it is totally below the level of our bodily senses, and is perceptible by reason alone. So by reason [e] and understanding let’s get hold of a new point about the soul.

  CLINIAS: What?

  ATHENIAN: If soul drives the sun, we shan’t go far wrong if we say that it operates in one of three ways.

  CLINIAS: And what are they?

  ATHENIAN: Either (a) the soul resides within this visible spherical body and carries it wherever it goes, just as our soul takes us around from one place to another, or (b) it acquires its own body of fire or air of some kind [899] (as certain people maintain), and impels the sun by the external contact of body with body, or (c) it is entirely immaterial, but guides the sun along its path by virtue of possessing some other prodigious and wonderful powers.

  CLINIAS: Yes, it must necessarily be by one of these methods that the soul manages the universe.

  ATHENIAN: Now, just wait a minute. Whether we find that it is by stationing itself in the sun and driving it like a chariot, or by moving it from outside, or by some other means, that this soul provides us all with light, every single one of us is bound to regard it as a god. Isn’t that right?

  [b] CLINIAS: Yes, one would be absolutely stupid not to.

  ATHENIAN: Now consider all the stars and the moon and the years and the months and all the seasons: what can we do except repeat the same story? A soul or souls—and perfectly virtuous souls at that—have been shown to be the cause of all these phenomena, and whether it is by their living presence in matter that they direct all the heavens, or by some other means, we shall insist that these souls are gods. Can anybody admit all this and still put up with people who deny that ‘everything is full of gods’?4

  [c] CLINIAS: No sir, nobody could be so mad.

  ATHENIAN: Now then, Megillus and Clinias, let’s delimit the courses of action open to anyone who has so far refused to believe in gods, and get rid of him.

  CLINIAS: You mean…

  ATHENIAN: … either he should demonstrate to us that we’re wrong to posit soul as the first cause to which everything owes its birth, and that our subsequent deductions were equally mistaken, or, if he can’t put a better case than ours, he should let himself be persuaded by us and live the rest of his life a believer in gods. So let’s review the thesis we argued [d] for the existence of gods against the non-believers: was it cogent or feeble?

  CLINIAS: Feeble, sir? Not in the least.

  ATHENIAN: Very well. So far as atheists are concerned, we may regard our case as complete. Next we have to use some gentle persuasion on the man who believes in gods but thinks they are unconcerned about human affairs. ‘My splendid fellow,’ we’ll say, ‘your belief in the existence of gods probably springs from a kind of family tie between you and the gods that draws you to your natural kin and makes you honor them and recognize their existence. What drives you to impiety is the good fortune of scoundrels [e] and criminals in private and public life—which in reality is not good fortune at all, although it is highly admired as such by popular opinion and its misplaced enthusiasms: poetry and literature of every kind invest it with a pernicious glamour. Or perhaps you observe men reaching the [900] end of their lives, full of years and honor, leaving behind them their children’s children, and your present disquiet is because you’ve discovered (either from hearsay or personal observation) a few of the many ghastly acts of impiety which (you notice) are the very means by which some of these people have risen from humble beginnings to supreme power and dictatorships. The result is that although by virtue of your kinship with the gods you’d clearly be reluctant to lay such things at their door, your mental confusion and your inability to find fault with them has brought [b] you to your present predicament where you believe they exist, but despise and neglect human affairs. Now, we want to prevent your thoughts from becoming more impious than they are already: let’s see if argument will ward off the disease while it is still in its early stages. We must also try to make use of the original thesis we argued so exhaustively against the absolute atheist, by linking the next step in the exposition on to it.’ So you, Clinias and Megillus, must do what you did before: take the young man’s [c] place and answer on his behalf. If any difficulty crops up in the argument, I’ll take over from you two as I did just now, and conduct you across the river.

  CLINIAS: Good idea. You play your part, and we’ll carry out your suggestions to the best of our ability.

  ATHENIAN: Still, perhaps it won’t be too difficult to show our friend that gods are just as attentive to details as to important matters—more so, in fact. You see, he was here a moment ago and heard that their special job—[d] an expression of their perfect virtue—is to watch over the universe.

  CLINIAS: Yes, he certainly did hear that said.

  ATHENIAN: The next thing is for our opponents to join us in asking this question: what particular virtue have we in mind when we agree that the gods are good? Now then: don’t we regard moderation and the possession of reason as a mark of virtue, and their opposites as marks of vice?

  CLINIAS: We do.

  ATHENIAN: What about courage and cowardice? Are we agreed they [e] come under virtue and vice respectively?

  CLINIAS: Certainly.

  ATHENIAN: And we’ll label the one set of qualities ‘disgraceful’ and the other ‘admirable’?

  CLINIAS: Yes, we must.

  ATHENIAN: And if the base qualities are characteristic of anyone, they are characteristic of us; the gods, we shall say, are not affected by them, either radically or slightly.

  CLINIAS: No one would disagree with that either.

  ATHENIAN: Well, then, shall we regard neglect and idleness and riotous living as part of the soul’s virtue? Or what’s your view?

  CLINIAS: Really!

  ATHENIAN: As part of vice, then?

  CLINIAS: Yes.

  ATHENIAN: So it’s the opposite qualities that will be ascribed to virtue? [901]

  CLINIAS: Right.

  ATHENIAN: Very well then. In our view all idle and thoughtless bons vivants will be just the kind of people the poet said were ‘like nothing so much as stingless drones’.5

  CLINIAS: Very apt, that.

  ATHENIAN: So we mustn’t say that God has precisely the sort of character he himself detests, and we mustn’t allow any attempt to maintain such a view.

  CLINIAS: Of course not; it would be intolerable.

  [b] ATHENIAN: Take someone who has the special job of looking after some particular sphere of action, and who is preoccupied with his major duties to the neglect of the small. Could we possibly commend him, except for reasons that would ring quite hollow? Let’s consider the point in this light: doesn’t this sort of conduct—divine or human—fall into two categories?

  CLINIAS: Two categories, do we say?

  ATHENIAN: Either a man thinks it makes no difference to his job as a whole if he neglects the details, or important though they are, he nevertheless lives [c] in idleness and self-indulgence and neglects them. Or is there so
me other possible reason for his neglecting them? (Of course, if it is simply impossible to look after everything, and a god or some poor mortal fails to take care of something when he has not the strength and therefore the ability, no question of positive neglect of either major or minor duties will arise.)

  CLINIAS: No, of course not.

  ATHENIAN: Now let our two opponents answer the questions of the three [d] of us. They both admit gods exist, but one thinks they can be bought off, the other that they are careless about details. ‘First of all, do you both admit that the gods know and see and hear everything, and that nothing within the range of our senses or intellect can escape them? Is this your position, or what?

  CLINIAS: ‘It is.’

  ATHENIAN: ‘And also, that they can do anything which is within the power of mortals and immortals?’

  CLINIAS: Yes, of course they’ll agree to that too.

  [e] ATHENIAN: Further, the five of us have already agreed that the gods are good—supremely so, in fact.

  CLINIAS: Emphatically.

  ATHENIAN: So surely, given they’re the sort of beings we’ve admitted, it’s absolutely impossible to agree that they do anything out of sloth and self-indulgence. Among us mortals, you see, laziness springs from cowardice, and sloth from laziness and self-indulgence.

  CLINIAS: That’s very true.

  ATHENIAN: Then no god neglects anything because of sloth and laziness, because no god, presumably, suffers from cowardice.

  CLINIAS: You’re quite right.

  ATHENIAN: Now if in fact they do neglect the tiny details of the universe, [902] the remaining possibilities are surely these: either they neglect them because they know that no such detail needs their attention, or—well, what other explanation could there be, except a lack of knowledge?

  CLINIAS: None.

  ATHENIAN: So, my dearest sir, are we to interpret you as saying that the gods are ignorant, and display negligence where it is necessary to be solicitous, because they don’t know? Or alternatively that they realize the necessity, but do what the most wretched of men are said to do, namely fail in their duty because they are somehow overcome by temptation or pain, even though they know that there are better options than the one [b] they’ve in fact chosen?