D.S.H.
[372] SOCRATES: Can you tell us what the just is, or don’t you think it’s worthwhile to discuss this?
FRIEND: I think it would be very worthwhile.
SOCRATES: What is the just, then?
FRIEND: Well, what could it be, if not what’s established as just by custom?
SOCRATES: That’s not the way to answer. If you were to ask me what an eye is, I’d tell you it’s what we see with; and if you demand that I prove it, I’ll prove it. And if you ask me what “soul” is the name of, I’ll tell you it’s what we think with. And if, again, you ask me what voice is, I’ll answer that it’s what we converse with. In this same way, now tell me what the just is, by referring to how we use it, like I’ve now done with these other things.
FRIEND: I can’t possibly answer you that way.
SOCRATES: Well, since you can’t do it that way, would it perhaps be easier for us to discover it in this sort of way? Now, when we want to distinguish what’s longer and what’s shorter, with what do we examine them? Isn’t it with a measuring-stick?
FRIEND: Yes.
[373] SOCRATES: Besides the measuring-stick, what skill do we use? Isn’t it skill in measuring?
FRIEND: Right, skill in measuring.
SOCRATES: And what about distinguishing what’s light and what’s heavy? Don’t we do that with a scale?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Besides the scale, what skill do we use? Isn’t it skill in weighing?
FRIEND: Definitely.
SOCRATES: Well, then, when we want to distinguish what’s just and what’s unjust, what instrument do we use to examine them? And, besides this instrument, what skill do we use in dealing with them? Or doesn’t this way make it clear to you either?
FRIEND: No.
SOCRATES: Well, let’s start again. Whenever we disagree about what’s larger and what’s smaller, who are the ones who decide between us? Aren’t they the ones who measure?
FRIEND: Yes.
[b] SOCRATES: And whenever we disagree about number, about many and few, who are the ones who decide? Aren’t they the ones who count?
FRIEND: Obviously.
SOCRATES: Whenever we disagree with each other about what’s just and what’s unjust, to whom do we go? Who are those who decide between us in each case? Tell me.
FRIEND: Are you talking about judges, Socrates?
SOCRATES: Well done! Now go on and try to tell me this: What are the measurers doing when they decide about what’s large and what’s small? They’re measuring, aren’t they?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when the weighers decide about what’s heavy and what’s light, aren’t they weighing?
FRIEND: Of course they’re weighing.
SOCRATES: And when the counters decide about many and few, they’re counting, aren’t they?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And when the judges decide about what’s just and what’s [c] unjust, what are they doing? Answer me.
FRIEND: I can’t.
SOCRATES: Say “they’re speaking.”
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then is it by speaking that they decide between us, whenever the judges decide about what’s just and what’s unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And it was by measuring that the measurers decided about what’s small and what’s large, since it was with a measuring-stick that these things were decided.
FRIEND: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Again, it was by weighing that the weighers decided about what’s heavy and what’s light, since it was with a scale that these things were decided.
FRIEND: It was.
SOCRATES: Again, it was by counting that the counters decided about [d] many and few, since it was by number that these things were decided.
FRIEND: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Yes, and, as we agreed a moment ago, it’s by speaking that the judges decide between us about what’s just and what’s unjust, since it was with speech that these things were decided.
FRIEND: Well said, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, because it was truly said: speech, as it seems, decides what’s just and what’s unjust.
FRIEND: It certainly seems so.
SOCRATES: What could the just and the unjust possibly be? Suppose someone asked us: “Since a measuring-stick, skill in measuring, and a measurer decide what’s larger and what’s smaller, what are “larger” and “smaller”?” We might tell him that “larger” is what exceeds and “smaller” is what’s exceeded. Or: “Since a scale, skill in weighing, and a weigher [e] decide what’s heavy and what’s light, what are “heavy” and “light”?” We might tell him that “heavy” is what sinks down in the balance, and “light” is what rises up. In this way, then, if someone should ask us: “Since speech, skill in judging, and a judge decide what’s just and what’s unjust for us, what could “just” and “unjust” possibly be?” How can we answer him? Are we still unable to tell him?
FRIEND: We’re unable.
SOCRATES: Do you think people do unjustice willingly or unwillingly? [374] What I mean is this: Do you think that people act unjustly and are unjust willingly or unwillingly?
FRIEND: Willingly, I’d say, Socrates, for they’re wicked.
SOCRATES: Then do you think that people are wicked and unjust willingly?
FRIEND: Definitely. Don’t you?
SOCRATES: No, at least not if we’re to trust the poet.
FRIEND: What poet?
SOCRATES: The one who said: “No one is willingly wicked, nor unwillingly blessed.”1
FRIEND: But, you know, Socrates, the old saying holds true, that singers tell many lies.
[b] SOCRATES: But I’d be surprised if this singer lied about this. If you have the time, let’s consider whether he tells the truth, or lies.
FRIEND: Well, I do have the time.
SOCRATES: Then which do you think is just, lying or telling the truth?
FRIEND: Telling the truth, obviously.
SOCRATES: Lying, then, is unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And which do you think is just, deceiving or not deceiving?
FRIEND: Not deceiving, certainly.
SOCRATES: Deceiving, then, is unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Well, then, which is just, harming or helping?
FRIEND: Helping.
SOCRATES: Harming, then, is unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
[c] SOCRATES: So, telling the truth, not deceiving, and helping are just, but lying, harming, and deceiving are unjust.
FRIEND: Yes, by Zeus, definitely.
SOCRATES: Even in the case of enemies?
FRIEND: Certainly not!
SOCRATES: Then is harming enemies just, and helping them unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And isn’t harming enemies just, even if you deceive them?
FRIEND: It must be.
SOCRATES: What about lying to deceive and harm them? Isn’t this just?
FRIEND: Yes. [d]
SOCRATES: Well, then, you say that helping friends is just, don’t you?
FRIEND: Definitely.
SOCRATES: By not deceiving them, or by deceiving them, if it’s for their benefit?
FRIEND: Even deceiving them, by Zeus.
SOCRATES: But, while it’s just to help people by deceiving them, certainly it’s not just to help them by lying? What if we help them by lying?
FRIEND: It would be just even if we lied.
SOCRATES: Then, as it seems, both lying and telling the truth are just and unjust.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And not deceiving and deceiving are just and unjust.
FRIEND: I guess so.
SOCRATES: Both harming and helping are just and unjust.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: So all these sorts of things, it appears, are both just and unjust. [e]
FRIEND: So it seems to me.
SOCR
ATES: Listen, then. I have a right and a left eye, don’t I, just like other people?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: A right and a left nostril?
FRIEND: Definitely.
SOCRATES: And a right and a left hand?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Although you call these by the same name, you say some are right and some are left. If I ask you which is which, wouldn’t you be able to say that these on this side are right and these on the other are left?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then let’s get back to our point. Although you call those acts by the same name, you say that some are just and some are unjust. Can [375] you say which are just and which are unjust?
FRIEND: Well, I suppose that each of these acts turns out to be just if and when we should do them, but unjust if we shouldn’t.
SOCRATES: Good for you! Then does the person who does each of these acts, when he should, do what’s just, while the person who does them, when he shouldn’t, does what’s unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And isn’t he himself just, the one who does what’s just, but the one who does what’s unjust is himself unjust?
FRIEND: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Now, who can perform surgery and cauterize and reduce swelling, if and when he should?
FRIEND: A doctor.
[375b] SOCRATES: Because he knows how, or for some other reason?
FRIEND: Because he knows how.
SOCRATES: And who can cultivate and plow and plant when he should?
FRIEND: A farmer.
SOCRATES: Because he knows how, or because he doesn’t?
FRIEND: Because he knows how.
SOCRATES: Isn’t this true for the other cases as well? The one who knows how can do what he should, if and when he should, but the one who doesn’t know how can’t?
FRIEND: So it is.
SOCRATES: And what about lying and deceiving and giving help? Can the one who knows how do each of these acts when he should and at the right time, but the one who doesn’t know how can’t?
[c] FRIEND: That’s true.
SOCRATES: But the person who does them when he should is just?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he does them because of his knowledge.
FRIEND: How else?
SOCRATES: Then a just person is just because of his knowledge.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Isn’t the unjust person unjust for the opposite reason?
FRIEND: So it seems.
SOCRATES: And the just person is just because of his wisdom.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: The unjust person is unjust, then, because of his ignorance.
FRIEND: I guess so.
SOCRATES: So it looks like justice is what our ancestors handed down to us as wisdom, and injustice is what they handed down to us as ignorance.
[d] FRIEND: I guess so.
SOCRATES: Are people ignorant willingly or unwillingly?
FRIEND: Unwillingly.
SOCRATES: So they’re also unjust unwillingly?
FRIEND: It seems so.
SOCRATES: Are unjust people wicked?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: So they’re wicked and unjust unwillingly?
FRIEND: Absolutely.
SOCRATES: And they act unjustly because they’re unjust?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: So, unwillingly?
FRIEND: Of course.
SOCRATES: Clearly what’s done willingly doesn’t happen unwillingly.
FRIEND: It couldn’t.
SOCRATES?: And acting unjustly comes about because there is injustice.
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: And injustice is unwilled.
FRIEND: Unwilled, yes.
SOCRATES: Then they act unjustly and are unjust and wicked unwillingly.
FRIEND: Unwillingly, it seems.
SOCRATES: Then in that case the singer didn’t lie.
FRIEND: I guess not.
1. Epicharmus of Syracuse, an early comic poet (frg. 7).
ON VIRTUE
Translated by Mark Reuter.
How can a man become virtuous? If virtue can be taught, there must be teachers of it; yet there don’t seem to be any—even the famous virtuous men of Athens failed to teach virtue to their own sons, let alone to anyone else. Nor is virtue a natural gift, for if it were there would be trainers dedicated to recognizing and fostering it, as with horse trainers and athletics coaches. The remaining alternative is that those who enjoy it have the gods to thank, not their nature, nor their educators.
Whole passages from Plato’s Meno reappear, more or less unchanged, in this dry little dialogue: 377b–378c ≈ Meno 93d–94e. This apparent plagiarism offends the sensibilities of modern scholars, but surely the author had no wish to conceal the borrowings from Meno; on the contrary, his use of themes and passages from Meno and other well-known Platonic dialogues is a way of citing them and drawing support from authoritative sources for his thesis. That thesis was not common ground in Plato’s Academy; Plato’s own position was far more nuanced than our author’s, and Xenocrates, a student of Plato and the third head of the Academy, wrote a work (now lost) affirming that Virtue Can Be Transmitted, perhaps in response to the question asked by Socrates in Meno, whether virtue can be taught. If the dialogue was part of a debate internal to the Old Academy, then it can be dated to the latter half of the fourth century B.C., when Aristotle as well as Xenocrates addressed the question. Or else the dialogue may have been directed against the Stoics, who claimed that virtue can be taught and that its foundation lies in human nature; if so, it might date from the middle of the third century B.C., a time when Arcesilaus, as head of the Academy, was placing new emphasis on Plato’s written works and drawing skeptical and anti-Stoical lessons from them.
The view espoused at the end of On Virtue, that virtue comes about by divine allotment, not only echoes Socrates’ comments at the end of Plato’s Meno; it is of a piece with Plato’s view that philosophers should rule and that their rule might come about by divine allotment ( Letter VII 326a–b, Republic 473c–d). Theological support for this view of god is given by Plato at Laws 715e–716d. Aristotle also uses some of the imagery and expressions found at the end of On Virtue (Eudemian Ethics 1246b37–1247a13 and 1248b3–7, Nicomachean Ethics 1145a20–29, Politics 1284a3–11).
Most manuscripts of On Virtue list as speakers ‘Socrates, Friend’, but two say ‘Socrates, Meno’, and one says ‘Socrates, Hippotrophus [Horse-trainer]’; that Socrates is a speaker is clear from the dialogue itself, but the other three appellations are evidently guesses by later scholars. So it seems to have been transmitted during antiquity without any indication of who the speakers were. The same is true of the dialogue labeled On Justice; these two dialogues also lack titles of a normal Platonic sort and may be among those said in ancient lists of Platonic works to be ‘without a heading’. In this translation, we have decided to call the unknown interlocutor ‘Friend’.
D.S.H.
SOCRATES: Can virtue be taught? If not, do men become good by nature, or in some other way? [376]
FRIEND: I can’t give you an answer right now, Socrates. [b]
SOCRATES: Well now, let’s consider it. Tell me, if someone wanted to become good with the virtue that makes expert chefs good, how would he do it?
FRIEND: By learning from good chefs, obviously.
SOCRATES: Good. Now if he wanted to become a good doctor, to whom would he go to become a good doctor?
FRIEND: That’s obvious—to one of the good doctors.
SOCRATES: And if he wanted to become good with the virtue that makes [c] expert builders good?
FRIEND: To one of the builders.
SOCRATES: And if he had wanted to become good with the virtue that makes men wise and good, where must he go to learn it?
FRIEND: This virtue, too, if it can be learned, I suppose he’d have to learn from good men. Where else?
SOCRATES: Then tell me, who were the good men of our city? Let’s consider if these are the ones who make men good.
FRIEND: Thucydides, Themistocles, Aristides, and Pericles. [d]
SOCRATES: Can we name a teacher for each of them?
FRIEND: No, we can’t; I haven’t heard of any.
SOCRATES: Well then, can we name a student, either a foreigner or a citizen, or anybody else, either free or slave, who is reputed to have become wise and good by associating with these men?
FRIEND: I haven’t heard of anybody.
SOCRATES: Might they not have been too jealous to share their virtue with other men?
FRIEND: Maybe.
SOCRATES: Just as chefs, doctors and builders are jealous—that way they won’t have any rivals. For it isn’t profitable for them to have many rivals or to live among many similar professionals. Is it similarly unprofitable for good men to live among men like themselves?
FRIEND: Probably.
SOCRATES: But aren’t they just, as well as good?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Does it profit someone to live not among good, but among bad men?
FRIEND: I can’t tell you.
SOCRATES: Well, can you tell me this—whether it’s the business of good men to harm, and of bad men to help or vice versa?
FRIEND: Vice versa.
[377] SOCRATES: The good, therefore, help, and the evil harm?
FRIEND: Yes.
SOCRATES: Is there anyone who wants to be harmed rather than be helped?
FRIEND: Of course not.
SOCRATES: Therefore, no one wants to live among bad rather than good men.
FRIEND: That’s right.
SOCRATES: Therefore, no good man will be too jealous to make another man good and similar to himself.
FRIEND: Apparently not, according to that argument.
SOCRATES: Have you heard that Cleophantus was the son of Themistocles?
FRIEND: I’ve heard that.
SOCRATES: Isn’t it obvious that Themistocles would not have begrudged his son becoming the best—Themistocles, a man who wouldn’t have begrudged that to anyone, if he really was good, which he was, as we admit.
Complete Works Page 258
