“While I was saying this Prodicus, annoyed that his prayers to the gods might appear useless, began to go after the young man in order to defend [399] himself; he meant to offer the same arguments that you did a moment ago. But then the supervisor of the gymnasium came up and told him to leave. He thought that Prodicus’ discussions weren’t suitable for young ears, and if they weren’t suitable, they must be wicked.
“The reason I’ve recounted this is so that you may observe how people feel about philosophy. If Prodicus were here arguing as he was, you would all think he was so mad that he should even be expelled from the gymnasium, [b] whereas just now you seem to have conducted your argument so extremely well, Critias, that you not only convinced everyone here but also made your opponent agree with you. It’s clearly like the situation in lawcourts: if two people were to offer the same testimony—one with the reputation of a gentleman, the other of a wicked man—the jurors would remain unconvinced by the wicked man’s testimony, but might possibly even do the opposite to what he wanted. But if the one who had the reputation of a gentleman were to say the same things, his words would [c] be judged to be absolutely true. Perhaps the attitude your listeners have taken towards you and Prodicus is like this. They thought that Prodicus was a sophist and a charlatan, but they think you are an important man who is involved in the affairs of our city. 6 They also believe that they should not concentrate on the argument itself but rather on the character of the people who are arguing.”
“Why, Socrates, you may not be serious about what you’re saying, but in my opinion Critias is clearly on to something important.”
[d] “Rest assured I’m absolutely serious. But since the two of you carried on your discussion so effectively, why not put the final touch on it as well?7 I think there’s something left for you to investigate, since there seemed to be agreement at least on the point that wealth is good for some and bad for others. All that’s left now is to examine what wealth itself is; unless you first determine this you won’t even be able to reach an agreement [e] on whether it’s bad or good. I’m ready to give you as much help as I can to complete your investigation, so it’s up to the one who claims that wealth is good to explain his position to us.”
“My own opinion about wealth is no different from everyone else’s: wealth is the possession of a lot of property. And I’m sure that Critias here also has the same opinion about wealth.”
“In that case, then, you would still be left to consider what property is in order to avoid the appearance a bit later of arguing about this all over [400] again. Let me illustrate this with the Carthaginians, who use the following kind of currency. In a small piece of leather something roughly the size of a stater8 is tied up, but no one knows what this is except the people who did the tying. Then when this is sealed they put it into circulation, and the person who has the largest number of these is considered to have the most property and to be the wealthiest. Yet if any Greek had a tremendous amount of this currency, he wouldn’t be any wealthier than if he had a lot of pebbles which he took from the hill. In Lacedaemon they [b] put iron into circulation according to weight, and what’s more, the useless kind.9 The person who has a large weight of this kind of iron is considered wealthy, yet elsewhere such a possession is worthless. In Ethiopia they use engraved stones which a Lacedaemonian would find useless. And among the Scythian nomads anyone who possessed the house of Poulytion would be considered no wealthier than an owner of Mount Lycabettus would be considered by us.
[c] “So clearly, each of these things cannot be property since some of the people who possess them seem no wealthier because of it. Yet each of them really is property for some people, and these people are wealthy because of their possession of it; but for others neither is it property nor does it make them wealthier. Likewise the same things are not beautiful and ugly to everybody, but rather different things strike different people in different ways.
[d] “If, then, we should wish to investigate why it is that houses are not property in the eyes of the Scythians but they are to us, or why leather is property to the Carthaginians but not to us, or why iron is property to the Lacedaemonians but not to us, wouldn’t our findings be precisely like that? Let me elaborate. Suppose someone in Athens had a thousand talents in weight of the stones found in the marketplace. Since we have no use for these stones, is there any reason why we should consider him any wealthier because he has them?”
“Apparently not.”
“But suppose he had the same weight of lychnite,10 would we say that he was in fact very wealthy?”
“Of course.” [e]
“Is it because the one thing is useful to us while the other is useless?”
“Yes.”
“And that’s also why among the Scythians houses are not property, because the Scythians have no use for a house; nor would a Scythian prefer the finest house over a heavy leather coat, since the one thing is useful to him while the other isn’t. Again, we don’t think that the Carthaginian coinage is property, since we couldn’t possibly obtain from it what we need, as we do with silver; therefore it would be useless to us.”
“Fair enough.”
“It follows that everything that turns out to be useful to us is property, while everything useless is not.”
In response to this Eryxias said: “How can that be, Socrates? When we’re [401] dealing with one another don’t we engage in talking and looking11 and many other things? Would we consider these property? They do seem useful. But even so we haven’t gained an impression of what property is. Everyone has pretty well agreed that something must be useful if it’s going to be property, but since not all useful things are property, what kinds of useful things are?”
“What12 if we were to pursue the question again through a comparison with drugs, which were invented for ending illnesses? Would we have a [b] better chance of finding what we’re looking for, namely, what it is that we treat as property and for what purpose the possession of property was invented? Possibly that approach would make it clearer to us. Now it appears that everything which is property must also be useful, and that what we call property is a species of these useful things. Therefore what we still have to do is consider for what use property is useful to use. For instance, all things which we use for work are useful, of course, just as all [c] things that have life are animals, but of these animals we call one species man. Now suppose someone were to ask us what would have to be done away with so that we wouldn’t need medicine or medical instruments. Our response would be, if illnesses were removed from the body and didn’t occur at all, or if they were removed as soon as they did occur. Therefore it seems that medicine is the science which is useful for removing illnesses.
[d] “But if someone were then to ask us what would have to be removed so that we wouldn’t need property, would we have an answer? If we don’t, let’s start over again along these lines: if a person could live without food and drink, and not go hungry or thirsty, what need would he have of these things, or of money or anything else to provide himself with them?”
“None, I suppose.”
“It’s the same with other things, too. If we had no need of the things that we presently require to take care of our bodies, heat and cold for [e] instance, and everything else too which the body lacks but requires, then what passes for property would be useless to us, since no one would have any need at all of the things for whose sake we want property. The result for us would be satisfaction, as far as the persistent desires and needs of the body are concerned. So if it’s to care for the body’s needs that the possession of property is useful, and if these needs were taken out of our way, we wouldn’t have any need for property, and property might not even exist at all.”
“It looks like it.”
“Then the things which are useful for that business appear to us, I suppose, to be property.”
Eryxias agreed with this, but he was becoming seriously confused by the argument.
[402] “What about this way
of looking at it? Would we say that the same thing can be sometimes useful, but sometimes useless, for one specific purpose?”
“No, I don’t think so. Instead, if we were to have any need of the thing for that one purpose, then I do think it’s useful, but if we don’t, then it isn’t.”
“So if we were able to make a gold statue without using fire, we wouldn’t have any need of fire for that purpose. And if we didn’t have any need [b] of fire, it wouldn’t be useful to us either. The same argument applies to other things as well.”
“It seems so.”
“And so it would appear that whatever isn’t needed when something is being done is also not useful to us in that particular case.”
“That’s right.”
“Then if it should turn out one day that we were able to put an end to the body’s needs so that it no longer had any, and we could do this without silver, gold, and other things of that kind which we don’t actually use for the body (in the way that we use food, drink, clothing, blankets and houses), then it would appear that silver, gold, and other such things [c] wouldn’t even be useful to us for this particular purpose, provided that the body’s needs can one day be removed without using them.”
“You’re right.”
“Then it would appear that these things aren’t property to us either if they aren’t useful, though they would be things which enable us to obtain what is useful.”
“Socrates, I could never be convinced that gold, silver, and other things like them are not property, as you say. I’m certainly convinced that the things which are useless to us are not property, and that property ranks among the most useful things besides.13 But I’m not persuaded that these [d] things are not actually useful to us for living, since we can obtain what we require by means of them.”
“Come on then, what would we say to this? Are there any teachers of music, letters, or some other skill, who obtain what they require for themselves by receiving compensation in return for their teaching?”
“There are.”
“So it’s with this skill of theirs that these people can obtain what they [e] require, by receiving something in return for that skill in the same way that we receive things in return for gold and silver.”
“Yes.”
“But if it’s with this that they obtain what they use for living, then it would actually be useful in itself for living. We did say, didn’t we, that property is useful because with it we’re able to obtain what we require for the body?”
“Yes we did.”
“So if these skills are classified as useful for this purpose, then it appears they are property, for the same reason that gold and silver are property. It’s clear too that those who possess these skills are wealthier. Yet a little earlier14 we were having a lot of trouble accepting the argument that these are the wealthiest people. Based on the agreement we’ve just reached, [403] however, it would have to follow that the more skillful are sometimes wealthier. For instance, if someone were to ask us whether we thought a horse is useful to everybody, wouldn’t you answer that it’s useful to those who know how to use a horse, but not to those who don’t?”
“I would.”
“And by the same argument medicine also isn’t useful to everybody, but only to the person who knows how to use it?”
“Yes.”
“Is it the same with everything else too?”
“Apparently.” [b]
“Then gold, silver, and the other things generally regarded as property would be useful only to the one who knows how they should be used?”
“Right.”
“Now weren’t we under the impression earlier15 that it took a gentleman to know when and how to use each of these things?”
“We were.”
“Then these things would be useful only to gentlemen, since they’re the ones who know how they should be used. But if these are useful only to them, then to them alone, it seems, would these things be property. It [c] appears, moreover, that if someone were to take a person who knew nothing about riding a horse and who owned horses which were useless to him, and then made him knowledgeable about horses, he would have made him at the same time wealthier too, since he has taken what was previously useless to this man and made it useful. For by giving the man some knowledge he’s instantly made him wealthy.”
“It seems so.”
“And yet I’m sure I could also swear on Critias’ behalf that he’s not convinced by any of these arguments.”
[d] “I’m certainly not. In fact I’d be crazy if I were. But go on and finish your argument that the things generally accepted as money—silver, gold, and other such things—are not property. You can’t imagine how much I admire these arguments of yours as I’m listening to you relate them right now.”
“I think, Critias, that you enjoy listening to me in the same way that you enjoy listening to the rhapsodes who sing Homer’s poems: you don’t think a word of it is true. But come on, what would we say to this? Would [e] you say that some things are useful for housebuilders when they are constructing a house?”
“Yes, I think so.”
“Would we say that those things are useful which they use16 for this construction—stones, bricks, boards, and that kind of thing? Or are these things also useful, the tools they used to build the house and with which they provided themselves with the boards and the stones, and likewise the tools for these tools?”
“I suppose that all the things involved in the operation are useful.”
“Isn’t this the case with all other activities? Not only are these things themselves useful which we use for each of our tasks, but also those by which we acquire these things and without which our work couldn’t be done?”
“Exactly.”
“Then likewise the things with which these last things were made, and [404] anything that came before them, and, again, the things with which these were made, and once more the things that preceded them, on and on endlessly—do all these things inevitably appear useful for the production of our work?”
“Yes, that might well be the case.”
“Now what if a person possessed food, drink, clothing, and whatever else he’s likely to use for his body, would he have any additional need for gold, silver, or anything else with which to acquire them, seeing that he already possesses them?”
“I doubt it.”
“Do you suppose a situation could occur when a man would need none [b] of these things for the use of his body?”
“No, I don’t.”
“Now if these things were to appear useless for this purpose, wouldn’t it follow that they can never appear useful? After all it was a basis of our discussion that things could not be sometimes useful, but sometimes useless, for one specific purpose.”
“Well, in that respect, at least, our arguments may be in agreement: if these things should ever be useful for this purpose, they would never turn out also to be useless. As it is, for doing certain things… [c]
…some for doing wicked things, others for doing good things?”17
“Yes, I would say so.”
“Can something wicked be useful for the purpose of doing something good?”
“No, I don’t think so.”
“Would we say that those acts are good which a person performs virtuously?”
“Yes.”
“Can a person learn anything which is taught orally, if he’s completely deprived of his ability to hear somebody else?”18
“No, by Zeus, I don’t think so.”
“So it would appear that hearing is to be classified as useful for virtue, [d] since virtue can be taught through the sense of hearing and we make use of this sense for learning.”
“Yes.”
“Since medicine can put an end to a person’s illness, it seems that sometimes medicine also may be classified as useful for virtue, if a person can acquire the sense of hearing through medicine.”
“That may be so.”
“And again, if we were
to obtain medicine in exchange for property, property would obviously be useful for virtue too.” [e]
“Yes, that’s quite true.”
“Likewise also the means by which we obtain the property?”
“Absolutely.”
“Do you suppose that a person could obtain money by wicked and disgraceful means, and in return get hold of the medical knowledge by which he would be able to hear after having been unable to hear, and that he could make use of that same ability for excellence or for other things of a similar kind?”
“I certainly think so.”
“Surely nothing wicked could be useful for virtue.”
“No, it couldn’t.”
“Then those things by which we obtain what is useful for one purpose or another are not necessarily also useful for that same purpose. Otherwise [405] bad things would sometimes appear to be useful for a good purpose. Perhaps this will make it clearer. If things are useful for one purpose or another, and this purpose couldn’t come into existence unless those things existed beforehand, tell me, what would you say about that? Can ignorance be useful for knowledge, or sickness for health, or wickedness for virtue?”
“I don’t think so.”
“Yet on this we would agree, that knowledge can’t belong to a person if ignorance didn’t exist in him beforehand, that health can’t belong to him if sickness didn’t exist in him beforehand, and that excellence can’t belong to him if wickedness didn’t exist in him beforehand.”
[b] “Yes, I suppose we would.”
Then it would appear that those things which are required for the creation of something else are not necessarily also useful for that thing. Otherwise it would seem that ignorance is useful for knowledge, sickness for health, and wickedness for virtue.”
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