It appears that those who formulated the Palestinian Covenant of 1968 sensed the difficulties inherent in the Arab position and wished to anticipate them by nailing down the qualification that only a small Jewish minority (the descendants of those who came to the country before 1917) would be given citizenship in “the liberated state,” thus assuring the Arab character of the country. If this stipulation manifests radicalization of the position, the reason was probably the apprehension that otherwise the ground would begin sliding beneath the Arab position.
The slogan of the “Democratic State” was offered as an escape from the odium that Article 6 of the 1968 Covenant brought upon the PLO stand, and as if the former superseded the latter, even without the formal act of amending the Covenant. It seems that the difficulties in which the idea of the Democratic State is enmeshed and the internal controversies it aroused, as expressed in this symposium, explain why Article 6 has not been amended, despite the fact that it damaged the Palestinian cause.
3. Postscript
The slogan of the “Democratic State” was hailed by Arab spokesmen as an all-important innovation demonstrating the liberal humanitarian nature of the Palestine movement. Yasser Arafat, to strengthen this impression, even said that its president can be Jewish. However, scrutiny shows that it is neither so liberal nor new.
The objective of setting up a Democratic Palestine was enshrined in the resolutions of the Eighth Palestinian National Assembly (March 1-5, 1971). The resolution was carefully formulated and it does not say, as Palestinian spokesmen purport to interpret the slogan, that all Israelis will be allowed to stay, but that the state will be based on equality of rights for all its citizens: “The future state in Palestine . . . will be Democratic, in which all will enjoy the same rights and obligations.” This is quite compatible with the quantitative limitation included in the infamous Article 6 of the 1968 Covenant.
It is not new. All along the Palestinians have repeatedly declared that their state will be democratic. That is part of the spirit of the age, when even autocratic regimes call themselves democratic. For instance, the Congress, which set up the “All-Palestine Government” in Gaza and which unanimously elected the former Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husaini, as its president, proclaimed on October 1, 1948 “the establishment of a free and democratic sovereign state. In it the citizens will enjoy their liberties and their rights. . . . ”
Even if the slogan of the “Democratic State” were free of inconsistency and insincerity it is not acceptable to the Israelis. The Israelis have no less a right to national self-determination than the Palestinian Arabs. They do not want to become Palestinians of Jewish faith; they intend to remain Israelis.
The difficulties for the Arabs inherent in the slogan of the “Democratic State” caused a decline in its discussion at subsequent Palestinian Congresses. This does not mean that it was discarded, as the alternative is to fall back on the brutality of the former, blatant, political-genocidal position.
NO NEED TO WORRY NOW
Perhaps the most common attitude is to concentrate at this stage on the demand for “self-determination for the Palestinians in their homeland” and leave the rest. This demand is an objective that can be easily justified. Defining the final objective now, it is argued, is a waste of time, and only a source of bafflement. Political objectives should be set in a time sequence. The problem of reconciling the existence of a large Jewish community with the conversion of the country into a Palestinian state is one for the distant future and should not bother the Arabs and Palestinians now. Now they should exert all their efforts in the struggle against Israel and in attaining of their national and social objectives. The achievement of these and the return of the Palestinians will produce new conditions which may solve the entire problem.
This approach was already alluded to in the Symposium. It has been expressed with greater clarity by Alias Murqus in his book criticizing the platform of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP) at its Second Congress in the summer of 1968. Murqus commends the LCP stand in defining that the “final solution to the Palestinian problem should be based on positions of principle, stemming from the inalienable right of the Palestinian Arabs in their land and homeland and hence their right to return there and achieve their self-determination . . . as the existence of the Jews in Palestine cannot impair the Palestinian natural and historical right in their homeland.” He stresses that “the final solution to the Palestinian problem is Palestine as an Arab homeland,” and as regards the future it calls for “the complete eradication of the State of Israel.” He goes on:
How shall we reconcile the existence of two million Jews and two million Palestinian Arabs? This is not our task or yours now. Let us define our objective in principle and nothing more. Let us define the present way to the goal: The fighting and the falling of hundreds of thousands from the Arabs and the Jews (from the Arab more than from the Jews). With the victory of the Algerian revolution the majority of the French, young and old, went, returned to France. With Arab victory in the Near East (the battle will be longer, fiercer and with heavier casualties), it is possible that the Jews in great numbers will return whence they came— Baghdad, Aleppo, Yemen, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Poland and other places, to France, or they will settle in Canada, the USA and Australia. This problem should not worry us, as its solution is by the struggle. (Marxism, Leninism and the World and Arab Development in the Platform of the Lebanese Communist Party, (Arabic) Dar al-Haqiqa, Beirut, 1970, pp. 362-363).
Egyptian-Israeli Accord on Sinai (September 1, 1975)
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:
ARTICLE I
The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.
The agreement concluded by the parties Jan. 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva peace conference constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of Oct. 22, 1973; and they are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant step towards that end.
ARTICLE II
The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.
ARTICLE III 1. The parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.
2. The parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the annex and, when concluded, the protocol shall be an integral part of this agreement.
ARTICLE IV
A. The military forces of the parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles: 1. All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as lines J and M on the attached map.
2. All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as line E on the attached map.
3. The area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.
4. The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.
5. The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and J will be a buffer zone. On this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli agreement of Jan. 18, 1974.
6. In the area south from line E and west from line M, as defined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex.
B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation of armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the U.N. functions an
d other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the annex and map which are an integral part of this agreement and of the protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this agreement.
ARTICLE V
The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions, and its mandate shall be extended annually.
ARTICLE VI
The parties hereby establish a joint commission for the duration of this agreement. It will function under the aegis of the chief coordinator of the United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The joint commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the protocol.
ARTICLE VII
Nonmilitary cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.
ARTICLE VIII 1. This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.
2. The parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.
ARTICLE IX
This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.
The U.S. Proposal for Early-Warning System in Sinai
In connection with the early-warning system referred to in Article IV of the agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that agreement (hereafter referred to as the basic agreement), the United States proposes the following: 1. The early-warning system to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the attached map will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements: a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the basic agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Gidi Passes as will be shown on the agreed map.
These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic-sensor fields at both ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.
2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations: a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1A, above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the parties to the basic agreement and the UNEF.
b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1B above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the parties to the basic agreement and to UNEF any movement of armed forces, other than the UNEF, into either pass and any observed preparations for such movement.
c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under these proposals shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under these proposals.
3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by these proposals, except for small arms required for their protection.
4. The United States personnel serving the early-warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.
5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.
6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the UNEF agreement of Feb. 13, 1957.
7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the basic agreement.
8. Notwithstanding any other provision of these proposals, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the parties to the basic agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both parties to the basic agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.
9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.
Annex to the Sinai Agreement
Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel agreement, representatives of the two parties shall meet in the military working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the agreement. In order to facilitate preparation of the protocol and implementation of the agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and other elements of the agreement, the two parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the agreement, as guidelines for the working group.
1. DEFINITIONS OF LINES AND AREAS
The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000— U.S. edition).
2. BUFFER ZONES
a. Access to the buffer zones shall be controlled by the UNEF, according to procedures to be worked out by the working group and UNEF.
b. Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.
c. In the buffer zone, between line E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the agreement an early-warning system entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this agreement.
d. Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for transit to and from the early-warning system; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and UNEF.
3. AREA SOUTH OF LINE E AND WEST OF LINE M a. In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.
b. Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil-field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work and live in the above-indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, 2B and the U.N. posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the protocol.
c. Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through UNEF checkpoints. UNEF shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the protocol.
d. Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved
in the civilian activities of the area, as agreed by the working group.
e. Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.
f. Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the protocol.
4. AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the U.S. over the areas covered by the agreement following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every seven to 10 days, with either party or UNEF empowered to request an earlier mission. The U.S. will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the U.N. peace-keeping mission in the Middle East.
5. LIMITATION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS a. Within the areas of limited forces and armaments the major limitations shall be as follows: 1. Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
2. Seventy-five (75) tanks.
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