Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad: Reaction to Israel-PLO Agreement (October 1, 1993)
The PLO was the Arab party pressing most for coordination among Arab parties. We have also stood for coordination, because we thought intra-Arab coordination could propel the peace process forward toward its objectives and firm up the steps leading in that direction. So, meetings to coordinate Arab moves were held between the bilateral rounds. The foreign ministers of the Arab states involved in the peace process used to meet to assess the previous round and devise tactics that might advance the peace process in the next round. In addition, the Arab delegations that held talks with the Israeli teams in Washington used to meet every week or so to compare notes. Each party, then, had a picture of how and what the others were doing. Thus, the Arabs moved in tandem toward a common objective.
All of a sudden, we hear that a secret agreement was reached between some PLO members and Israel. It turns out that the agreement was worked out in many months of secret negotiations, when, meanwhile, Arab states were meeting at the levels I have noted. The Palestinian side was engaged in talks with Israel, without the coordination it had pressed for. To my mind, this is not their best option, nor the best route to the establishment of peace. Yet, we decided not to obstruct the agreement. We said this is up to the Palestinian people and their organizations. However, no one should expect us to wax enthusiastic over a secret agreement concluded behind our backs. . . .
What is the justification for the unilateral decision that has been taken? We are all together. We all participated in the preliminary talks that laid the foundations of the Madrid conference. But, suddenly, one party began following a separate path. As we have always done, we will continue to urge and hope that the Palestinian Arab people regain their legitimate rights.
I said we decided not to obstruct the agreement. I did not say we will obstruct those who oppose it. We will not obstruct it, although we are not satisfied with it, especially since it deviates from the consensus. . . .
It is not our specialty, responsibility, or right to repress those who oppose this agreement or those who oppose anything else. . . .
We must carry on with the peace process that began in Madrid. . . .
If I struck the deal Arafat did, I would come up against many real problems. This has nothing to do with how the masses feel about Arafat or me. If I were to conclude such a deal, the Syrian people would conclude I had compromised my cause and abandoned the cause of another Arab people. . . . You know, there are those who paid with their lives for individual actions the masses perceived as not being in their best interests. I don’t want to lead you to think I have just one individual in mind, but more than one.
Arafat and I and every Arab know that the masses will conduct themselves according to their perception of their leaders. This is not to be interpreted as encouragement on my part for such a course of action; nor do I see it as a solution; if anything, it will further complicate matters. This is my personal opinion.
We have repeatedly said that, many times. The Syrian delegation to the negotiations said that, and I, too, have said that in some statements. I said three elements should be dealt with, although they are classified under the title of peace. They are withdrawal, peace, and security. We should discuss all these. Each side will attain what we all agree is its right, and which will provide security and peace of mind for it. We know peace has its requirements. We do not expect to take what we believe to be our right while others do not take theirs. We also believe we should take our rights and give others their rights. . . .
As long as this occupation remains, its results, including the boycott, must remain. I heard some statements by Israelis, including Peres while he was at the United Nations. In his statements, both in the U.N. General Assembly and to the press, he says, effectively: Why are you Arabs boycotting us? You have been saying the Palestine question is the core of the conflict. Here we are now, we have reached an agreement. It seems to me he is either insulting the intelligence of the others, specifically the Arabs, or he wants to fill the occasion, or the paper he is reading, with any words. Of course, we have said, and we still say, that the Palestine question is the core of the conflict. It is the core of the conflict in that it was the starting point of hostility. Hence, we called it the core of the conflict, but it is not the conflict. The Palestine question is the core of the conflict, but it is not the conflict. The Israelis know they have fought states. All the wars that were fought between Arabs and Israel were wars with states bordering Palestine. As a result of these wars, the core of the conflict that started in Palestine expanded to mean that every occupied Arab territory has become the core of the conflict.
Hani al-Hasan: Opposition to the Israel-PLO Accord (October 9, 1993)37
I personally thought from the outset that the letter of invitation to the October 1991 Madrid peace conference would only lead to the consecration of Israeli control over Palestinian land and the Palestinian people. In my view, what happened now amounts to the consecration of this control.
Indeed, Israel did recognize the PLO, but only after stripping the organization of all that it represents. The PLO which Israel has recognized is one that has submitted to Israeli demands. It is no longer the PLO that embodies the Palestinian people’s aspirations to independent statehood after a full Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and upholds the rights of the Palestinian refugees.
The Palestinian negotiator knows full well that Israel has no intention of withdrawing to the pre-June 1967 borders, and the proposed accord is therefore aimed at deceiving the Palestinian people.
Israel’s intention to keep 20 percent of the West Bank in addition to East Jerusalem when a permanent solution is supposed to be in place five years down the line was spelled out during Palestinian-Israeli “security talks” held in London in late 1992. . . .
At another secret PLO-Israel meeting, this one in Cairo around two months ago, Israeli Environment Minister Yossi Sarid made clear to Nabil Shaath, an Arafat adviser, that even his own Meretz faction supported the official Israeli position on Jerusalem (that it will remain Israel’s undivided capital) and that the Jerusalem issue can only be discussed from a religious angle. Hence East Jerusalemites who will take part in elections to the proposed Palestinian Council will do so as candidates or electors from other West Bank towns.
Those who concluded the accord with Israel, agreeing to stop the intifada,are banking on the Jewish state’s good will. The accord treats the occupied lands as disputed territories and is a recipe for the establishment of a federation between the State of Israel and a Palestinian “entity.” PLO negotiators Abu-Mazen and Ahmad Krai (Abu-Ala’a) were told as much during the Oslo talks. That is how Israel plans to keep its army in the West Bank even if a Palestinian “entity” emerges there.
As to the refugee issue, it was decided at the last meeting in Oslo that the multilateral committee on refugees would deal with seven areas none of which features UN Resolution 194 calling for the repatriation or compensation of 1948 refugees. This is a step towards ending the refugee issue and striking it off the United Nations’ agenda.
That is why we, the 1948 exiles, categorically reject what is happening. The PLO leaders who concluded the deal with Israel have all but buried the refugees’ right of return.
This is why someone like myself opposes what is happening now— even though I do not belong to the school of rejectionism and fully belong to the school of political settlements. But settlements are based on balance, whereas the proposed solution is one imposed by Israel as the victor.
As Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s remarks after he recognized the PLO indicate, proponents of the Gaza-Jericho deal have been entrusted with the task of punishing anyone who resorts to violence. It is strange that a Palestinian leader should undertake to stop the resistance in, say, Nablus or Hebron (on the West Bank) which will remain under Israeli occupation for at least five years. Hence Gaza-Jericho advocates will be the allies of the I
sraeli security forces over the next five years.
It is true that we will get a handful of billions of dollars and that we will build power stations in Gaza and a sewage system on the West Bank. But this is not what the PLO is about.
West Bank-Gaza Palestinian Leaders: Memorandum to Chairman Yasir Arafat (November 1993)
Mr. President of Palestine and Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee; Members of the PLO Executive Committee:
Greetings from Palestine:
Since the signing of the Declaration of Principles and the mutual recognition agreement between the PLO and the Israeli Government, the Palestinian people, together with their national forces, have been facing a new situation that has imposed new challenges. This is because the Declaration of Principles is an event that separates a militant stage, which aimed at underscoring Palestinian presence on the political map of the region and the world, from another militant stage that moves toward a greater and more advanced achievement; namely, the setting up of an independent Palestinian state on the land of Palestine by Palestinian hands.
Your Excellency the President: We assume that our Palestinian people, together with their national forces, have studied the agreement in terms of preambles, texts, and prospects as the various national institutions did in order to endorse it constitutionally through the PLO Executive Committee and the PLO Central Council. However, the agreement has produced an opposition that has different principles and objectives. And this is natural in an arena which pioneered the entrenching of democratic dialogue and relations among its forces as the only way to govern national life in the various fields.
The signatories to this memorandum believe that the Palestinian-Israeli agreement is a decisive political event which should be dealt with in a positive and responsible way in order to develop what is positive in it and be-siege what is negative.
In light of all this, we declare:
First, our total affiliation with our people’s potentials to build our new entity on the ground;
Second, our commitment to the PLO and its legitimate institutions as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the national framework to which there is no alternative in order to organize and lead the national potentials toward achieving all the national legitimate objectives of the Palestinian people.
Proceeding from this, and in order to benefit from our democratic right of taking the initiative to propose ideas and procedures which are important and vital in this qualitative stage of our national struggle, we reiterate the following:
First: We are not satisfied with the political leadership’s method of work in this stage, either in terms of running the difficult and delicate negotiations with the Israeli side or in terms of the preparations to embark on the stage of national construction in the interim period. It is obvious to everybody that the political leadership is practicing its role in a manner that is close to improvisation and without prior preparation for the necessary practical steps toward embodying the national interests through a planned implementation of our obligations to what was signed.
Second: The political leadership has not made sufficient effort to invigorate the required national dialogue whether on the level of the national forces, which adopted the agreement as an opportunity that would provide serious possibilities to proceed toward our national objectives, or on the level of the principled opposition to the agreement. Our national traditions require that we expeditiously launch such dialogue and work seriously to render it a success. The objective is to create a reasonable level of national harmony that will entrench Palestinian national security and create a healthy atmosphere for further mobilization toward the new tasks of the Palestinian people.
Third: The political leadership failed to present the agreement in an objective way to the Palestinian people so that this people would be aware of the prospects and potentials of their present and future moves. Consequently, this increased the confusion, ambiguity, and concern, particularly when the Palestinian people receive various and contradictory interpretations, not only on the level of the PLO and Israel, but also within the PLO itself.
Fourth: If we return to the statements and comments of the majority who voted, during the recent meeting of the PLO Central Council, in favor of the Declaration of Principles agreement, we will find that their support was on condition that the leadership performance will develop, Palestinian potentials will be mobilized, Palestinian skills and expertise will be exploited in the best way possible, and that the peace process will be dealt with as a militant process, not an administrative or bureaucratic one. As many of the PLO Central Council members said, whether the result of the Declaration of Principles agreement will be good or bad for the Palestinian people, and whether it will pave the way for national independence and an independent state, or whether it will consecrate the occupation, this result will be basically decided through the materialization of the previous conditions.
While we present these general remarks as a first step, we ask the political leadership to shoulder its responsibilities in dealing with the negative aspects in a manner that guarantees a balanced, viable, and responsible performance during the next stage.
Based on this, we present the following urgent demands: 1. The political leadership should set up specialized councils in all fields of political action, whether on the level of building the new entity or on the level of organizing moves in the Arab and international arenas.
2. The political leadership should appeal to all specialists in various sectors to join these councils and their working groups, whether through planning or implementation. In order to regulate this great process, a department should be set up in the PLO assigned with following up this issue and working out the appropriate action frameworks.
3. Adopting the principle of professional and political efficiency in forming the working groups, establishments, negotiating committees, and other bodies, and abandoning the fractional mentality and appeasement at the expense of efficiency.
4. Working out an integrated negotiating plan that is based on the Declaration of Principles and that ensures integration and harmony of the working groups and the various negotiating teams.
5. Forming a mini-leadership team to lead the entire negotiating process, supervise and follow it up, and coordinate between the various committees and groups.
6. Forming the Palestinian Development and Reconstruction Council according to certain specifications that ensure sound performance, planning, follow up and monitoring, and the credibility of our people with the donor countries and in order to develop the infrastructure of our national economy. Any delay in the formation of this council will waste more time and weaken the credibility of the Palestinians with the international parties that assist our people.
7. Completing the work of the Legal Committee assigned with drafting the bylaw of the Palestinian national authority (the constitutional document) in a manner that emphasizes its democratic nature and commitment to all principles contained in the Palestinian Declaration of Principles. This constitutional document should then be presented for broad deliberations by the Palestinian people as soon as possible.
8. The political leadership should immediately form a higher leadership authority that will start a national dialogue and work for the continuation and success of this dialogue. The political leadership should benefit from its previous mistakes in this respect, since the committees that used to be formed did not work with sufficient seriousness.
9. Setting up a higher planning, consulting, and guidance authority of experts that operates alongside the Executive Committee and assists it in carrying out its major tasks in this stage.
While making such a proposal, we are not undermining the role and jurisdiction of the first executive authority. We present these proposals because we know how this authority has been adversely affected by the resignation of some of its members and the possibility that others may resign or freeze their membership. . . .
The signatories: Dr. Haydar ’Abd
al-Shafi, Bashir al-Barghuthi, Ibrahim Abu ’Ayyash, Dr. Anis Fawzi al-Qasim, Tawfiq Abu Bakr, Dr. Taysir ’Aruri, Samih ’Abd al-Fattah, known as Abu Hisham, Lawyer ’Ali al-Safarini, Faysal Hurani, Lawyer Muhammad ’Ayyash Milham, Nabil ’Amr, the Reverend Ibrahim ’Ayyad, Dr. Mundhir Salah, Dr. ’Izz al-Din al-Manasirah, and Ghazi al-Sa’di.
Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad and U.S. President Bill Clinton: Statement on Their Meeting (January 16, 1994)
Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad
I wish to express my deep satisfaction for what these talks have affected in terms of U.S. determination to do all it can in order to bring the peace process to its desired objective—the objective of establishing a just and comprehensive peace in the region through the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, and 425 as well as the principle of land for peace.
In this respect, I appreciate the fact that not withstanding the great importance that President Clinton attaches to the internal affairs of his country, he has attached a special importance as a full partner and honest intermediary to helping the parties reach a comprehensive peace that is in the interest not only of the peoples of the region, but also the people of the world at large.
Today’s meeting between President Clinton and myself came to crown a number of exchanges and telephone communications between us over the last year. I hope that our meeting today will contribute to the realization of the aspirations of the peoples in the region; mainly, that this new year will be the year of achieving a just and comprehensive peace which puts an end to the tragedies of violence and wars endured by them for several decades.
The Israel-Arab Reader Page 63
