The image formulated in the minds of Western people and which formulated in public opinion was that Syria was the aggressor and Syria was the one who shelled settlements from the Golan prior to the 1967 war. These claims carry no grain of truth in them. As Moshe Dayan has explained in his memoirs, that it was the other side who insisted on provoking the Syrians until they clashed together and then claimed that the Syrians are the aggressors. Mr. President, the peace talks between Israel and Syria have been ongoing for the last eight years with off and on, of course.
We hope that this is going to be the last resumption of negotiations which will be concluded with a peace agreement, a peace based on justice and comprehensivity, an honorable peace for both sides that preserves rights, dignity and sovereignty. Because only honorable and just peace will be embraced by future generations. And it is the only peace that shall open new horizons for totally new relations between peoples of the region.
President Assad has announced many years ago that peace is the strategic option of Syria, and we hope that peace has become the strategic option for others today in order to have or to leave future generations a region that is not torn with wars, a region whose sky is not polluted by the smell of the blood and destruction. We all here agree that we are at a threshold of a historic opportunity, an opportunity for the Arabs and Israelis alike, and for the United States and the world at large. Therefore, we all have to be objective and show a high sense of responsibility in order to achieve a just and comprehensive peace, a peace that has been so long awaited by all the peoples of our region and the world at large.
UN Security Council: Israel’s Withdrawal from Lebanon (June 19, 2000)
The Security Council welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590) ... [that] Israel has withdrawn its forces from Lebanon in accordance with resolution 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978.
. . . . The Council notes that Israel and Lebanon have confirmed to the Secretary-General, as referred to in his report of 16 June 2000 (S/2000/590), that identifying the withdrawal line was solely the responsibility of the United Nations and that they will respect the line as identified. . . .
The Security Council calls on all parties concerned to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and to exercise utmost restraint. The Council reemphasizes the need for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.
The Security Council, recalling resolution 425 (1978) and resolution 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, calls on the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority and presence in the south. The Council notes that the United Nations cannot assume law and order functions which are properly the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon. In this regard, the Council welcomes the first steps taken by the Government of Lebanon and calls upon it to proceed with the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces as soon as possible, with the assistance of UNIFIL, into the Lebanese territory recently vacated by Israel.
The Security Council welcomes the measures taken by the Secretary-General and the troop-contributing countries relating to UNIFIL augmentation, in accordance with paragraph 32 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 May 2000. The Council stresses that the redeployment of UNIFIL should be conducted in coordination with the Government of Lebanon and with the Lebanese armed forces. . . .
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: Leaving for the Camp David Talks (July 10, 2000)
. . . . The moment of truth is close and I am prepared for it.
One hundred years of enmity and struggle meet at this point in time. We have buried too many; there has been suffering and anguish on both sides because of the unbearably high price not only for defeat but also for victory. The time has now come to put an end to the conflict, and to give our children the opportunity to flourish in peace.
The time has come to make decisions and to bequeath a better future for our children; a different reality from that of our generation and our parents’ generation.
This is the time to devote our best resources to education, to reducing unemployment, to bridging social gaps, to equal opportunities, and fully utilizing the enormous potential of our young and gifted generation.
This is the meaning of peace and security!
There is no peace without a price, just as there is no peace at any price. The dream and the ideal are lofty, and they will never be straightforward and perfect. The reality of life is highly complex and complicated. Painful compromise is required. There is no choice. . . .
The negotiations will be heart-rending and difficult because they will involve not only distant maps and locations, but also our beloved homeland. They will involve roots entrenched deep in the hills, and the love of the homeland to which I am bound and committed. This is a love that cannot be divided.
If we do reach an agreement that will put an end to the conflict, there will be a heavy but necessary price to pay. As Menahem Begin said, “The difficulties of peace are better than the agonies of war.”
If there is an agreement, it will only be one that will strengthen the security of Israel, its economy, and its regional and international standing. Otherwise, there will be no agreement.
If there is an agreement, it will only be one that will comply with the principles to which I committed myself before I was elected, and principles that I have consistently and clearly stressed: -A united Jerusalem under Israeli sovereignty;
-The 1967 borders will be amended;
-The overwhelming majority of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be in settlement blocs under Israeli sovereignty;
-No foreign army in the entire area west of the Jordan River;
-A solution to the problem of refugees outside Israeli sovereign territory.
These are the principles—these and no others. If there is an agreement, I will submit it, as I promised, to the Israeli people for decision. It is the Israeli people who will decide on the agreement in a referendum. I will sign the agreement only if I am convinced that it strengthens Israel and its future. Such an agreement will, I am sure, be approved and endorsed by an overwhelming majority of the Israeli people, and I am sure by a majority of the Israeli residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip.
If there is an agreement, it will require painful compromise, not only by us, but also by the Palestinians; otherwise, there will be no agreement.
I would like to take this opportunity, on the eve of the summit, to address the Palestinian leadership and people and ask them to clear the air of accusations, threats and gloomy prophecies, and to rise to the greatness of the hour.
We are arriving at a decisive crossroads in the future relationship between us. The choice between us is between the peace of the brave, which will put the relationship between us on a positive track of good neighborliness and prosperity; or, God forbid, will lead to violent conflict, which in turn will lead to further suffering and victims, and will not solve anything.
The State of Israel does not wish to control you or your future. We want good neighborly relations with you based on respect and liberty, on broad coordination, on shared interests, and on a separation that will allow you and us to maintain independent identities, development and free choice.
And I look forward to Yasir Arafat coming to Camp David with the full backing of the Palestinian people to achieve a historic peace. I expect him to come full of resolution and the ability to make a decision in order that together we may achieve our common goal. Together, with the help of the President of the United States, we will be able to bring peace and security to our peoples. . . .
U.S. President Bill Clinton: Statement after the Camp David Peace Talks (July 25, 2000)
After 14 days of intensive negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, I have concluded with regret that they will not be able to reach an agreement at this time. As I explained on the eve of the summit,
success was far from guaranteed—given the historical, religious, political and emotional dimensions of the conflict.
Still, because the parties were not making progress on their own and the September deadline they set for themselves was fast approaching, I thought we had no choice. We can’t afford to leave a single stone unturned in the search for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.
Now, at Camp David, both sides engaged in comprehensive discussions that were really unprecedented because they dealt with the most sensitive issues dividing them; profound and complex questions that long had been considered off limits.
Under the operating rules that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, they are, of course, not bound by any proposal discussed at the summit. However, while we did not get an agreement here, significant progress was made on the core issues. I want to express my appreciation to Prime Minister Barak, Chairman Arafat and their delegations for the efforts they undertook to reach an agreement.
Prime Minister Barak showed particular courage and vision, and an understanding of the historical importance of this moment. Chairman Arafat made it clear that he, too, remains committed to the path of peace. The trilateral statement we issued affirms both leaders’ commitment to avoid violence or unilateral actions which will make peace more difficult and to keep the peace process going until it reaches a successful conclusion.
At the end of this summit, I am fully aware of the deep disappointment that will be felt on both sides. But it was essential for Israelis and Palestinians, finally, to begin to deal with the toughest decisions in the peace process. Only they can make those decisions, and they both pledged to make them, I say again, by mid-September.
Now, it’s essential that they not lose hope, that they keep working for peace, they avoid any unilateral actions that would only make the hard task ahead more difficult. The statement the leaders have made today is encouraging in that regard.
Israelis and Palestinians are destined to live side by side, destined to have a common future. They have to decide what kind of future it will be. Though the differences that remain are deep, they have come a long way in the last seven years, and, notwithstanding the failure to reach an agreement, they made real headway in the last two weeks.
Now, the two parties must go home and reflect, both on what happened at Camp David and on what did not happen. For the sake of their children, they must rededicate themselves to the path of peace and find a way to resume their negotiations in the next few weeks. They’ve asked us to continue to help, and as always, we’ll do our best. But the parties themselves, both of them, must be prepared to resolve profound questions of history, identity and national faith—as well as the future of sites that are holy to religious people all over the world who are part of the Islamic, Christian and Judaic traditions. . . .
[Jerusalem] was the most difficult problem. And I must tell you that we tried a lot of different approaches to it, and we have not yet found a solution. But the good news is that there is not a great deal of disagreement— and I want to emphasize this—it seemed to me, anyway, there was not a great deal of disagreement in many of these areas about what the facts on the ground would be after an agreement were made—that is, how people would live.
For example, everyone conceded that Jerusalem is a place that required everyone to have access to the holy sites and the kinds of things you’ve heard, and lot of other things in terms of how, operationally, the Israelis and the Palestinians have worked together; there was actually more agreement than I had thought there would be.
But obviously, the questions around Jerusalem go to the core identity of both the Palestinians and the Israelis. There were some very, as I said—it has been reported Prime Minister Barak took some very bold decisions, but we were in the end unable to bridge the gaps. I think there will be a bridge, because I think the alternative is unthinkable. . . .
But I think it is fair to say that at this moment in time, maybe because they had been preparing for it longer, maybe because they had thought through it more, that the Prime Minister moved forward more from his initial position than Chairman Arafat, on—particularly surrounding the questions of Jerusalem.
Now, these are hard questions. And as I said to both of them, none of us, no outsider can judge for another person what is at the core of his being, at the core of his sense of national essence. But we cannot make an agreement here without a continuing effort of both sides to compromise. . . .
Oh, yes, there were always side papers—even going back to 1993— about how these final issues would be solved. There were always speculation, there were always the odd conversation between Palestinians and Israelis who were friends and part of the various—the different government operations. But these folks really never had to come together before, and in an official setting put themselves on the line. And it is profoundly difficult. . . .
Of all the peace groups I ever worked with, these people know each other, they know the names of each other’s children, they know how many grandchildren the grandparents have, they know their life stories, they have a genuine respect and understanding for each other. It is truly extraordinary and unique in my experience in almost eight years of dealing with it. . . . They couldn’t get there. But this was the first time in an organized, disciplined way they had to work through, both for themselves and then with each other how they were going to come to grips with issues that go to the core of their identity. . . .
One of the things that often happens in a very difficult peace process is that people, if they’re not careful, will gravitate to the intense position rather than the position that will make peace. And it’s very often that people know that a superficially safe position is to say no, that you won’t get in trouble with whoever is dominating the debate back home wherever your home is, as long as you say no. . . .
The Palestinians changed their position; they moved forward. The Israelis moved more from the position they had. I said what I said; I will say again: I was not condemning Arafat, I was praising Barak. But I would be making a mistake not to praise Barak because I think he took a big risk. And I think it sparked, already, in Israel a real debate, which is moving Israeli public opinion toward the conditions that will make peace. So I thought that was important, and I think it deserves to be acknowledged.
But the overriding thing you need to know is that progress was made on all fronts, that significant progress was made on some of the core issues, that Jerusalem, as you all knew it would be, remains the biggest problem for the reasons you know.
But what we have to find here, if there is going to be an agreement—by definition, an agreement is one in which everybody is a little disappointed and nobody is defeated, in which neither side requires the other to say they have lost everything and they find a way to—a shared result. . . .
Keep in mind: When the Oslo Agreement was drafted, these things were put down as final status issues because the people that drafted them knew it would be hard. And they took a gamble. And their gamble was that if the Israelis and the Palestinians worked together over a seven-year period and they began to share security cooperation, for example . . . and if they kept making other specific agreements, that by the time we got to the end of the road, there would be enough knowledge and trust and understanding of each other’s positions that these huge, epochal issues could be resolved.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: Statement after the Camp David Talks (July 25, 2000)
The Government of Israel, and I as Prime Minister, acted in the course of the Camp David Summit out of moral and personal commitment, and supreme national obligation to do everything possible to bring about an end to the conflict—but not at any price—while at the same time, strengthening the State of Israel, and Jerusalem its capital. In the course of the negotiations, we touched the most sensitive nerves, ours and the Palestinians, but regretfully—with no result.
We were not prepared to relinquish three things: the security of Israel, those things that are holy to Israe
l, and the unity of our people. If we will be faced with the alternative between compromising one of these and a confrontation, the choice is clear to every Israeli.
We’ve known how to face such situations in the past, and we will in the future. Yet, if we will find ourselves in a confrontation, we will be able to look straight into the eyes of our children and to say that we have done everything to prevent it. In the face of the dangers and risks before us, we must put aside all our differences and unite, as we have known to do so many times in the past.
All my life I fought for Israeli security, and I reiterate: I will not agree to relinquish the vital interests of Israeli security; I will not agree to give up the strengthening of Israel and the bolstering of greater Jerusalem, with a solid Jewish majority, for future generations.
Israel was prepared to pay a painful price to bring about an end to the conflict, but not any price. We sought a stable balance, and peace for generations to come, not headlines in tomorrow’s paper. The summit was a major—and for now the latest—milestone in the intensive and exhaustive negotiating process to achieve a framework agreement for the permanent status accord with the Palestinians, which my government has been striving to achieve.
We can today look in the mirror and say: In the past year, we have exhausted every possibility to bring an end to the 100-year-old conflict between us and the Palestinians, but regrettably the conditions were not yet ripe.
I understand the disappointment of many in Israel, who believe in coexistence and extending a hand in peace to our Palestinian neighbors. I even join them in their disappointment. However, we will not cease our effort to achieve peace and will continue to work to bring it about—yet not at any price.
Arafat was afraid to make the historic decisions necessary at this time in order to bring about an end to the conflict. Arafat’s positions on Jerusalem are those which prevented the achievement of the agreement. . . .
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