by FDR
Roosevelt was the first president inaugurated under the Twentieth (lame-duck) Amendment, which moved the date from March 4 to January 20. A blinding rainstorm failed to put a damper on the 1937 ceremony as FDR proclaimed “one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished.” Courtesy of the Library of Congress
New York’s Mayor Fiorello La Guardia takes a break from the 1938 campaign at Hyde Park. Mrs. La Guardia is at left, Congresswoman Caroline O’Day sits on the rear seat, Eleanor stands at right.
Roosevelt flashes his identification as a member of the volunteer fire department of Hyde Park.
FDR’s devoted secretary and confidant Missy LeHand and the president in the Oval Office, September 6, 1938. Justice Felix Frankfurter called LeHand the fifth most powerful person in the country.
FDR observing naval exercises from the deck of the USS Indianapolis, May 3, 1934. Navy secretary Claude Swanson is at left, former secretary Josephus Daniels at right.
Sara entertained the King and Queen at Hyde Park with simple dignity. When she suggested her son forego pre-dinner cocktails, the president demurred, supported by the King. “My mother would have said the same,” George VI observed.
“I was never so frightened in my life,” said Queen Elizabeth after riding with FDR along woodland trails to Top Cottage at Hyde Park. Betsey Cushing Roosevelt (James’s wife) sits beside the King.
Anna and FDR watch an impromptu baseball game between newscaster Lowell Thomas’s “Nine Old Men” and White House correspondents at Pawling, New York, August 31, 1938.
Roosevelt liked nothing better than to inaugurate the major league baseball season each year at Washington’s Griffith Stadium. The cast changed little from 1934 to 1940: James Farley, Harry Hopkins, Clark Griffith, “Bucky” Harris, Joe McCarthy, Joe Cronin, and Connie Mack. The 1937 All-Star game was played in Washington, and Mel Ott of the New York Giants joined the festivities.
Opening day, 1937.
FDR watches as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson draws the initial number for the nation’s first peacetime draft, October 29, 1940.
Roosevelt salutes the Atlantic Fleet from the bridge of the USS Houston.
Churchill, meeting Roosevelt off Newfoundland, presents the president a letter from King George VI on August 9, 1941. FDR grips Elliott’s arm; son John stands behind Churchill.
Joint Sunday service on the fantail of the Prince of Wales. Roosevelt and Churchill are seated at top left. FDR insisted on walking the length of the ship to take his seat.
FDR and Churchill, shown here at service, became fast friends and were always able to resolve differences between their staffs. Left to right: Admiral Ernest J. King, Averell Harriman, General George C. Marshall, Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Admiral Harold R. Stark.
FDR and Churchill hold a joint press conference sitting behind Roosevelt’s desk in the Oval Office, December 21, 1941. The president wore a black armband to commemorate Sara’s death.
The president bestows the Medal of Honor on Brig. Gen. James Doolittle following his daring 1942 raid on Tokyo. Left to right: General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, FDR, Mrs. Doolittle, Doolittle, General Marshall.
FDR enjoys army field mess in Morocco with Harry Hopkins, Lt. Gen. Mark Clark, and Maj. Gen. George Patton. Military censors blanked out Patton’s 1st Armored Division shoulder patch. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
General Henri Giraud and General Charles de Gaulle pose for the cameras at FDR’s insistence. “Roosevelt meant the peace to be an American peace … and that France … should recognize him as its savior,” de Gaulle wrote later. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
Roosevelt, in the presence of a pensive Churchill, announces the doctrine of “unconditional surrender” at Casablanca.
Churchill keeps FDR company as he fishes at Shangri La, May 16, 1942, during a break from the TRIDENT conference.
A healthy and ruddy Roosevelt meets with Canada’s governor general, the Earl of Athlone (George VI’s uncle), Prime Minister Mackenzie King, and Churchill at Quebec, August 17, 1943.
The Big Three at their first meeting, Teheran, November 30, 1943. Harry Hopkins, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, and Anthony Eden stand directly behind.
FDR preparing to review American troops with Eisenhower at Castelvetrano, Sicily, December 8, 1943. George Patton stands at left.
Roosevelt huddles with the Democratic congressional leadership following his return from Teheran, December 17, 1943. Left to right: Senate Majority Leader Alben Barkley, House Majority Leader John McCormack, Vice President Henry Wallace, Speaker Sam Rayburn. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
Five-year-old Ruthie Bie was the granddaughter of Christian Bie, caretaker of Top Cottage. This photo, taken by Daisy Suckley, is one of only two images known to exist showing FDR in a wheelchair.
Roosevelt sailed to Hawaii to discuss Pacific strategy with MacArthur and Nimitz, shown here on the deck of the USS Baltimore, July 16, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
A beaming Churchill greets FDR at Quebec for the OCTAGON conference, September 14, 1944. It was here that Roosevelt and Churchill initially approved the Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
Running mate Senator Harry Truman and Roosevelt at a Rose Garden photo op, August 18, 1944. “I had no idea he was in such a feeble condition,” said Truman afterward. “He got more cream in the saucer than he did in the cup.”
To allay concerns about his health, FDR barnstormed through New York City for four hours in pouring rain and near-freezing temperatures, October 21, 1944. Courtesy of the National Archives and Records Administration
Roosevelt’s fourth inauguration, January 20, 1945, was held on the south portico of the White House rather than at the Capitol, and there was no parade. “Who’s going to march?” asked FDR.
Stalin and FDR confer privately at Yalta (interpreters Pavlov and Bohlen at right). At this meeting Stalin agreed to join the war against Japan three months after Germany’s defeat.
FDR and Stalin await Churchill for the formal picture-taking ceremony, February 9, 1945. Secretary of State Edward Stettinius stands behind the empty chair; General Marshall, caught with his hands in his pockets, is behind Roosevelt.
Formal portrait of the Big Three. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Admiral William Leahy, and General Alexei Antonov stand behind the principals. Courtesy of the Library of Congress
An exhausted Roosevelt reports to Congress on the results of the Yalta conference. This is the first time FDR remained seated when he addressed a joint session.
FDR at his writing table at Warm Springs two days before his death. The president went to Georgia to regain his health.
Lucy Rutherfurd at Warm Springs, April 11, 1945. After Missy LeHand’s stroke in 1941, Lucy and FDR resumed seeing each other, often at the White House or at Shangri La. Lucy was with the president when he died and hers was the last face he saw.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 11, 1945. This is the last photograph of the president.
Marshall and Stark’s recommendation made sense to Roosevelt. When the cabinet met on November 7, he asked Hull to summarize the situation in the Far East. In his meandering Tennessee vernacular, Hull spoke fifteen minutes. (“If Cordell says, ‘Oh Chwrist’ again I’m going to scream,” FDR whispered to Frances Perkins. “I can’t stand profanity with a lisp.”)72 The secretary of state’s conclusion was that the situation was critical and that Japan might attack at any time.73 Roosevelt asked each member of the cabinet for his or her opinion. All agreed that Congress would give the president a declaration of war if he asked for it, but public support would depend on the circumstances. The president turned sharply to Hull. “Do not let the talks [with Nomura] deteriorate. Let us make no more of ill will. Let us do nothing to precipitate a crisis.”74 The split was evident. Hull and the cabinet, temperament
ally inclined to support China regardless of the strategic consequences, were ready for war; Roosevelt and the military, determined to avoid a diversion in the Far East, sought to minimize conflict with Japan.
In his talks with Nomura (who was joined on November 15 by Saburo Kurusu, a seasoned diplomat sent by Tokyo to impart a final urgency to the discussions*) Hull was rigid and sanctimonious. White supremacy ran deep in east Tennessee and Hull found it difficult not to be condescending. When the Japanese sought concrete answers, Hull lectured on moral principles. As one scholar wrote, the secretary of state was more “intrusive, altogether more ‘preachy,’ he flogged the tired old issues again and again.”75
On November 20, 1941, Nomura and Kurusu presented Japan’s final offer—a proposal for a six-month cooling-off period that would allow both sides time to reassess the situation. Essentially it was a return to the status quo before the American embargo. Japan would agree to no further territorial expansion and would withdraw its troops from southern Indochina in return for a relaxation of U.S. trade sanctions.76 Thanks to MAGIC intercepts, the administration knew this was Tokyo’s last stand. “This time we are making our last possible bargain,” Foreign Minister Togo informed his Washington representatives. “I hope we can settle all our troubles with the United States peacefully.”77
The Japanese proposal said nothing about China. As a result Hull found it “clearly unacceptable.”78 But Roosevelt saw a glimmer of hope. Fully mindful of Marshall and Stark’s admonition to avoid war with Japan, he seized on the idea of a temporary modus vivendi. After learning the details of the Japanese offer, he scribbled a note to Hull as a basis for a conciliatory reply:
6 Months
U.S. to resume economic relations—some oil and rice now—more later.
Japan to send no more troops to Indochina or Manchurian border or any place South (Dutch. Brit. or Siam).
Japan to agree not to invoke tripartite pact even if U.S. gets into European war.
U.S. to introduce Japs to Chinese to talk things over but U.S. to take no part in their conversations.
Later on Pacific agreements.79
Roosevelt said the United States did not intend to interfere or mediate between Japan and China. “I don’t know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats, but the United States’ only intention is to become an ‘introducer.’ ”80 The president dropped earlier American demands that Japan withdraw from China. Later he told Ickes “he was not sure whether or not Japan had a gun up its sleeve.” Ickes was convinced war was inevitable, but Roosevelt was not. “It seemed to me,” wrote Ickes, “that the President had not yet reached the state of mind where he is willing to be aggressive as to Japan.”81
Roosevelt’s conciliatory stance won quick military support. On November 21 Major General Leonard T. Gerow, chief of the Army’s War Plans Division, representing General Marshall, who was spending Thanksgiving in Florida, wrote Hull that the Army considered it a matter of “grave importance to the success of our effort in Europe that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan.… [A] temporary peace in the Pacific would permit us to complete defensive preparations in the Philippines and at the same time insure continuance of material assistance to the British—both of which are highly important.”82
Time was running out. Nomura and Kurusu asked Tokyo for an extension of the November 25 deadline, and Togo gave them until the twenty-ninth. “This time we mean it. The deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.”83 MAGIC intercepts delivered the message to FDR and Hull almost as quickly as Nomura received it.
For whatever reasons, Roosevelt’s suggestion of a modus vivendi was never presented to the Japanese. Revisionist historians and some conspiracy theorists argue that the Roosevelt administration had given up hope for peace in the Pacific and wanted to lure the Japanese into attacking first.84 Traditional historians have downplayed the significance of modus vivendi and assert that Japan was bent on war in any event.85 Hull’s rendition of events is meretricious; Stimson’s is flawed; and Roosevelt left no record.86 Professors William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, in their magisterial account of prewar diplomacy, call the failure to present the modus vivendi a mystery: “Until and unless additional evidence comes to light, the role of the President as well as of Secretary Hull will remain a subject of speculation.”87
The sparse record available indicates that FDR’s plan encountered heavy going, both from America’s allies and in the cabinet. China was outraged, the Australians and the Dutch thought it was a bad idea, and Churchill, who always favored a tough stance toward the Japanese, deftly played the China card. “Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war,” he cabled Roosevelt. “But what about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? If [China] collapses our joint dangers would enormously increase.”88 In the cabinet Stimson and Knox were prepared to play for time but despaired of leaving China in the lurch; Morgenthau was appalled at the prospect; Hull was already on record to that effect; and Ickes (for the umpteenth time) considered resigning. “If this negotiation with Japan had been consummated, I would have promptly resigned from the Cabinet with a ringing statement attacking the arrangement.… I believe the President would have lost the country on this issue and that hell would have been to pay generally.”89
When Roosevelt met with his war council (Hull, Stimson, Knox, Marshall, and Stark) on November 25, 1941, it was agreed that little room for negotiation remained.90 The discussion focused on what to do should Japan reject a temporary truce. Aware that Tokyo had set a November 29 (Saturday) deadline, Roosevelt said, “We are likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as next Monday because the Japanese are notorious for attacking without warning. The question is how to maneuver them into firing the first shot without too much danger to ourselves.”91 The president was not baiting a trap but, like Lincoln prior to Fort Sumter, wanted Japan to be perceived as the aggressor.* The consensus was that the Japanese would move from Indochina against Thailand, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, rather than the Philippines. It was not a question of whether the Japanese would attack, but where and when.92
Separated by more than sixty years and three generations from events in 1941, it is difficult to appreciate the implicit racial hostility toward Japan that characterized Roosevelt’s discussions with his advisers as war drew near. Sir Lewis Namier, the eminent British scholar, once observed that historians are inclined to remember the present and forget the past. Dimensions of tolerance are much greater now than they were then, and, given Japan’s current economic and industrial prowess, we can easily forget how little credibility Westerners assigned to the Japanese military in 1941. The army had been bogged down in China for four years; Zhukov had made quick work of the garrison in Manchukuo; and the Japanese Navy had not been engaged in battle on the high seas since 1905. “The Japs,” as FDR called them, might prevail in Southeast Asia, but they were scarcely seen as a threat to American forces in the Pacific, certainly not to Pearl Harbor, which both the Army and the Navy believed to be impregnable. This supercilious dismissal of Japan as a serious military rival allowed the war council to discuss the possibility of war in Southeast Asia with remarkable detachment. The conflict, if it came, they felt would be a distraction but little more.
Hull met Nomura and Kurusu in the late afternoon of Wednesday, November 26. Instead of presenting FDR’s plan for a modus vivendi, he gave the Japanese what they interpreted to be an ultimatum: a ten-point clarification of American demands for settlement in the Pacific that went far beyond anything broached previously. Not only was it nonresponsive to the Japanese truce offer, but the United States called for Japan’s complete withdrawal from China and Indochina, recognition of the Chungking government of Chiang Kai-shek, renunciation of further expansion in Southeast Asia, and withdrawal from the Tripartite Pact.93 It was a statement for the record rather than a serious attempt to reach agreement.94 “I have washed my hands of i
t,” Hull told Stimson afterward. “It is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and Navy.”95
The abrupt shift from modus vivendi to confrontation caught the military by surprise.96 On November 27, 1941, Admiral Stark alerted Kimmel in Hawaii and Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commanding the Asiatic Fleet, to be on guard. “This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra [Malay] peninsula or possibly Borneo.”97*
The Army’s warning to commanders in the Pacific was less strongly worded but made the same point:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.98
