by FDR
Churchill was alone with Roosevelt at Hyde Park for a day and a half. Except for Hopkins, no aides or advisers were privy to their discussions. Official Washington waited nervously. “I can’t help feeling a little bit uneasy about the influence of the Prime Minister,” wrote Stimson. “The trouble is WC and FDR are too much alike in their strong points and in their weak points. They are both penetrating in their thoughts but they lack the steadiness of balance that has got to go along with warfare.”62
Stimson’s apprehension was well founded. Churchill presented a masterly case for why a second front in Europe should not be mounted in 1942. Aside from the severe shortage of landing craft—a problem that would plague the Allies for the next two years—America’s troops were unready and Britain’s too thinly spread. And the time to prepare was too short. “No responsible British military authority has so far been able to make a plan [for a cross-Channel attack in 1942] which has any chance of success unless the Germans become utterly demoralized, of which there is no likelihood,” said Churchill. “Have the American Staffs a plan? At what points would they strike? Who is the officer prepared to command such an enterprise? What British forces and assistance are required?”63
Churchill recognized that the Allies could not remain idle throughout 1942 and once again proposed an invasion of French North Africa (GYMNAST). “This has all along been in harmony with your ideas,” he told FDR. “In fact it is your commanding idea. Here is the true second front of 1942. I have consulted cabinet and defense committees and we all agree. Here is the safest and most fruitful stroke that can be delivered this autumn.”64
Roosevelt needed little convincing. The risk of a premature landing in Europe was one he did not wish to run, particularly with congressional elections looming in November.* As early as June 17, two days before Churchill’s arrival, he had indicated to the War Department his concern about a cross-Channel attack.65 Armed with Churchill’s reservations, the president cut short his sojourn at Hyde Park and summoned General Marshall and Admiral King to a meeting in the Oval Office on Monday, June 21.
In the course of four White House conferences, the last of which continued well past midnight, Churchill held forth on the advantages of invading North Africa. Marshall and King just as vigorously defended the cross-Channel attack. Marshall argued that GYMNAST was at best an unnecessary diversion that would indefinitely postpone the invasion of Europe. King doubted if the British would ever agree to invade the Continent. Both at one point suggested that if Britain persisted in its opposition to a cross-Channel attack, the United States should abandon the “Germany first” strategy agreed to at ARCADIA, “turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against Japan.”66 Roosevelt came down hard. The chiefs’ suggestion, he said, was “a little like taking up your dishes and going away.”67 Later he told Marshall and King, the “defeat of Japan does not defeat Germany. On the other hand … defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life.”68
Over the robust objections of the American joint chiefs, Roosevelt ordered the North African attack. Aside from Britain’s reluctance, FDR now recognized that a cross-Channel invasion could not be launched in 1942 and it was imperative that U.S. ground forces be brought into action against Germany as soon as possible. American public opinion was howling for vengeance against the Japanese. To keep the nation’s strategic priorities straight, Roosevelt wanted to come to grips somewhere with Hitler. “We failed to see,” said Marshall many years later, “that the leader in a democracy has to keep the people entertained. That may sound like the wrong word, but it conveys the thought. The people demand action. We couldn’t wait to be completely ready.”69*
Once Roosevelt unequivocally ordered the invasion of North Africa [now code-named TORCH], Marshall and King gave it their complete support. Marshall organized the Army’s part of the operation with his usual tenacity, and King set aside his customary Anglophobia. “We are embarked on a risky undertaking,” Stimson confided to his diary on September 17, 1942, “but it is not at all hopeless and, the Commander in Chief having made the decision, we must do our best to make it a success.”70 To lead the invasion Churchill diplomatically suggested an American be named, and General Marshall chose Dwight D. Eisenhower, Marshall’s former deputy for war plans, who was in England planning the cross-Channel attack.71
Roosevelt’s biggest problem was breaking the news to Stalin. The Russians had already invited Churchill to Moscow, and FDR chose to let the prime minister explain the change of plans. “It is essential for us to bear in mind our Ally’s personality and the very difficult and dangerous situation he confronts,” Roosevelt cabled Churchill. “I think we should attempt to put ourselves in his place, for no one whose country has been invaded can be expected to approach the war from a global point of view.”72
Churchill met with Stalin in the Kremlin for five lengthy sessions between the thirteenth of August and the early morning hours of the sixteenth. The Soviets followed their customary negotiating strategy: rigid intransigence sandwiched between an exceptionally cordial welcome and an uproariously celebratory good-bye.* Stalin said he regretted the Allies’ decision but acknowledged that it was not his to make. To Churchill’s surprise he instantly saw the advantages of a North African attack. “It would hit Rommel in the back. It would over awe Spain. It would produce fighting between Germans and Frenchmen … and it would expose Italy to the whole brunt of the war.”73 Churchill told Roosevelt the meetings had gone well. “I am sure that the disappointing news I brought could not have been imparted except by me personally without leading to really serious drifting apart. Now they know the worst, and having made their protest are entirely friendly. Moreover, Monsieur Stalin is entirely convinced of the great advantages of TORCH.”74
Planning for TORCH led to considerable toing and froing between the American and British chiefs of staff that Churchill and Roosevelt ultimately had to resolve. The British wanted to land on the Mediterranean coast of Africa, as far east as possible. That would provide instant support for Montgomery’s beleaguered Eighth Army in Egypt. General Marshall, on the other hand, insisted on landing on the Atlantic (west) coast of Morocco. Marshall worried that a landing inside the Mediterranean would require passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. “A single line of communication through the Straits is far too hazardous,” he told FDR.75 Churchill thought Marshall’s caution misplaced. Spain was not going to war because of TORCH, he told Roosevelt, and it would take at least two months for Germany to work its way through Spain to Gibraltar. It was essential, said Churchill, to land on the Mediterranean coast. “If TORCH collapses or is cut down as is now proposed, I should feel my position painfully affected.”76
Roosevelt was sympathetic. Churchill had convinced Stalin of the importance of TORCH, and the president did not wish to leave him in the lurch. He rejected a harsh reply drafted by General Marshall and suggested instead that simultaneous landings be considered.77 The president and Churchill exchanged several more cables—“we are getting very close together,” said FDR on September 4—and eventually a compromise was reached. The United States offered to reduce the size of its landing at Casablanca and provide additional support for the British to land near Algiers. “I am directing all preparation to proceed,” Roosevelt told Churchill. “We should settle this thing with finality at once.”78
“We agree with the military layout as you propose it,” Churchill replied. “It is imperative now to drive straight ahead and save every hour.”79 What General Eisenhower referred to as a “transatlantic essay contest” ended with a boisterous exchange of cables.80
“Hurray!” said FDR on September 5.
“Okay full blast,” Churchill rejoined.81
U.S. and British troops went ashore near Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers in the early-morning hours of Sunday, November 8. Resistance was slight. French units offered token resistance but negotiations with local commanders quickly brought the fighting to a close. Many in the United States and Gr
eat Britain criticized Allied military authorities for collaborating with Vichy’s representatives, but the consequences of not doing so would have been catastrophic. Not only would the casualties have been heavy (there were nearly 120,000 French troops in North Africa), but the specter of American and British forces in pitched battle against the French would have poisoned public opinion in France. By November 12 all of Morocco and Algeria were under Allied control.*
Roosevelt provided direct support. He prerecorded a message to the people of France and North Africa that was broadcast as the troops came ashore. In his accented but elegant French FDR noted his personal familiarity with France (“I know your farms, your villages, your cities”), his admiration for the Republic (“I salute again and reiterate my faith in Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity”), and the historic bonds between France and the United States (“No two nations are more united by friendly ties”). He pledged immediate withdrawal once the Germans were defeated, and evoked the image of French grandeur. “Vive la France éternelle!”82
To ensure regional support and head off possible intervention by neighboring powers Roosevelt dispatched personal letters to the Sultan of Morocco, the Bey of Tunis, the President of Portugal, and Generalissimo Francisco Franco. FDR had kept the United States neutral during the Spanish Civil War, much to the chagrin and discomfiture of many Americans, and now he collected his IOU. “The presence of American military forces in North Africa presages in no manner whatsoever a move against the people or Government of Spain,” he told Franco.83
Franco’s response relieved whatever fears American military planners may have had of Spanish intervention. “I accept with pleasure and I thank you for the assurances which Your Excellency offers the Government and the people of Spain,” said Franco. “I can assure you that Spain knows the value of peace and sincerely desires peace for itself and all other peoples.”84
Hitler responded to the Allied invasion by seizing what remained of unoccupied France. German mechanized forces quickly overran the southern part of the country, six Italian divisions marched in from the east, and the Luftwaffe set up shop in Tunisia, quickly joined by two panzer divisions. When the Germans attempted to capture the French fleet at Toulon (they had mined the harbor exit to prevent its escape), the Navy scuttled it. The Allies regretted that the French admirals had not sailed to North Africa earlier but could rejoice that the fleet had not fallen into German hands.85
In January 1943 Roosevelt and Churchill met again, this time at Casablanca. The tide had turned ever so slightly. Heavy fighting was under way in Tunisia, but Montgomery had broken Rommel’s Afrika Korps at El Alamein and was driving westward across Libya; Zhukov, now a Marshal of the Soviet Union, had mounted a massive counterattack at Stalingrad, isolating the German Sixth Army Group and subtracting 350,000 soldiers from the Wehrmacht; in the Pacific the Allies’ laborious island-hopping campaign had begun with the capture of Guadalcanal.
Hitler’s defeat in Africa was a matter of time. The problem for Churchill and Roosevelt was the next step. As in June, Marshall argued for a cross-Channel attack; Admiral King pressed the Navy’s case for the Pacific; and the British insisted on the invasion of Sicily. That would clear the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean, menace Italy, and had the virtue that it could be mounted immediately. The British case was compelling. Even General Marshall recognized that the preconditions for a successful landing on the coast of France did not yet exist. The Battle of the Atlantic had not been won; the Luftwaffe remained formidable; the logistical base to support an invasion was not in place; and the U.S. Army had still to prove its combat effectiveness.* When Eisenhower, who had firsthand experience landing in North Africa, noted that the forces to invade Europe could not be assembled until 1944, the decision to attack Sicily was settled. Churchill and Roosevelt, who monitored the meetings of the Combined Chiefs but did not attend, formally approved the choice on January 23, 1943.86
A second pressing issue at Casablanca was the future of France—or, more precisely, the determination of who was to represent France. The matter was given added urgency by the fall of Algeria and Morocco. These were departments of metropolitan France and could not simply be occupied by the Allies as conquered enemy territory. The problem was exacerbated by the historic division of French society. Neither London nor Washington fully appreciated the extent to which France was at war with itself. Large segments of the French population, much of the officer corps, and central elements of the Church had never accepted the French Revolution or the Republic. Unlike in Great Britain or the United States there was no consensus on the rules of the constitutional game. Since 1789 France had experienced three republics, three monarchies, two Napoleonic empires, two provisional regimes, a Directory, and the Paris Commune. Vichy was not an entirely German import, and Marshal Pétain spoke to and for those who rejected Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.87
Roosevelt’s preference was to postpone thinking about postwar France until hostilities were over. In the interim Washington supported General Henri Giraud, a senior but obscure French general whom diplomat Robert Murphy had discovered rusticating in the Loire. Giraud had no following in France or North Africa, no public persona, and little political insight. Simply put, he was an American puppet invented by the State Department to avoid having to deal with the recognized leader of the French resistance, Brigadier General Charles de Gaulle.
The British supported de Gaulle, as did most of antifascist France. Although de Gaulle was under a death sentence from Vichy, his Free French movement had become the rallying point of the liberation. His roster read like a who’s who of France’s future political and military leadership including Jean Monnet, Maurice Schuman, René Pleven, Michel Debré, François Mitterrand, André Malraux, and generals Philippe Leclerc, Alphonse Juin, Pierre Koenig, and Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The Free French movement spanned the political spectrum from left to right and transcended the division between the Republic and its enemies. The symbol de Gaulle chose, the republican tricolor with the cross of Lorraine superimposed, reflected (for one of the few times in French history) the union of Christianity and the Revolution. Obstinate, difficult, impossible in many respects, de Gaulle personified French independence.
Roosevelt wished to create a power-sharing coalition between de Gaulle and Giraud, but de Gaulle was not interested. He posed for a photograph with Giraud but tore up a press release Robert Murphy had written and composed his own asserting the independence of the Free French movement. Later de Gaulle said, “Roosevelt meant the peace to be an American peace, convinced that he must be the one to dictate its structure, and that France in particular should recognize him as its savior and its arbiter.… Like any star performer he was touchy as to the roles that fell to other actors. In short, beneath his patrician mask of courtesy, Roosevelt regarded me without benevolence.”88
After the picture taking ceremony with de Gaulle and Giraud, Roosevelt and Churchill met the press on the lawn at Casablanca. Roosevelt captured headlines around the world with what appeared to be an offhand comment. After a casual reference to General Grant, FDR said:
The elimination of German, Japanese and Italian war power means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other peoples.89
Roosevelt was not shooting from the hip. The doctrine of unconditional surrender had been discussed extensively in Washington in early January, Churchill was apprised of it during informal discussions at Casablanca, and the British war cabinet was informed on January 20.90 Far from being a spontaneous improvisation on Roosevelt’s part, “unconditional surrender” was deliberately announced at Casablanca to aid Allied morale, assure Stalin that there would be no separate peace with Hitler, and confirm that Germany’s defeat would be complete—that there would be no “
stab-in-the-back” mythology that might lead to the re-creation of a new Third Reich. There is also no evidence that “unconditional surrender” prolonged the war. Hitler refused to admit the possibility of any defeat, and anti-Nazi dissidents accepted unconditional surrender at face value.91
When the conference ended, Churchill went to the airport to see Roosevelt off. He helped the president into the plane and returned to his limousine. “Let’s go,” he told an aide. “I don’t like to see them take off. It makes me far too nervous. If anything happened to that man, I couldn’t stand it. He is the truest friend; he has the farthest vision; he is the greatest man I have ever known.”92
* In January 1942 German U-boats prowling off the East Coast sank 48 ships of 276,795 tons; in February, 73 ships of 429,891 tons; and in March, 95 ships of 534,064 tons. The Navy did not sink its first German submarine until April 1942. Williamson Murray and Allan B. Millett, A War to Be Won 250 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000).
* One morning FDR wheeled himself into Churchill’s bedroom just as the prime minister emerged from his bathroom stark naked and gleaming pink from a hot bath. Roosevelt apologized and turned about, but Churchill protested, “The Prime Minister of Great Britain has nothing to conceal from the President of the United States.” Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins 442 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948).
* Written by George S. Kaufman and Moss Hart, and acted in the title role by Monty Woolley, The Man Who Came to Dinner portrays an eccentric, acid-tongued radio critic and lecturer (based loosely on Alexander Woollcott) who arrives as a houseguest for one night and suffers a fall, which confines him to a wheelchair and renders him unable to depart for several weeks. The play was a smash hit on Broadway and in London and was made into a movie in 1941, also starring Monty Woolley.
