THE DEATH OF MAGO
In Bruttium, Hannibal had doubted that his brother Mago would reach him from Genoa in Liguria for several reasons, one of them being his own isolation and another the increased power of Rome to mobilize. Hannibal’s doubts were soon confirmed. After Scipio had already taken the theater of war to Africa, the Romans blocked Mago Barca in Italy with four legions distributed from Ariminum to Arezzo. In 203 Mago tried to fight this combined Roman army of four legions near Milan with his Ligurians and remnant Carthaginians, even fielding war elephants, but, early in the battle, he was wounded in the leg and fell off his horse, likely then sustaining added injury. The battle quickly turned, and without his leadership, his army was defeated. Mago escaped to his ships at Genoa, but died at sea from his wounds. When Hannibal found out later, he mourned his second brother’s death. Two Barcid lions were down, and only the one—fiercest of all three—remained.
HANNIBAL LEAVES ITALY
Carthage managed to get sufficient transport fleet protection to Italy and bring Hannibal home. Embarking from the Ionian coast, what Hannibal must have felt and contemplated looking back at the receding shore of Italy and his sixteen years there will always be a tantalizing prospect for historians. Livy concludes that Hannibal left Italy with bitterness and regrets, and while this may be true, it is also typical of Livy to negativize Hannibal whenever possible.15 However, Hannibal may have indeed felt as Livy wrote: that it wasn’t Rome undermining or conquering him but his own people and foes in Carthage, and that his Punic enemy Hanno could only bring down the Barcids by ruining Carthage.
In reflection, more than a third of Hannibal’s life had been spent on Italian soil. The first three years of lightning success had been so rewarding and full of promise as he brought Rome to her knees. But the last thirteen had been an endless, slow series of frustrating circles, at times one step forward and maybe more than one step back at other times. He had lost two brothers in or around Roman lands and waters, and had not accomplished his ultimate goal of forcing Rome to give way to Carthaginian sovereignty. And while he never backed down from his vow to his father of eternal enmity toward Rome, now he faced a greater obstacle. Rome had reversed the table on him, also slowly at first but unmistakable now with Scipio in Africa threatening the very survival of Carthage.
As his fleet neared Africa, it is equally fascinating to consider what Hannibal felt having been away from his homeland and his childhood city of Carthage for most of his life. Did he feel a deep, inherent loyalty to a place he hadn’t seen for so many decades? Did he feel betrayed, as his father had, by the decisions of weak leadership in Carthage? Hannibal could certainly sum up all the circumstances in which Carthage had taken the expedient and conservative but not so bold policy route, perhaps as could be expected for a commercial rather than military power. While it had tried to reinforce his campaigns, mostly with his brothers’ forces, Hannibal knew that Carthage could and would blame him for the largest share of responsibility of failure if Scipio could not be stopped, but it is likely Hannibal would not have necessarily shared that shouldering of ultimate responsibility as his forces landed and he touched the soil of Africa once again.
In the autumn of 203, Hannibal landed considerably to the south of Carthage—a cautious hundred miles away—at Leptis Minor (modern Lemta)16 in Tunisia. He brought with him possibly fifteen thousand to twenty thousand of his remaining veterans: Balearians, Libyans, Cartha-ginians, Spanish, and Celts, as well as the best of the Bruttians. How few of his original veterans remained from crossing the Alps is unknown—certainly not many—but if Hannibal had any left, most of them would have been in their thirties17 or, like him, in their midforties. This would make them at least a decade older than the average age of troops in general. These veterans may have been experienced and wily, but likely no longer strong enough to last through a full day of battle. If Hannibal cursed the gods and men, as Livy says, he was too smart to let his men know how low his spirits must have been at this irrevocable turn of his fortune.
HANNIBAL ASSEMBLES AN ARMY TO MEET SCIPIO
Hannibal managed to secure a bit of time through the autumn and early winter before Scipio would march to meet him or he would confront Scipio, despite Carthage’s missals to defend its lands. In addition to his veterans from Italy, he was able to secure another twenty-five thousand soldiers—including Balearic islanders, Ligurians recruited by his brother Mago, and other African mercenaries—but could muster only three thousand to four thousand cavalry of mostly new Numidian allies. Hannibal had already long culled out the useless men in his forces while back in Italy. In addition there were those who probably refused to go to Africa,18 those his practiced eye knew could not fight a prolonged battle because they were now too old, those who would not be able to leave Italy, or those who had vacillating priorities (fear rather than loyalty, according to Livy19) and therefore weak ties to his war effort. Thus Hannibal had probably reduced his standing army to half its size. He knew he was deficient in cavalry, and while he also pulled together eighty war elephants, these were young beasts and not battle trained; hardly a surrogate for the mobile Numidian cavalry that had been so decisive in his best battles. He thus assembled an army of about forty thousand foot soldiers,20 likely around half of them totally inexperienced relative to about a third who were veterans.
When Carthage had called him to defend the city, Hannibal had delayed in bringing his forces to battle, knowing they were unready and that he was outmatched by Scipio’s trained army. But when he understood at last the danger of Massinissa’s Numidian cavalry joining with Scipio’s forces, he marched quickly and tried to intercept Scipio before Massinissa reached him. Hannibal failed to reach Scipio in time, since Scipio was already far to the west on the edge of Numidia, and Hannibal had to march from the Gulf of Sidra to the southeast of Carthage in short order, likely a distance of several hundred miles.
Scipio already had around twenty-eight thousand well-trained infantry, including some veterans of Cannae who had been exiled in Sicily and were now resolute in their new zeal and strength to acquit themselves honorably because Scipio had redeemed them.21 He also had two thousand cavalry ready for battle before Massinissa’s reinforcements. Hannibal may not have known the full state of Scipio’s cavalry, but he was highly aware of what Numidians could do in battle. Massinissa met Scipio with six thousand Numidian infantry and four thousand cavalry. Hannibal sent spies to assess the Roman army, but Scipio intercepted them. Rather than kill or torture them, the Roman general instead sent them around his camp with a Roman tribune to tour all of his preparations and gauge his strength so that they could go back to Hannibal with a full report. Perhaps this happened after Massinissa’s arrival, which would have given Hannibal an even more discouraging assessment.22 This subtle but daring move on the part of Scipio had the desired effect on Hannibal’s army: it was apparent that Scipio was so unafraid in the knowledge of his strength that he seemed already confident of the outcome. It was a page right out of Hannibal’s tactics copied by the master’s best student: getting inside the minds of the enemy. Hannibal, too, was canny enough to sense the outcome before the battle began.
HANNIBAL AND SCIPIO MEET ON THE EVE OF BATTLE
Both brilliant generals had a strong sense of the outcome beforehand, a rare event in history. Too often the brutal psychology of war is reduced to mere statistics. Stripping the physical horrors and mental devastation from one side and the exhausted elation on the other makes warfare seem like a sporting event with only win and loss columns. But it is equally naïve to ignore the calculation and planning for supply lines and the jockeying to intimidate and outwit the opponent.
Some extrapolate from Polybius the idea that Rome’s aim for universal dominion came via Scipio just before his victory at the Battle of Zama.23 Perhaps one of the best war planners in history, Scipio marshaled every known possibility to his advantage before taking the field at Zama, and Hannibal was no less aware of this than Scipio. Before, Hannibal’s best pl
oys had always been to quickly analyze his immediate options and his enemy’s weaknesses and then to seize the day by springing the element of surprise and undermining his enemy’s confidence as part of his battle plan.24 Hannibal usually had been able to use stratagems and ambushes to strike terror into his enemies, but here at last in Scipio was a formidable enemy who would not be swayed—a master of manipulation himself.
At Zama, Hannibal knew he had no surprise to unfold. Carthage had given him little that he could play into a winning hand. The environment and terrain yielded no advantage for him on the large plain, which the greater Roman cavalry could exploit, having chosen the battlefield. Weaknesses that had precipitated previous Roman failures—insufficient training and overwhelmingly raw recruits and lack of mobility in cavalry—were now Hannibal’s. Whether through bribery or Scipio’s diplomacy, the Numidians who had been a considerable part of Hannibal’s previous strength and success were now mostly on the Roman side. Hannibal may not have been afraid, but it is certain that his new army assembled at Zama would have been. “The profoundest truth of war is that the issue of battle is usually decided in the minds of the opposing commanders, not in the bodies of their men.”25 This sentiment of military historian B. H. Lidell Hart was epitomized by the speech Livy puts into the mouth of Scipio right after the battle of Cannae, when he berates Lucius Caecilius Metellus and his fellow surviving Romans for their flight and possible treason. Referring to the fear and defeatist thoughts of the Roman stragglers from Cannae, Scipio reputedly says, “The enemy’s camp is nowhere more truly than in the place where such thoughts can arise.”26 The perception of despair would haunt the combatants in war, first the Romans between 218 and 216 and now Carthage, especially from 205 to 202. In the time leading up to Zama, Carthage’s armies were already “defeated in spirit” after the failure at Utica, as Polybius assesses accurately.27
After his spies were sent back—graciously—with a full report of Roman readiness, Hannibal gauged Scipio’s confidence from a distance and perceived it was not the overconfidence displayed by prior Roman generals. The report of Scipio’s surprising treatment of the spies must have spread like wildfire in the Carthaginian camp and added to its trepidation. Knowing the effect Scipio was having on his army, Hannibal admired Scipio’s courage and apparent magnanimity. Hannibal asked Scipio to meet him, hoping to avert disaster but also wanting to see his new worthiest foe face-to-face and make his own judgment, after having learned—as Scipio might have even wanted—that Massinissa’s Numidian cavalry force had joined the Romans.
The famous story of the momentous meeting between Hannibal and Scipio and a few of their aides before battle reveals much about both commanders. Although it is likely both spoke each other’s language, they appear to have used translators for effect: neither would want to appear the least bit inarticulate or be judged by their accents. Livy says Hannibal and Scipio were struck dumb at first in each other’s presence out of respect, but Hannibal broke the silence. He is supposed to have said, “What I was at Trasimene and Cannae, you are today.”28 But Polybius emphasizes as always the fickleness of fortune in Hannibal’s words to Scipio about his own reversals.29 Hannibal would have been about twelve years older than Scipio and likely tried to exploit the age and experience differences by expecting the younger man to defer to his fame—looking for a psychological advantage.
But knowing how difficult a victory would be for Carthage this time, especially given Roman cavalry superiority with Numidian allies, Hannibal asked for the previous terms of settlement offered before Carthage had broken the truce. To maintain Carthaginian freedom, Hannibal offered that Carthage would give up all claims to Spain, Sicily, Sardinia, and all islands between Italy and Africa—a hollow concession, since Rome now controlled them anyway—and that Scipio could make this settlement for Rome without any risk of battle. These terms were less onerous than Rome’s demands after Carthage had attacked the envoy. Scipio essentially said, “No deal,” noting that Hannibal fully understood the Romans had the advantage. Scipio demanded instead that Carthage place itself under the authority of Rome with respect to the broken truce or fight this decisive battle to determine it by a military outcome. Livy’s reconstructed long speech has Scipio finishing with these words to Hannibal: “Prepare to fight because evidently you have found peace intolerable.”30 Of course, peace is what Hannibal requested; it was the Roman terms for peace that Hannibal found intolerable. Scipio offered to renegotiate if Carthage offered compensation for the Roman cargoes taken and the violence suffered by the envoys, but neither Hannibal nor Scipio would concede anything.31 They returned to their respective camps—possibly even both of which were visible from the meeting place—knowing that battle was imminent.
THE BATTLE OF ZAMA
The two generals’ speeches to their men, as Polybius records them before battle, employed different psychological ploys. Scipio exhorted his men to remember their recent victories rather than their past defeats. He left them no choice but to conquer or die, warning that any outcome other than victory or death would end in dire captivity for surviving Romans, as there could be no safe place to hide in Africa in defeat, and they were far inside Punic territory, where little relief would come to them from the distant Mediterranean if they lost.32 Scipio said men who enter the field with steady resolve to conquer or die have the advantage of no other choice for living. Hannibal, on the other hand, reminded his men of the long string of past victories in Italy, not their recent trials in Spain, south Italy, and Africa, suggesting that the Romans facing them had the tainted memory of defeat, a weakening factor. Hannibal additionally had his squadron commanders speak to his multicultural forces in their own languages. Using fear as motivation, they specifically singled out Carthaginians to consider what would happen to their wives and children if they lost. The whole army was further encouraged to maintain its reputation for invincibility under Hannibal’s leadership at Trebia, Trasimene, and Cannae.33
The battle that would end the Second Punic War commenced the day after the two great generals met. It was probably around mid-October during a dry spell, which would be optimum for troop and animal movements. It took place somewhere at or around Zama, about eighty-five miles and a five-day march to the southwest of Carthage, on the often vague frontier between Carthage and Numidia, within modern Tunisia. It seems to have been a wide place on the plain now loosely called Zama Regia (Djama), between two modern wadis (creekbeds that are dry much of the time), Tessa and Siliana, and somewhere around the modern villages of Maktar, Sebaa Biar, and Lemsa.34 Scipio’s position seems to have been nearer a spring than Hannibal’s. Better water access could easily affect battle outcomes.
Hannibal may have had a numerical advantage with perhaps as many as forty thousand infantry in his army, but many of the soldiers fighting for Carthage would have been fairly raw recruits or recently acquired mercenaries. Hannibal’s cavalry included in the above total would have been barely four thousand after his force had been doubled earlier when joined by a minor Numidian prince named Tychaeus. Hannibal also had eighty war elephants, but these were mostly young and untrained. The makeup of the Carthaginian army was extremely diverse, with Carthaginians. Libyans, Balearics, Celts, Ligurians (from Mago), and Spanish added to Hannibal’s troops from Italy, which would include Bruttians and Lucanians as well as his old veterans.35 Hannibal knew that Scipio now had an advantage of 50 percent more cavalry than he could muster for Carthage, and Hannibal also knew from experience that the Romans’ Numidian cavalry were skilled.
Even given the disadvantages he faced, the outcome of the battle was not inevitable. Hannibal arranged his battle formation to suit what strengths he had. Starting at the break of day, the battle would favor Carthage, since the Romans would have faced east into the sun about the time the war elephants would be charging. But if the battle lasted long into the day with growing heat, the Carthaginians would be fighting with the sun glaring in their eyes.
Thinking hard about his position and pos
sible outcomes, Hannibal placed his eighty war elephants in the front with some of his light infantry skirmishers, hoping the beasts would cause fear and confusion and break up the Roman center with their charge. Next he placed his first line of twelve thousand mercenaries, possibly quite a few of whom were trained in some form of warfare. Behind them he assembled his Libyan and Carthaginian levies and recruits numbering at least eight thousand to ten thousand, although because many of these would have been young and undertrained, they would be fighting for their homeland as a primary incentive, a mind-set different from the mercenaries’. Finally, Hannibal placed his old veterans from Italy several hundred meters behind the other lines. Possibly numbering up to fifteen thousand, Hannibal’s Italian veterans would have been the least mobile and needed to reserve their strength, as they were likely the oldest men on the field except for the Bruttians among them. On his flanks, Hannibal placed his four thousand cavalry, with his Numidian allies at his left making one half, and the other half being Carthaginian horsemen at his right.
In his troop placements, Hannibal seems to have predicted correctly that Scipio would try an enveloping tactic with his superior cavalry, but he hoped his cavalry would draw Scipio’s off the field of play.36 Hannibal was asking his own cavalry to bear a hard burden, which could have worked if their smaller numbers had been able to keep the larger Roman cavalry occupied long enough for Hannibal’s numerical advantage in infantry to bear fruit. Given the choice between having more cavalry or elephants, Hannibal would surely have chosen cavalry, but he didn’t have that choice. Both Hannibal and Scipio knew that the elephants could be frightened.
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