After the Army of Tennessee arrived at Tuscumbia, Hood immediately wired Taylor, “I am here, and need at once twenty days supply of breadstuffs and salt.” Because Taylor had not repaired the railroad from Cherokee to Tuscumbia, Hood was forced to send empty wagons 15 miles to Cherokee, transfer the supplies from train cars to wagons, and haul the supplies back to Tuscumbia over poor roads. The 30-mile roundtrip also forced Hood to ask Taylor for forage for supply-train animals.14
With Thomas gathering Federal forces in central Tennessee around Nashville and Sherman marching across Georgia, Hood—anxious to launch the invasion—continued to press Confederate authorities for supplies. Hood attempted to clear up a railroad bottleneck that was contributing to delays in shipments. Because supplies were transported by multiple railroad companies, offloading and transferring was required in Corinth, Mississippi, before the final shipment of supplies reached the rail terminus in Cherokee. In an effort to get results as fast as possible, Hood bypassed the nominally effective Taylor by appealing directly to L. J. Fleming, the general superintendent of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. “I must have 20 days supply of rations for this army at Cherokee with the least possible delay,” he pleaded on October 31. Hood also asked that Fleming allow his trains to run directly to Cherokee to avoid transfer at Corinth before closing with “time is of the utmost importance.” That same day, Hood wired the quartermaster in Meridian, Mississippi, “Give me all the aid you can in transporting twenty days supply of rations for this army to Cherokee station at once. Time is all important.”15
Disputes among the civilian-owned railroads were out of Hood’s control, but they seriously affected the delivery of supplies. While in Tuscumbia, Beauregard wired Taylor on November 1, “The Mobile and Ohio Railroad refuse to send rolling stock enough to supply the wants of the service on the road from Corinth here. It is most important that this be attended to at once.” Beauregard added, “You will take measures promptly to get the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads to work together and secure enough cars and motive power.” Earlier, Beauregard had requested that Taylor come to Tuscumbia, but, noting the delivery problems, withdrew his request and instructed instead that Taylor remain in Selma and solve the problems with the railroads. Like Hood, Beauregard sometimes found it necessary to bypass Taylor and communicate directly with civilian authorities. On November 2, Beauregard implored railroad superintendent Fleming to “Use every effort to forward stores arriving at Corinth to Cherokee without transshipment. Delays embarrass us and impede our movement.”16
The myriad problems in supply and logistics encountered by Hood— among the most complex in all the years of the Civil War—do not impress his critics. According to Wiley Sword, diary entries penned by Hood’s men during the movements in northern Alabama reveal “plummeting” morale as a result of insufficient supplies. Sword provided two quotes of complaint, one from an individual identified as “a disgruntled captain,” and the other identified simply as “a soldier.” A careful check of the sources cited by Sword, however, reveals that the “disgruntled captain” and the “soldier” were one and the same: Capt. Samuel Foster of Granbury’s brigade, a Joseph Johnston devotee who despised Hood. Foster, who later condemned Hood’s aggressiveness at Franklin, complained when Hood wisely decided to avoid unnecessary bloodshed and bypass Decatur. “We left Decatur last evening, without making an effort to take it,” wrote Foster, who noted that the Yankees left their flag “flying in full view” of the Confederate army. Sword, who quotes liberally from the words of Hood’s detractors such as Foster, routinely disregards the records of men who concurred with Hood’s decision. A. L. Orr of Cleburne’s division wrote to his sister in Ellis County, Texas, “We could of taken it [Decatur] but would of lost a grate many men.”17
Notwithstanding Hood’s repeated and conscientious efforts, adequate supplies had still not reached the army in Tuscumbia as late as November 17. Beauregard, meanwhile, pressed him to launch the invasion. “I have now seven days rations on hand, and need thirteen days additional,” replied Hood in defense of his actions. “Please use every effort to have these supplies pressed forward.” Beauregard’s biographer Alfred Roman, however, mischaracterized Hood’s reasonable and wise desire to feed his men before moving north: “Realizing the fact that nothing could be gained—while much might be lost—by further procrastination, and wishing to spur on General Hood to definitive action, General Beauregard, on the same day, sent him the following letter.” Claiming that “nothing could be gained” by a commander awaiting adequate supplies for his men before launching an invasion of Tennessee, and that waiting for these provisions was “procrastination,” are manifestly unfair characterizations of Hood’s actions. Beauregard replied the same day, directing Hood to “take the offensive at the earliest practical moment.”18
During the early days of the Tennessee invasion, in spite of the difficulties incurred by Taylor’s inability to adequately supply the army, Hood issued General Order Number 37 from outside Columbia, Tennessee, on November 28, ordering his troops not to plunder the property of civilians, either Confederate or Unionist.19
The indifference and ineptitude demonstrated by senior Confederate authorities following the evacuation of Atlanta resulted in the suffering and deprivations of the soldiers at the front. Their distress persisted well into December, by which time Hood’s army was in front of Nashville. As late as December 6, Hood asked Beauregard, “Please have the railroad to Decatur repaired at once.” When a week passed without result, Hood wrote again on December 13, complaining that the “quarter master charged with rebuilding the railroad from Cherokee toward Decatur, still complains of not being able to obtain the necessary labor and material.” Because it was imperative to bypass Taylor, Hood added, “Please give [the quartermaster] authority to impress at once all that is necessary.” Beauregard’s own difficult position of administrative responsibility without operational control required constant haggling with other commanders and Confederate politicians. He asked Governor Joe Brown of Georgia on December 2 to repair railroads from west Georgia to Augusta to facilitate the transportation of supplies for Hood’s army. On the same day, Beauregard appealed directly to the Confederate adjutant general Samuel Cooper in Richmond, stating that Hood’s army was “sadly in need of every disposition of military supplies—horses and mules for artillery and other transportation,” as well as blankets and clothing. The exasperated Beauregard fumed to Cooper that nobody in the central government “whose powers should be ample, and whose instructions should be full and clear,” seemed willing to take charge of problems that directly affected acquisition of supplies.20
On the same day (December 13) that he complained about the lack of materials to fix the railroad from Cherokee toward Decatur, Hood wired Beauregard from his headquarters outside Nashville about the severe weather and the suffering of his men: “Major Ayer, chief quartermaster, informs me that Major Bridewell at Augusta [Georgia] has fifty bales of blankets belonging to this army. Please have them sent forward at once.” Because the Confederate government and his superiors were unable to provide for his army and the winter weather was battering his men, Hood had little choice but to take matters into his own hands when the opportunity arose. In a letter to Beauregard on December 14, Taylor complained that Hood was issuing orders and taking actions in his department. “Citizens residing in the northern counties of Mississippi and Alabama represent that officers, acting under the orders of Gen. Hood, are seizing their good mules … and replacing them with broken down and worthless animals,” complained Taylor, who added that “camps of dismounted men belonging to the Army of Tennessee have been established in this department by Gen. Hood without consultation or notification of me.” Rather than being uninterested in logistics, Hood was, if anything, overzealous.21
“Though fairly well supplied with food,” wrote Thomas Hay regarding the army’s supply situation while outside Nashville, “it was in need of shoes and clothing.” Six pages later, howev
er, Hay stated that the army was “poorly fed.” These conflicting statements make it impossible to know what Hay really believed about the situation, but Confederate Gen. Henry Clayton knew it firsthand and wrote his wife about it on December 11: “The great thing which reconciles us to this uncertain condition of things is that we are getting enough to eat, man and beast.” Even after the army was soundly defeated at Nashville in the middle of the month and forced to retreat, W. G. Davenport of the 10th Texas Cavalry noted that “food could generally be had.” General William Bate confirmed Hood’s pre-invasion opinion that the army could find provisions in Tennessee when he wrote in his official report that the army enjoyed “a superabundance of rations” from the countryside.22
Once the Tennessee Campaign ended, Beauregard penned his January 9, 1865, report to the Confederate War Department. In it, he discussed the delays encountered by Hood in launching the invasion. His explanation, although technically correct, omitted many important details that made it at best misleading. The plan of campaign into Middle Tennessee as originally conceived and designed might have compelled Sherman to abandon his raid across Georgia to the coast and pursue Hood into Middle Tennessee. “But instead of crossing the Tennessee River at Gunter’s Landing as General Hood intended at Gadsden,” wrote Beauregard, “he suddenly changed his line of march … and repaired to Tuscumbia and Florence.” The poor condition of the railroads forced Hood to await supplies, added Beauregard, which “delayed his advance for nearly three weeks.23
Historian Thomas Hay was unmoved by Hood’s efforts to supply his army and prepare for the movement into Tennessee. “The paralysis of Hood’s decision,” concluded Hay, “cost him many lives, the campaign, and finally his command.” Wiley Sword also shrugged off Hood’s difficulties and used a metaphor that belittled the physical condition of the crippled, one-legged general. Hood, observed Sword, was “tripping over his foot” as he tried to commence the invasion.24
Problems supplying the Army of Tennessee persisted even after Hood’s resignation. When the army was under the temporary command of Richard Taylor, Confederate authorities were no more successful supplying it than when Hood was in command—even though the army was operating in Taylor’s own department. In a February 9, 1865, letter to Jefferson Davis, the Reverend John Talley from Hancock County (Culverton), Georgia, described the behavior and condition of the army as it passed through the area en route to Augusta. Officers and men frequently visited his home, Talley wrote, adding, “There can be no doubt but the disasters were the result of want of discipline and subordination,” and that “the quartermaster’s department was badly managed [in Tennessee] and the men were neglected and are now suffering from that neglect.” Talley conveyed to Davis that during the retreat from Nashville, many men were “without a shoe and nearly naked, because the quartermaster did not do his duty.” The soldiers, who had been passing Talley’s home for 10 days, were described as “not half clothed” and “without blankets.” Many Georgia troops, added the reverend, “have left the army to go home to obtain supplies of necessary articles.”25
Although the historical record demonstrates that circumstances beyond Hood’s control contributed mightily to the Confederacy’s inability to adequately supply the Army of Tennessee during the fall and winter of 1864, Hood is held solely culpable and routinely characterized as indifferent and inept at army logistics.26
In addition to logistical difficulties, the absence of sufficient cavalry further complicated matters for Hood. The bulk of the Army of Tennessee’s mounted arm under Gen. Joseph Wheeler was ordered by Beauregard on October 21 to return to Georgia to resist Sherman.27 Wheeler’s command was replaced by veteran troopers under Nathan Bedford Forrest, who were based in and operated out of Gen. Richard Taylor’s Department of Alabama, Mississippi, and East Louisiana.
Even if the railroads had been repaired and adequate supplies obtained, Hood’s move into northern Alabama later in October was largely without the protection of adequate cavalry. Informed on October 20 that Forrest was departing Clifton, Tennessee, for an eventual rendezvous with the army, Beauregard and Hood spent the next 15 days laboring under the impression that Forrest was moving into Middle Tennessee, which fit into the overall Confederate strategy. Although his exact whereabouts temporarily remained unknown, Forrest would be moving in a general direction that would intersect with Hood’s army as it moved north from Alabama. Unfortunately, Taylor neglected to share details of Hood’s plan with the cavalryman, who rode to Jackson, Tennessee, in preparation for a raid into northern Tennessee near the Kentucky border.28
The miscommunication between Beauregard, Taylor, and Forrest began on October 22, when Beauregard instructed Taylor to order Forrest to join Hood. Taylor complied the next day when Beauregard repeated the order, but his message to Forrest on October 23 expressed no sense of urgency. Instead, Taylor directed the cavalry commander to join Hood “as soon as you have accomplished the objects of your present movement.”29
Hood learned on the morning of October 23 that Forrest was not operating in the area and that if the army crossed the Tennessee River, it would be escorted by only a single division of cavalry under the command of Gen. William H. “Red” Jackson. Demonstrating appropriate caution, Hood decided to stay on the south side of the river and move farther west toward his supply base at Tuscumbia. As noted earlier, intelligence provided by Roddey convinced Hood that Decatur was less heavily defended than Guntersville. Although Hood did not know Forrest’s exact whereabouts, Decatur was farther west and thus closer to Forrest.30
On October 28, having heard nothing from Nathan Bedford Forrest, Hood (with General Beauregard present) sent a message directly to the cavalry commander. The communication, which bypassed General Taylor (whom Hood notified the next day) directed Forrest to at once meet the main army near Bainbridge, Alabama. Hood sent the message via General Roddey’s cavalry, since other channels of communication had failed to reach Forrest. Although Hood’s critics may portray Hood’s action as insubordinate and disrespectful, he understood the urgency of the situation and took the appropriate action.31
In response to Hood’s entreaties, Taylor once again instructed Forrest on October 29 to report to Hood. Like his initial message, however, the tone was cool and casual: “As soon as you have accomplished the objects of your present movement your course will be directed toward middle Tennessee, where you will put yourself in communications with General Hood.” Forrest, who inferred no sense of urgency from Taylor’s communication, did not reply for several days. With Sherman advancing steadily eastward through Georgia toward Savannah and Thomas organizing his growing Federal army around Nashville, Hood was forced to await Forrest’s arrival. Unbeknownst to Hood, however, the cavalryman was conducting a raid in northern Tennessee near the Kentucky border.32
On November 2, nearly two full weeks after the original request that Forrest join Hood, and still having heard nothing from the cavalryman, both Beauregard and Hood once again bypassed General Taylor by sending more messages directly to Forrest. Beauregard directed the cavalryman “to report at once to General Hood.” Hood’s own message inquired with some deserved angst, “When can I expect you here or when can I hear from you? I am waiting for you.” Beauregard’s adjutant went so far as to try and contact Forrest via another route. He sent a telegram to his counterpart Maj. J. P. Strange, assistant adjutant general in Jackson, Tennessee, asking, “Where is General Forrest?”33
Forrest finally acknowledged receipt of Hood’s and Beauregard’s messages by replying to Taylor in a rather reluctant manner, stating that he would “obey the order unless it was countermanded.” Although Sherman was ravaging Georgia and Thomas was consolidating his army in Middle Tennessee, Forrest claimed that his activities blocking the river would be more detrimental to the enemy. The cavalryman agreed to comply and join Hood, but only after he had gathered his command and attended to his horses.34
Although Hood is commonly held completely responsible for the delay in commencing
the Tennessee Campaign, Nathan Bedford Forrest’s entire command did not join Hood’s army in Tuscumbia, Alabama, until the 14th of November—23 days after Beauregard sent instructions to Taylor calling for Forrest to join the army and participate in the movement.
In recent decades, the historiography on Hood’s efforts to obtain supplies and launch the Tennessee Campaign includes the charge that bitterness and rank rivalry came between Gens. Beauregard and Hood. It is time to review the literature and determine from where this idea originated, and whether it has any merit.
Thomas Hay, who made only brief and constrained comments on Beauregard’s possible frustration at not being adequately consulted during the planning phase of the campaign, dedicated only a single paragraph of his book to any possible impropriety regarding Hood’s treatment of Beauregard. Stanley Horn raised the issue of the difficulties incurred by Beauregard, and perhaps some annoyance, but failed to mention any conflict between the two generals. Thomas Connelly was the first author to assert that a rancorous relationship existed between the two men. In fact, Connelly implied that at times, Hood’s conduct in October and November 1864 toed the line of mutiny. A reading of the correspondence between Hood and Beauregard in the Official Records, together with reminiscences by both commanders, demonstrates that Connelly’s assertions are baseless. The tone and content of the correspondence cited by Connelly is no different from those of thousands of other exchanges between military commanders of the era, Federal and Confederate alike. Connelly went out of his way to create a conflict between the two generals that never existed.35
John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General Page 17
