1 Harold Simpson, Hood’s Texas Brigade: Tee’s Grenadier Guard (Fort Worth, TX: Landmark Publishing, 1999), 158; Patterson, Rebels From West Point, 135.
2 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 467; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 35.
3 Castel, Decision in the West, 523; OR 38, pt. 5, 1,018; OR 39, pt. 2, 865.
4 Augusta Daily Constitutionalist, August 13, 1864.
5 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 64-74. This was originally published one year earlier as Embrace an Angy Wind: The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah: Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville (Harper Collins, 1992).
6 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 278.
7 OR 39, pt. 2, 865; OR 38, pt. 5, 1,023.
8 Ibid., 39, pt. 3, 805.
9 OR 45, pt. 1, 647.
10 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 285; OR 39, pt.3, 913-914; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 64.
11 OR 39, pt. 3, 845; OR 39, pt. 3, 499; OR 39, pt. 3, 613.
12 Noel Carpenter, A Slight Demonstration: Decatur October 1864, A Clumsy Beginning of Gen. John B. Hood’s Tennessee Campaign (Austin, TX: Carol Powell, publisher, 2007), 137; OR 52, pt. 2, 769; OR 39, pt. 3, 868, 871.
13 OR 45, pt.1, 648.
14 Ibid., 39, pt. 3, 868.
15 Ibid., 871; 52, pt. 2, 772.
16 Ibid.
17 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 65; Foster, One of Cleburne’s Command, 142; Carpenter, A Slight Demonstration, 131.
18 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 301. Alfred Roman was Beauregard’s friend, and the former general is widely considered to be an unacknowledged co-author of his own biography.
19 OR 45, pt. 1,1,255. (According to Judge Frank H. Smith’s History of the 24th Tennessee, troops from Carter Stevenson’s division were reported to have looted civilian homes and stores in Columbia, prompting Hood to issue the general order.)
20 OR 45, pt. 2, 637, 640, 653, 685, 689.
21 Ibid., 636, 689.
22 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 140, 146; Henry Clayton Papers, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa; W. G. Davenport, Incidents in the Life of WG Davenport Which Occurred During the Time of His Service in the Civil War, Tularosa, New Mexico, January 16, 1915 (Salt Lake City: LDS Church Archives), Microfiche No. 6082730; OR 45, pt. 1, 747.
23 OR 45, pt. 1, 651.
24 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 66; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 74.
25 OR 49, pt. 1, 966-967.
26 Shortages of supplies were not exclusive to the Army of Tennessee under Hood. While serving in the Army of Northern Virginia in 1862 and 1863 his own Texas brigade was not always adequately supplied. Diarist Mary Chesnut described the Texans as they passed through Richmond: “Such rags and tags … Nothing was like anything else. Most garments and arms were such as had been taken from the enemy. Such shoes as they had on … They did not seem to mind their shabby condition. They laughed, shouted and cheered as they marched by.” Mary Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, Isabella Martin and Myrta Avary, eds. (Avenel, NJ: Gramercy Books, 1997), 231.
27 Carpenter, A Slight Demonstration, 25.
28 Ibid., 24; OR 39, pt. 3, 837.
29 Ibid., 853.
30 Carpenter, A Slight Demonstration, 33.
31 OR 39, pt. 3, 863.
32 Ibid., 853.
33 Ibid., 52, pt. 2, 770; 39, pt. 3, 879; 52, pt. 2, 773.
34 Ibid., 39, pt. 1, 869.
35 Hay, Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, 60; Horn, The Army of Tennessee, 379-383; Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 480-489.
36 Ibid., 483; Sherman, Memoirs, 508-509.
37 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 483.
38 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 65.
39 The Battle of Franklin: Five Hours in the Valley of Death, Wide Awake Films, Kansas City, MO, 2005.
40 OR 39, pt. PAGE3, 870.
41 Carpenter, A Slight Demonstration, 32; OR 52, pt. 2, 767, 769.
42 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 281; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 268.
43 OR 45, pt. 1, 647; Hood, Advance and Retreat, 268-269.
44 Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 288-302.
45 Dyer, The Gallant Hood, 319.
46 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 63, 65.
47 Ibid., 66; 39, pt. 3, 870.
48 OR 45, pt. 1, 647.
49 Ibid.; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 64; OR 45, pt. 1, 647.
50 Connelly, Autumn of Glory, 484.
51 OR 39, pt. 3, 867.
52 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 66; OR 39, pt. 3, 871.
53 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 66.
54 Ibid., 70.
55 Ibid.; OR 39, pt. 3, 914.
56 Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 70; Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 605-606; Sword, The Confederacy’s Last Hurrah, 70; ibid., 913-914.
57 Ibid., 65, 74-75; Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard, 332.
Chapter 8
“It is striking how history, when resting on the memory of men, always touches the bounds of mythology.”
— Leopold von Ranke
Frank Cheatham and the Spring Hill Affair
Much has been written over the past 140 years of the Confederate failure at Spring Hill, Tennessee. Exactly what happened and who was responsible have never been conclusively established. None of what has been written on the so-called Spring Hill Affair identifies the specific reasons for the puzzling breakdown in Confederate command that resulted in the successful withdrawal of John Schofield’s army from Columbia to Franklin—right past Hood’s sleeping Army of Tennessee— on the night of November 29, 1864.
Virtually any Southern force of size could have trapped Schofield that night. An excellent brief summary of these events appeared in the early classic Battles and Leaders of the Civil War:
A single Rebel brigade like Adams’s or Cockrell’s or Maney’s—veterans since Shiloh— planted squarely across the pike, either south or north of Spring Hill, would have effectually prevented Schofield’s retreat, and daylight would have found his whole force cut off from every avenue of escape by more than twice its numbers, to assault whom would have been madness, and to avoid whom would have been impossible.
Why Cleburne and Brown failed to drive away Stanley’s one division before dark; why Bate failed to possess himself of the pike south of the town; why Stewart failed to lead his troops to the pike at the north; why Forrest, with his audacious temper and his enterprising cavalry, did not fully hold Thompson’s Station or the crossing of the West Harpeth, half-way to Franklin; these are to this day disputed questions among … the Confederate commanders.1
Although virtually every aspect of the Spring Hill Affair seems to have been considered, two questions are rarely, if ever, raised regarding the roles played by Stephen D. Lee and Nathan Bedford Forrest. First, why did corps commander Lee not inform Hood that Schofield’s entire force had completely evacuated Columbia? Although the Federal withdrawal lasted several hours and was completed about 3:00 a.m., it is inconceivable that none of Lee’s pickets or scouts would have missed the movement of 800 wagons, dozens of artillery batteries, and 22,000 infantry. If Hood had been informed that the entire Federal army was withdrawing en masse earlier, it is reasonable to assume that he would have taken a different course of action. Among the Confederate commanders routinely criticized for the Spring Hill debacle, Lee escapes mention.
Second, why has Nathan Bedford Forrest evaded reproach for his role at Spring Hill? He is likewise held blameless for the Federal escape even though he was instructed to seize control of the road. He acknowledged his instructions, failed to do as instructed, and never informed Hood that the road remained open. Throughout the night of November 29-30, Hood received several visitors at his headquarters near Spring Hill. Although multiple orders were issued throughout the evening, none resulted in the road being blocked. Forrest was among
the senior commanders known to have met with Hood that evening. The two generals held a long meeting that began around 9:30 p.m. Forrest had ridden to Hood’s headquarters to inform him that Frank Cheatham’s corps had failed to block the road. The meeting included Hood, Forrest, and A. P. Stewart, whose corps had arrived and was resting nearby. According to Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee, who was present at this meeting, Hood said to Stewart, “It is of great importance that a brigade should be put on the road tonight. Can you send one?”
Stewart replied, “Well General my men have had nothing to eat all day, and are very tired and …”
Hood interrupted Stewart and turned to his cavalry commander, “General Forrest, can you put a brigade there?”
Forrest replied, “Yes, General, if I can get ammunition, though my men have been fighting all day with nothing to eat besides.”
To accommodate rapid movement, Forrest had left his ordnance wagons at Columbia earlier that day, so Hood ordered Stewart to provide ammunition to Forrest and the two generals departed Hood’s headquarters. According to Harris, “Hearing no more, [Hood] and his staff presently went to bed.”2
As Forrest departed, Gen. William Bate arrived to inform Hood that the road was still open. Hood told Bate not to worry, because Forrest had just been ordered to seize the road north of Spring Hill. Confident in his intrepid cavalryman, Hood told Bate to rest well and that tomorrow the army would have “a surrender without a fight.”3
In an effort to comply with Hood’s orders, Forrest sent Gen. Lawrence Sullivan “Sul” Ross’s Texas cavalry brigade north of Spring Hill to Thompson’s Station, where the Texans briefly succeeded in holding the road before being repelled by Federal infantry. Ross withdrew to a nearby hilltop, from which point he later recalled watching the enemy march past his position throughout the night. What is not known is whether Ross reported back to Forrest that the Federals still controlled the road. Either he did not, or if he did and Forrest received the news, Forrest failed to report the failure to Hood. Hearing nothing from Forrest to the contrary, Hood reasonably assumed the reliable cavalryman had succeeded in gaining control of the road. In Civil War literature, neither Ross nor Forrest is criticized for failing to notify Hood that they were unable to hold the road.4
Civil War historians frequently censure Hood for neglecting to personally confirm that his important orders to block the road had been followed. A typical example is provided by A. P. Stewart’s biographer Sam Elliott in Soldier of Tennessee: “Stewart remarked, as he consistently would in later years, that as Hood was present on the field, he should have made sure that his orders were obeyed.” Considering the tragic consequences of the Confederate failure to seize the road—and that Hood was the army commander—this criticism of Hood is not completely unfair. However, Capt. A. C. Jones of the 3rd Arkansas Infantry, who served under Hood in the Army of Northern Virginia, disagreed with Stewart. “It seems a strange sort of military discipline that a commander in chief should issue his orders to his corps commanders and then go to the front to see those orders executed,” explained Jones. “Was that the custom of General Johnston or any other great commander?… . How could General Hood know of the dereliction of any particular officer and be on the spot to correct it? His proper place was at some central point, where he could have been communicated with by his subordinates.”5
If failing to ensure compliance of an important order is blameworthy, how does Forrest evade censure for his actions at Spring Hill? Forrest gave an order of the most critical importance to a subordinate (Ross), assumed it would be accomplished, and went to bed. Using A. P. Stewart’s logic, Forrest should have ridden to Thompson’s Station to personally make sure that Ross had blocked the road. Unlike Hood, Forrest’s inaction is never deemed negligent, nor is he blamed for the Confederate failure at Spring Hill.6
In a postwar letter, Gen. Daniel Govan held Hood directly responsible for the Spring Hill failure. “I should say the blame must be his,” Govan insisted. “[H]e should have mounted his horse, taken personal command and directed the advance himself.” Govan then asked, “Would this not have been the course of Lee, Jackson, and Forrest?” Govan’s belief that Forrest would have taken personal charge in such a situation is curious because Forrest had that opportunity at Spring Hill—and failed to do so.7
In addition to the well-known laudanum myth, some authors have described Hood as being physically and intellectually impaired at Spring Hill. In The Finishing Stroke: Texans in the 1864 Tennessee Campaign, John Lundberg claimed that Hood was “confused and half asleep” when A. P. Stewart visited him at his headquarters on the evening of November 29. The author’s footnote implies that the source for the observation comes from Stewart. Lundberg’s source, however, is not Stewart but author Wiley Sword, who wrote (without proper sourcing) that Hood’s mind was “clouded by fatigue and perhaps laudanum.” Lundberg repeated elsewhere in his book, again without a reliable source, that Forrest visited Hood later in the evening and that Hood was “still half asleep.”8
It is interesting to note that Hood met with generals Forrest, Stewart, Cheatham, and Bate during the night at Spring Hill, and interacted with several staff members including majors Cumming, Hamilton, Blanton, and Mason, as well as Governor Isham Harris (who served as a volunteer staff member for Hood), yet none of these men ever wrote a word about Hood being fatigued or in any way mentally infirmed.
Another florid and unfounded account of the Spring Hill Affair was crafted by Eddy Davison and Daniel Foxx in their biography of Forrest. In describing the breakfast meeting at Rippavilla on the morning of November 30, after it was discovered that Schofield had escaped during the night, they wrote the following: “Once everyone was present, Hood began throwing the blame at nearly each commander. As he dressed down this illustrious array of Confederate officers, Hood mainly accused Generals Cheatham and Cleburne. Hood blamed everyone but himself, and it was well known within the ranks of the Army of Tennessee that Hood had no great love for his new command.” As a source for these astounding comments, Davison and Foxx cite a single page of Hood’s memoirs and Confederate Gen. James Chalmers’s official report of the Tennessee Campaign. Neither source mentions anything that remotely relates to these unfounded assertions.9
No written records of the Rippavilla meeting have been located, and it is not known with certainty even who was in attendance. If Hood blamed any specific officer(s) at the meeting for some lapse in command judgment, their identities remain unknown. Davison’s and Foxx’s contention that the soldiers of the Army of Tennessee knew that Hood “had no great love for his new command” is as remarkable as it is unbelievable. If it was so well known, why did neither Hood nor any of the 20,000 soldiers and officers of the Army of Tennessee who survived the Tennessee Campaign ever write a word about it?
Unable to identify those responsible for the failure at Spring Hill, modern authors routinely defer blame to Hood, who as senior commander can rightly be held ultimately responsible. Although Hood may be considered the culprit today, it was not so in late November 1864.
Of the failure at Spring Hill, Dr. Charles T. Quintard, chaplain of the Army of Tennessee, wrote, “Who was to blame of the subordinate commanders I cannot say exactly, but General Hood’s orders were positive and specific, conveyed by two of his staff officers and lastly by Governor Harris to General Cheatham.” According to S. A. Cunningham of the 41st Tennessee Infantry, the Federal escape at Spring Hill was “a failure for which it was understood General Hood was not to blame. There were grave mistakes made,” he continued, “but the ability and the faithfulness of Confederate generals are a source of pride and gratitude to which we should cling for all time. Even at Spring Hill, where the greatest misfortunes occurred, I have no word of reproach.”10
Captain Jones of the 3rd Arkansas Infantry wrote that many men in the Army of Tennessee, especially among the commanding officers, bitterly resented the removal of Joe Johnston, and that Hood “found himself in the embarrassing condition of having
neither the confidence nor sympathy of his subordinates. The consequence of this feeling,” continued Jones, “was that in the execution of this movement on Spring Hill a portion of his command at least seemed more afraid of being led into a trap than anxious to make a success of what was, in fact, up to a certain point one of the most brilliant achievements of the war.”11
Colonel W. D. Gale, a member of A. P. Stewart’s staff, believed that Hood’s flanking movement at Spring Hill was “in conception worthy of Stonewall Jackson, and in execution feeble and disgraceful.” Blaming Hood’s subordinates for not attacking the fleeing enemy, Gale wrote, “Not a blow was struck, though orders were sent by Gen. Hood several times to attack at once.” Major James Ratchford of Hood’s staff agreed, and wrote the following:
General [Stonewall] Jackson, in all his campaigns, never planned a movement that gave greater promise of success than did the movement of General Hood at Spring Hill. General Hood said in his report that he gave General Cheatham positive orders in person, while in sight of the turnpike at Spring Hill, to attack the retreating enemy, and place his men across the pike. He said further that he sent staff officers to Cheatham several times after that, urging him to place troops across the pike to intercept the fleeing Federals. Major Blanton and Major Hamilton, both of Hood’s staff, each told me personally that [they] had carried the orders to General Cheatham. That grand old hero [General Hood] died without ever defending himself, allowing the world to believe that he was responsible for the failure.12
Schofield’s cavalry commander, James Wilson, was impressed with Hood’s actions. “His [Hood’s] plan was brilliant,” wrote Wilson about Spring Hill, “and so obviously proper that Schofield should have divined it from the start.” Wilson later supposed that the failures of Hood’s “bold undertakings,” such as the flank march from Columbia to Spring Hill, was due in part to the indifference of Hood’s subordinate officers.13
John Bell Hood: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of a Confederate General Page 19
