If Hood needed a senior subordinate to place in independent command at Murfreesboro with full discretionary authority, who would have been a better appointee than Forrest? With fewer than 22,000 effective infantry at Nashville, Hood could not have spared any of his three corps commanders (Lee, Stewart, or Cheatham). Forrest’s previous success in independent command made him the best available commander. Hood instructed Forrest to “continue to act upon your best judgment.” He did, and he succeeded by keeping Rousseau confined to Murfreesboro and Hood’s army’s supply line and retreat route open. Although Forrest was not at Nashville when Thomas attacked on December 15, Hood immediately recalled him on December 16 when the Confederate lines collapsed and the retreat began. At that point, Rousseau’s threat was no longer a concern.21
Because Hood has been so deeply castigated for sending Forrest and an independent command to watch Rousseau, the natural line of inquiry is whether the absence of Forrest and one brigade from Bate’s division fatally weakened Hood and led to the loss at Nashville. On December 16, Thomas’s attack broke the left side of Hood’s line on the second day of the battle. It was not Hood’s under-strength cavalry that was turned and defeated. Rather, it was that portion of the line manned by Gen. Jesse J. Finley’s Florida brigade, which belonged to Bate’s division of Cheatham’s corps. Had Forrest and his single cavalry division been at Nashville, the fatal break in the Confederate line would almost certainly still have occurred.22
Civil War writers and historians often ignored the persistent problems surrounding the performance and conduct of Bate’s division during the campaign. Forrest was displeased with two of Bate’s brigades and reported what he called “shameful” conduct by Finley’s and Henry R. Jackson’s brigades during an engagement on December 7 outside Murfreesboro. “I seized the colors of the retreating troops and endeavored to rally them,” Forrest explained in his official report of the fighting, “but they could not be moved by any entreaty or appeal to their patriotism. MajorGeneral Bate did the same thing, but was equally unsuccessful as myself.” Finley’s and Jackson’s brigades were then recalled by Hood to Nashville (as noted earlier) and took up positions in the Confederate defensive line, where they played a prominent role in the result of the ensuing battle. On the second and final day of fighting at Nashville, a large Federal force, protected by the crest of a hill, stormed the position held by Bate’s division, whose men had neglected to construct rifle pits at the locations specified by the army’s chief engineer Colonel Stephen Presstman. The portion of the Southern line occupied by Finley’s brigade was the first to break. Like a line of dominoes, their sudden retreat destabilized the entire line and led to the Confederate collapse.23
Problems with Bate and his troops were later reported to Richmond by the Reverend John Talley of Culverton, Georgia. Talley penned his letter to Jefferson Davis on February 9, 1865, as Bate’s division passed near his home en route to North Carolina. Wholly unimpressed by what he saw, the reverend called the Army of Tennessee “not much better than an armed mob.” He went on to say of Bate, “I am satisfied you must relieve General Bate; he has not the shadow of authority over his men for good. The unanimous voice of the men is he is unfit for the responsible position. He lacks influence and has no authority over his men.” This was not an isolated instance.24
Although not directly related to Hood’s command decisions during the Nashville Campaign and treatment by various writers, it is worthwhile to consider the general performance of William Bate’s division to add context to the subject. As it turns out, the performance of this general and his brigades was an issue throughout the Tennessee Campaign (and thereafter, as evidenced by Talley’s letter to President Davis), and yet Bate and his troops have largely evaded criticism by Civil War historians. In a postwar letter to Hood, Stephen D. Lee complained bitterly about the performance of Bate and his division at Franklin. Ed Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps (which had been assigned to Cheatham’s corps during the flank march from Columbia to Spring Hill), was returned to Lee’s command on the morning of November 30 and was the first of Lee’s three divisions to reach Franklin. Johnson’s men arrived at Winstead Hill around 5:00 p.m. (about dusk)—after the Confederate charge was well underway. Once on the field, Johnson’s division was sent to Cheatham, who ordered the command to immediately attack that same portion of the Federal line being assaulted by Bate’s division. After lamenting the heavy casualties Johnson’s division suffered, Lee wrote: “When Johnson made his most gallant attack after dark, he was cautioned not to fire till he reached the works, as Bate’s men were there. They were not there and the report was at the time they never were there… I understand that Bate’s division did not go to the works at all [emphasis in the original].” Lee asked Hood if he could confirm his information, and then added, “His [Bate’s] troops were not at his works when my gallant division got there. Nor if my recollection is correct were many of his dead.”25
Despite the fact that the Yankee breakthrough occurred along that portion of the line manned by Bate’s division on December 16, Thomas Hay blamed the Confederate defeat at Nashville on Forrest’s absence (which then made it all Hood’s fault). “Forrest’s absence from the army was unnecessary and in the end calamitous,” argued Hay, who went on to state that Hood’s detachment of Forrest to Murfreesboro was “an inexcusable violation of all the rules of war.” On December 15, the first day of the battle, Hood’s line was about four miles long. After the fighting ended that day, Hood reduced his line to about three miles and improved it considerably. Adding a single cavalry division and small infantry brigade along lines this long would almost certainly have had no impact whatsoever on what occurred at Bate’s position on Shy’s Hill. No one knew where the attack or breakthrough, if there would be one, would take place. The Confederate army sustained about 1,500 killed and wounded at Nashville (less than five percent of those engaged), but lost about one-half of the army’s 100 artillery pieces, which was indeed calamitous. If Hay (and others) believed that “Forrest’s absence … was unnecessary and in the end calamitous,” they have to believe his presence would have either prevented the collapse, or saved much or all of the artillery. Both are highly doubtful. In addition, when Bate’s front broke, the Confederate line collapsed so quickly that horses could not be brought forward in time to remove the artillery.26
It is also impossible to calculate how many Confederate prisoners taken during the battle and difficult retreat would have been saved by Forrest’s presence, but in many cases it would have made no difference whatsoever. Private Sam Watkins wrote that scores of Confederates had “allowed themselves to be captured,” and S. A. Cunningham recalled many Tennessee soldiers deserting during the Nashville retreat. In his official report, George Thomas recorded 2,000 Confederate deserters taking the oath of allegiance at Nashville, although he did not specify how many of these had deserted from Hood’s army between December 16 and the end of the Federal pursuit of Hood’s army 10 days later. According to Thomas, he ended the Nashville fighting and follow-up with 4,490 prisoners. Because many Confederates were reported to have voluntarily surrendered, it is impossible to estimate the impact Forrest’s presence would have had on the number of prisoners Hood lost.27
When Hood arrived with his army south of Nashville on December 2, he immediately sought reinforcements from any sector. In fact, his search began even before the army’s arrival at Nashville. On November 25, Hood dispatched an officer to Mississippi to gather conscripts for Edward Walthall’s division and also asked the Corinth military authorities for 1,000 convalescents to be sent to the Army of Tennessee.28
One common and harsh criticism of Hood’s invasion of Nashville involves reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi. In his memoirs, Hood stated his hope that Gen. E. Kirby Smith, commander of Confederate forces west of the Mississippi River, would send troops. The river, however, was completely controlled by the Federals after the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson in 1863. It would have been extremely difficult
to shift large numbers of men to the river without the enemy knowing it, and then obstruct the crossing. Hood and Beauregard were well aware of this. Historians, however, rarely discussed the fact that an alternative plan was proposed to Smith.
Of all the books written about the Army of Tennessee and Hood’s Tennessee Campaign, only Stanley Horn took the time to explain that an alternative plan proposed by Beauregard was in the works. Aware of the difficulties of crossing the river, Beauregard asked Kirby Smith to make a demonstration northward into southeast Missouri simulating a threat to St. Louis. With Smith’s Rebel army moving north, the Federals would have but little choice other than to keep a large defending force near that important city, or if Gen. A. J. Smith’s corps was en route to Nashville, force its return to Missouri. It was these troops that were being sent as reinforcements to Thomas in Nashville to oppose Hood. A well-played demonstration by Kirby Smith may well have kept A. J. Smith’s 15,000-man command from being sent to Middle Tennessee, and may have compelled Washington to divert even more troops to Missouri to supplement Smith’s relatively small force. However, Kirby Smith, who often failed to cooperate with coordinated efforts, would not make the demonstration. If A. J. Smith had been held in Missouri, Thomas’s army at Nashville would have been smaller by at least 15,000 men (and perhaps more). How that would have played out in the final fighting is anyone’s guess.29
While Hood’s army was gathering below Nashville on December 2, Beauregard was in Montgomery, Alabama, wiring Jefferson Davis about reinforcements for the Army of Tennessee. “Generals Steele and A. J. Smith are reported to be re-enforcing General Thomas at Nashville. Cannot I send General E. Kirby Smith to re-enforce General Hood in Middle Tennessee, or take offensive in Missouri? His assistance is absolutely necessary at this time.” Two days later, Davis replied that he concurred with the plan. However, in a stunning admission that Smith was unsuited for his position, the president warned Beauregard that Smith had “failed heretofore to respond to like necessities and no plans should be based on his compliance.” Nevertheless, under such dire circumstances, Beauregard, Davis, and by extension, Hood, had little choice but to hope that Smith would comply with so much at stake. Beauregard attempted to appeal to the Trans-Mississippi commander with logic and reason. “You are probably aware that the Army of Tennessee, under General J. B. Hood,” began Beauregard, “penetrated into Middle Tennessee as far as Columbia, and that the enemy is concentrating all his available forces, under General Thomas, to oppose him.” He continued:
It is even reliably reported that the forces under Generals A. J. Smith, in Missouri, and Steele, in Arkansas, have been sent to re-enforce Thomas. It becomes, then, absolutely necessary, to insure the success of Hood, either that you should send him two or more divisions, or that you should at once threaten Missouri, in order to compel the enemy to recall the re-enforcements he is sending to General Thomas. I beg to urge upon you prompt and decisive action. The fate of the country may depend upon the result of Hood’s campaign in Tennessee. Sherman’s army has lately abandoned Atlanta on a venturesome march across Georgia to the Atlantic coast about Savannah. His object is, besides the destruction of public and private property, probably to re-enforce Grant and compel Lee to abandon Richmond. It is hoped that Sherman may be prevented from effecting his object, but, should it be otherwise, the success of Hood in Tennessee and Kentucky would counterbalance the moral effect of the loss of Richmond. Hence the urgent necessity of either re-enforcing Hood or making a diversion in Missouri in his favor.30
Taken aback by Davis’s comment about Smith’s anticipated lack of cooperation, Beauregard’s adjutant general Col. George W. Brent wrote to Beauregard on December 8: “It would be well to recommend to the Department that General Bragg be sent at once to relieve Smith, and organize and administer Trans-Mississippi, and General R. Taylor to command troops.” Brent added that it would “secure prompt action” that Smith was anticipated not to provide. Although there was no way for Confederate authorities to have known, by this date it was too late to help Hood’s army at Nashville.31
Unmoved by Beauregard’s desperate appeal, Smith did not reply until January 6—long after the matter had been settled on the hills south of the Tennessee capital. Writing from his headquarters in Shreveport, Louisiana, Smith informed Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper:
I have the honor to acknowledge a dispatch from the honorable Secretary of War, received at these headquarters on the 29th ultimo, directing, if practicable, the crossing of troops in aid of General Hood, or a diversion in his favor by a movement into Missouri. The heavy rains which have fallen, unusual even at this season, with the exhausted condition of the country and our limited transportation, make it impossible, before early summer, either to attempt crossing troops or to renew operations against the enemy. I have delayed my reply to this dispatch until views of Lieutenant-General Buckner could be obtained, the matter being then under consideration, a letter previously received from General Beauregard on the same subject having been submitted to him.32
Smith wrote to Beauregard that same day, as follows:
Your letter of December 2, from Montgomery, Ala., together with a communication from Colonel Brent, assistant adjutant-general, of the 3rd of the same month, were delivered by your aide, Captain Toutant, on the 20th ultimo. Feeling convinced of the utter impracticability of operating during the winter season, I delayed answering your letter until Lieutenant-General Buckner, commanding District of West Louisiana, to whom it had been submitted, could be consulted. I enclose you a copy of his reply. The swamps on the Mississippi are at this season impassable for conveyances, the bayous and streams all high and navigable for the enemy’s gunboats. The country has been so devastated by the contending armies and is so exhausted that the troops would require transportation for supplies for near 300 miles from the interior to the Mississippi.
Appreciating our necessities in your department and ardently desiring the transfer of this army to your aid, I am powerless to assist you either by crossing troops or by operating in North Arkansas and Missouri. The country north of Red River is bare of supplies and is at this season utterly impracticable for the operations of armies and the movement of troops. More than 200 miles of destitution intervenes between our supplies and the enemy’s works on the Arkansas, near 500 of desert separate our base on Red River from the productive region of Missouri.
Trusting you appreciate the difficulties under which I labor and believe in an honest desire on my part to assist you, I remain your friend and obedient servant,
E. KIRBY SMITH, General33
After having been told that the “fate of the country” depended upon his assistance and knowing Hood’s army to be facing a powerful enemy outside Nashville, Smith refused to make even the pretense of a demonstration into Missouri and instead, asked Beauregard to appreciate the difficulties under which he labored. Considering the difficulties under which Hood and the Army of Tennessee had labored from the gates of Atlanta to the fields of Franklin and now in the fortifications south of Nashville; or the suffering of Lee’s beleaguered army in the trenches outside Richmond and Petersburg; or the torment endured by the citizens of Georgia under first Sherman’s artillery and then his torches, Smith’s comment is inexcusable. It also highlights Jefferson Davis’s pointed criticism to Beauregard that Smith’s cooperation was unlikely.
Thomas Hay wrote of the folly of Hood’s vain hope of reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi, yet told his readers nothing of Beauregard’s effort to convince Kirby Smith to impel—through a mere demonstration—a return of 15,000 Federal troops back to St. Louis from Nashville.34
Historians also ignored two important points Hood made in his well-known and oft-cited December 11 letter to Confederate Secretary of War James Seddon. “Some fifteen thousand of the enemy’s Trans-Mississippi troops are reported to be moving to reinforce the enemy here,” wrote Hood. “I hope this will enable us to obtain some of our troops from that side in time for the Spring c
ampaign, if not sooner.” Hood’s reference to receiving reinforcements in time for the Spring 1865 campaign season indicates that an attack by Thomas— although probable—was as of December 11 not obviously imminent. Further, Hood’s reference may well indicate that he thought it possible Thomas only intended to fortify and hold Nashville, and not attack his army.35
More importantly, Hood’s statement provided his superiors with yet another alternative method of obtaining reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi. Knowing that action by Kirby Smith had been requested but not yet answered, Hood (as noted earlier) astutely recognized that sending 15,000 Union troops to Nashville from St. Louis would leave a large portion of the Mississippi River undefended by Federal infantry, and thus create opportunities for the crossing of Trans-Mississippi troops.
Historians who assert that Hood erratically stumbled to Nashville and did nothing but await certain destruction by overwhelming enemy numbers are simply wrong.
On many fronts, historians have had a field day lambasting Hood’s march north to the outskirts of Nashville. Thomas Connelly wrote that the move to Nashville was due to the “further deterioration of Hood’s mental condition.” Hood, continued Connelly, “marched into a trap” at Nashville and—ignoring the circumstances that dictated his decision, and his advance preparations in case of the need to retreat—was “operating with delusions of victory.” Of reinforcements from the Trans-Mississippi, Connelly wrote, “Hood had not received the slightest hope from either the government or from Beauregard of any planned reinforcement from Kirby Smith’s department.” Although true, Hood knew that reinforcements had been requested. What he did not know was that Smith had refused to provide reinforcements or make a diversionary movement into Missouri, which could have drawn troops away from Thomas. This is another example of an author holding back the full story from the reader—the alternative plan requested of Smith would have reduced Thomas’s total troop strength by at least 15,000.36
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