On Tuesday 7 January the United States unilaterally imposed sanctions on Libya with little or no consultation and expected the rest of us to follow. I was not prepared to go along with this. I made it clear in public that I did not believe that economic sanctions against Libya would work. The US State Department was highly displeased and even suggested that Britain was the least helpful of their European allies — something which was quite unjust since we were already applying stiff measures against Libya as regards arms, credits and immigration and had closed down the Libyan ‘People’s Bureau’. One reason why the United States considered Britain particularly difficult was because of my un-European habit of straight talking when I disagreed. When I discussed how to deal with Libya with President Mitterrand in Lille in mid-January he sounded a good deal more hawkish than I was. No doubt the Americans were receiving a similar impression.
In late January, February and March tension between the United States and Libya rose as US naval forces started manoeuvres in an area of the Gulf of Sirte which Libya, in violation of international law and opinion, claimed as its own territorial waters. On Monday 24 March US aircraft were attacked by Libyan missiles fired from the shore. US forces struck back at the Libyan missile sites and sank a Libyan fast patrol boat.
I had to consider what our reaction would be. I was conscious that we had 5,000 British subjects in Libya, while the United States had only 1,000. I was also aware of the possibility of Libyan action against our base in Cyprus. But I told Cabinet that in spite of this we must endorse the right of the United States to maintain freedom of movement in international waters and air space and its right to self-defence under the UN Charter.
Meanwhile, the Americans may have started to see who their true friends were. I learned that the French were expressing reservations about any policy of confrontation with Colonel Gaddafi, arguing that any US military action would win Libya Arab support and urging the need to avoid ‘provocation’.
Then in the early hours of Saturday 5 April a bomb exploded in a discothèque frequented by US servicemen in West Berlin. Two people — one a US soldier — were killed and some 200 others — including 60 Americans — were injured. US intelligence, confirmed by ours, pointed to a Libyan involvement. For the Americans this was the final straw.
Just before 11 p.m. on the night of Tuesday 8 April I received a message from President Reagan. He requested our support for the use of the American F1–11s and support aircraft based in Britain in strikes against Libya, and he asked for an answer by noon the following day. At this stage there was nothing to indicate the precise nature of US objectives and targets. I immediately called in Geoffrey Howe and George Younger to discuss what should be done. At 1 a.m. I sent an interim reply to the President. Its main purpose was to ask him to think further. I emphasized that my basic instinct was to support the United States but I also expressed very considerable anxiety about what was proposed. I wanted more information on the targets in Libya. I was worried that US action might begin a cycle of revenge. I was concerned that there must be the right public justification for the action which was taken, otherwise we might just strengthen Gaddafi’s standing. I was also worried about the implications for British hostages in the Lebanon — and, as events were to turn out, rightly so.
Looking back, I think that this initial response was probably too negative. Certainly the Americans thought so. But it had the practical benefit of making them think through precisely what their objectives were and how they were to justify them, which is certainly one service to be expected of a friend. Two other considerations influenced me. First, I felt that there was an inclination to precipitate action in the United States, which was doubtless mirrored there by a perception of lethargy in Europe. Second, even at this stage I knew that the political cost to me of giving permission for the use of US bases by the United States in their strikes against Libya would be high. The Government’s fortunes were just recovering from the low point of Westland and BL: but that recovery was fragile. I could not take this decision lightly.
Geoffrey, George, officials and I met the following morning at 7.45 at No. 10. A message had been received from the White House saying that the final reply to the original request was not now required by noon. I decided to use the time available by having lists of possible Libyan targets drawn up which would be as narrow as possible. More in hope than anticipation, a list of non-military actions which the US might take was also drawn up. I held a further meeting in the early afternoon, but there was little we could usefully do until I received the President’s reply to my message. I waited with some anxiety throughout the afternoon and evening.
Some time after midnight President Reagan’s response came through on the hot-line. It was a powerful, detailed and not uncritical answer to the points I had raised. President Reagan stressed that the action he planned would not set off a new cycle of revenge: for the cycle of violence began a long time ago, as the story of Gaddafi’s terrorist actions demonstrated. He drew attention to what we knew from intelligence about Libyan direction of terrorist violence. He argued that it was the lack of a firm western response which had encouraged this. He felt that the legal justification for such action was clear. The President emphasized that the US action would be aimed at Gaddafi’s primary headquarters and immediate security forces, rather than the Libyan people or even troop concentrations of the regular armed forces. The strikes would be at limited targets. I was particularly impressed by the President’s sober assessment of the likely effect of what was planned. He wrote:
I have no illusion that these actions will eliminate entirely the terrorist threat. But it will show that officially sponsored terrorist actions by a government — such as Libya has repeatedly perpetrated — will not be without cost. The loss of such state sponsorship will inevitably weaken the ability of terrorist organizations to carry out their criminal attacks even as we work through diplomatic, political, and economic channels to alleviate the more fundamental causes of such terrorism.
I read and reread the President’s message. He was clearly determined to go ahead.
The more I considered the matter the clearer the justification for America’s approach to Libya seemed. The phenomenon of the terrorist state which projects violence against its enemies across the globe, using surrogates wherever possible, is one which earlier generations never confronted. The means required to crush this kind of threat to world order and peace are bound to be different too. There was no doubt of Gaddafi’s culpability. Nor when the most powerful country in the free world decided to act against him must there be any doubt where Britain stood. Whatever the cost to me, I knew that the cost to Britain of not backing American action was unthinkable. If the United States was abandoned by its closest ally the American people and their Government would feel bitterly betrayed — and reasonably so. From this point on, my efforts were directed not at trying to hold America back but to giving her Britain’s full support, both as regards use of bases and in justifying its action against what I knew would be a storm of opposition in Britain and Europe. This did not mean, however, that I would go along with every American suggestion. It remained vital that the air strikes be limited to clearly defined targets and that the action as a whole could be justified on grounds of self-defence.
The first task next day was to convince my colleagues of what needed to be done. Geoffrey Howe was against the American action, but once the decision had been made to support it he defended the line staunchly in public. George Younger supported it from the first.
That afternoon I sent a further message to President Reagan. I pledged ‘our unqualified support for action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities’. I pledged support for the use of US aircraft from their bases in the UK, as long as that criterion was met. But I questioned some of the proposed targets and warned that if there ensued more wide-ranging action the Americans should recognize that even those most keen to give them all possible
support would then find themselves in a difficult position.
It is all but impossible to keep anything secret in Washington, which was now awash with rumours of US preparations for military action against Libya. This did not make it any easier to maintain a discreet silence about our own attitude. At one point on Friday it seemed that the US was not intending to use the F1 — 11S based in Britain, which would of course have substantially eased our predicament. But later in the evening it appeared that they would indeed wish to do so. Later still I received a message from President Reagan thanking me for our offer of co-operation and confirming that the targets would be closely defined under three categories: those which were directly terrorist related; those having to do with command, control and logistics which were indirectly related; and those relating to defence suppression — that is radar and other equipment which would endanger the incoming American aircraft.
On Saturday morning General Vernon Walters came to see me to explain American intentions in more detail. I began by saying how appalled I was that the gist of my exchanges with President Reagan was by now openly reported in the US press. This meant, of course, that the propaganda battle was even more important. I eagerly welcomed General Walters’s offer to show us in advance the statement from the President which would announce and explain the Libyan raid. He and I also discussed how much intelligence information could be used in public to justify the action. I was always more reluctant to reveal intelligence than were the Americans. But on this occasion it was obviously vital to do so if the general public were to be convinced of the truth of the allegations we were making against Gaddafi. In fact, although I do not believe that anyone’s life was endangered as a result of these revelations, it is certainly true that a fair amount of intelligence dried up. I also discussed with General Walters the President’s latest list of targets which I found reasonably reassuring. I suspect that the General knew precisely which targets the US would hit by the time he came to see me. If so, it was very wise of him not to say what they were. I hoped that he would be even more discreet in the rest of his trip to Paris, Rome, Bonn and Madrid where he was to explain the intelligence on which the US was acting and ask for European support.
Now that America was actually asking the Europeans for assistance which involved a political price they showed themselves in a less than glorious light. Chancellor Kohl apparently told the Americans that the US should not expect the wholehearted support of its European allies and said that everything would turn on whether the action succeeded. The French who just recently had indulged in at least private sabre rattling refused to allow the F1 — 11s to cross French airspace. The Spanish said that the American aircraft could fly over Spain, but only if it was done in a way which would not be noticed. Since this condition could not be met, they had to fly through the Straits of Gibraltar.
Speculation was now rife. We could not confirm or deny our exchanges with the Americans. The Labour and Liberal Parties insisted that we should rule out the use of American bases in the UK for the action which everyone now seemed to expect. It was important to ensure that senior members of the Cabinet backed my decision. At midday on Monday (14 April) I told the Cabinet’s Overseas and Defence Committee what had been happening in recent days. I said that it was clear that the US was justified in acting in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Treaty. Finally, I stressed that we had to stand by the Americans as they had stood by us over the Falklands.
That afternoon it was confirmed by telephone from Washington that American aircraft would soon take off from their British bases. I received the news shortly before attending a long-standing engagement at the Economist: this was a reception to celebrate either the great Victorian constitutionalist Walter Bagehot or Norman St John Stevas, his contemporary editor, depending on your point of view. As I entered the Economist building off St James’s, Andrew Knight, the magazine’s editor, remarked with some concern how pale I looked. Since my complexion is never ruddy, I must have appeared like Banquo’s ghost. But I wondered how Andrew Knight would have looked if he knew about those American F1 — 11s heading secretly and circuitously towards Tripoli. Nevertheless I praised Bagehot, kissed Norman and returned to No. 10.
Late that night I received a message from President Reagan saying that the US aircraft would shortly strike at five named terrorist-associated targets in Libya. The President confirmed that the text of his televised statement to the American people took into account our advice to stress the element of self-defence to get the legal position right. My own statement to the House of Commons on the raid for the following day was already being drafted.
The American attack was, as we had foreseen, carried out principally by sixteen F1-11s based in the UK, though a number of other aircraft were also used. The attack lasted forty minutes. Libyan missiles and guns were fired but their air defence radars were successfully jammed. The raid was undoubtedly a success, though sadly there were civilian casualties and one aircraft was lost. Television reports, however, concentrated all but exclusively not on the strategic importance of the targets but on weeping mothers and children.
The initial impact on public opinion in Britain, as elsewhere, was even worse than I had feared. Public sympathy for Libyan civilians was mixed with fear of terrorist retaliation by Libya. Conservative Central Office received large numbers of telephoned protests, as did the No. 10 switchboard. Worries were expressed about the fate of British nationals there and the potential for hostage taking. Opposition critics, Conservative back-benchers and Tory newspapers alike were bitterly critical of the fact that I had given permission for the use of the bases. I was depicted as cringing towards the US but callous towards their victims. I reported fully on what had happened to the Cabinet, some of whose members I subsequently learnt thought that they ought to have known about the raid beforehand. Later that afternoon I made my statement to a largely sceptical or hostile House of Commons. President Reagan telephoned me afterwards to fill me in on what had been happening and to wish me well in fighting off the criticism he knew I faced. He said that when in his speech on television the previous night he had referred to the co-operation of European allies, he had had only one country in mind — the United Kingdom.
I was to speak in the emergency debate on the Libyan raid in the House on Wednesday afternoon. It was intellectually and technically the most difficult speech to prepare because it depended heavily on describing the intelligence on Libya’s terrorist activities and we had to marshal the arguments for self-defence in such circumstances. Every word of the speech had to be checked by the relevant intelligence services to see that it was accurate and that it did not place sources at risk. The debate was rank with anti-American prejudice. Neil Kinnock misquoted President Reagan’s televised broadcast; but he did so once too often. I had heard him do this earlier in the day and I had the full text of what the President had actually said given to Cranley Onslow, the Chairman of the ‘22 Committee Executive. Mr Kinnock said:
The purpose of the bombing raid on Tripoli and Benghazi on Monday night was said by President Reagan to be to ‘bring down the curtain on Gaddafi’s reign of terror’. I do not believe that anyone can seriously believe that that objective has been or will be achieved by bombing.
Cranley Onslow interrupted to point out that the President had said precisely the opposite:
I have no illusion [my italics] that tonight’s action will bring down the curtain on Gaddafi’s regime, but this mission, violent as it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women.
As the Victorians used to say: ‘collapse of stout party’.
My speech steadied the Party and the debate was a success. But there was still a large measure of incomprehension even among our supporters. I went that Friday to Cranley Onslow’s constituency. I felt that people were looking at me strangely, as if I had done something terrible, which given the sensational and biased media coverage you could understand. When I explained to party workers at a reception that our
action had been taken to protect the victims of future terrorism, they understood: but the accusation of heartlessness stuck — and it hurt. Yet the Libyan raid was also a turning point; and three direct benefits flowed from it.
First, it turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan-sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined. We are all too inclined to forget that tyrants rule by force and fear and are kept in check in the same way. There were revenge killings of British hostages organized by Libya, which I bitterly regretted. But the much vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not and could not take place. Gaddafi had not been destroyed but he had been humbled. There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years.
Second, there was a wave of gratitude from the United States for what we had done which is still serving this country well. The Wall Street Journal flatteringly described me as ‘magnificent’. Senators wrote to thank me. In marked contrast to feelings in Britain, our Washington embassy’s switchboard was jammed with congratulatory telephone calls. It was made quite clear by the Administration that Britain’s voice would be accorded special weight in arms control negotiations. The Extradition Treaty, which we regarded as vital in bringing IRA terrorists back from America, was to receive stronger Administration support against filibustering opposition. The fact that so few had stuck by America in her time of trial strengthened the ‘special relationship’, which will always be special because of the cultural and historical links between our two countries, but which had a particular closeness for as long as President Reagan was in the White House.
The Downing Street Years Page 59
