‘Well, Bryans told me that Stahmer was a big noise.’55
In that case, Andersen had to concede, he was not a translator.
Heinrich Stahmer was a not inconsiderable noise in Ribbentrop’s Foreign Ministry. There was also a lesser noise, one Herbert Stahmer, a former pupil of Albrecht Haushofer, presently serving as Legation Secretary in the Madrid Embassy, who was commissioned by Albrecht around this time to open a channel for peace negotiations to the British Ambassador in Madrid, Sir Samuel Hoare – as will appear. Which Stahmer Bryans was seeking to contact remains a mystery, although it is likely, perhaps, that it was the senior of the two.
Bryans was returned to London in early March, his flight and debts paid off by the Lisbon Embassy. Cadogan and MI5 would have liked him locked up56 – he had committed an offence under the Defence Regulations by attempting to communicate with the enemy – but it was realised that if treated severely he would make public his contacts with Lord Halifax and the travel facilities granted him by the Foreign Office, to the considerable embarrassment of both. Consequently no action was taken against him, and he was dealt with gently when questioned. He was not asked about Stahmer.
MI5 kept Bryans under strict observation. MI6 had graver concerns. In early May, a week before Hess’s flight to Scotland, Menzies wrote to Cadogan to say the time had come to take off the kid gloves and ‘interrogate him [Bryans] thoroughly about matters that seriously affect the safety of our organisation abroad’.57 Menzies knew by this time that ‘Charles’ was von Hassell.58 Did he suspect that Bryans had been used by German intelligence through his contact with von Hassell? At all events, it is difficult to understand how Bryans could have ‘affected the safety’ of Menzies’ agents – unless, of course, MI6 was in touch with Albrecht Haushofer’s former pupil and believed he might be the Stahmer Bryans was trying to contact.
Menzies’ concern also prompts questions about Frank Foley’s arrival in Lisbon with his secretary as cover on 17 January – as described earlier59 – at the time Bryans was making a nuisance of himself there. It has been assumed that Foley’s mission was connected with Albrecht Haushofer’s 23 September letter to Hamilton. It now seems at least possible that he went with the more immediate task of investigating Bryans as he sought to enter Germany claiming he had a commission from Lord Halifax.
CLAUDE DANSEY
Albrecht Haushofer’s bid to open a channel to Hoare through Herbert Stahmer in Madrid coincided with a significant escalation in British approaches to Germany, although whether in continuation of the deception campaign or as genuine offers from the British peace faction is unclear. Several strands have been noted: in November Sir William Wiseman had approached Fritz Wiedemann in San Francisco;60 in December Sir David Kelly in Berne had given Prince Hohenlohe the impression that he inclined towards a compromise peace,61 and Lady Barlow had wired Baron Bonde, encouraging him to seek another meeting with Göring.62 Now, in January 1941, Carl Burckhardt in Geneva was approached by an emissary purporting to represent influential British circles seeking a negotiated peace.
This was Tancred Borenius, a Finnish-born art historian who had settled in London before the First World War. After lecturing in the history of art at University College London he had been appointed Professor in the faculty in 1922. Besides building an international reputation as a scholar, he was an accomplished raconteur and had established himself in the highest circles of British society.
He was art adviser to Henry Lascelles, 6th Earl of Harewood, who was married to King George VI’s younger sister, Mary. Borenius was also well acquainted with the King’s younger brother, the Duke of Kent, and his wife, Marina. He was also involved in Polish affairs as Hon. Secretary General to the Polish Relief Fund, through which charity he had come to know General Wladyslaw Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish government in exile in London.63 Sikorski was naturally concerned for a peace restoring Polish independence, although there is no evidence linking him to Borenius’ Swiss mission.
When von Hassell travelled to Switzerland in January 1941 hoping to meet Lonsdale Bryans – who failed to show up – he was contacted by Carl Burckhardt who told him of a recent approach by Professor Borenius on behalf of English circles who believed a reasonable peace could still be concluded. Borenius had claimed close connections with Buckingham Palace, ‘above all the Queen’. The British royal connection was blanked out in the original, Swiss, publication of von Hassell’s diaries, but appears in the more recent German edition. Borenius also told Burckhardt he was convinced there was a mood for compromise in the English cabinet, although Eden’s entry in place of Halifax was a handicap; however, there was much opposition to Eden’s appointment.64
Burckhardt had questioned him on terms, to which Borenius replied:
Holland and Belgium must be restored; Denmark could remain an area of German influence; some kind of Poland (without the former German provinces) must be established for reasons of prestige “because the Poles have struck out so bravely for England”. Otherwise in the east no special interest (not even for Czechoslovakia). Former German colonies to Germany. The British Empire otherwise unshorn. For France no special enthusiasm in England.65
These were weak and impractical terms that would not have been contemplated by any British cabinet led by Churchill supported by Eden and Labour realists like Attlee and Bevin. On the question of who the British would be prepared to deal with, Borenius had expressed himself very cautiously, but had given the clear impression they would be extremely unwilling to conclude peace with Hitler. ‘Chief argument: one cannot believe a word he says.’66
It is now possible, since the researches of John Harris, to say with all the certainty possible without documentary evidence that Borenius was sent by MI6. Harris interviewed his son, Lars Ulrich – known as ‘Peter’ – Borenius, who has since died, and was told that Tancred had been briefed for his journey to Switzerland by Claude Dansey, and had been given a book to take out – believed to have been a code book – and a poison pill ‘the size of a golf ball’.67 It was a family joke that he would have choked to death on the pill before the cyanide could have taken effect. Peter also told Harris that after Switzerland his father had moved on to Italy. Presumably this was possible because he travelled on his Finnish passport. It is surprising nonetheless, since it was well known that he was based in London. Perhaps the poison pill was supplied for the Italian leg of his journey.
The significance of Peter Borenius’s story is that Claude Dansey was at the time Stewart Menzies’ second in command in MI6 with the title Assistant Chief of Secret Service (ACSS). A formidable operator with wide experience in many countries, his specific role since 1936 had been the establishment of an intelligence-gathering network for Germany and Italy entirely separate from the existing structure of MI6 officers working as passport control officers at British embassies and consulates – a wholly transparent cover known to every foreign intelligence service. Dansey set up his parallel system under cover of commercial enterprises; his headquarters at Bush House in central London was ostensibly the export department of Geoffrey Duveen & Co., international fine art dealers.68 A connection with Borenius seems very likely.
Since Dansey’s code name was ‘Z’, his network was known as the ‘Z’ organisation. On the outbreak of war he had moved his operation to Switzerland, but after the fiasco at Venlo and Menzies’ appointment as ‘C’ he had been posted back to London, where he established himself as, in effect, chief executive under Menzies of the agent-running departments of the service, excluding his nominal equal, the Deputy Chief (DCSS), Colonel Valentine Vivian, whose responsibilities were confined to the code and cipher establishment at Bletchley Park, security and counter-espionage, which included liaison with MI5.69 Dansey could exert much charm, but was better known for malevolence. He hated Vivian;70 the two did not speak to each other. This could help to explain why MI5 was left in the dark about actions MI6 took to follow up Albrecht Haushofer’s lett
er to Hamilton, although, of course, MI5 and MI6 officers did work together on the Double-Cross Committee.
On return to London Dansey had left a substantial staff in Switzerland running agents in Germany and occupied Europe. Among them was Halina Szymanska, wife of the former Polish military attaché in Berlin whom Canaris had helped across the border. She supplied information from within Germany, provided by an official connected to the opposition circle within Canaris’s Abwehr, and from Canaris himself, whose MI6 code name was ‘THEODOR’.71 There were difficulties communicating with London since the Swiss only allowed enciphered messages to be sent through the Swiss Post Office – lending credence to Peter Borenius’s account of his father being given a code book to take out to Geneva.
A clear trace of an MI6 campaign to persuade German intelligence of influential figures in the British establishment looking for a negotiated way out of the war can thus be seen variously in the stories of Sir William Wiseman – a friend of Claude Dansey – in San Francisco; of Dusko Popov, briefed by Menzies himself over the New Year; and of Professor Borenius, briefed by Dansey.
It will be recalled that in September Dr Ludwig Weissauer had conveyed Hitler’s peace terms to the British government through the president of the Swedish High Court of Appeal, Dr Ekeberg, who had transmitted them to the British Minister in Stockholm. These terms, which included restoring a Polish state and returning sovereignty to the western occupied countries, but not to Czechoslovakia, were remarkably similar to the conditions Borenius had brought to Switzerland.72
Curiously, Borenius was not the only Finnish peace emissary that January. The previous November Dr Weissauer had enlisted the help of the Finnish Ambassador in Berlin to ascertain how British business and financial circles judged the prospects for peace. The Ambassador commissioned for the purpose a Finnish businessman, Dr Henrik Ramsay, who was due to go to London for talks on British nickel concessions in Finland. Ramsay travelled to Stockholm in December, meeting Dr Ekeberg at the end of the month, thence via Berlin and Lisbon to London, where he stayed from 18 to 26 January 1941.73 He returned, again via Berlin. Whatever his findings, his report has been lost.
Meanwhile, the questions hanging over the peace soundings in Sweden and Switzerland were matched by those surrounding Sir Samuel Hoare in Spain.
SAM HOARE
Sir Samuel Hoare had been posted to Madrid in summer 1940 as His Majesty’s Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary on Special Mission. His task was to prevent the Spanish dictator, General Franco, from entering the war on Hitler’s side. Beyond that role in early spring 1941 his activities were extraordinary and opaque.
Hoare came from the wealthy banking family of that name. His early career in Parliament had been interrupted by the First World War; ill health had prevented him serving at the front, but as a result of learning Russian he had been recruited by the chief of the Secret Service and posted to MI6’s Petrograd station. Resuming his Parliamentary career after the war he had risen rapidly and held a succession of the highest cabinet posts during the 1930s, latterly on the extreme ‘appeasement’ wing of the government as a sharp critic of Churchill. On coming to power in May 1940 Churchill had dropped him from the cabinet, but soon found him this special mission to Spain, which suited his exceptional negotiating talents.
At the same time Churchill had one of his own friends, Captain Alan Hillgarth, posted to the Madrid Embassy as Naval Attaché with the clandestine mission, co-ordinated with Stewart Menzies, of subverting Spanish generals and officials to the British cause. For this he was provided with an initial US$10 million from contingency funds. His other special responsibilities were countering enemy intelligence operations and reporting U-boats in Spanish waters. He was permitted to communicate directly with Menzies.74
In the vital spheres of financial aid to Spain and trade through the British naval blockade Hoare was advised by David Eccles, a perceptive politician and businessman recruited by the Ministry of Economic Warfare. Eccles came to know Hoare well and to admire him for his superb intellect and knowledge of the world, his social gifts and powers of negotiation. The Spaniards, Eccles wrote to his wife, liked Hoare very much, ‘quite undisturbed by that element of Jesuitism in his character, which is so often found in their own.’75 Churchill’s private secretary, Jock Colville, described it as a ‘natural bent for intrigue … It was not without justification that he was called “Slippery Sam”.’76
Of Herbert Stahmer’s approaches to Hoare on behalf of Albrecht Haushofer, we only have Stahmer’s brief account in an unpublished manuscript. There is no corroborating evidence. Hoare did not report them to the Foreign Office and in his memoirs denied responding to overtures.77
Stahmer’s story is that Albrecht called him to Berlin late in 1940, briefed him fully on Hess’s desire for peace and his letter to Hamilton, and asked him to make contact with Hoare to discuss a basis for negotiations and ‘arrange a conference in Spain or Portugal as soon as possible between both Ambassadors [British and German] and Haushofer, to which Hess might also find opportunity to take part’.78
Albrecht was playing a double game: while this approach to Hoare had Hess’s approval and authorisation, Stahmer was clear that his commission to open a line to the British Ambassador came from ‘the group Popitz, Hassell, Haushofer’ – in other words the anti-Hitler opposition – ‘for the eventuality of a coup against Hitler.’79
Some time during the winter of 1940/41 Stahmer opened conversations with Hoare through the secretary at the Swedish Embassy in Madrid and, according to his own account, soon established that a change in both British and German governments was a precondition for an armistice leading to peace negotiations. He went on to arrange a secret conference between Hoare and Lord Halifax on one side, Hess and Haushofer on the other, for February or March 1941, in Lisbon or another suitable place.80 This is puzzling, for while it is known that Albrecht Haushofer regarded Hoare as ‘half shelved [by Churchill] half lying in wait [to replace him]’,81 it is impossible to imagine Hess taking part in conversations predicated on a coup to remove Hitler.
It is also puzzling that Albrecht never mentioned Stahmer’s negotiations with Hoare. He did not include them in a report he made to Hitler on his British connections immediately after Hess’s flight,82 an omission which could have had fatal consequences for him had Hitler known of the talks from discussions with Hess. It must be assumed, therefore, that Albrecht did not tell Hess the whole story of Stahmer’s progress with Hoare: the inference is that he intended to conduct the negotiations with Hoare and Halifax himself on behalf of von Hassell’s opposition circle.
In view of the premise of the proposed negotiations that both Hitler and Churchill would be removed, it is interesting that this proposition had come up in a New Year address by Franz von Papen, German Ambassador in Angora (Ankara), Turkey. The British Ambassador to Turkey reported on von Papen’s speech in a letter to Eden and added that ‘one of his cherished ideas is that Herr Hitler and Mr Churchill should be bartered against each other.’83
It was a period of mounting tension in Spain. Franco had replaced his Anglophile Foreign Minister with an aggressively pro-German relative, Serrano Suñer, who had stepped up the pressure on him, if not to join Hitler, at least to allow German troops through Spain to take Gibraltar, the British citadel holding the western Meditarranean. There were constant rumours of German troops on the border. While Hoare had won a superlative reputation among the Spaniards,84 he lacked physical courage: David Eccles had observed this on several occasions and noted the resulting ‘bouts of hesitation and compromise’.85 The panics were particularly evident in the early months of 1941, betrayed by long, repetitive wires for Churchill’s immediate attention, which annoyed Cadogan and struck Foreign Office officials as ‘both excitable and confused’.86
His actions were similarly erratic. On 5 March he talked with Ribbentrop’s envoy, Prince Hohenlohe, against the explicit instructions of the Foreign Offic
e – as will appear. On 15–17 March he travelled to Lisbon, not for the conference with Halifax, Haushofer and Hess that Stahmer had allegedly prepared, but to see President Roosevelt’s special envoy, Colonel William Donovan. The following month he left Madrid for Seville, thence travelled to Gibraltar, stirring a barrage of speculation. It was noted at the Foreign Office:
It should be on the record that the Ambassador went to Gibraltar in spite of categorical instructions that he was not to do so. He did not inform us of his movements, nor has he given any explanation why it was necessary for him to spend a week at Gibraltar …87
If Hoare subsequently gave an explanation it does not appear in the files.
Haushofer’s activities during this period in early 1941 are also undocumented. Between 2 and 5 February he travelled to Sweden, no doubt for Hess, but what he discussed with whom is not known.88 It was probably in connection with the King of Sweden’s offer to mediate between Britain and Germany. It was a fortnight later, on the 19th, that Menzies wrote to Henry Hopkinson telling him of a letter von Papen had written to the King of Sweden encouraging him to try to bring the war to an end in collaboration with the Pope; the King did not consider the time opportune. As noted earlier, the bottom half of this letter is missing from the file.89
Between 21 and 24 February Albrecht was again with Hess, but the content of their talks is not known. He appears in von Hassell’s diary on 10 March, saying in a discussion at Popitz’s residence in Berlin that there was an ‘urgent desire from above’ for making peace. ‘He [Haushofer] himself now thinks as we do,’ von Hassell noted, ‘and recognises the “qualities” of the regime in the shape of the whole world’s distrust of Hitler and his insufferableness as the obstacle to any reliable peace.’ They then discussed how von Hassell’s connections in Switzerland could be exploited to allow Albrecht to obtain authentic confirmation of this view of ‘the possibility of negotiations with a regime change’.90
Hess, Hitler and Churchill Page 18
