While Davies' predecessor, William Christian Bullitt, Jr. had been an admirer of the Soviet Union who gradually came to loathe Stalin's brutality and repression, Davies remained unaffected by news of the disappearance of thousands of Russians and foreigners in the Soviet Union throughout his stay as U.S. Ambassador. His reports from the Soviet Union were pragmatic, optimistic, and usually devoid of criticism of Stalin and his policies. While he briefly noted the USSR's 'authoritarian' form of government, Davies praised the nation's boundless natural resources and the contentment of Soviet workers while 'building socialism'. He went on numerous sanitized tours of the country, carefully prearranged by Soviet officials. In one of his final memos from Moscow to Washington D.C., Davies assessed:
"Communism holds no serious threat to the United States. Friendly relations in the future may be of great general value."
Davies attended the Trial of the Twenty One, one of the Stalinist purge trials of the late 1930s. Despite widespread evidence to the contrary, he was convinced of the guilt of the accused, although he was a lawyer himself. According to Davies, "the Kremlin's fears [regarding treason in the Army and Party] were well justified". His opinions were at odds with most of the non-Stalinist press of the day, as well as those of his own staff, many of whom had been in the country far longer than Davies. The career diplomat Charles Bohlen, who served under Davies in Moscow, later wrote:
"Ambassador Davies was not noted for an acute understanding of the Soviet system, and he had an unfortunate tendency to take what was presented at the trial as the honest and gospel truth. I still blush when I think of some of the telegrams he sent to the State Department about the trial." (p.51)
"I can only guess at the motivation for his reporting. He ardently desired to make a success of a pro-Soviet line and was probably reflecting the views of some of Roosevelt's advisors to enhance his political standing at home."(p.52)
Davies even claimed that communism was "protecting the Christian world of free men", and he urged all Christians "by the faith you have found at your mother's knee, in the name of the faith you have found in temples of worship" to embrace the Soviet Union.”
Kennan worked briefly for Davies.
Wikipedia: George F. Kennan –
“Kennan found himself in strong disagreement with Joseph E. Davies, Bullitt's successor as ambassador to the Soviet Union, who defended the Great Purge and other aspects of Stalin's rule. Kennan did not have any influence on Davies's decisions, and the latter even suggested that Kennan be transferred out of Moscow for "his health". Kennan again contemplated resigning from the service, but instead decided to accept the Russian desk at the State Department in Washington.”
Kennan was transferred back to Moscow near the end of World War II.
Here, he would write one of the ten most important documents in American history.
***
A NUTCRACKER ARMY, 1788-1945
“During the night, after everyone else has gone to bed, Clara returns to the parlor to check on her beloved nutcracker. As she reaches the little bed, the clock strikes midnight and she looks up to see Drosselmeyer perched atop it. Suddenly, mice begin to fill the room and the Christmas tree begins to grow to dizzying heights. The nutcracker also grows to life size. Clara finds herself in the midst of a battle between an army of gingerbread soldiers and the mice, led by their king. They begin to eat the soldiers.
The nutcracker appears to lead the soldiers, who are joined by tin ones and dolls who serve as doctors to carry away the wounded. As the Mouse King advances on the still-wounded nutcracker, Clara throws her slipper at him, distracting him long enough for the nutcracker to stab him.”
That famous ballet is not such a bad metaphor for the American Armed Forces from 1788 to 1945.
The United States Constitution was ratified in 1788, replacing the ineffective Articles of Confederation.
Not a lot of people realize that the Constitution created a permanent Navy, but no permanent professional Army. Article 1 Section 8 –
“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
[…]
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress …”
An idealistic system.
The Roman Republic ran under a similar system – volunteers raised when needed – no professional full-time army.
Militia. Minutemen. Under the control of individual states.
After every major war in American history, there would be a demobilization afterwards. The government would recruit volunteers and draft conscripts for war service when a new major conflict broke out, but once the war ended, the soldiers would hammer their swords back into ploughshares and go back to the business of life.
At the end of World War II, the expectation was the same – time to demobilize and go home again, and get back to the business of life.
But then, February ’46.
***
TWO IF BY SEA
I’m trying to show you at least a few of the cards that the American officials – President Truman in particular – were looking at in 1946. The expectation was to go home. Roosevelt had cut a deal with Stalin; the Nazis were turned back; Stalin would leave occupied Eastern Europe; time to go back to life-as-it-was.
Joseph Stalin had different ideas.
Kennan – with that strange mix of love and hate and puzzlement towards Russia that those of us who love that country so often feel (I feel it, too) – Kennan, with his terrific Russian language skills and his deep understanding of the country, Kennan saw the coming storm.
He sent one of the most important telegrams in American history; indeed, no single American message might have been as important since the ride of Paul Revere.
On 22 February 1946, less than two weeks since Stalin’s speech and the supposed 99.7% voter turnout in the Soviet “elections” – unsurprisingly reelecting Stalin and company by wide margin – Kennan sent his famous “Long Telegram from Moscow” –
“861.00/2 - 2246: Telegram
The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State
SECRET
Moscow, February 22, 1946--9 p.m. [Received February 22--3: 52 p.m.]”
It has been long since declassified and entered into the public domain. You can read the whole thing here, it is extremely insightful:
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
Officials in Washington DC were asking the Russian bureau what was happening in Moscow. Wasn’t Stalin our friend? What’s with this “we’re going to destroy capitalism” speech? Wasn’t he saying he’s our good friend, like, five minutes ago? This seems bad, no? What the hell is going on here?
Kennan’s reply begins –
“[The answer to that question] involves questions so intricate, so delicate, so strange to our form of thought, and so important to analysis of our international environment that I cannot compress answers into single brief message without yielding to what I feel would be
dangerous degree of over-simplification. I hope, therefore, Dept will bear with me if I submit in answer to this question five parts, subjects of which will be roughly as follows:
(1) Basic features of post-war Soviet outlook.
(2) Background of this outlook
(3) Its projection in practical policy on official level.
(4) Its projection on unofficial level.
(5) Practical deductions from standpoint of US policy.
I apologize in advance for this burdening of telegraphic channel; but questions involved are of such urgent importance, particularly in view of recent events, that our answers to them, if they deserve attention at all, seem to me to deserve it at once.”
Part 1 of the Long Telegram outlined the Communist Party’s 1946 doctrine, now that they were turning their back on the Western Allies.
There is nothing so surprising in Part 1: it’s Stalin’s unique blend of hyper-ideology and pragmatic realpolitik. The Communist Party under Stalin was dedicated to the destruction of capitalism, but was pragmatic on timelines, shortages of material, quality of soldiering, training, weapons, etc. Stalin was looking for a fight, but a fight on his terms: he was seeking victory with patience, not ideological martyrdom immediately.
Part 2 is fascinating –
“Part 2: Background of Outlook
Before examining ramifications of this party line in practice there are certain aspects of it to which I wish to draw attention.
First, it does not represent natural outlook of Russian people. Latter are, by and large, friendly to outside world, eager for experience of it, eager to measure against it talents they are conscious of possessing, eager above all to live in peace and enjoy fruits of their own labor. Party line only represents thesis which official propaganda machine puts forward with great skill and persistence to a public often remarkably resistant in the stronghold of its innermost thoughts. But party line is binding for outlook and conduct of people who make up apparatus of power--party, secret police and Government--and it is exclusively with these that we have to deal.
Second, please note that premises on which this party line is based are for most part simply not true. Experience has shown that peaceful and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible. Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness.”
This is why I always say to read primary source materials of this type, instead of reading summaries.
I’ve read and re-read Kennan’s communications. They’re fascinating study. They changed the world – they re-shaped American thinking about everythingfrom 1946 to 1991 and beyond, fundamentally transforming America’s role in the world.
And yet, almost no summaries of the Long Telegram mention this hyper-biting point:
“Basic internal conflicts in advanced countries are no longer primarily those arising out of capitalist ownership of means of production, but are ones arising from advanced urbanism and industrialism as such, which Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness.”
I mean, isn’t that interesting, at least?
Kennan was an odd sort of man, brilliantly clear-sighted yet very hopeful at the same time. Here, he is not saying that there are no problems in the West, nor is he adopting any particular faddish popular line of thinking.
He’s arguing, simply, that conflicts arise from urbanism and industrialism – pollution, bad city living conditions, and so on.
This seems to me, if ones looks into it, to be basically correct. When Marx and Engels were doing their investigations in England, they happened to pick one of the single worst decades to be an urban laborer in English history. This is basically uncontroversial; even most of the hardest of hard-left will admit it. It was considerably better 20 years earlier and 20 years later. Industrialism and urbanization come with problems, yes. But that didn’t represent an ideological death match to Kennan, so much as a series of practical problems regarding pollution, family life, working conditions, dependence on wages for living and insecurity from that, and so on.
But the real biting point is hilarious – “… Russia has thus far been spared not by socialism but only by her own backwardness.”
I mean, that’s legitimately funny. Kennan’s document is often described in dour and serious tones – and to be sure, it had gigantic effects on world history – but he’s got a wry and penetrating style that is downright funny to read. Unless you’re a Russian Communist, I suppose. Most people don’t like to laugh at themselves.
And yet, Kennan’s most important points about Soviet psychology are almost never quoted in full, despite being the most important part of the whole piece. Kennan wrote the details about theoretical Marxist doctrine briefly and tersely, but then spent considerable time on the actual psychology and demands of the Soviet rulers. This is the heart of the document, since the American government was going to need to deal with the Soviet government.
Kennan keeps making these biting observations –
“Internal rivalries of capitalism do not always generate wars; and not all wars are attributable to this cause. To speak of possibility of intervention against USSR today, after elimination of Germany and Japan and after example of recent war, is sheerest nonsense. … Falseness of those premises, every one of which predates recent war, was amply demonstrated by that conflict itself. Anglo-American differences did not turn out to be major differences of Western World. Capitalist countries, other than those of Axis, showed no disposition to solve their differences by joining in crusade against USSR. Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.”
I mean, that’s obvious, right?
“Instead of imperialist war turning into civil wars and revolution, USSR found itself obliged to fight side by side with capitalist powers for an avowed community of aim.”
***
TRAGIKOMEDIYA
It wouldn’t be that much of an exaggeration to say it went like this –
Soviet leaders: West, come help us! Brotherhood of man!
American leaders: Okay. Are you going to be crazy and declare war on us afterwards?
Soviet leaders: No! Be good friends!
American leaders: Why are you mass-killing your own people? Are you going to go all crazy?
Soviet leaders: They were working with Nazis! Sabotage! Bad! Judge finds guilty, so must be true! Guilty! Bad! Kill them for working with Nazis!
American leaders: Umm, okay, yeah, the Nazis are bad. So what happens after we beat the Nazis if we work together on that?
Soviet leaders: Peace and friendship! Be good friends! Elections, democracy!
American leaders: Oh, that sounds good. Okay. Here’s a bunch of trucks, vehicles, war material. We’re leading an invasion of Normandy. We’re coming. Hold on. We’ll open a Western front to the war and smash the Nazis together.
Soviet leaders: Thank you for the help.
American leaders: No problem. Can you remove your occupying soldiers from Eastern Europe now, like you promised, and let them have free elections?
American leaders: Nyet! Nyet! Nyet! You want to destroy us! All you capitalists will destroy us! Nyet! We fight you!
Western leaders: What just happened?
***
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUSSIAN LEADERS
Again, you should read Kennan’s Long Telegram –
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
It is full of gems.
“Nevertheless, all these theses, however baseless and disproven, are being boldly put forward again today. What does this indicate? It indicates that Soviet party line is not based on any objective analysis of situation beyo
nd Russia's borders; that it has, indeed, little to do with conditions outside of Russia; that it arises mainly from basic inner-Russian necessities which existed before recent war and exist today.”
By that, he means, Stalin needed an external enemy to justify holding complete power, not delivering on promises, and arresting/killing/assassinating all of his old colleagues and rivals.
“At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. But this latter type of insecurity was one which afflicted rather Russian rulers than Russian people; for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”
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