If concavity was essential to the heavily armed warrior in main-taining the unusual weight of the new shield, then square or rectangular shapes, for all their advantages in creating a solid wall of protection, became utterly impractical. After all, concavity when applied to those configurations resulted, like the Roman scutum, only in a cylindrical shape, useful for protecting the warriors' flanks, adding more armor-plating against some thrusts, but hardly effective in reducing weight off the hand and arm. To create the necessary flap or lip at the top of such shields would result in awkward corners, hardly compatible for insertion of the shoulder when pushing or resting the shield. Also, construction of such a lip would require a supporting framework or, even worse, perhaps accompanying sideguards down the entire length of the shield, which would impair lateral movement. Of course, such a 'shoe-box' shield could be poised only in a single position, absolutely perpendicular to the ground, flap
side always up. No such shield to my mind has ever existed at any time. The circular shape, on the contrary, always presented a natural fit for the shoulder, regardless of the shield's rotation or angle of deflection. Circularity was perfect for the application of concavity; concavity was perfect for the tactics of the phalanx.
Less dramatic, but equally innovative, was the near universal adoption of a spike added to the butt end of the thrusting spear—a device only rarely seen before the advent of the hoplite panoply and not at all on javelins or spears outside of Greece.20 Like the concavity of the shield, it too represents a technological reaction to the increasing practice of fighting in massed array. A bronze, squared spike usually ranging from 2 to 8 ins (5 to 20 cm) in length, it has often been described rather awkwardly by modern scholars as the 'butt-spike,'21 but to the Greeks it was commonly known as either the sturax, sauroter, or ouriachos.22 True, the butt-spike was useful in providing a counterweight to the spearhead (or so the adjective saurobrithes suggests [Trag. Adesp. 264]), allowing the 7 or 8 ft (2 or 2.4 m) shaft to be balanced with ease. Its combined small diameter and sharp point also ensured that the spear could be reversed and conveniently stuck fast into even hard ground when not in use (e.g. Hom. Il. 10.153): the phrase 'spears on their butt-spikes' was proverbial—whether for inactivity or battle-readiness (cf. Dio. Chrys. 2.45.5). In addition, this bronze covering at the base stopped rot and wear of the wood there, and perhaps also reduced cracking and splintering of the shaft itself by containing fractures which originated at the base. Since the bronze spike lacked a sharp edge along its side, occasionally the butt-spike was slapped against a victim in mock combat or employed for non-lethal punishment (e.g. Xen., Hell. 6.2.19; Onasander 10.4).
All these considerations, however, were really secondary: it was the spike's more important function as an offensive weapon during phalanx battle (e.g. cf. the verb sturakizo Hsch. 732.6), which explains its growing popularity after the appearance of the phalanx. Indeed, only the critical combat advantages which might accrue to the hoplite in mass combat from the use of butt-spike justified the addition of such a potentially treacherous weapon to his arsenal, liable to contribute to the accidental wounding of one's own men (e.g. Plut. Pyrrh. 33). In the crowded conditions of the phalanx, hoplites in the second, third, and fourth ranks would have to contend with the dangerous butt-points of those positioned in front of them in the first three ranks. Fighting with level spears ahead, these hoplites were, of
course, unaware of the exact effect to the rear of their spear strokes. The Persians, at any rate, used small spheres instead of spikes, perhaps with fear of such accidental wounding in mind (Hdt. 7.41.8).
In a great many hoplite (and later Macedonian) battles we hear that the spears of the front ranks were snapped during the initial collision (e.g. Aesch. Ag. 64–6; Xen. Hell. 3.4.14; Diod. 15.86.2; 17.100.7; 19.83; Hdt. 7.225; Plut. Alex. 16.4; Eum. 7.3). So frequent was this phenomenon that Euripides' Amphitryon is made to ask how might a man defend himself when his spear-shaft was apt to break (HF 193). The answer obviously is that most hoplites, if the shaft was not seriously splintered, could simply switch their grip (ek metalepseos) and reverse ends.23 Since most spears probably broke between the lance-head and grip point, the hoplite might still retain 3 or 4 ft (1 or 1.2 m) of good shaft attached to the butt-spike. In the subsequent press of bodies the reduced 'spear' for a time must have made a most effective 'inside' weapon for fighting in the pushing and shoving of the first ranks. Balance, of course, was now hardly a problem for the broken shaft of reduced length, since the spike was both lighter and smaller than the original spear point. The smaller size of the broken shaft and spike therefore could allow the hoplite to jab quickly and repeatedly with great mobility and freedom of movement. Its dimi-nished length of 3 or 4 ft also still offered an extra foot or two of striking power over the less effective, secondary weapon, the short sword. In Lucian's Toxaris (55.3), for example, Lonchates perhaps suffered from such a blow when he is described suffering a butt-spike wound to the thigh, presumably as he fought in the front ranks.
The value of the butt-spike as a secondary weapon once the spear head was lost is also nicely illustrated in Polybius' famous comparison between Greek and Roman armament: 'Without butt-spikes the Romans could only deliver their first blow with the point of the spear; afterwards, should the points be broken, the spears became useless to them' (6.25.6). He adds that once the Romans finally incorporated Greek-style spear-butts, they could continue to fight 'by reversing ends and striking with the butt-spike' (6.25.9). Even when the spear head remained intact, the butt-spike was also useful. Sometimes segments of the phalanx were cut off and surrounded, or found themselves too far inside the enemy's ranks—instances where the enemy might not only appear at face to face, but at the rear and side as well. Then a quick jab backward with the butt-spike could clear the way and provide a second or two of safety in which the hoplite might turn about and face the danger to the rear. Consequently, even if
hopelessly surrounded, he was still to be attacked with caution, since the moving shaft could keep the enemy clear at both ends.
The most common use of the butt-spike in both literature and art, however, is in the coup de grace, where it is brought down—often with both hands—vertically on a prostrate, usually wounded foe. Among the first-rank fighters, after an enemy was hurt or knocked off his feet, the smaller diameter and stoutness of the spike made it the preferable weapon to penetrate the opponent's breastplate or helmet. There are examples at Olympia and elsewhere of armor pierced with square, rather than round or irregular shaped holes, suggesting the entry and exit wounds from the spike rather than the spear-head.24 On sculpture, too, we occasionally see a hoplite aiming his butt-spike for a final blow against a defeated adversary.25 In literature the picture is similar. Once Philopoemen had wounded Machanidas, Polybius relates that he finished him off with a two-handed stab of the butt-spike (11.18.4, cf. too Paus. 8.49.7), a blow that was often used in hunting wild animals (AP 6.110,111). Plutarch, remember, describes the last moments of Masistius, the Persian cavalry commander at Plataia. His unusually thick armor protected him well even while unhorsed on the ground until finally a hoplite ran him through at his helmet-visor with his butt-spike (Plut. Arist. 14.6.4), indicating that the spike was often the weapon of choice for dispatching prostrate, armored foes.
A second instance where hoplites found the vertical stab of the butt-spike indispensable was among the rear ranks, those men who were stationed behind the first three rows. In ranks four through eight of most phalanxes, infantry advanced in battle with raised spears. In this way accidental wounding before the encounter with enemy ranks could be minimized and hoplites could offer the phalanx some protection against missiles (e.g. Polyb. 18.29–30). The shaft also perhaps offered stabilization as the hoplite pushed and leaned into the men in front, ready, too, to step up a rank if any of those ahead went down. Occasionally, as the advance progressed, the battlefield was littered with the bodies of the dead, the wounded, and those who had simply tripped and were unable, in th
eir armor and amid the mob, to regain their feet. As the rear ranks of the phalanx encountered these unfortunates on the ground there was a need to dispatch them quickly before they could trip up or strike out at the advancing ranks. Simple trampling of the enemy was both awkward and dangerous, and thus the best way to attack then was simply to come down hard with the already upraised spear-shaft, driving the butt-spike through their
armor or exposed flesh. That way the march could continue relatively unimpeded and there was no need to reverse the spear or bend over with the short sword—impossible tasks anyway during the advance of crowded ranks. Those in the killing-zone at the front of the phalanx could rest assured that their role need not be to finish off their adversaries, but merely to wound, trip, or knock them out of the way as they went on ahead to create crucial momentum in this contest of pressure. It was the job of those hoplites to the rear to dispatch with their butt-spikes all who were passed over. The wedge construction, sharp point, and absence of barbs made the butt-spike the ideal secondary weapon, designed specifically to pierce armor (if given a stationary target) and to be withdrawn quickly with ease.
Thus, the butt-spike, too, must be seen as a weapon deliberately introduced for phalanx warfare. This inclusion of a weighted spike at the butt end of the spear illustrates that it was now seen as a thrusting, seldom a throwing, weapon; its added weight was no drawback to a warrior who had already sacrificed moveability and with it the desire for individual duelling. Moreover, the added offensive capability of the spike suggests that the prior practice of employing two spears was now superfluous, since even a broken shaft need not be discarded as 'useless.' The uniform adaptation of the butt-spike and the real advantages it brought in the melée must also account for the ever diminishing size of, and thus need for, the secondary sword, which evolved from the long, heavy weapon of the early Dark Ages to the short, slashing blade of classical times. True, the use of either end of the spear in the attack suggests a natural limitation in range: the lethal zone of assault is confined in a vertical sense to stabbing up and down, without the lateral scope the sword offers. But, again, within the confines (and safety) of dense formations there was really no need—or rather no chance—to slash sideways, but rather a need for a hoplite only to stab his foe standing at his face or dispatch him on the ground at his feet. Neither movement of the spear fouled his neighbor at his side.
CONCLUSION: A TECHNOLOGICAL, NOT A TACTICAL, REFORM
Military technology in the Greek world—despite what most scholars think—usually reacted to the demands of the changing battlefield in the form of new or improved weapons. The emergence of hoplite arms and armor in Greece, generally around 700 BC, was no exception
to this natural process. Such equipment must be seen as part of the historical response to improve the combat efficacy of men who were currently fighting in massed array—in this case, presumably at first with a variety of 'outdated' weapons such as javelins, long swords, non-metallic armor, and flat, single-gripped shields of various shapes. There is not enough substantial evidence from Proto-Corinthian pottery or lyric poetry to convince us that phalanx tactics either emerged gradually around 650 BC, and thus somewhat independently of hoplite equipment, or, on the contrary, were a revolutionary breakthrough brought about suddenly around 700 BC, largely by the adoption of the double-grip hoplite shield.
Moreover, both theories inherently must postulate an immediately preceding age (at least prior to 700 BC) of widescale duelling and skirmishing, predominantly by armies of aristocratic grandees, usually mounted (for transportation rather than charging), and armed with the javelin or spear, a long sword, and light body protection. Yet, the recent research of Latacz and Pritchett on the so-called phalanx passages in the Iliad demonstrates that these lines probably reflect historical reality—a logical, understandable method of massed combat in practice well before 700 BC. Would not these early phalanx fighters initially employ traditional weapons?
Soon, however, the growing uniformity of such fighting must have affected the contemporary equipment of the later Dark Ages in a wide variety of different ways.26 Some items traditionally in use such as both the small, round and the larger rectangular shields, the long sword, and the javelin—not to mention the use of the horse itself—were eventually discovered in the environment of the new battlefield to be inadequate for phalanx tactics. For example, earlier shields could not resolve the two contradictory demands of great size and supportability created by phalanx warfare; previous offensive arms also required too much room to maneuver and perhaps lacked the penetrating power necessary to force back ranks of newly armored men. Consequently, they were either abandoned outright or gradually superseded by the superior technology of hoplite weaponry. Other elements were retained, albeit drastically modified to meet new needs. For example, crested head-gear and body armor were kept (after all, they still retained advantages for men who would fight in the phalanx), but now they were considerably enlarged and reworked with heavy bronze, emerging as the so-called Corinthian helmet and bell-corselet. Both items stressed, above all, complete defensive protection for the eyes, nose, ears, mouth, chest, and back in the
crowded melée, all at the expense of mobility, comfort, and visibility.
Similarly, the advantages of the spear, which had seen prior haphazard use, now became apparent for men who would thrust only in one direction—directly ahead: it was also uniformly outfitted with a bronze spike at its butt-end—something only seen rarely in the past—now uniquely useful for both front and rear ranks of the phalanx. In turn, little opportunity was left for sword play; the advantages the sword offered in maneuverability were negated by the confines of the phalanx. Since it lacked the crucial penetrating power and length of the spear, the sword soon evolved into a shorter secondary blade. Finally, radically new components were introduced, entirely unknown and unlike anything ever seen previously. The double-grip and concavity of the circular shield were designed specifically for the requirements of heavily armored men in close combat, most of whom needed to push with their bodies when not thrusting with the spear. Thus hoplites could save their left hands with the double-grip, their arms by resting the shield's lip on their shoulders; for most in the phalanx who pressed against bodies of their friends, not their foes, the enemy might more often be an exhausted arm than a point of iron. In short, the expense and the careful, peculiar construction of the shield were justified only by its application to this particular type of massed fighting. The concave shield and the butt-spike, then, both reflected the new needs of men who would now fight in the middle and rear ranks as well—men who might never encounter the enemy at all face to face.
This hypothesis of prior phalanx tactics not only accounts for the very discovery and purpose of such hoplite weapons, but also is not dependent upon the shaky evidence of vase-painting or lyric poetry, either for the exact dating of specific items of panoply or the emergence of the phalanx. More importantly, the general idea that preexisting phalanx warfare of some sort was continuously being improved or reinvigorated by the adoption of various new designs in equipment synchronizes well with later evolutionary patterns in Greek warfare. For example, already by the end of the sixth century BC, the bell-corselet itself was replaced by a composite cuirass, while crests and greaves at this time began to be omitted entirely.27 These trends only continued in the fifth century. A desire to make phalanxes more mobile and more flexible to meet a variety of new opponents and challenges accelerated the spread of a less restrictive, conical helmet and often perhaps the very abandonment of the metal breastplate entirely.
Armament and tactics thus must be seen always as interrelated; throughout the history of Greek warfare warriors invented, adapted, or rejected specific weapon designs—constantly seeking through their own hands-on experience those best suited to contemporary fighting, often without any larger social, political, or economic implications. Thus, the growing shock tactics of phalanx warfare very soon spawned a fully armored, though awkward fight
er. Nearly two centuries later he gave way to the modified figure of a hoplite without complete bronze protection, who, in turn, by the late fifth century, became a much lighter infantryman—all in technological response to continual tactical changes on the battlefield. The reverse process seldom occurred.
This belief that items of the panoply were responses to prevailing massed tactics neither proves or disproves the accompanying idea of sudden political and social changes between 700 and 650 BC—the so-called hoplite reform.28 Some who would still believe in such a dramatic transformation in both war and society might interpret the invention and adoption of the panoply in this crucial period by growing groups of phalanx warriors as the critical impetus for their ultimate success against the 'enemy' (aristocratic knights?). According to this view, such equipment probably could have provided much needed technological superiority and uniformity—the final, successful 'edge' to the struggles of a less organized (and less successful) phalanx of past times.
My own belief, however, is that because the adoption of the panoply represented a technological, not a tactical, breakthrough, it must also be seen (alas) as a purely military, rather than a political or social phenomenon. The acquisition of new equipment on a wide scale by small landowners was reflective, not causative, of their economic prosperity and growing political independence. It was simply an illustration that most small farmers who fought in the phalanx had already 'arrived' and now gradually had gained the experience, expertise, and wealth to manufacture superior arms for their specialized needs as shock troops. Both the peculiarity and limitations of hoplite weaponry may suggest that phalanx warfare around 700 BC was finally becoming codified as the exclusive ritual of landed infantry men, as the only game in town. The notion that there is an intrinsic connection between hoplites and phalanxes thus must be modified: hoplites (i.e. men equipped with the panoply) were created for, and nearly always fought in, phalanxes (i.e. massed groups of shock troops); phalanxes, however (both an earlier and later phenomenon),
Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience Page 11
