23. This auxiliary use of the spike is, of course, ignored by Euripides since the point here is to show the legitimacy, if not the advantage, of the bow over the spear.
24. Snodgrass 1967:56, 80.
25. G.M.A.Richter, Catalog of the Greek Sculptures in the Metropolitan Museum of Art (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), pl. 82; Anderson 1970: pl. 10 and Richter (supra n. 21) 195.
26. The nature of fighting and equipment in the Dark Ages is a difficult topic. The web of relative historicity in Homer—Mycenaean, Dark Age, or 750–700 BC—is difficult to unravel. Archaeological evidence such as burial finds are not representative of society as a whole but are often predicated on class considerations, and few Geometric vases contain clear pictures of fighting. In any case, figure representations do not appear until the very end of the period (e.g. ca 800 BC). Nevertheless, there is a consensus that in the eleventh, tenth, and ninth centuries many warriors were equipped with non-metallic body armor, long swords, thrusting (and later) throwing spears, and flat, round, and rectangular shields. Most believe that these aristocratic fighters made some such frequent use of the horse, and fought in a highly mobile, fluid, and individual fashion. I do not know when phalanx tactics first emerged in Greece, nor how long such shock fighting had existed with traditional, duellist weapons within this general period. We can be sure only that the 'phalanx' did emerge at least before Homer and prior to the introduction of hoplite weapons.
27. Cf. Snodgrass 1967:91–5; Anderson 1970:20–4.
28. It seems less likely (as Snodgrass 1965:122 suggests) that individual warriors, most often aristocrats, would first employ the hoplite panoply and then be joined (under compulsion?) by newer land-owners. Why would aristocrats originally design weaponry so ill-suited to skirmishing and so ideal for the uniformity of (as yet unknown) massed battle? Are we to believe a knight would 'suit up' in the panoply, dismount (so unlike his medieval cousin), and then stab away or cast with his spear in single combat on the ground against non-hoplites, with such liabilities as reduced vision, comfort, and mobility? Once he abandoned his horse, would he not be defenseless—as later experience teaches us—against quick, lightly clad (and poor) javelin-throwers or bowmen? And how might such equipment then find its way into the phalanx—as if its ideal application came only through accident or chance? Clearly such unusual arms and armor must have been designed in advance for a specific type of combat, which was growing increasingly codified, if not ritualistic.
29. Even recent works dedicated to the premise that modern technology can determine the very course of warfare acknowledge the frequent primacy of tactics and thus (as was nearly always true in the Ancient Greek world) the responsive, rather than causative, effect of new weapons. So, S.M. van Creveld in Technology and War (New York, 1989) concludes with the observation:
In sum, since technology and war operate on a logic which is not only different but actually opposed, the conceptual framework that is useful, even vital, for dealing with the one should not be allowed to interfere with the other. In an age when military budgets, military attitudes, and what passes for military thought often seem centered on technological considerations and even obsessed by them, this distinction is of vital importance. In the words of a famous Hebrew proverb: 'The deed accomplishes, what thought began.'
* * *
Part III
THE ENVIRONMENT OF BATTLE
Even in daytime those fighting do not perceive everything, indeed no one knows anything more than what is going on right about himself.
Thucydides
* * *
4
THE KILLING ZONE
John Lazenby
No one alive today has ever experienced anything really like a hoplite battle. Contemporary accounts survive, at least one by an eye-witness, but they chiefly take a wide-angle view. There is no 'blow-by-blow' commentary. To try to understand what went on at the 'sharp end', we have to draw on many sources, including poets and dramatists, and the best we can hope to achieve is a composite picture, since no two battles were exactly alike.
There is, at least, no good reason to distrust such evidence. Tyrtaios, for example, despite legends such as that he was a lame Athenian schoolmaster (cf., for example, Paus. 4.15.6), was almost certainly a Spartan, and had probably seen action. He describes a king of Sparta, for example, as 'our king Theopompos' (5.1), and includes himself among Spartan warriors when he cries 'in a moment we shall all be slogging it out together' (19.16). Aischylos is supposed to have fought at Marathon, where his brother was killed (Hdt. 6.114). Euripides, whose descriptions of battle are amongst the best to have survived, was a well-to-do Athenian,1 and would probably have been required to serve as a hoplite or in the cavalry. If he was born on the day of Salamis, as tradition has it, he could have fought anywhere from Greece to Egypt between 460 and 446 BC, and would still have been liable for military service at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. In any case, it is better to rely on writers who were at least alive when hoplites were the dominant force in Greek warfare, than on the earlier Homer, or later authors such as Polybios, Diodoros, or Plutarch. After all, the audiences of Aischylos and Euripides would have included many a hoplite, and Tyrtaios' war-songs were still being sung in Sparta in Plato's day (cf. Leg. 629a and 667).
Homer's Iliad probably contains the most vivid descriptions of fighting to have survived from antiquity, but it was almost certainly
composed before the hoplite age, and although it does make occasional references to massed infantry fighting, it is principally concerned with individual duels, and the throwing-spear is the dominant weapon. As for later writers, the difficulty is that we can never be sure what to make of what they say. Clearly they sometimes drew on earlier sources, lost to us, some of which were contemporary with the hoplite age, but unless they specify which, doubts must remain. Warfare in Greece was profoundly transformed in the fourth century, with the advent of Philip of Macedonia, and although hoplites continued to fight for a century or more, they were increasingly replaced by Macedonian-style 'phalangites', armed in a different way (cf., for example, Plut. Cleom. 11.2), and accustomed to fight in a different way. Thus we cannot be sure that what Polybios, for example, or the tactical writers, Asklepiodotos, Arrian and Aelian, have to say, is relevant. What follows, then, is an attempt to reconstruct what it was like to take part in a hoplite battle, based on contemporary evidence.
We begin with the setting, which was usually a flat terrain. Hills, streams, marshes, the sea, and other features, often play some part, but are rarely, if ever, crucial. There is much truth in the remark Herodotos attributes to Mardonios (7.9ß.1), that 'when the Greeks declare war on each other, they choose the best and smoothest place and go down and have their battle on that', though it is less true, as we shall see, that they suffered heavily as a result. The area would be enough to accommodate several thousand men, but probably not more than 50,000 at most, if Greek was fighting Greek. Thucydides, for example, evidently thought that First Mantineia was a big battle (5.74.1), yet it is doubtful whether more than about 20,000 hoplites took part, and at the Nemea, possibly the greatest hoplite battle ever fought, there were probably fewer than 50,000 (Lazenby 1985:128–9, 136).
Since battles were usually fought in the summer, it would be hot and sunny—this was the point of Dienekes' reply to the defeatist who told him, before Thermopylai, that the Persian arrows would blot out the sun (Hdt. 7.226). Bad weather, even thunderstorms, rarely, if ever, interrupted proceedings (cf., for example, Thuc. 6.70.1), though Plutarch alleges that one such aided Timoleon's victory at the Krimisos (Tim. 28.1–3). Battles could be fought at other times of the year, for example the one between the Mantineians and Tegeates at Laodokeion in the winter of 423/2 BC (i.e. between October and March: Thuc. 4.134), but perhaps the only time conditions affected the issue was when snow drove the forces of the 'Thirty' away from
Phyle in the winter of 404/3 BC (Xen. Hell. 2.4.3).
Before battle, the hoplites would form up in t
heir files, eight deep or more. The greatest depth recorded is the 'fifty shields' of the Thebans at Leuktra (Xen. Hell. 6.4.12), though the forces of the 'Thirty' also formed up fifty deep at Mounychia in 403 BC, when confined to a single road (Xen. Hell. 2.4.11). Probably in most armies men from the same localities served together—Lysias, for example, implies that in the Athenian army men from the same deme fought alongside each other (16.14). But in the Spartan army, by Xenophon's time, recruitment was no longer on a local basis. Sons, fathers and brothers did not necessarily even serve together in the same morai (cf. Xen. Hell. 4.5.10).2 Nevertheless, the members of the smallest units, the enomotiai, presumably knew each other, since they only consisted of forty men, even at full strength, and on campaign probably only contained thirty-five men or fewer (cf., for example, for Leuktra, Xen. Hell. 6.4.12 and 17). Presumably, too, since the composition of an enomotia was based on age-groups, with the younger men in the front ranks, each man also knew his place.
One wonders, however, whether this was true of most armies. There is no evidence that there were units smaller than a lochos in national armies other than the Spartan,3 and although the size of a lochos varied from state to state, and from time to time, they always seem to have contained several hundred men. Unless units of this size were broken down into smaller ones, it is difficult to believe that every man would have had a fixed position,4 and one suspects that before a battle there was a certain amount of jostling as men found themselves a place. This may be part of the point of Brasidas' scornful remark (Thuc. 5.10.5) that movement of spears and heads was characteristic of troops who would not stand their ground.
If the battle was at all unexpected, men could still be putting on their armour as they took their positions, as happened before Second Mantineia (Xen. Hell. 7.5.22). In Euripides' Heradidae (723–5), it is even suggested that the aged Iolaos should have someone carry his equipment to the battle-line, and in real battles, officers in particular may only have taken their shields from their soldier-servants at the last moment (cf. Xen. Hell. 4.8.39). If there was time to kill before the advance, men would stand with spears at the slope and shields leaning against their legs (cf., for example, Xen. An. 1.5.13, Hell. 2.4.12). Sometimes the pose was kept up to show contempt for an advancing enemy, if an anecdote about Chabrias is true (Diod. 15.32.5, Polyaenus 2.1.2). Spartans possibly sat while waiting, as seems to have been true
of Plataia (cf. Hdt. 9.72.1), though there they were being subjected to fire from Persian archers rather than waiting to advance against other hoplites.
Many generals would take this opportunity to harangue their men, perhaps addressing them unit by unit, as Pagondas did before Delion, 'so that they did not all leave the line at once' (Thuc. 4.91), or walking along the ranks as Archidamos did before the 'Tearless Battle' (Xen. Hell. 7.1.30), presumably so that all could hear him. But the Spartans preferred to encourage each other, according to Thucydides (5.69.2), 'knowing that long practice in action is of more help than brief, well-rounded, verbal advice'. Generals and their staff would also be busy with the sacrifice, and perhaps having a drink of wine to steady their nerves, as Kleombrotos and his officers were before Leuktra (cf. Xen. Hell. 6.4.8), though it seems unlikely that wine was normally served out to all.
The signal for the advance was often given by trumpet (cf., for example, Thuc. 6.69.2; Eur. Heracl. 830–1), and the hoplites would move forward, initially, perhaps, with spears still at the slope (cf. Xen. An. 6.5.25). Men would sing the 'Paian' (e.g. Xen. Hell. 4.2.19), or, in the Spartan army, if Plutarch is right (Lyc. 22.2–3), a hymn to Castor. Most armies did not march in step, judging by Thucydides' emphasis that the Spartan army did, to the sound of pipes (5.70). At a further signal, down would come the spears (Xen. An. 6.5.25), or at least those of the first two or three ranks, and a good general hoped all would be lowered simultaneously for effect. 'Since there were many soldiers,' Iphikrates is supposed to have said on one occasion (Polyaenus 3–9.8), 'they were neither able to level spears nor to sing the paian together; when I ordered "level spears", there was more noise of teeth to be heard [presumably chattering!] than of weapons.' But if it worked, the result could be terrific. It is vividly captured by Plutarch (Arist. 18.2) in his description of the moment at Plataia, when 'in an instant the phalanx took on the look of a wild animal, bristling as it turns at bay'.
Armies sometimes advanced at the double (e.g. Thuc. 4.96.1; Xen. Hell. 4.3.17), and Thucydides' description of the slow advance of the Spartans at First Mantineia (5.70) implies that this was unusual. But one suspects that all hoplites started at a walk, and then, unless they were Spartans, broke into a double when they got near the enemy. Xenophon ordered his men to double when the first sling-stones rattled against their shields (An. 4.3.29), and it was probably usually when they came within missile-range that hoplites started to run. The
slow approach of the Spartans was designed to preserve their formation. At the Nemea they are even said to have halted within 200 yds (180 m) of the enemy, to perform a final sacrifice to 'Artemis the Huntress' (Xen. Hell. 4.2.20), which would also have given them a chance to dress their line. This was clearly a matter of concern. At Kounaxa, when the line started to billow out, Xenophon and his comrades shouted to each other not to 'run races' (An. 1.8.19).
Often, too, Greeks raised a war-cry, evidently sounding something like 'eleleu' (cf., for example, Xen. An. 1.8.18; Ar. Av. 364), and sometimes drummed spear on shield (Xen. An. 1.8.18). In Aischylos' Seven Against Thebes (385–6) there is even a reference to the fearful clangour of bronze bells, apparently fixed on the insides of shields! Aischylos also remarks on the dust raised by advancing troops, the Voiceless herald of an army' (Supp. 180, Sept. 81–2), and Euripides likens the flashing of the bronze accoutrements to lightning (Phoen. 110–1).
Many battles, it appears, were virtually decided almost before they began, by the flight of one side or the other. As one of the characters in Euripides' Bacchae remarks, 'it is common for fear to strike with panic an army under arms and in its ranks, before the spears touch' (303–4). At First Mantineia the centre of the allied line, particularly those opposed to the 300 Spartan hippeis, broke and ran, 'the majority not waiting to come to grips' (es cheiras: Thuc. 5.72.4), and notoriously at the so-called 'Tearless Battle', 'only a few of the enemy waited for the Spartans to come within spear-range' (eis doru: Xen. Hell. 7.1.31). As Euripides again says, the test of a man's courage was not the bow, but 'to stand and look and outface the spear's swift stroke, keeping the line firm' (HF 162ff.) or, as Xenophon more succinctly puts it, castigating a coward, 'because he could not look the spears in the face, he did not want to serve' (Symp. 2.14).
Sometimes, too, at least one wing of a phalanx contrived, by luck or judgement, to avoid a head-on collision. Thucydides says (5.71.1) that all armies tended to edge to the right, as each man sought the protection of his neighbour's shield for the unguarded right half of his own body, and there was thus a tendency for each side to create an overlap on the right. Euripides refers to the stalemate situation which could result (Supp. 704–6), and this was, presumably, why the battle of Laodokeion was 'ambiguous' (Thuc. 4.134.1). At the Nemea, however, the Spartans appear to have deliberately exploited the tendency (Lazenby 1985:139–40), and although the result was that the left was sacrificed, this may have seemed acceptable. The left
consisted of allied troops, who would not lose too heavily if they beat a hasty retreat, and the right could then take the victorious enemy right in its shieldless flank, as it broke off pursuit and attempted to retire (Xen. Hell. 4.2.22).
If, however, phalanxes met head on and were prepared to fight it out, the gap between them would have closed rapidly until sometimes the opposing front ranks literally crashed together (e.g. Xen. Hell. 4.3.19). More often, one suspects, the advance of both phalanxes slowed as they got 'within spear-range', and the men in the front ranks probed with their spears, trying to stab their opposite numbers.
How were these initial thrusts normally delivere
d? The language Xenophon uses in the Anabasis (e.g. 1.2.17, 6.5.25) certainly seems to suggest that spears were lowered from the shoulder to the underarm position, below the waist, as the advance began (cf. Anderson 1970:88–9). This would have had the advantages that there would, perhaps, have been less likelihood of accidentally wounding one's own comrades (Hanson 1989:162), and that the thrust could then have been directed below the rims of enemy shields, at relatively unprotected parts of the body. But both Tyrtaios (19.12) and Kallinos (1.10) describe soldiers as carrying their spears aloft (anaschomenos/oi), and when Tyrtaios exhorts the Spartans to 'brandish the mighty spear in the right hand' (11.25), he can hardly be thinking of an underarm thrust.
It is true that the latter is sometimes depicted on vases, but where it is, the scenes are invariably duels between individuals. There does not seem to be any example of lines of hoplites advancing with spears levelled below the waist.5 Admittedly, there are very few such scenes, in any case, but those that have survived, from the Chigi vase onwards,6 invariably show hoplites carrying spears overarm. Similarly, although wounds to the lower part of the body, and to the legs, are mentioned (cf., for example, Tyrt. 10.25), it is not usually clear when they were inflicted. In one case where it is, when the Spartan prince, Archidamos, receives a wound through his thigh, right at the beginning of a fight, he is specifically said to be leading his men in column, two by two (Xen. Hell. 7.4.22–3). Assuming that he was on the right, the position normally occupied by a commander, the right side of his body would have been completely unprotected, and even an overarm thrust could have got him in the thigh.
Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience Page 13
