Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  Fearing the collapse of his ally’s front, General Falkenhayn begrudgingly accepted Emperor Wilhelm’s decision to utilize the four newly trained German corps for a February East Prussian campaign (the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes) to coincide with the Carpathian offensive.3 Nevertheless, Falkenhayn was convinced that Conrad’s Carpathian offensive would not render a decisive victory because he lacked the troops necessary to envelop and overpower Russian extreme flank positions dispersed over hundreds of kilometers.

  The South Army’s need for mountain equipment for the upcoming offensive sparked yet another episode of allied friction. In a 15 January telegram, General Ludendorff warned Conrad that he would withhold German assistance unless Habsburg Supreme Command agreed to provide the muchneeded equipment.4 Ludendorff revealed that a number of German generals preferred that the South Army be deployed on more favorable terrain.

  Habsburg reconnaissance efforts intensified despite inclement weather conditions. Intelligence reports indicated that Russian troops had constructed blocking positions all along their front to compensate for their fewer numbers. Deteriorating weather conditions increased the demand for road maintenance to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies.

  Conrad opposed creating a Central Power Supreme Command, citing national, dynastic, political, and military considerations. Nonetheless, he continuously demanded that the Germans provide reinforcements for his Eastern front operations. He argued that, with the failure of German military efforts in the West, the time had come to focus on the East. Conrad insisted that victory had thus far eluded his troops because the Germans refused to provide the necessary reinforcements.

  The Carpathian Winter War further illuminated the need for a unified allied command, and the issue remained a bone of allied contention until the war’s end. German High Command outwardly questioned General Conrad’s leadership capabilities, and clashes between Conrad and Falkenhayn aggravated the issue.5 The two military leaders were as dissimilar in stature as in their strategic beliefs. The taller Falkenhayn commanded a greater presence, in contrast to Conrad, who was relatively short in stature and grandfatherly in appearance. The two rarely communicated by telephone, interacting instead at impromptu meetings that Falkenhayn dominated. Inevitably, days later, Falkenhayn received a communiqué from Conrad contradicting or questioning any agreement the two had reached.

  Falkenhayn reminded Conrad that in the West, Anglo-French troops outnumbered the Germans two to one. Therefore, he could spare no troops to support Conrad’s Carpathian operation. Conrad insisted that only an additional six German infantry divisions could produce a military victory and that by transferring three to four German divisions to the Habsburg Third Army’s eastern flank positions, Russian troops could be encircled. He added that defeating the Russians would persuade Italy and Romania to remain neutral. During their most recent exchange, Falkenhayn was surprised to learn that the Habsburg Third Army had been forced to retreat fifty kilometers into the mountains. When asked whether he could assure that the Habsburg armies deployed in the Carpathian Mountains could maintain their current positions, Conrad replied that he could not.6

  Pressure to launch an offensive in the Carpathians also partially stemmed from bleak reports emanating from Fortress Przemyśl. In early January 1915, Habsburg Supreme Command ordered the designation of a fortress minimal defending force, with the remaining garrison troops providing offensive punch for a future major breakout effort. The minimal defending force received orders to destroy important military objects within the fortress before joining any successful breakout effort. During the latter half of January, garrison forces reorganized in preparation for that breakout attempt. According to a 17 December situation report, the fortress could only hold out until 15 January; horse feed would be depleted by 10 January. However, a later 1 January 1915 report estimated that the garrison could hold out until 18 February if 7,000 horses were slaughtered for their meat. Despite the reprieve, Conrad remained under intense pressure to take the initiative and rescue the fortress. The decision to slaughter horses to extend the fortress food supply naturally reduced the number of pack animals available for moving supplies and ammunition as needed, as well as transporting the sick and wounded to and from fortress perimeter positions. A 15 January report stated that slaughtering an additional 3,500 horses would extend the garrison’s food supply to 7 March. When czarist siege troops learned of the butchering occurring behind the fortress walls, they began to mimic the sound of horses whinnying. The Russians jokingly compared Fortress Przemyśl to the Trojan horse: in the Greek legend, the warriors rode inside the belly of a horse, while in Fortress Przemyśl, the horses rode inside the bellies of the warriors.7

  The Habsburg armies deployed in the Carpathian Mountains bore little resemblance to the fighting force mobilized in July 1914. Having lost much of its professional and noncommissioned officers and experienced soldiers in the initial campaigns, the k.u.k. army of January 1915 more closely resembled a Miliz (militia) force, now reduced to “more or less an improvised army of reserves.”8 The severe bloodletting in the opening and fall campaigns necessitated the Habsburg army’s reorganization in October 1914 and again in January 1915.

  Österreich-Ungarns letzter Krieg describes the 1915 Habsburg army as a Volksheer, a military force far inferior to its once-proud legacy, while Austrian historiography acknowledges the Russians’ superior ability to adapt to the winter mountain environment.9 Perhaps most damning, however, was Habsburg Supreme Command’s failure to learn from its November 1914 to early January campaigns. Instead, the 1915 Carpathian Winter War became more a question of what Conrad wanted to do (wollen), as opposed to what he was able to do (können).

  It is impossible to accurately assess the total losses incurred during the 1915 winter offensive. Recording losses was a complicated task, particularly considering the transfer of nearly every small infantry unit to another at some point during the campaign. Wounded, sick, and frostbitten soldiers continually transferred from the front. Soldiers from the Balkan and Galician fronts and hundreds of thousands of Ersatz (replacement troops) later transferred to the Carpathian Mountains. Austrian official sources estimate the winter offensives produced some 800,000 casualties, but the number is likely far greater. Though the high casualty rate alone is astounding, the fact that most were not related to combat (something Austria-Hungary’s Last War and other official reports fail to reveal) is even more mind-boggling.

  On 1 January 1915, Conrad and Falkenhayn exchanged views about Habsburg Carpathian offensive plans and sparred over who should command the new South Army set to deploy in the Carpathian theater.10 Falkenhayn made numerous valid arguments against Conrad’s plan, including the fact that a 375-kilometer expanse separated the flanks of the German and Austro-Hungarian strike forces.11 Furthermore, the mountain region lacked the necessary roadways and higher-capacity rail lines, and presented serious communication and logistical challenges. With Russian defenders firmly entrenched on higher ground, Conrad’s plan might yield a few localized military gains at best, not the highly touted decisive victory. Falkenhayn further explained that deploying additional German troops in the east meant compromising his Western front operations—something he was not willing to do.

  Emperor Wilhelm interceded, assuring Conrad of German support for the undertaking. Vienna’s urgent appeals, the threat of Italian and Romanian intervention, and growing concern that the Habsburg army’s continuing battlefield defeats might cause it to collapse persuaded the German emperor to accede to Conrad’s request for reinforcements. In a letter to the emperor’s military chancellery and foreign minister, Conrad justified the need for a major Carpathian offensive, citing growing Russian military presence in the region and the crisis at Fortress Przemyśl. He assured the Germans that the Balkan front was not in imminent danger. The Save and Danube rivers had frozen over, and sufficient Habsburg troops were in position to repel a Serbian attack. To underscore his assertions, Conrad transferred three of his own d
ivisions from the Balkan front to the Carpathian Mountains in early January 1915.

  The issue of Italian neutrality became a lightning rod for the allied commanders’ diametrically opposed viewpoints. Conrad refused to consider Italian territorial demands, insisting that the Russian front held the greatest opportunity for victory.12 German diplomatic and military leaders increasingly pressured Vienna to relinquish territory to Italy to at least ensure its neutrality.13

  The ongoing Fortress Przemyśl crisis limited Conrad’s military options. Taking its cue from Conrad, the German Eastern front command (Oberost) expressed grave concern over the situation hoping to divert Falkenhayn’s attention to the Eastern front. Oberost punctuated its argument by reminding Falkenhayn of the severe criticism he received for his failed Western front Ypres campaign in late 1914.

  General Falkenhayn remained nonplussed and held fast to the assessment that action be taken on the Serbian, not Russian, front. Victory against Serbia would open the Danube River for the delivery of much-needed arms and ammunition to Turkey, a Central Powers ally since November 1914. Citing growing concern over the neutral states, Falkenhayn suggested that Conrad crush Serbia with the troops intended for his Carpathian campaign because the weakened Serbian army suffered from severe losses, privation, disease, and a critical shortage of matériel. A Habsburg victory over Serbia would also restore prestige the empire had forfeited earlier at the hands of its tiny Balkan foe.14 Arguing that a Balkan campaign was not feasible, Conrad repeated his demand for the transfer of all available German troops to the Carpathian front.15

  The bickering finally ended on 8 January, when Falkenhayn begrudgingly informed Conrad of Emperor Wilhelm’s decision to supply German troops for his Carpathian offensives. He promised to provide two and a half divisions if Conrad agreed to two conditions. The Habsburg units should comprise the majority of the newly created army, and it should be commanded by a German general, von Linsingen.

  On 11 January generals Conrad, Falkenhayn, Ludendorff, and Linsingen met in Breslau to discuss allied Eastern front operations. Conrad seized the opportunity to promote his Carpathian operation as the surest means to keep Rome from entering the war.16 Falkenhayn disagreed, arguing that Italy’s neutrality could best be secured by Austro-Hungarian territorial concessions.

  Another serious challenge facing Habsburg Supreme Command surfaced during the winter of 1914–1915. Growing numbers of politically unreliable Czechoslovakian, Ruthenian, and Romanian replacement troops were deployed on the Eastern front. Their arrival coincided with an increase in antimilitary, antidynastic propaganda. Troops deserted in increasing numbers, a problem that continued throughout the Carpathian winter offensives. Among the most notorious defections was that of Czech Infantry Regiment 28. The regiment, recruited from industrialized Prague, reputedly crossed over to the enemy en masse “without a single shot being fired from a Russian battalion.”17 At no other time during the war, with the possible exceptions of the summer 1916 Brusilov offensive and the late October 1918 final battles of the war, had Slavic soldiers so brazenly shirked their duty as in the Carpathian Winter War.

  Exacerbating the problem, the Carpathian Mountain region was home to a large Ruthenian population, many of whom were Russian sympathizers who shared similar religious beliefs and language, and who provided the Habsburg enemy with valuable intelligence information. Not surprisingly, Austro-Hungarian troops deployed in the hostile region grew increasingly paranoid. Episodes of “spy mania” led to hundreds of civilians being charged with espionage and hanged.

  General Conrad concluded that only a swift and decisive action would prevent an enemy breakthrough of his thinning front lines. The Russian threat to the Dukla Valley and Uzsok Pass, gateway to Hungary, also must be neutralized. Conrad proposed launching an attack from Mezölaborcz in the Laborcz Valley toward Lisko–Ustrzyki Dolne–Sanok. The objective was to seize the key rail connections located behind enemy lines and advance along the shortest route to Fortress Przemyśl.

  In December 1914, Russian control of key Carpathian Mountain pass positions gave czarist troops an important strategic advantage, one they utilized to deter advancing Habsburg troops. Efforts to outflank czarist positions required Conrad’s troops to undertake long and strenuous maneuvers. Even so, the Russians skillfully avoided encirclement, retreating at the last possible moment to reestablish solid defensive positions.

  Few examples of major winter mountain battle existed before the Carpathian Winter War. Nonetheless, the problems Conrad encountered in the November and December 1914 campaigns should have remained fresh in his mind. Without exact timing, luck, and an efficient supply system, the Carpathian winter offensive was doomed to fail. Without any of them, it collapsed.

  On the Eastern front in early January 1915, strong indications existed that Russia was increasing its Carpathian military presence. In the West, the Germans had settled into protracted trench warfare against the English and French after the first battle at Ypres. Turkey established a front in the Russian Caucasus in late December and on the Middle Eastern front. Its December victory left the Serbian army decimated and incapable of any large-scale operations.

  Russian military strategists, particularly General Ivanov, anticipated that an immediate attack could deal a deathblow to Habsburg troops, which would persuade Italy and Romania to join the Entente. Situated close to railroad lines and on more traversable terrain, Russian troops were in an excellent position to carry out the plan. If needed, significant reinforcements could rapidly deploy into the mountains.

  General Ivanov obviously believed that a rapid offensive could best be launched against Austria-Hungary rather than Germany. This, however, raised a serious question: once Russian forces broke through to the Hungarian plains, would they then be able to extricate themselves fast enough to avoid a possible major counteroffensive on their northern German flank?

  A campaign against Germany, Stavka acknowledged, presented a serious military challenge. German Eastern front troop numbers had tripled since war was declared, and the efficient Prussian rail system permitted the transfer of large contingents to any battle zone. Russian maneuverability was much more limited on that front. Furthermore, if czarist troops deployed along the Vistula River attempted to invade German territory, their flanks would become exposed. General Ivanov’s strategy in winter 1915 aimed to neutralize the threat to his extreme left flank Carpathian Mountain positions before any attempt at invading Germany.18 Consequently, intense enemy attacks targeted Conrad’s Third Army and endangered the neighboring Fourth Army to the north. Enemy action also threatened to isolate Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin in the East Carpathian region.

  At a meeting in Siedlice on 17 January 1915, Russian military leaders decided to launch a major offensive against Germany as a logical continuation of their 1914 Vistula River campaigns. A significant advantage of the plan was that many Northwest front rivers, lakes, and swamps would be frozen this time of year, facilitating troop movement. However, as was so often the case, Stavka had divided council. The impasse led General Ivanov to focus on preparing for a Carpathian Mountain offensive, disregarding the decision that had made Germany Russia’s primary target in early 1915.19 He began initiating steps to invade Hungary. Ivanov calculated that the action required only fourteen to eighteen days of preparation, including the transfer of troops and equipment. Maintaining a steady flow of supplies was critical.

  On 13 November 1914, Stavka’s General Danilov requested that Ivanov prepare a detailed assessment of the Carpathian front situation. Ivanov’s chief of staff, General Alexejev, responded to the request by offering explanations for the urgent need to transfer reinforcements to the Southwest front. These included that Fortress Przemyśl siege troops were too weak to sustain a forceful Habsburg attack, thereby requiring an additional four to five divisions’ worth of reinforcements. Alexejev also noted that a mere two cavalry divisions defended key Uzsok Pass and Baligrod positions and that an invasion of Hungary necessitated additional manpower.
He further insisted that mountain artillery was critical in view of the Carpathian terrain and weather, and he assured that, given the proper resources, the Southwest front armies could garner important victories and thereby gain important political influence vis-à-vis the neutrals. In his closing argument, Alexejev warned of a new German threat to the Southwest front even though, other than a 17 January telegram reporting the capture of a few Germans in the area, no evidence supported the assertion. The report, however, convinced Stavka to transfer XXII Corps and six mountain artillery batteries to the Southwest front, which impaired czarist Tenth Army’s efforts against the Germans at the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes.20

  When the war ended, Russian generals blamed General Ivanov’s machinations for spoiling any chance of an early 1915 victory on the German front. Stavka’s eventual support for Ivanov’s plan attested to its weakness by allowing a front commander to interfere in major command decisions. Inconsistent decisions regarding the division of forces and deployment of reserves further illuminated the Russian High Command’s proclivity for allowing personal interests and prestige to influence military decisions. In the final analysis, czarist Carpathian operations led to defeat on both fronts. Stavka’s decision to pursue a Carpathian operation signified Russian awareness of the serious threat the Germans posed to czarist right flank positions. General Ivanov claimed that reinforcements were necessary because his insufficient forces could not withstand a Habsburg attack. He must launch an offensive to encircle Habsburg right flank positions in order to invade Hungary. Ivanov further demanded first-class troops, not unseasoned reserve formations, because of the excessive demands of mountain warfare.