By 11 January, General Ivanov had deployed large troop concentrations near the Dukla Pass area, where Russian control of Uzsok Pass helped further his intentions.21 On 20 January final plans for a Russian invasion of Hungary determined that a frontal assault through the Carpathian Mountains toward Hungary would neutralize any Habsburg threat in the region. An unanticipated drawback of the plan was that it would draw Russian armies deep into the 250-kilometer Carpathian Mountain front, making a rapid retreat difficult and increasing the threat to the Northwest (German) front flank positions.
In early January 1915, thirty-five Habsburg divisions faced twenty-nine czarist entities on the mountain front. South of Fortress Przemyśl, along a 140-kilometer line extending to east of Uzsok Pass, nine and a half Habsburg divisions opposed nine enemy divisions. Along the 250-kilometer-long mountain ranges extending from Uzsok Pass to the Romanian frontier, four and a half improvised secondand third-line Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin units countered five Russian national guard divisions. At Fortress Przemyśl, three and a half divisions countered four infantry and two cavalry besieging divisions.
Like their Habsburg counterparts, Russian troops deployed in the Carpathian Mountains could also be described as a trained militia force; they had encountered equally difficult weather and terrain conditions.22 This meant that by early 1915, two peasant armies deployed in the Carpathian war theater sought in vain to defeat the other. Battlefield disease resulted in serious losses to both sides. Intestinal typhus led to an order for Habsburg troops to boil all drinking water and milk.23 Implementation of an immunization program and the onset of colder weather helped contain the illness.
On 1 January 1915 Conrad ordered that all wounded soldiers keep their rifles with them so they could later be given to replacement troops. As an added incentive, Fourth Army offered to pay any wounded soldier who carried his rifle and bayonet to field hospitals.24 For supply columns, smaller Panja wagons and sturdy horses had replaced the more cumbersome military-issued wagons and larger draft animals. Hay proved difficult to transport into the mountains and was replaced by alternative feed sources. A feed shortage led to the starvation death of tens of thousands of horses.25
Battle raged at the Fourth Army southern flank at Gorlice, and on 1 January Russian forces captured Uzsok Pass. The serious setback endangered Third and Fourth Army inner flank positions.26 The ensuing struggle forced the Third Army to retreat, exposing its flank positions as well as those of Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. Between 1 and 15 January, 2,300 Habsburg officers, 121,000 troops, 20,000 horses, and 3,300 wagons dispatched to the Carpathian front. During the month of January 1915 alone, more than 1,000 trains transported 5,500 officers, 260,000 soldiers, 39,400 horses, and 7,500 supply wagons and artillery pieces. Simultaneously, 62,000 sick and wounded Habsburg soldiers and 38,000 Russian prisoners were transported from the front lines. South Army consisted of some 350 officers and 24,500 soldiers.27
The troops defending Uzsok Pass suffered extreme exhaustion and lacked shelter from the harsh elements.28 General Pflanzer-Baltin could not prevent his battle-weary troops from abandoning their Uzsok Pass positions. Conrad sought to reinforce the Army Group, but the severe rail limitations to that theater prevented rapid action. The situation stabilized when arriving reinforcements launched a counterattack.29 The three infantry and one Honvéd (Hungarian) Cavalry Division that comprised Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin had received inadequate training and were commanded by inexperienced officers. Rain interrupted supply efforts as the badly needed reinforcements were in transport to the front.30 On New Year’s Day, Russian troops attacked Uzsok Pass under cover of night.31 The surprised Habsburg troops withdrew in chaos to the Ung Valley, allowing Russian troops to advance against Third Army flank and rear echelons. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin received orders to attack the advancing czarist flank, but the troops proved too exhausted and were only capable of fulfilling defensive missions.32 The only serious in early January 1915 engaged Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s flanks.
Russian occupation of much of the province of Bukovina near the Romanian frontier demanded immediate countermeasures to prevent a collapse of the thinly manned Hungarian front. The First Army V Corps, under the command of General Paul Puhallo von Brlog, transferred from the northern front to secure the Third Army’s endangered right flank area and participate in the upcoming operation. The corps participated in all three Carpathian winter campaigns as a significant attack element. Its transport into the Carpathian Mountain theater commenced on 3 January. As Habsburg forces commenced preparations for the upcoming offensive, Russian Third Army forces struck the inner flanks of the Fourth and Third Army and at Gorlice, where the two czarist fronts intersected. Third Army III Corps and a newly formed four-cavalry division force received orders to close the gap that had formed between the two armies. That breach continued to be a hot spot throughout the Carpathian campaigns.33
Map 3. Sketches of the 1914–1915 Winter Campaign in the Carpathians, December 1914
In early January 1915, little hope existed for the timely liberation of Fortress Przemyśl. A 1 January muster report estimated that the garrison housed 128,000 soldiers and 14,500 horses, though their physical condition was rapidly declining. Russian siege troops utilized the pause in battle to construct a railroad around the fortress perimeter, which would allow them to more easily vanquish any breakout attempt.
Flooded roads and dense fog slowed troop and supply movement as steady rainfall transformed the ground into a vast sea of mud.34 Sleds utilized to transport supplies in higher elevations and roads increasingly required maintenance. The effective use of artillery became extremely limited. Overall, the situation proved a harbinger of things to come.
The constant stream of Fourth Army units being transferred to the Carpathian Mountain theater produced an unsettling situation. Furthermore, many of the new arrivals’ homes were situated behind enemy lines. Paranoia and the threat of desertion, particularly among Ruthenian troops, increased.
The Russians continued to fortify their positions, while the Habsburg Third Army remained too weak to resist a major attack. On 2 January General Boroević received orders to prepare his eastern flank forces for a powerful strike against the czarist-controlled Lisko–Sanok railroad and communication centers, which had fallen to the Russians at the end of December 1914. Third Army west flank units would join the eastern flank attack force once it had gained momentum. General Boroević planned to seize several critical railroad junctions. If Ustrzyki Dolne could initially be seized, the target railroad trunk lines at Lisko–Sanok would buckle, also threatening Russian positions near Fortress Przemyśl. This strategy basically rehatched Conrad’s December 1914 campaign plan.35
The same day, Conrad ordered Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to retake Uzsok Pass, but heavy snowfall disrupted the effort as hazardous road conditions and the snow drastically slowed troop and supply movement. Much-needed mountain artillery remained on the Balkan front.36 The X Corps situation remained static in the Laborcz Valley, a hot spot of the first two Carpathian offensives. The exhausted 2nd Infantry Division reported a severe loss of officers and horses.37 Habsburg command ordered all units to maintain their positions and utilize the time to clear obstructed roads.38 The 2nd Infantry Division engaged czarist troops at Jasiel, doorway to the strategic rail junction at Mezölaborcz, which fell to the Russians after fierce battle in early February 1915. Only four X Corps artillery pieces supported the Habsburg infantry in days-long battle against czarist troops. The inexperienced X Corps troops received orders to defend the key battleground. Their prolonged and difficult approach to the front forfeited the element of surprise, permitting the enemy time to institute countermeasures. Jasiel, defended by the Habsburg 2nd Infantry Division, again fell to the Russians on 7 January.
Poor visibility and harsh weather conditions did not deter Russian activity around Fortress Przemyśl.39 Numerous Habsburg communiqués complained of the shortage of professional officers available for the upcoming offensive.40
A prevalence of less experienced reserve officers serving as field commanders would have serious repercussions for the military operation. On 3 January an XVIII Corps report revealed that the persistent harsh conditions were having a demoralizing effect on the troops. To make matters worse, corps artillery batteries had not arrived. XVIII Corps, under the command of General Heinrich Tschurtschentthaler, nonetheless succeeded in taking the high ground northeast of the Baligrod communication center without serious battle.41 Tschurtschentthaler had commanded the Habsburg 44th Infantry Division until December 1914, at which time he became commander of the XVIII Corps, a position he held until March 1915. He later served on the Italian front in the Tyrol.
Habsburg Supreme Command ordered intense reconnaissance missions in preparation for the approaching offensive. It was imperative that preventative attacks bind enemy troops to keep them from being transferred to areas designated for the upcoming offensive.42 Enemy pressure forced Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s left flank and Fourth Army units rearward. The recent loss of Uzsok Pass forced Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s Corps Hofmann to retreat between 3 to 5 January.43 Significant reinforcements were needed to retake the pass, future site of major battle. Habsburg III Corps received orders to close the dangerous gap between the Third and Fourth Army inner flanks by attacking at these positions.44 Conrad anticipated that the addition of three V Corps infantry divisions and units from other fronts would be sufficient to produce a swift and decisive victory. Additionally, a Habsburg show of force in the Carpathian Mountains would keep the neutrals from entering the conflict.45 Amid growing concern over the crisis at Fortress Przemyśl, Conrad ordered fort commander General Kusmanek to devise a breakout plan by mid-February.46 At least three czarist reserve infantry and two cavalry divisions supported by numerous third-line units now besieged the fortress.47 The New Year brought strict food rationing at the fortress, with bread servings reduced by one quarter and animal feed being prepared for human consumption. The slaughter of horses had two positive effects: it provided additional meat to sustain the garrison and increased the supply of oats for human consumption. On the other hand, fewer horses were now available to perform heavy tasks, including moving artillery shells and ammunition, as well as transporting the wounded. Habsburg intelligence reports indicated that eleven infantry and two cavalry divisions of the Russian Third Army were deployed southeast of Gorlice, twelve infantry and five cavalry divisions of the czarist Eighth Army further southeast. Three regular and two Cossack and third-line national guard divisions had reportedly been deployed between the Uzsok and Verecke passes.
X Corps received orders to prevent enemy excursions into the Laborcz Valley and to expand its reconnaissance efforts. Ensuing skirmishes with enemy troops reduced X Corps numbers as the launch date for the major offensive loomed. Significantly, control of the frontier ridges gave the Russians easier access to Mezölaborcz, where General Ivanov intended to mass czarist troops for his own offensive, set for three days after the 23 January Habsburg initiative. On 4 January work began to improve and restore the supply transport routes and to construct a small-gauge railroad for V Corps supply trains.48 The following day, Conrad issued an order to all field officers forbidding the insertion of March Brigade replacement troops into combat as self-standing units and to transport artillery into the mountains.49 V Corps troops began taking position on the high terrain at the Third Army extreme right flank. While Russian forces remained mainly passive, both sides reinforced and improved their positions. General Boroević requested that Conrad supply him with additional troops to reinforce his army’s right flank to spearhead the offensive.50 In the days leading up to the offensive, heavy rains and mud made it difficult for troops to remain in position and severely limited supply and reconnaissance efforts.51
General Conrad again admonished X Corps 2nd Infantry Division to prevent Russian troops from infiltrating the Laborcz Valley. It was imperative that the division seize the higher ground to the west and intensify its reconnaissance efforts.52 Upon Conrad’s request, German general Hindenburg agreed to transfer two and a half Ninth Army divisions to the Carpathian front. The move, approved by Emperor Wilhelm on 8 January, created the new South Army under German command and expanded allied influence to the Habsburg front.53 South Army German troops experienced delays in their estimated nine-day travel time, particularly after transfer to the low-capacity Hungarian railroads. German troops finally arrived thirty hours late, delaying the South Army’s offensive by one day.54 Though Third Army’s III Corps attacked toward Banica near Gorlice on 5 January, the isolated attacks lacked crucial coordination between the armies’ inner flanks. The rugged terrain produced numerous isolated and uncoordinated attacks throughout the Carpathian campaigns, which proved damaging to both the Habsburg Third and Fourth armies.55 On 5 January czarist troops temporarily postponed a planned attack at Gorlice on the Fourth Army front, using the time to construct stationary fortified positions.56 The lull prompted Conrad to order the transfer of three Fourth Army divisions to the Third and South armies as reinforcements for the offensive.57 A day earlier, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s Corps Hofmann, still recovering from engaging czarist troops earlier at Uzsok Pass, came under enemy attack. General Peter Freiherr von Hofmann commanded the corps bearing his name until February 1917. For his later success in forcing czarist troops out of Uzsok Pass, Hofmann was sometimes referred to as the savior of Hungary, for preventing its invasion. Units had to cancel reconnaissance patrols because of flooding, while corps reports cited widespread disease and frostbite within the ranks.
As a counter to the late December 1914 Russian gains, VII Corps deployed at the Dukla Pass southwest of Baligrod. A main objective was to keep the pass roads open.58 Indicative of the serious casualties sustained in recent military actions, a 5 January VII Corps report listed 95 dead, 227 sick, 235 wounded, 37 captured, and 36 missing in action as of 3 January 1915.59
Reinforcements were desperately needed for the upcoming offensive. The crisis persuaded Balkan theater commander, Archduke Karl, to transfer seven divisions to the Carpathian front, including the three-division XIX Corps. General Ignaz Trollmann Freiherr von Loucenberg served as commander of the XIX Corps in January 1915. He served under Attack Group Puhallo during the Carpathian campaigns. General Trollmann, like his fellow field commander, General Sandor Szurmay, acquired a tremendous amount of combat experience in the three Carpathian winter campaigns. Embarrassment over the monarchy’s December 1914 Serbian defeat still lingered, but the additional seven divisions could produce victory on the Russian front.
The Habsburg Third Army lost a third of its troops during its most recent engagement with the enemy. This prompted Conrad to request another two divisions from the Germans to support his Carpathian operation. Given the shortage of his own reserve troops, Conrad insisted that he needed seven additional German divisions, four to protect the Italian frontier and three for the Romanian frontier.
As Habsburg–Italian diplomatic negotiations dragged on, Conrad maintained that Rome’s irredentist demands pointed to its intention to wage war against the Dual Monarchy, but he insisted that territorial concessions were out of the question. The Germans kept pressure on Habsburg leaders to accede to Italian territorial demands, further straining already tense allied relations. Conrad asserted that the monarchy’s erstwhile ally merely awaited a Habsburg defeat to justify entering the conflict. Thus, a swift and decisive victory over Russia would preclude a three-front war.
On 6 January inclement weather conditions continued to wreak havoc on offensive preparations. Flooding conditions continued while labor crews worked feverishly to repair damaged roads. Snowfall continued in the higher elevations, where the lack of alternative supply routes created severe problems.60 The need for road repairs reached a critical stage as the transport and placement of artillery pieces presented serious challenges.61 General Szurmay discovered that his intended approach route was not suitable for transporting artillery and bridges in the region desperately nee
ded repair. Regardless of the enormous logistical difficulties, the threat to Habsburg flank positions must be neutralized.
Regaining control of the Uzsok Pass was critical for Third Army success. It remained quiet on 6 January; however, there were sightings of enemy reinforcements shifting to opposite Third Army’s right flank positions. The Third Army III Corps and Fourth Army IX Corps inner flank situation continued to raise security concerns. Uncoordinated efforts at the corps’ inner flanks were the source of many problems in the coming months. General Rudolph Kralicek commanded the Fourth Army IX Corps for two years beginning in November 1914.
The previous loss of professional soldiers severely reduced the Habsburg army’s combat effectiveness. Most units were now comprised of reserve officers and officer candidates. The Fourth Army had sacrificed much of its offensive power, having relinquished numerous divisions to Third Army.62 Continued Russian occupation of the Bukovina intensified the need to immediately reinforce Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front to rectify the situation. Enemy gains had also increased the potential for Romanian interest in the province of Transylvania.
Group Puhallo, mainly V and XVIII Corps, comprised the Habsburg Third Army main offensive. Group Joseph, essentially VII Corps, received orders to hold the Dukla Pass, while Group Szurmay was assigned to safeguard Uzsok Pass and adjacent Borynia. Strong Russian forces occupied the intended Group Szurmay and XVIII Corps attack sites.
Main roadways became closed to vehicular traffic, prompting the need for makeshift sleds. Preparing artillery firing positions continued to pose an increasingly difficult challenge. An important railway leading to the Cisna depot would soon be operational, and the single narrow-gage forest railway was now operational for V Corps utilization.
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