Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  Horses collapsed from overexertion, and combat troops had to assist in road repairs. The operation came to rely heavily on pack animals, particularly at higher elevations, creating an urgent need for straw and hay to feed them.63 The animals had become easy targets for enemy snipers, who recognized their importance. Injured horses were shot to put them out of their misery; others died from starvation or exhaustion. The starving animals gnawed on tree bark but later died when, after drinking water, their bloated stomachs burst. Many lost their footing and broke their legs attempting to navigate the icy mountain passes. On 7 January VII Corps repulsed a czarist attack, while nearby, the X Corps 2nd Infantry Division battled the enemy. General Conrad threatened the Germans with transferring his Second Army from the Polish front back to the Carpathian theater, but he abandoned the idea as too time-consuming. However, Conrad used the threat to pressure German High Command into agreeing to supply additional troops to his Carpathian operation. As German Ninth Army troops prepared to deploy into the Carpathian Mountains to join Habsburg units, forming the new South Army, General Freytag-Loringhoven, the ranking German military liaison to Habsburg Supreme Command, voiced grave concerns over the hazardous terrain chosen for the German troop deployment. German soldiers were unaccustomed and ill-prepared for the rigors of winter mountain warfare and did not possess the proper equipment. Though General Freytag-Loringhoven’s arguments proved justified, tragically, they fell on deaf ears. Conrad, meanwhile, assured Falkenhayn that two good roads and a railroad line were located in the South Army deployment zone and that he would supply light wagons and draft animals for German use. When asked whether his Third Army would be able to hold the Carpathian ridgelines for the next several weeks, Conrad could not say for certain.

  On 8 January, Third Army’s main mission encompassed ensuring the safe arrival of reinforcements by securing the travel route between Mezölaborcz and Takcsany. Third Army left flank forces (III and VII Corps) must thwart any Russian offensive effort directed against the vulnerable Fourth Army southern flank.64 The gap between Third and Fourth Army remained a major concern, particularly near Gorlice. Fourth Army nonetheless had to surrender two additional divisions to the Third Army.65 Snowdrifts obstructed the few traversable areas of the front; many roadways were completely blocked. Situation reports indicated increasing losses due to illness and frostbite.

  An order to conserve artillery shells confirmed a persistent ammunition shortage that continued to plague Habsburg military operations. Numerous corps logbook entries bemoaned the urgent need for shelter and ammunition, particularly artillery shells. Artillery pieces, many of which had been lost or become irreparable, remained in short supply. A ten-day period of Russian passivity beginning on 8 January offered Habsburg troops welcome relief. Frantic preparations for the upcoming offensive continued, but reconnaissance missions frequently had to be canceled as a result of dense fog and snow in the mountains.66 En route from the Balkan front, XIX Corps’ three infantry divisions and a cavalry division received orders to secure the Mezölaborcz–Takcsany–Nagypolany rail line upon their arrival at Third Army’s eastern flank. Once all V Corps troops assembled, it would support the effort to regain Uzsok Pass. A major offensive launched in the direction of Uzsok, Turka, and Lutoviska was scheduled for 20 January. The XVIII, XIX, and a portion of the X Corps would seize the main objective of Lisko–Sanok. A preliminary attack the day before aimed to seize Uzsok Pass and secure that flank area.67 However, this required Group Szurmay’s flank units to first advance forward. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin would support the Third and South Army offensive by striking Russian positions.68

  South Army consisted of five infantry and two cavalry divisions, which included two- and three-quarter German infantry and one cavalry division (half the 3rd Garde Division, the 1st Infantry Division, the 48th Reserve Infantry Division, and the 5th Cavalry Division). Two infantry divisions, two separate brigades, and one cavalry division (19th and 55th Infantry divisions, 12th and 131st Landsturm brigades, and 10th Cavalry Division) represented the Habsburg portion. Of the army’s 45,700 soldiers, 19,645 were German and 26,055 Austro-Hungarian.

  Returning to the burning issue of Italy’s demands, Conrad advised Foreign Minister Berchtold that surrendering territory would be construed as a sign of weakness and would only prompt greater demands. Thus, concessions to Rome must be avoided.69 On the other hand, Conrad supported negotiating a separate peace treaty with Russia to allow him to focus on defeating Italy if war ensued between them.

  On the Carpathian front, XVIII Corps advanced from its assembly area to its new deployment area with no serious enemy interference. Its progress slowed, however, as it encountered unfavorable terrain and weather conditions.70 Labor and technical units continued efforts to maintain supply and troop traffic flow, while overburdened railroad lines experienced multiple delays.71 Clearing snow-blocked supply routes received priority, but a shortage of labor crews hampered the effort. Enlisting the aid of combat units to maintain the roads became commonplace.

  Though it became increasingly critical for Habsburg forces to regain control of Uzsok Pass before the main offensive, prevailing conditions guaranteed that the planned two-pronged advance required Herculean effort. Meanwhile, Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin struggled to traverse the mountain ridges on its front, retarded by two meters of snow.

  This study will focus on Hungarian Group Szurmay, whose initial mission was to retake Uzsok Pass, and the Habsburg army X Corps’ bloody defense of the strategically important Laborcz Valley and railroad center at Mezölaborcz. General Sandor Szurmay commanded his eponymous corps from November 1914 until February 1917. He also commanded the 38th Infantry Division beginning in December 1914. Corps Szurmay engaged in fierce battle in all three Carpathian winter campaigns.

  Army Group Szurmay and other units, such as Archduke Joseph’s VII Corps, fought to defend against an invasion of their homeland. As the Carpathian campaign continued, many Hungarian soldiers placed a handful of their home soil in a knapsack before they deployed to the battlefield. Should they die in this foreign land, at least the dirt from their homeland could be placed on their grave. Though often outnumbered, these troops fought stubbornly and bravely; however, their efforts were retarded by the many years of an official Magyarization policy, which declared Hungarian the official language of the country and forced the indoctrination of Romanians, Slovaks, and other ethnic minorities to ensure Hungarian dominance. This did not improve any Romanian, Slovak, Croatian, or Slovenian patriotic feelings. These troops, serving as unwilling combatants, often proved unreliable in combat.

  Russian troops threatened to advance into Laborcz Valley to seize Mezölaborcz, their chief objective. If successful, the move would cripple any Habsburg operation to rescue Fortress Przemyśl.72 On 8 and 9 January general instructions for the offensive now targeted 22 January as the launch date. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin was already engaged in battle. On 9 January continued difficulties hampered preparations for the approaching action. VII Corps’ 17th Infantry Division reported it had completely depleted its supply of artillery shells, leaving the infantry without artillery support for ten days. One corps cannon regiment had been in repair for days. Most remaining operable artillery pieces had been pulled out of their positions, and it would require several days to emplace them again because of the prevailing conditions. Reconnaissance efforts continued to be hampered by bad weather.73 Maps for reconnaissance purposes proved useless thanks to poor visibility. X Corps’ patrols advanced at a rate of one kilometer an hour. Alternating periods of light rain and snow exacerbated conditions in the valleys. The severe conditions placed an added burden on pack animals, which did not receive proper veterinary care.

  Table 1. Austro-Hungarian Troops Transported to the Carpathian Front

  Recovered Troops Sent to the Field

  Year Officers Men

  1914  6,182 133,683

  January–June 1915 16,444 459,256

  Totals 22,626 592,939

 
Total 1914 Replacement Troops

  Officers Men Total

  Reserves 12,000 639,000 651,000

  New Formations  5,000 292,000 297,000

  Total 17,000 931,000 948,000

  Source: Franek, “Die Entwicklung des österreich-ungarischen Wehrmacht,” 11; see ÖULK, Ergänzungsheft, 5; Probleme der organization im ersten Kriegsjahre, 25. Franek’s numbers differ in the two sources.

  The threat of the Fourth Army coming under attack at Gorlice resurfaced. A reported nine czarist divisions were in position to strike Fourth Army right flank positions. This raised concern about the possibility of Fourth Army receiving orders to transfer more units to Third Army.

  Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s left flank forces received orders to attack, while its right flank units must block any enemy advance. The army group must initially support the main offensive effort and then shift to assist the South Army in battling its way out of the mountains. If Pflanzer-Baltin’s troops encountered no significant Russian resistance, they would then launch an offensive. On 20 January South Army should attack, while its cavalry units destroyed railroads behind enemy positions. Transport of the 6th and 19th Infantry divisions to reinforce Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin received confirmation.74

  Returning to the major offensive force, Third Army, once its eastern units advanced, its western units would also attack. Fourth Army southern flank units would then thrust toward Jaslo to protect the offensive force’s northern flank.75 The immediate mission of the army’s designated eastern flank offensive group was to secure the new V and XVIII Corps’ major supply center and reconnoiter forward, while XVIII Corps seized the railroad junction at Ustrzyki Górne.76 Reports emanating from Fortress Przemyśl, meanwhile, warned that enemy troops were being shifted from Uzsok Pass and that portions of two divisions were now positioned in the designated V and XVIII Corps and Group Szurmay deployment area.77 Sorties were called off as a result of the declining health of the fortress inhabitants.

  The two-pronged attack to recapture Uzsok Pass consisted of V Corps 33rd Infantry Division assaulting czarist positions at the pass with the support of South Army forces. Simultaneously, XIX Corps troops would advance to Mezölaborcz.78 As the launch date neared, preparations to retake the strategically important pass intensified.

  A X Corps manuscript deposited in the Vienna War Archives detailed the prevailing weather conditions (frequent snowfall alternating with rain) harassing Habsburg troops. Many supply routes remained in poor condition, while labor crews constructed serpentine approaches on steeper high-elevation ridges through deep snow. This would assist the movement of heavy ammunition and artillery wagons that could not be easily moved forward.79 Reports of lung and intestinal disease had become widespread. Transporting the wounded through the deep snow proved a daunting task. The drifting snow required skis and sled runners for supply wagons, but none were readily available.80 Deep snow, frigid temperatures, high winds, and fog blanketed the entire front, while frost and ice covered the few mountain passageways. Huge mounds of shoveled snow framed the roadways.81 Oftentimes visibility was limited to 50 meters. Unit logbooks continued to emphasize the lack of troop shelter and the necessity for engineering units to assist in the construction of defensive positions.82

  Meanwhile, a foreboding silence pervaded the Galician and Carpathian fronts. Major supply depots continued to be prepared, while technical troops proved unsuccessful in maintaining major passageway traffic flow because of insufficient troop numbers. On 10 January XVIII Corps secured the area for construction of its main supply center and then attempted to seize the Ustrzyki Górne area.83 Continued Russian passivity on 9 and 10 January provided the Third Army the additional opportunity to recuperate and continue making preparations for the offensive.84 Railroad transport became limited to ten trains a day, while its escalating usage severely overtaxed the few existing lines and produced further serious delays that hampered timely troop deployments and the commencement of operations.85

  Habsburg Supreme Command’s attention remained focused on the vital Mezölaborcz communication and transport center.86 Only two field howitzers and one field cannon battery were assigned per division.87 Entire Third Army artillery batteries remained behind the main mountain ridges when it was critical that as many as possible be positioned rapidly to support the offensive. The designated Third Army portion of the offensive toward the Lisko–Sanok–Lutoviska railroad junctions would end the enemy’s ability to rapidly shift troops or reinforcements to any threatened front areas.

  On 11 January the strategy for “one of the most difficult campaigns an army ever faced” neared completion.88 The Austrian official history, however, described the approaching offensive operation as a “cruel folly.” Undertaking a major offensive on snow and ice covered mountain terrain in −20°C to −30°C temperatures, if not an act of desperation, certainly did not represent sound military planning. The November and December 1914 Carpathian Mountain experiences indicated that more realistic planning was appropriate. The proposed Third Army eastern flank attack in the densely forested Waldkarpathen, a region possessing few traversable routes for supply or reinforcement transit, was questionable. Moreover, during all three Carpathian offensive efforts, deadly frontal assaults were launched. General Conrad claimed that his actions were dictated by the time pressure to relieve Fortress Przemyśl. The Habsburg Supreme Commander’s hasty planning and failure to achieve critical mass at key attack areas led to disaster. It should be recalled that Conrad’s strategy relied heavily on luck, surprise, and mild weather, none of which worked in his favor.

  X Corps, for example, was ordered to attack as one of its divisions approached the front, producing a chaotic and deadly situation. On 11 January, the Corps was ordered to advance over hazardous terrain, a move that exposed its 2nd Infantry Division’s northern flank positions and further exhausted the already battle-weary troops.89 The same day, XVIII Corps command learned that its artillery units had been transferred behind the forward ridgelines, while its supplies arrived on makeshift sled columns. Available Group Szurmay troops prepared roadways for wagon traffic; nevertheless, they remained impassible, even when oxen were used.

  Already on 13 November 1914 czarist general Danilov requested an exact description of the Carpathian Mountain situation in the area of Sanok–Sambor–Stryj from General Alexejev, the Southwest front’s chief of staff. General Alexejev presented arguments for the necessity of reinforcements for that front, emphasizing that only weak czarist forces besieged Fortress Przemyśl. Thus, an energetic attack from the fort could endanger his position. He argued further that just two cavalry divisions occupied the critical area between Uzsok Pass and Baligrod, and therefore, reinforcements were crucial there as well. However, the Southwest front would have to be reinforced at the expense of the German Northwest front, chosen by Stavka as the main campaign area. General Ivanov requested four to five divisions to strengthen the siege of Fortress Przemyśl and answered a question posed by Stavka by stating that German strength in the Carpathian Mountains could only be determined by battle. Finally, in order to continue exploiting any success against the enemy, the main Carpathian passes must be held solidly to secure Galicia. On 16 November, the argument changed to the fact that Southwest front troops must attack Fortress Cracow and secure the Southwest front’s left flank area by seizing the Carpathian Mountain passes. The major Vistula River crossing points, in any case, must be kept in Russian hands.

  On 11 January General Ivanov reported the significance of a possible Habsburg offensive to Stavka. Claiming to ensure maintaining possession of East Galicia, Ivanov deployed reinforcements to the Dukla Pass region as he chose the Mezölaborcz area for his main assault. He utilized the reputed threat to the czarist extreme left flank positions to justify the increased troop concentrations. Thus, he requested reinforcements to launch his own frontal offensive to encircle the Habsburg extreme right flank mountain positions and then proceed to invade the Hungarian plains.90 This, he claimed, would also thw
art any Habsburg offensive efforts. Both General Conrad and General Ivanov viewed the Carpathian Mountain region as a viable setting to launch a major decisive offensive and prepared for such an action.

  We will now examine the activities of an Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin division to gain insight into the prevailing battle conditions on that isolated front. The 54th Infantry Division consisted of nine mostly Transylvanian supply battalions, primarily older soldiers with some battalions composed of mainly Romanians. Staff officers, transferred from militia-level support services, had little if any combat experience. Furthermore, the division lacked almost all necessary basic equipment. Because they lacked uniforms, some officers wore civilian clothes, with a star placed on their sleeve designating them as military personnel. The troops received a variety of obsolete rifles as armaments but few machine guns. Division troop morale and fighting value had sunk so low that Hungarian gendarme units enforced discipline. The division had sustained severe casualties in the earlier Bukovina struggles.

  Between 10 and 15 January smaller division infantry units, such as the Meszoly battalion, experienced enormously exhausting marches. They then launched attacks against Kirlibaba, a key position situated on top of a rock formation, where one machine gun emplacement easily blocked the approach road. The ensuing division assault occurred without artillery support, while the advance march required constant shoveling. Movement remained greatly restricted by the deep snow, and a path had to be shoveled to the front before the attack. Thus the battalion units advanced one and a half kilometers, not the ordered eight. On 12 January the forward attack group was repulsed by heavy enemy fire, while on 13 January the deep snow hindered launching a full-scale assault. The attacking Landsturm troops’ obsolete dark uniforms (regular troops wore a more suitable color) made them easy targets against the stark white snow backdrop; they thus sustained numerous casualties before being forced to retreat. Early on 14 January the Meszoly battalion recaptured some positions.91