Having sacrificed 2,800 VII Corps soldiers since 25 January, a surprise enemy assault captured the key Ung Valley Czeremcha position. The corps possessed no troops to regain the lost terrain.62 Archduke Joseph noted on 27 January:
A new enemy arrived today, but a rather fair one because it hampers both the Russians and us. This is the enormous snow and terrible cold. Terrible reports have already been arriving (especially from the 20. Honvéd Infantry Division) about the numbers of frostbite cases, many of which are serious. In the evening, it started snowing heavily, which may be good for us because the Russian supply, advanced far forward, would be difficult.63
The critical battle situation and unrelenting winter storms that intensified after 26 January exacted a tremendous human toll. In three days, VII Corps’ 17th Infantry Division lost 1,700 men and the 20th Honvéd Infantry Division 2,000 on the first battle day. Sickness and frostbite continued to account for more casualties than combat.64 The night of 27 January witnessed further heavy snowstorms, strong winds, and subzero temperatures. Ill-prepared replacement troops, pressed into the front lines in a futile effort to stem the enemy tide, sustained serious losses.65 Artillery shell shortages exacerbated the Habsburg crisis, and some batteries withdrew from the battle zone when their shell supplies expired.66 The unrelenting Russian pressure in the Dukla Pass and Mezölaborcz areas forced a Habsburg retreat to the Hungarian frontier, while battle continued to rage at the upper San River Valley region and the Cisna supply depot.
A letter by General Erich Ludendorff written to General Moltke on 27 January 1915 bemoaned the Carpathian Mountain military situation and complained that the terrain difficulties had been anticipated. Ludendorff lamented the fact that the “Austrians” retreated at the mere appearance of a “superior” enemy force on the battlefield. Under the mistaken impression that Fortress Przemyśl could only resist until 7 March, he believed they could not save the fortress.67 The German High Command, as mentioned, had earlier opposed the South Army deployment in the difficult terrain east of Uzsok Pass; in hindsight, such arguments seem justified.
The conditions described above, combined with a lack of feed, led to the sacrifice of animals, so crucial for maintaining a steady flow of supplies. Increasing numbers of damaged supply wagons and animal carcasses blocked the supply routes. Train commanders received orders not to abandon supplies in the rear echelon areas.68 Herculean efforts proved necessary to sustain supply movement from the distant rearward railroad unloading stations to the front lines. Almost the entire Third Army front had now been forced onto the defensive.69
In retrospect, Attack Group Puhallo obviously lacked sufficient troop numbers for its ambitious mission and most likely needed twice its allotted strength to attain the objective, Lisko–Ustrzyki Dolne. With greater numbers, Group Puhallo may have forced the Russians back to protect their main railroad supply lines instead of launching their successful 26 January counterattack.70 Regardless, the excessive demands placed on Puhallo’s numbed soldiers left little hope for a decisive Habsburg success any time soon as troop apathy and battle fatigue became universal.71 As prolonged exposure to the harsh conditions caused mental breakdowns, the troops retreated to their original positions. However, information surfaced that the Russian fighting machine was also faltering as entire czarist units surrendered. The Austrian official history of the war concedes that the initial Habsburg territorial gains did not justify the tremendous bloodletting or the troops’ physical and moral suffering. The first Carpathian campaign cost the Third Army almost 80 percent of its manpower, the majority attributable to noncombat causes such as frostbite.
Major battle now focused around Baligrod and the Dukla Pass region. The overwhelming enemy assault against XVIII Corps’ 43rd Infantry Division almost destroyed its battle worthiness.72 It is remarkable that General Boroević even maintained his lines because as his troop numbers declined, the enemy received reinforcements to launch further attacks. Third Army would not receive major reinforcements before mid-February. Could the Russians be kept at bay that long?
Only 55,000 III, VII, and X Corps soldiers now defended the major invasion route through the Ondava and Laborcz valleys into Hungary. The inadequate numbers, the extended front areas, and the lack of hope for the timely deployment of reinforcements made the Habsburg military situation untenable. Some units had sustained sacrificial bloodlettings, yet Conrad ordered his troops to hold their present positions to the last man.73 Fortunately for the troops, the enemy did not press its advantage.74
Map 7. Situation 28 January–2 February 1915
On 28 January Group Szurmay encountered increasing difficulties. Its 71st Infantry Brigade lost some of its reserve forces and supply trains without battle. General Boroević, meanwhile, notified Conrad that his army could no longer undertake offensive action because of the horrendous conditions and escalating casualties.75 The inclement weather limited military action to brief flurries of activity. Escalating shortages of draft animals forced infantry sections to assist transporting ammunition, artillery, machine guns, food provisions, and battle baggage. Before battle, soldiers warmed their hands and weapons over fires to remove ice and snow to make them functional. The end of battle did not signify rest for the suffering troops. Casualties escalated as the surviving soldiers’ mental and physical capabilities declined.
III Corps engaged in major combat extending from the end of January until well into February. On 28 January both its divisions (22nd and 28th) retreated. Further Russian assaults against the corps endangered the Fourth Army inner flank situation, but its retreat removed the basis for any Fourth Army offensive action to assist it.76 On 29 January the Russians launched another major assault against the critical Laborcz Valley railroad junction at Mezölaborcz. The attack continued until it capitulated on 6 February. Unrelenting czarist attacks in the Dukla hollow and Laborcz Valley consumed the reeling Third Army’s offensive capabilities. As the army’s means of resistance evaporated, the seemingly endless Russian onslaught continued against the defending III, VII, and X Corps.
Blizzard conditions continued to exacerbate the Habsburg supply situation. Supply trains halted when drifting snow obstructed their movement, but no labor crews were available to restore service. Group Szurmay’s 8th Cavalry Division required eight hours to transfer its battle trains four kilometers rearward, exhausting its pack animals. Telephone service interruptions caused by frozen wires continued to delay transmission of orders, and soldiers discarded important material and equipment during their repeated retreat movements. Enormous snowdrifts forced troops to move along treacherous secondary paths and road shoulders to skirt the worst sections. Even the local light Polish Ponja wagons required four to six horses to move. The steepness of roads and their concomitant icy conditions made them almost impossible to utilize, often forcing single-file movement through meter-deep snow. Even adding civilian workers to assist the road maintenance proved inadequate.77
Conversely, the consistently severe weather conditions facilitated czarist defensive efforts and provided valuable time to implement necessary countermeasures as the attackers exhausted themselves. Persistent unfulfilled requests for reinforcements exacerbated the apathy spreading through Habsburg ranks. Many soldiers succumbed to the White Death, while others chose to end their suffering by standing up in their position to receive a Russian sniper’s bullet. Nightfall brought no rest because of the fear of freezing to death or being attacked by wolves.78 The repeated collapse of Habsburg defensive lines forced the constant removal of weary soldiers from a nonthreatened area to march them to the threatened section. They could not replace the escalating losses, but units still received the standing order to “hold positions to the last man”—an order that in the present circumstances held little meaning.79 Lacking sufficient manpower, counterattacks proved futile.
VII Corps’ 17th Infantry Division reported that thirty men in one company suffered from frostbitten feet. Two other companies listed ninety-six cases of frostbite and numerou
s other casualties. All field units presented wrenching accounts of the debilitating conditions and horrific demands placed on their soldiers.80 Nonetheless, division command ordered that they hold all positions and launch a counterattack on 30 January.81
The deepening crisis necessitated deploying additional inadequately trained replacement units into battle without any combat-experienced officers. They served as cannon fodder against the enemy’s superior numbers, but no other troops were available to attempt to halt the enemy drive. Artillery support often failed to neutralize Russian positions because the guns were positioned too far behind the front, while the snow masses stymied attempts to move them forward.82 Division commanders realized that any chance of successful offensive action had vanished and their flank positions would be threatened if neighboring units failed to join their attack or retreat movement, a frequent occurrence.83 Group Szurmay reported that many of its troops had fallen ill or collapsed from sheer exhaustion, and requested that every effort be made to bring food supplies forward. A XIX Corps’ 34th Infantry Division report revealed that “along the entire road lay numerous exhausted men affected by the cold, snow and difficult terrain.” Such conditions had reached epidemic dimensions.
Meanwhile, Group Szurmay’s 40th Honvéd Infantry Division battled colossal snow masses as it endeavored to maintain liaison with its extended left flank positions. Cold-related illnesses and hunger rendered many troops incapable of performing their duties. Combat boots were of inferior quality. Their soles, consisting of a cardboardlike material, became saturated and shredded, causing the poor-quality leather to rip. Combat boots disintegrated, and if new ones did not arrive soon, the number of incapacitated soldiers would increase significantly. Adding to their misery, the troops had not received regular nourishment for two days. When it finally arrived, each platoon received an allotment of five pieces of bread per soldier.84 In addition to insufficient supplies, severe deficiencies in weaponry greatly inhibited the Habsburg army. The increasing scarcity of rifles, the result of loss on the battlefield, proved an insurmountable problem that affected the battlefield situation and the training of March Brigade replacement troops, who entered combat having only practiced with sticks. To diminish the shortage, special troop details collected the weapons of dead and wounded Habsburg and Russian soldiers; however, their efforts often proved futile.85 A persistent shortage of artillery shells also hindered the army’s efforts by hampering artillery effectiveness, while the extreme effort required to transport them into the mountains compounded the situation. In fact, lacking transportation means, the recently arrived 29th Infantry Division had no ammunition column.86 Thus, the army paid particular attention to preventing the loss of artillery during the many retreat movements.
On 30 January, as persistent enemy pressure forced a rapid Third Army retreat, General Boroević requested replacement troops to supplement the poorly prepared VI March Battalion troops scheduled to arrive soon. He claimed that this would enable him to halt the unrelenting Russian attacks.87 As his situation deteriorated, Boroević requested a full-strength infantry division to alleviate the V and VII Corps’ dire situation.88 Conrad ordered Fourth Army to either transfer another infantry division to the reeling Third Army or launch its own offensive to support its neighbor. The recent transfer of numerous Fourth Army divisions to the Carpathian front signified that its own offensive endeavors must be launched with far fewer numbers against strong Russian defensive positions. As the Fourth Army Tagebuch repeatedly recorded, any offensive endeavor would be an act of human sacrifice for “the common good,” as no chance existed of achieving success.89 A brigade, formed from Fourth Army Infantry Regiments 81 and 88, transferred to the VII Corps to buttress its wavering front lines in that strategic area.
In the meantime, enemy forces continued to pummel X Corps positions in the vicinity of the Mezölaborcz railroad junction, while VII Corps’ twenty-four-kilometer front at Dukla Pass successfully resisted repeated enemy attacks.90 The presence of significant czarist reinforcements in the Dukla Pass area indicated that the enemy’s major offensive effort remained in the critical Mezölaborcz area.91
As inclement weather conditions persisted, countless soldiers, too weak to complete strenuous marches, simply vanished in the frozen abyss.92 The heavy snowfall made travel on the few secondary roadways difficult and continued to affect the use of artillery in battle.93 A 30 January 8th Cavalry Division report indicated that dismounted cavalry troopers, prisoners of war, and civilians performed roadwork and maintained and repaired communication lines.94 General Szurmay placed priority on ammunition and food echelon deliveries along the Uzsok Pass serpentine roadway, forbidding train column stoppages except to feed horses.95 A Group Szurmay 66th Infantry Brigade report provides insight into troop morale. It described its troops as famished and exhausted, its numbers as seriously diminished. The brigade requested wagons to transport wounded to the rear echelons and reported that its artillery units ran out of shells!96 The 7th Infantry Division commander reported that Infantry Regiment 68 troops could perform only limited military action.
In the eastern Carpathian Mountain region a meter of fresh snow covered Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s positions, requiring ski patrols for reconnaissance missions. Gusty winds and blowing snow blinded the troops. Many units lost their way maneuvering, and additional troops froze to death or suffered frostbite.97 Compasses proved worthless in the densely forested and snow-covered terrain. Similar conditions also affected Third Army’s V Corps and Group Szurmay.98
Even Fourth Army troops further north had to shovel through almost two meters of snow to advance. The Third Army situation continued to worsen, partly because General Boroević inaccurately assumed that the Russians’ offensive objective was only to neutralize his right flank offensive efforts.99 Snow masses also hindered czarist attacks, which often collapsed at the defensive barbed-wire entanglements.100
South Army continued its slow, painstaking attacks toward multiple objectives. Its German troops now better understood Habsburg tribulations in this winter hell, but after seven days of steady combat, all troops required rest. Artillery pieces sank into the deep snow once moved off the roadways and often became irretrievable. A shortage of draft animals forced troops to continue to assist moving equipment, as well as shoveling passageways and secondary routes.101 Individual soldiers often did not return from assigned missions. A succinct description of battlefield conditions:
At the end of January, a sudden thaw and rain set in. Everyone was drenched to the bone, with no chance to dry off. Adding to this, the men’s clothing froze to their bodies overnight like an icy suit of armor. Those that didn’t have nerves of steel broke down. Then, the Russian counterattack struck. The soldiers, already half mad before the ordeal, retreated in apathetic resignation to their original positions. By now, even the enemy had enough of the fighting. On their side too, entire units surrendered. Finally, the killing subsided. There we were, where we had begun in mid-January; but in the time that had passed, yet another army had perished.102
Night temperatures sank to −20°C and often times lower. Prevailing conditions prohibited the placement of machine guns off the roadways, while icy slopes had to be hacked step by step under enemy fire. Ice-covered roadbeds continued to prevent nighttime travel or delivery of supplies.103
General Conrad planned to launch a Fourth Army southern flank counterattack, which he originally scheduled for 7 February, to alleviate the Third Army’s crisis.104 Five divisions (10th, 11th, 13th, 26th, and 45th) and the 11th Honvéd Cavalry Division would strike southward to relieve pressure on Third Army III Corps positions. In the interim, the Russians continued buttressing their troop strengths between the Uzsok and Dukla passes. As Habsburg losses escalated, an impending collapse of the VII and X Corps fronts appeared imminent.105 Because of the desperate need for reinforcements, the 23,000-man VIII Corps transferred from the Balkan theater to Boroević’s front in an attempt to provide momentum to his stalled offensive efforts. L
imited railroad capacity, however, produced delays in the transfer of the corps. Conrad stipulated that VIII Corps be deployed as a single entity, rather than being inserted piecemeal as so often occurred. Meanwhile, Infantry Regiments 81 and 88 continued their travel to the hard-pressed VII Corps to participate in a counterattack.106
Increasing attention focused on the threatened Mezölaborcz area, one so critical for troop and supply movement to the Third Army eastern flank. Conrad determined that once reinforcements provided security for that area, they would launch an offensive. The question remained whether sufficient troop numbers could be assembled for defensive purposes until adequate relief arrived. March Brigade replacement troops of 2,000 men possessing, at most, eight weeks’ basic training deployed to the front. As the military situation worsened, training time for these Ersatz troops lessened. VI March Battalion soldiers, like their predecessors, lacked sufficient preparation for the rigors of mountain battle and extreme conditions.107
A VII and X Corps retreat endangered the entire army front, which had become increasingly incapable of offering effective resistance. General Boroević ordered the two endangered right flank corps to maintain their positions, regardless of the cost. With just 15,800 soldiers on its twenty-eight kilometer, three-division front, the battered X Corps nevertheless launched an attack to relieve pressure on the decimated III Corps.108 On South Army’s front, Russian tactics continued to retard offensive endeavors and forced Habsburg commanders to constantly react to the enemy’s astute countermeasures.109
On 1 February, General Conrad ordered the transfer of a further Fourth Army division to the Third Army front, while two and a half additional divisions redeployed to the critical Mezölaborcz area to buttress Third Army’s buckling flank. VIII Corps, currently en route, would launch a decisive counterattack on 7 or 8 February. Until then, Third Army had the unenviable mission to maintain their increasingly threatened positions, which would also serve to protect the exposed South Army left flank. The Mezölaborcz–Lupkov railroad line, where the enemy concentrated its offensive efforts, was vital for the success of any offensive action launched to relieve Fortress Przemyśl. The depleted VII and X Corps, however, could offer little resistance to the enemy efforts.110 Fierce fighting continued on this front throughout the first week of February. A report aptly described the dwindling Habsburg troop stands as the k.u.k. Stakettenzaun (picket fence) army. Efforts to fill front-line gaps with the few available troops failed to reverse the deteriorating situation. Only significant reinforcements could change the momentum of battle.111
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