Blood on the Snow
Page 16
Second Army headquarters requested the attack set for 22 February toward Lupkov be postponed because deteriorating roads interfered with the Third Army’s assault toward Mezölaborcz.13 On 22 February, instructions to Attack Group Tersztyánsky emphasized that the threat to Fortress Przemyśl made a military success imperative. Second Army must attack and cooperate with a simultaneous fortress breakout effort toward it.14 The serious time constraints forced the launching of the offensive before all designated units had assembled. The Habsburg army would have neither the matériel nor the manpower necessary to accomplish its mission. Severe weather warnings went unheeded, causing undue suffering for the war-weary soldiers. Not until 24 February would heavy artillery batteries be ordered forward, but few were actually moved to the high mountain front.
On 22 February a key half-kilometer stretch of road was washed away, preventing the 27th Infantry Division units from reaching their designated deployment area. The following day the road to Takcsany, a major supply depot, closed, forcing the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division to utilize a detour march route.15 Horses sank in the mud; many died from exhaustion while attempting to extricate themselves. Carts and wagons bogged down to their axles. Constant stoppages forced units to halt for long periods of time. In preparation for the impending attack, ultimately postponed until 27 February, new infantry units advanced only six kilometers on 22 February, followed by twelve over the next two days. Some units received orders to leave supply wagons in rear echelon areas except those transporting food provisions.
In view of the calamitous supply situation, the General Staff Railroad Bureau commenced closely monitoring supply train movement along the routes most crucial for the impending offensive. One meter of new snow fell in higher elevations. Then on 24 February a Railroad Bureau expositor report warned that the Takcsany–Zemplenoroszi supply route, particularly at a serpentine section of the road, was impassable and would be unusable for days. The Railroad Bureau complained that the number of road maintenance crews were inadequate to perform the Herculean task. If additional workers were not available soon, combat units would be utilized to perform emergency road maintenance. The success of the campaign hinged on the maintenance of supply routes.16
Meanwhile, the Germans planned their own preemptive strike against the massed Romanov armies on the Northwest front. The entire German strategic reserve consisted of three reserve and one regular army corps transferred from the Western front. By the end of January 1915, the Teutonic Eighth and Ninth Armies had established defensive positions in Poland. The ensuing Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes commenced during an intense day-long blizzard. Meter-deep, wind-whipped snow created man-sized snowdrifts. As with the Carpathian campaign, most German supplies and reserve ammunition remained rearward, snowbound at railroad depots. Yet because of the severe weather conditions, it proved a perfect time to launch the attack, as it caught the Russians by surprise. The ongoing Habsburg military crisis prompted the German decision to concentrate their strategic reserve in the east for a major offensive against the Russians to relieve the pressure on their ally.
Intercepted Russian communications alerted German Eastern Command of the enemy’s intention to invade Prussia and create a new army somewhat further south. The Germans thus advanced their timetable to disrupt the czarist intentions. The immediate German objective became to neutralize the Russian Tenth Army, presently deployed forward of the Angerapp Lake line, which had become isolated from its neighboring units. Between 6 and 7 February, czarist Tenth Army forces, oblivious to the impending attack, shoveled snow from their positions. On 7 February, a German Tenth Army hammer blow drove the startled Russian covering forces rearward, threatening its potential retreat route to the Augustov forest. The Germans then struck the czarist flank.
The Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes attained its primary objective of purging East Prussia of enemy presence. Another Russian army had almost been destroyed and significant troop numbers taken prisoner. The military success, though a tactical one, did not produce the required strategic victory and depleted the German strategic reserve. German forces, bogged down by the weather conditions, terminated the offensive effort because of the breakdown in communications, the serious supply problems, and general troop exhaustion. The troops had reached the end of human endurance.17
In the following month, Grand Duke Nicholas and The Russian High Command (Stavka) would support launching a renewed czarist offensive in the Carpathian Mountains under pressure from General Ivanov, the front commander. The failure to gain a military decision on the German front partly influenced the Russian decision. Also influencing their decision making was the fact that a major victory over the Dual Monarchy might incite Italy and Romania to join the Entente war effort. The factor of neutral states was also a major determinant in Conrad’s Carpathian Mountain adventures.
Returning to the Carpathian Mountain theater, Habsburg Supreme Command anticipated that the Russians planned to launch an offensive through the mountains to invade Hungary, which placed the Habsburg Second Army commander in a daunting situation. The present successful Russian advance had to be halted. The XVII Corps, its capabilities and numbers diminished by earlier fruitless attacks, received orders to defend its positions on 16 February and then prepare to resume its attack the next day in cooperation with the Third Army offensive. A fierce enemy attack, however, forced the corps to retreat instead. In the meantime, the warmer temperatures created swollen waterways and impaired movement on the washed-out roadbeds.
Meanwhile, well before the Second Army offensive commenced, the escalating Third Army left-flank crisis forced the diversion of in transit Second Army reinforcements to that hard-pressed front. At the extreme western left flank, 16,900 XIX Corps soldiers countered 28,000 enemy troops.18 These unfavorable numbers necessitated a speedy redirection of two infantry divisions from the Second Army front, the 41st Honvéd (20 February) and the 27th Division (23 February), to the endangered sector.
Renewed enemy assaults in the Cisna–Baligrod vicinity resulted in further serious battle. The enemy continued its onslaught against the XIX Corps along both sides of the vital Baligrod–Cisna roads, steadily intensifying its desperate tactical situation. The corps became incapable of warding off further czarist attacks. Its divisions retreated without any serious enemy pressure.19 Between 12 and 14 February the corps reported 27 officers and 1,138 troops sick or wounded. 43rd Infantry Division reported only 2,820 troops remaining, and the 34th, 3,200.20 General Böhm-Ermolli’s first order exhorted the faltering XIX Corps and Group Szurmay to maintain their positions; he then ordered V and XVIII Corps to retake their previously occupied positions south of the San River, once sufficient reinforcements had arrived.21
On 15 February a Corps Hofmann (Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin) report relative to the condition of its troops emphasized their constant close contact with the enemy and their having reached the extreme parameters of their physical capacities. Furthermore, casualties from illness, frostbite, and battle had reduced the battle stands to a minimum and negatively affected morale.22 Officer and noncommissioned officer losses led to their lesser presence at the front. Many Landsturm and reserve troop units lacked effective leadership, and some were no longer capable of offensive action.
By 16 February General Böhm-Ermolli concentrated on consolidating his battlefront and avoiding piecemeal insertion of reinforcements into the front lines.23 March (replacement) formations received transport priority over new troop entities. General Böhm-Ermolli, in an attempt to rectify the serious numerical deficiency in artillery, ordered the numerous batteries behind the main mountain ridgelines be brought forward. He set 19 February as his offensive launch date.
Russian heavy artillery began firing on the sensitive Wola Michova transportation area. The defending corps sustained an additional 10 percent casualties, while the X and XVII Corps also reported serious losses.24 An enemy attack pierced the front between V Corps and Group Szurmay, forcing the V and XVIII Corps to retreat. F
ourth Army must, if necessary, launch a relieving attack to assist its neighboring army.25 Its IX Corps was ordered to launch an attack on 17 February despite the weather and terrain difficulties.26 Serious problems had occurred already in the approach march as high water levels dogged the troops as they crossed numerous water lines. Attack routes were turned into pits of mud.
The unfavorable troop conditions were well documented. On 17 February, numerous corps commanders reported their troops were exhausted and apathetic. The adverse conditions that existed in early February persisted, further diminishing troop numbers. The Carpathian mountain terrain limited observation in the forward areas. Casualties increased as ammunition supplies became depleted. Additional howitzer shells and heavy howitzers were desperately needed.27
Poor communication and lack of liaison between units produced battlefield confusion and numerous uncoordinated counterattacks, which the Russians easily rebuffed. The few arriving reinforcements, hurled into the melee under no artillery support, failed to stem the Russian tide. Repeated enemy blows forced a XIX Corps retreat, creating a ripple effect along the entire front. Only significant reinforcements could stabilize the reeling Habsburg front. However, the last available troops had been inserted into the front lines, and Habsburg resistance verged on collapse.28
The multiple communication problems supported the argument to reduce the scope of the Second Army offensive to both sides of the Baligrod roads. Narrowing the width of the attack front also provided the advantage of the San and Solinka rivers, forming protective flank barriers for the advancing troops. It also appeared to offer more favorable ridgeline objectives for the advance. Yet potential danger existed at the Second Army right flank area. The addition of three recently arrived infantry divisions would assist in reconquering the Lupkov small-gauge railroad line.
Again, as early as 16 February, General Böhm-Ermolli ordered all available artillery batteries to the front. Meanwhile, various batteries that already arrived had not been positioned where ordered. Only Group Szurmay found most of its assigned artillery properly positioned before the offensive, partly because its terrain was more favorable for gun placement. However, most batteries remained several days’ march behind the main mountain ridges. The repeated argument that heavy howitzer artillery placement in mountain terrain was difficult, if not impossible, was later contradicted under far worse conditions in the Italian Alps, where successful placement of artillery was accomplished, albeit with tremendous effort.
General Conrad pressured Böhm-Ermolli to launch a decisive offensive along the shortest route to the beleaguered fortress. This frontal attack had neither adequate material preparation nor all of its divisions inserted into the battle line. Missing artillery batteries would not be ordered to the front until 24 February, some arriving on 27 February.
XIX Corps, its left flank now reinforced by the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division, would initiate the Second Army offensive. Its attack direction toward Lupkov was perceived to be the enemy’s most vulnerable position. The 19 February launch date was postponed to the next day. The corps’ objective became to regain the dominant terrain, where it offered the Russians little advantage, then attack Mezölaborcz.29 Meanwhile, the corps received a brief respite when the enemy halted its attacks to recuperate from its own severe losses. X Corps’ 24th and 34th Infantry Divisions received orders to support the XIX Corps’ offensive effort.30 Wary of the escalating danger of an enemy breakthrough between the V Corps and Group Szurmay’s northern flank, VII Corps must continue to bind enemy forces and attack to seize terrain, but the corps failed to advance (X and VII Corps had the mission to seize the Lupkov area). III Corps must demonstrate to draw enemy attention from the main battle area. As the 27th, 32nd, and 38th Infantry Divisions arrived to reinforce Second Army efforts, Fourth Army’s IX Corps (13th and 26th Infantry Divisions) planned attack achieved slow, insignificant gains against strong enemy positions.31 Multiple units requisitioned additional artillery and shells, requesting that their attack await proper artillery support. Numerous batteries reported that many guns had ceased to function and that howitzer shells were necessary to neutralize enemy defensive positions.
Conrad ordered that reserve forces be utilized to maintain attack momentum once the offensive was launched and that Second Army should not await the late arrival of supporting infantry division units before launching its effort. Such pressure stemmed partially from intelligence reports that indicated that four czarist siege divisions had been transferred from the For tress Przemyśl arena to the Carpathian front. Further slaughter of fortress horses extended food rations a few more days. Any additional decrease in food portions would not only endanger the troops’ physical well-being, but further reduce their ability to perform their duties—and, as a result of the horse slaughter, lessen the fortress’s remaining maneuver capabilities. Early February witnessed a sharp decline in garrison combat worthiness. Sickness had become rampant, and deaths caused by severe exhaustion escalated. Fortress food supplies would last until 16 March, a fact that increased the pressure to launch a relieving offensive as soon as possible.32 However, the time of year was obviously not conducive for such a military endeavor.
General Metzger, chief of the Habsburg Operations Bureau, discussed the approaching offensive via field radio with the Second Army chief of staff, General Bardolff. Metzger claimed that pressure to attack did not result from the critical Fortress Przemyśl situation, but nevertheless, the offensive should be launched as soon as possible. Above all, Second Army should not await the arrival of the 31st Infantry Division, but rather redesignate it a reserve unit.33
The Second Army offensive launch date depended on the military situation at Lupkov; therefore, its attack front was extended to include the XVIII Corps middle and right flank forces and even V Corps.34 Argument held that if the offensive did not also include Lisko–Ustrzyki Dolne and Fortress Przemyśl, the enemy could attack the isolated South Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. The obsession to liberate Fortress Przemyśl bestowed on the Second Army the formidable task of launching an offensive on a constricted twelve-kilometer front and attempting to seize the enemy’s most developed defensive positions on the dominating terrain at Zebrak and Chrysczczata.
Bitterly cold nights, combined with wet conditions, took a heavy toll on the troops’ health. Every day thousands fell ill, suffered from frostbite, or succumbed to exposure; losses to illness doubled. The problem of maintaining an adequate flow of supplies also remained unresolved. Labor crews had to maintain the main supply route, Nagypolany–Zemplenoroszi–Cisna.35 Draft animals, 1,650 in all, were transported into the mountains to assist in restoring the disabled supply system. The terrible road conditions led to confrontations between the multiple units seeking to utilize the same routes. The 31st, 32nd, and 38th Infantry Divisions were delayed in reaching the Second Army front and were unavailable to participate in the initial phase of the campaign.36 Meanwhile, the enemy extended powerful attacks to the Third Army front and Beskid ridges. Reinforcements were a dire necessity, but why had they not been dispatched earlier?
On 19 February South Army’s 19th Infantry Division reputedly could not conduct offensive operations. Low troop morale resulted from soldiers suffering from extreme exhaustion verging on physical collapse. Casualties, illness, and frostbite cases had taken a heavy toll after six days of uninterrupted battle. The division’s capabilities had declined so disastrously that it could not repel a serious enemy attack.
The order to launch the 20 February offensive emphasized that Third Army must participate for Second Army to succeed. Third Army’s mission remained unchanged while the main Second Army offensive forces would attack along the Baligrod roads toward Lisko. The initial military objective remained the area of Lisko–Ustrzyki Dolne to interrupt the crucial Russian east–west railroad line. Advancing Habsburg forces should draw numerous czarist troops, preventing increased Russian numbers from being deployed against South Army and Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin. These two armie
s would join the offensive action once they had received adequate reinforcements. Fourth Army’s XI Corps (15th and 30th Infantry Divisions) and First Army’s 5th Infantry Division were transferred to Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin, whereupon the group commander shifted two infantry and one cavalry division to assist South Army efforts to extricate itself from the mountains.37 The Russians, perceiving Habsburg intentions, hurled significant formations against South Army, while the new Russian Ninth Army deployed against Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin to halt its victory train. South Army remained entrapped in the mountains and the Army Group’s efforts soon became crippled by strong enemy countermeasures.
The Second Army offensive, now postponed until 22 February, would drive a wedge deep into the enemy front. However, a major disadvantage appeared once progress had been achieved. Both flanks became more exposed to potential enemy activity, particularly in the Oslava Valley and Wola Michova area. Thus, a swift enemy counterstroke to cripple any progress must be expected.
Second Army priority remained to prevent a Fortress Przemyśl capitulation. XIX Corps must reconquer Lupkov by 22 February while 41st Honvéd Infantry Division defended the critical left flank area, where the enemy posed the greatest threat to the operation. The Honvéd division launched an attack without artillery support because of rain and poor visibility.38 At the opposite Second Army flank, the gap between the V and XVIII Corps had been sealed. Coinciding with the arrival of replacement troops, a V Corps division (37th Honvéd Infantry Division) attained the San River and reestablished contact with XVIII Corps’ right flank units.39