Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  For Conrad, launching a breakout effort from Fortress Przemyśl became increasingly urgent. The For Conrad, launching a breakout effort from Fortress Przemyśl became increasingly urgent. The perpetual inclement weather increased the number of sick and frostbitten troops; between 1 and 10 March the number of troops hospitalized increased. An additional 2,000 troops became designated as too exhausted for duty, and garrison morale reached new lows.

  Returning to the 6 March Habsburg general offensive, while XVIII Corps left flank and V Corps right flank forces must advance, it remained crucial that the Fourth Army prevent Russian forces from being shifted against Second Army. The entire Habsburg front, stretching from the Vistula River to eastern Galicia, prepared for new decisive battle as time pressure relative to Fortress Przemyśl demanded frenetic activity.138

  Stavka perceived the possible danger emanating from the Habsburg operation against their extreme left flank positions, the most sensitive portion of their front. Indications that Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin prepared to renew its advance raised serious concern about the threat to disrupt the major czarist transportation and communication links connecting eastern Galicia and Russia. This resulted in reinforcements being sent to counter the enemy threat. General Tersztyánsky, meanwhile, blamed the failure of his attack efforts on overall conditions and the fact that multiple artillery batteries remained behind the Carpathian ridgelines. However, he himself had left twenty-seven batteries in the rear echelon areas, and the Russians often utilized inclement weather conditions to launch attacks. Field commanders cautioned Conrad that no further progress was possible without significant reinforcements; the deteriorating battle worthiness of Habsburg units made even maintaining present lines questionable.

  On the first day of the new Third Army offensive, severe casualties forced termination of the operation. Two potentially dangerous enemy tactical options threatened Habsburg efforts. The Russians could transfer troops from the Habsburg Second Army front to the Third Army theater. Also, if Third and Fourth Armies remained passive, additional czarist troops could be deployed against the hapless Second Army. The operation’s success hinged on preventing the Russians from rapidly reinforcing their armies countering Second Army.139

  Meanwhile, the beleaguered Third Army VII and X Corps faced insurmountable problems, while XVII Corps failed to crack Russian resistance. Once again, the weather conditions and close proximity of friendly forces to Russian forward positions prevented artillery support. Habsburg troops continued to sustain enormous casualties; nevertheless, the battered III and VII Corps received orders to launch another futile attack effort that produced further unnecessary bloodshed.140 Despite the insertion of all available reserves, VII Corps defensive efforts against Russian attacks failed to halt enemy advances.

  Third Army’s inability to maintain attack momentum and Fourth Army’s delay in launching a relieving offensive resulted in Second Army bearing the brunt of enemy assaults. Third Army at first repulsed attacks against its eastern flank positions, but once forced into a defensive stance, the stage was set for impending military disaster.141 Meanwhile, Conrad prodded General Boroević to bind opposing enemy forces. However, Third Army’s situation had deteriorated so quickly that it could not render serious opposition to the enemy. Aware of the Third Army situation, the enemy transferred numerous units against the battered Second Army—precisely what Conrad hoped to prevent!

  The single Second Army’s only battle success occurred when XIX Corps stormed the Magurczyne heights, enabling the corps to attain their crucial objective, the Lupkov railroad. The next day (7 March) they also conquered the bloodied position at Chrysczczata, securing General Tersztyánsky’s right flank position.142 XIX Corps troops repulsed seven renewed enemy night assaults while Corps Schmidt again advanced on Manilova.143 Through its sacrificial efforts, Second Army succeeded in driving a sixteen-kilometer-wide wedge into enemy lines, but it was too weak to maintain momentum and garner a decisive victory. Meanwhile, the enemy reinforced its fronts against Group Tersztyánsky and the XVIII Corps. General Tersztyánsky ordered his officers to ruthlessly exert their authority over their battle-fatigued troops while division commanders must move their headquarters closer to the front for better control of their units (one was reported over forty kilometers from the battlefield).144

  In the meantime, General Tersztyánsky’s attack groups, Corps Lutgendorf and Schmidt, awaited an Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin feint attack to distract enemy attention from the critical Baligrod–San River line, where Second Army’s offensive would be renewed along its entire front.145 However, the steep ridgelines were so covered in ice that they proved difficult to traverse. A V Corps effort north of the San River failed to achieve the intended impetus for the Second Army endeavor. Heavy enemy artillery crossfire and the futility of defending positions forced V Corps to surrender a key position. In spite of receiving reinforcements, the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division could not advance from Chrysczczata, and the offensive thus rapidly collapsed. Second Army success had been dashed by the same circumstances as the first endeavor, such as when adjacent armies launched attacks but failed to bind significant enemy units.146 Meanwhile, four new czarist regiments (137th, 138th, 229th, and 230th) appeared on the Second Army front. The mission to rescue Fortress Przemyśl had become a Palladium for the Habsburg army.147

  Nevertheless, General Conrad continued to anticipate a Second Army left flank success because it appeared to possess a relative numerical superiority over opposing troops. However, excessive losses brought the supporting XVIII Corps advance to a halt as extreme weather conditions made it impossible to prepare defensive positions on newly acquired terrain.148 The offensive effort continued on 7 March, but urgent requests for additional artillery batteries to support V Corps’ San River battle went unanswered because none was available.149 Nevertheless, some infantry units successfully crossed the river in an attempt to pierce enemy positions and threaten czarist flank areas.

  The Fourth Army’s long-anticipated attack to relieve pressure on the northern Third Army flank was again postponed because of “unpredictable weather,” although the operation was essential for Third and Second Army success. When finally launched, after achieving some inconsequential initial successes, it failed to penetrate the seemingly impregnable enemy lines because of insufficient troop numbers and artillery support.150 General Conrad recognized that the Gorlice area represented the Achilles’ heel of the czarist Northwest and Southwest front positions, where it formed the hinge that connected the two enemy fronts, but he lacked the necessary troops to take advantage of the situation. The Germans deployed the requisite troop strength in early May to launch an offensive that subsequently won the greatest Central Power victory of the war at the battle of Gorlice–Tarnov.

  On the same day (7 March), South Army launched a new offensive effort along its entire front to envelop czarist positions. However, dense fog precluded artillery support for the infantry, who struggled as a Siberian cold wave struck the mountains, with temperatures plummeting to −23°C and more than two meters of snow falling.151 The army’s attempted double envelopment of Wyszkov and seizure of the dominating area heights failed to achieve significant progress. Battling the mountain blizzard conditions, all attacks ground to a halt.152 Only the army’s right flank XXIV Corps advanced, but it failed to achieve significant progress.153

  Strong enemy forces attacked Third Army when it attempted to advance again. X Corps parried night attacks until 8 March, when it retreated; then multiple reports of enemy troop concentrations at the army right flank and III and XVII Corps fronts resulted in the order to hold all positions.154 Blizzard conditions prevailed until midmonth, transforming mountain slopes into a treacherous glaze of ice and providing the enemy significant protection. The unbearable conditions wore down the soldiers’ will to resist as they vainly sought shelter from the bone-jarring cold. This introduced an insidious disintegration process, which gradually spread among all Habsburg armies. Conrad had good reason
to fear that the next serious military defeat could result in the total collapse of his army.155

  Subzero temperatures caused machine gun water jackets to freeze, rendering many useless in battle. The exhausted and starving troops struggled to remain awake, fearing that sleep would bring the White Death, while frostbite cases continued to escalate.156 Delivery of food to the front was only attempted at night, and thus the meager rations were frozen solid upon arrival. Often the food carriers succumbed to the horrible conditions. Interestingly, enemy snipers reportedly never shot at food servers; they often even knew their names. Front-line troops had to transport their own field kitchens.157 Drifting snow halted movement near the front while the transport of wounded soldiers rearward came to a complete halt. Second Army sustained serious losses between 1 and 5 March. XIX Corps lost 5,400 men. In four days, the 32nd Infantry Division lost 50 percent of its manpower. Nevertheless, the corps received orders to maintain its gains and rehabilitate its badly shaken troops.158 The 29th and 34th Infantry Divisions combined troop stands equaled one-third of a full infantry division.159 V Corps also sustained severe losses: its 37th Honvéd Infantry Division lost an average of 250 soldiers a day.160 After XIX Corps’ seizure of the crucial heights at Chrysczczata during all night battle 7 to 8 March, a fierce enemy counterassault supported by overwhelming firepower forced its evacuation.161 The high terrain became a field of corpses. The exhausted XVIII Corps meanwhile seized some territory at the Wetlina River, while V Corps and Group Szurmay reported severe losses of officers and horses at the flooded San River.162

  The Habsburg military situation reached crisis proportions as Second Army exertions achieved little. As so often occurred, General Conrad had underestimated the Russian ability to swiftly and effectively neutralize his efforts; he’d also underestimated the difficulties posed by the rugged mountain winter conditions. It required three hours of extreme exertion to traverse just 1,000 paces on the Dzial ridges.163 Despite the appearance of sunshine on 8 March, daytime temperatures hovered around −5°C and dropped to −20°C at night, accompanied by biting wind. Attempts to remove or rescue even lightly wounded men were hampered by the deep snow. Fallen soldiers near enemy lines could not be saved.164 Physically and psychologically exhausted, the battered troops recognized the futility of assaulting the well-fortified enemy positions, particularly because they lacked reserve troops. The likelihood of Italy and Romania entering the war increased substantially with the continued Habsburg military setbacks.165 Rome had not delineated its final demands for Dual Monarchy territory, but there was no doubt it would. In the meantime, General Falkenhayn pressured Conrad to encourage his foreign minister to conclude diplomatic negotiations with Italy because sufficient military concerns existed to avoid “trouble in the Balkans and Romania.”

  Böhm-Ermolli prodded his troops to continue their efforts to seize the Baligrod roads, while Conrad harangued his field commanders to obtain success because of the deteriorating Fortress Przemyśl situation. However, the enemy countered every Second Army effort by transferring reinforcements to any threatened area. After twenty-four hours of constant czarist attacks along the entire front, the Russian Third Army attempted to pierce the Habsburg Fourth and Third Army inner flank positions while, in addition, shifting significant troop numbers to the critical Homonna area in the vicinity of Mezölaborcz.166

  An artillery officer described the cold, ice, and snowstorms, the critical need for night rest, and the possibility of an epidemic breakout during the 8 March attack. A shortage of drinking water led to the utilization of a source located beneath the burial site of twenty soldiers, resulting in sickness and disease. Some of this artillery battery suffered slow and purposeless deaths, further demoralizing the survivors.167 The loss of more than half the battery’s horses left barely thirty capable of duty while the regimental commander maintained his headquarters forty kilometers behind the front.168 Targeting deep trenches and enemy strong points required heavy-caliber but also light shells to force the defenders to keep their heads down. With neither available, the infantry had to launch surprise attacks before daybreak. Available artillery shells were consumed rapidly, further compounding the existing shell shortages. Ignoring the generally unfavorable situation, 9 March army dispositions ordered the continuation of the attack. Corps Schmidt’s troops must capture the dominating heights at Manilova and seize the area around the small village of Rabe. The shattered XIX Corps again prepared to repulse an enemy attack. All units reported the debilitating effect of the frigid overnight temperatures, which claimed numerous victims, while they achieved no significant forward progress. Blinded by his obsession to free Fortress Przemyśl under the time constraints, Conrad’s failed frontal assaults sealed the offensive’s fate. Conrad had somehow expected General Tersztyánsky to overcome the critical military situation. The steady arrival of czarist reinforcements indicated that the enemy had no intention of surrendering territory in any critical areas.

  Because of its severe manpower shortage, XIX Corps requested that Infantry Regiment 33 labor detachments be utilized as combat troops, partially because its replacement troops proved unsuitable for it. The unrelenting pressure relative to Fortress Przemyśl produced the order to attack at the Dzial ridges, a somewhat constricted area not conducive to either maneuver or easy supply.169 The difficult terrain between the Solinka brook and those Dzial ridges presented an almost impossible setting for launching a successful attack. Nevertheless, it was ordered.170

  The Austrian official history confirms that the persistent fierce snowstorms caused rapid termination of any efforts to advance. Transport of ill soldiers from the front lines continued to be an exercise in futility, while the slick, icy ground proved impassable.171 Second Army had reached to about fifty kilometers from Fortress Przemyśl’s outer walls, but its units had been bled dry attempting to advance along the Baligrod roads, while the surviving troops suffered from extreme combat fatigue. Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy had constructed new defensive lines twenty-five to thirty kilometers behind the front, which did not bode well for the attempts to relieve Fortress Przemyśl.172

  Weather conditions aided czarist counterassaults against XIX Corps’ 29th Infantry Division positions. The enemy burst through division lines, forcing a retreat to earlier defensive positions. Because there were no reserves, the customary counterattack could not be launched. Man-high snow blanketed the XIX Corps front, where its 17,400 troops opposed 25,000 Russians. Losses steadily mounted; since 20 February, 41st Honvéd Infantry Division numbers sank from 12,000 to 2,110 men. Artillery support was rendered useless by wind-driven snow, while machine gun mechanisms continued to malfunction from the cold. Troops continued to starve while the anticipated daily order to “unconditionally maintain your positions” again remained in effect.173

  Battle ensued between Third and Fourth Army inner flanks to bind enemy forces and prevent their transfer to counter Third Army offensive efforts. III Corps supported Fourth Army IX Corps efforts through artillery fire and demonstration activity, their locations separated by extremely rugged mountain terrain.174 Meanwhile, Group Szurmay’s sacrificial attack efforts on the afternoon of 9 March failed to jar the Russians from their domineering defensive positions. Despite rare effective artillery support, enemy crossfire halted all efforts to advance.175 By the morning of 10 March the military situation had worsened, while blizzard conditions halted all military efforts.176 The Russians finally attained equal numbers to the attacking Second Army forces on the decisive twelve-kilometer Baligrod front, and they continued to be more adept at fighting in winter conditions and utilizing the adverse winter conditions to their advantage, particularly during offensive operations.

  The impending surrender of Fortress Przemyśl and sudden unfavorable Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin situation also affected Habsburg diplomacy. Disturbing news emanating from Rome brought additional German pressure on Vienna and Conrad to assume a more conciliatory position relative to Italy. General Falkenhayn pressured Co
nrad to negotiate with Rome because of the necessity of Italian and Romanian military support in the Balkans. But no Habsburg statesmen or military commander desired to surrender the Trentino to perfidious Italy.177

  The Russians launched a counterattack that terminated any Habsburg efforts.178 The fatigued Habsburg units retreated to their original positions, but entire battalions surrendered to the enemy to escape the inhuman conditions. Other soldiers continued to endure the torment in the frozen Carpathian hellhole.179 Front-line troops desperately required rehabilitation and reinforcements to replace the enormous losses.

  Artillery shells could no longer be fired within 800 meters of Habsburg lines because of increased short rounds, and its support of the infantry remained unsatisfactory.180 Although numerous batteries left in rear echelon areas were ordered brought forward, significant numbers did not move. “Mountain” artillery batteries most suited for the campaign terrain remained stationed on the Balkan front. The enemy’s successful rapid reinforcement of its positions on the Baligrod front made the Second Army’s human sacrifice a wasted effort. Infantry divisions, which possessed regimental numbers of men or even fewer, manned three-kilometer or wider front lines.

  By 10 March Habsburg military leadership had reached its nadir in effectiveness. Despite explicit orders to attack, no commander would take the initiative, waiting instead for adjacent units to act. A nervous atmosphere prevailed everywhere. Some field officers were cashiered and others transferred from the battlefront, destroying any remaining command stability and dissolving any remaining trust in the high command. Habsburg Supreme Command demonstrated a lack of empathy for the unbearable conditions under which its troops labored.