Blood on the Snow
Page 21
Four infantry divisions arrived to be inserted into Second Army front lines, but the prevailing situation neutralized the exploitation of any temporary advantage, and multiple problems were encountered in attempting to coordinate their insertion into front positions.
A 12th Infantry Division after battle report cited several factors to explain its unsuccessful early March offensive efforts at Gorlice on the Fourth Army front. Blizzard conditions prevented success as the troops reached enemy positions exhausted and stunned. Artillery preparation for the 9 March offensive should have commenced earlier, but the prevailing conditions delayed it until 8 March. The attacking troops encountered heavy flanking fire, producing numerous casualties.181 When Habsburg artillery finally commenced firing, the enemy evacuated its front lines, negating its effect. After a half-hour advance to within 500 paces of the enemy’s positions, heavy czarist infantry and machine gun fire halted further progress, and excessive losses halted the attack. Infantry Regiment 100 reported that of its 335 losses, 229 were missing in action.182
Archduke Joseph depicted the horrors encountered by his men:
On the terribly slippery slope . . . the Honvéds attacked with indescribable heroism and bravery. The horrifying casualties were caused partly by the unsuitable lower command. The shortage of officers had a negative effect because the charge was carried out piecemeal instead of unified.
The regiment’s strength sank to 2,000 men. Both officers and men complained about Russian Infantry Regiment 73 brutality. They shot all our medical troops and the stretcher-bearers, even though they clearly saw them bending over the wounded . . . as well as moving wounded. All our dead lie unburied because we can’t get close to them. I had respected the Russians as being a knightly rival, such things had never occurred before! Are they “wild Asians”?
After what happened, my Honvéds lost patience, there will be no mercy for captured Russians.183
Titular commander Archduke Friedrich, in a report to Emperor Franz Joseph’s military chancellery, emphasized that the Second Army had attacked for nine days on its restricted attack front. Inclement weather conditions and well-fortified enemy positions prevented attaining victory while the enemy reinforced its numbers. Any available forces had to strike the enemy flank and rear areas in an attempt to prevent the establishment of new defensive positions and renewed resistance. Success depended upon maintaining the initiative and cooperation. But wasn’t this advice a bit late?
On 11 March General Conrad pressured General Tersztyánsky that Fortress Przemyśl could survive for just one more week.184 Even if they slaughtered additional horses and foraged foodstuffs and fodder, the garrison could only persevere until 24 March.185 Only a successful major offensive had any chance of rescuing the fortress.
Second Army continued to encounter insurmountable odds attempting to maintain steady supply movement. General Tersztyánsky complained that supplies were not sufficient, while on 11 March, provision columns were in a holding position at Cisna. When supplies failed to reach the front, desperate appeals to maintain traffic on the roads increased. On the same day the Russians launched an anticipated counteroffensive against XIX Corps left flank positions, its assault toward Wola Michova threatening to neutralize Second Army offensive efforts. The only intact infantry division in that critical vicinity, the newly arrived 14th Infantry Division, had to be hurled into battle piecemeal. Although Second Army was now the brunt of major enemy counterattacks, it received orders to continue its offensive. However, once XIX Corps had to retreat, the army’s offensive had been neutralized and the sole supply lifeline for the main attack group endangered.186 How could enemy efforts be neutralized if steady czarist reinforcements hurled at the Baligrod front negated all Habsburg efforts?
The two-week campaign placed inhuman demands on the surviving combatants. In early March alone, there were 40,000 cases of frostbite reported because of blizzard conditions.187 Coordination between units and communication breakdowns remained a common occurrence. When chances for a successful northern front offensive had dissipated, Attack Group Tersztyánsky received orders to prevent a Russian breakthrough at Wola Michova, but that proved impossible under the circumstances. The troops could accomplish nothing more,188 and General Tersztyánsky finally admitted that success was unattainable.189 However, was he not partially to blame for the situation? Russian troops could now easily smash through the thin, wavering Second Army lines; just maintaining the present positions required significant reinforcements. General Böhm-Ermolli reminded Tersztyánsky of the urgent necessity to liberate Fortress Przemyśl, as if such reminders were necessary! However, all approach routes remained covered in ice and snow, and the inclement weather conditions actually worsened.190
An interesting story in one officer’s Nachlaß in the Vienna War Archives describes the exertions of Second Army troops in moving a supply column forward. One day, the troops encountered a particularly long stoppage. Hoping to discover the reason for the delay, the officer worked his way to the front of the line until troops told him to halt. When he inquired about the reason for the lengthy stoppage, he was informed that General Tersztyánsky did not wish to be disturbed during his afternoon nap. The general had ordered a halt to all military columns while he got some rest.191
For Second Army troops, noncombat casualties continued to outnumber battlefield losses. Indicative of this, one unit lost 150 men to enemy fire, 200 to frostbite.192 Troops were forced to use snow for cover and protection, which increased the likelihood of frostbite.193 The 27th Infantry Division found itself hampered by up to two meters of snow, while the strength of the XIX Corps dissipated drastically. With no relief in sight, troops became even more demoralized. Suicide remained a viable solution to some troops.194
On the Third Army front, a powerful enemy night attack against the inner flanks of the 21st and 45th Infantry Divisions was repulsed; then heavy snowfall ensured that the front remained quiescent throughout the remainder of the day. Efforts to strengthen positions and prepare a second defensive line behind the front were attempted, irrespective of current conditions.195 South Army reported some progress in its continued efforts despite heavy snowstorms, but achieved little success since it launched its effort on 7 March. The army, however, repulsed several enemy counterattacks.
Conrad’s Flügeladjutant, Major Kundmann, observed, “it almost seems as though everything is working against us, even the weather,” in relation to the impending demise of Fortress Przemyśl and the possibility of having to surrender the Trentino irredenta to Italy. Meanwhile, the next offensive effort planned for 12 March had to be postponed until 16 March because of the unrelenting weather conditions, although action was certainly imperative. Kundmann concluded that everyone had lost their nerve and could think only of retreat.196
General Tersztyánsky nevertheless contemplated continuing his Baligrod efforts on 12 March, indicative of the pervasive influence of Fortress Przemyśl. At Wola Michova, 21,000 czarist troops opposed 13,000 XIX Corps soldiers, bolstered by any reinforcements and reserve formations rushed to the threatened fourteen-kilometer front.197 The enemy failed to exploit its numerical superiority, but the question remained unanswered of how to salvage the Second Army offensive. Russian troops then smashed through Group Tersztyánsky’s defensive lines, producing substantial casualties and threatening to puncture his entire front. The threat of a XIX Corps collapse resulted in the transfer of all available reserve troops (five battalions) to the corps’ western flank positions.198
On 10 and 12 March troop strength reports revealed additional serious troop losses. The 41st Honvéd Infantry Division was proclaimed incapable of undertaking offensive action, while 32nd Infantry Division had sustained 50 percent casualties. During four days, 27th Infantry Division sacrificed 3,290 soldiers, the 13th Landwehr Infantry Division 2,608.199
It proved fortunate that the enemy attacks eventually slackened, although Russian artillery fire continued its harassing fire. Indications of the deconstruction of Austr
o-Hungarian troop units multiplied. XIX Corps troops remained in a particularly precarious state, with 29th Infantry Division on the verge of collapse. Soldiers often endured exhausting marches to be immediately hurled into battle on unfamiliar terrain.200 The 43rd Landwehr Infantry Division troops reputedly could no longer be relied on in battle, and 34th Infantry Division and XVIII Corps were at the extreme end of their physical capabilities; many V Corps troops suffering from frostbite could not attack.201 Group Szurmay’s efforts were neutralized by the same dire conditions, so he pulled his troops back to reduce the senseless loss of life, intending to regain any surrendered positions when weather conditions improved. A new wave of blizzard conditions signified that such relief would not be forthcoming soon. General Tersztyánsky concluded that his units could not undertake offensive action and that low troop numbers precluded launching counterattacks, so he was limited to defending his present positions.202
Continued Russian pressure on Manilova threatened Second Army’s western flank positions, while X Corps supportive efforts failed to ease the battered XIX Corps’ worsening plight. The shattered Second Army could not achieve its original missions. Various unit documents and logbooks emphasized that their troops had reached their physical limits. Tragically, Conrad appeared to ignore the extreme deprivations at the front, perhaps out of desperation with the rapidly deteriorating and seemingly hopeless situation.
A sudden thaw severely affected the single army supply route, but overnight freezing temperatures improved the road conditions somewhat. However, the problem of maintaining a steady flow of supplies and the care and feeding of horses remained unresolved. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s eastern corps wagons and field stoves remained marooned in their assembly area because of the extreme difficulties. The 15th Infantry Division possessed only five artillery pieces to support the next day’s offensive—it required six hours to move a gun forward 500 meters.203
Conrad harangued Böhm-Ermolli again that Fortress Przemyśl food supplies would only last until 24 March, but he added that he did not want to increase pressure on the Second Army; rather, he was merely providing orientation for future decisions. The prevailing mood at Habsburg Supreme Command was described as pessimistic. Conrad accepted that Fortress Przemyśl’s fate had been sealed, but nevertheless, he directed the fortress commander to launch a breakout attempt coordinated with Second Army offensive relief efforts.204
13 March witnessed numerous Russian attacks against Gorlice, though enemy efforts were repulsed with heavy losses between Lupkov, Cisna, and Wyszkov. The enemy did succeed in breaking through Second Army’s extreme left flank 29th Infantry Division positions, crippling the army’s offensive efforts. Further powerful Russian assaults forced XIX Corps to relinquish Magurczyne and Chrysczczata, which had been conquered at the cost of tremendous human sacrifice. General Tersztyánsky now faced the unenviable task of conducting a comprehensive retreat.205 Renewing offensive efforts would be impossible until the shattered XIX Corps recovered. Its present resistance power appeared almost nonexistent, its troops apathetic.
By 14 March the Russian numerical superiority had bled the defending Habsburg corps. Between 1 and 15 March Second Army sustained 51,086 casualties, more than one-third of its original 148,848-man complement. Attack Group Tersztyánsky incurred two-thirds of these losses (855 officers and 37,108 soldiers). Officially 54 percent of these (340 officers, 17,210 men) were killed or wounded, and an additional 451 officers and 11,098 men succumbed to sickness. In addition, 31 officers and 1,194 men became prisoners of war, while another 33 officers and 7,703 men were reported missing in action. Many wounded were presumed to have frozen to death.206 The Second Army offensive drew five and a half enemy divisions into its imbroglio, relieving pressure against Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s front.
The losses resulted primarily from launching repeated frontal attacks lacking artillery support against strong Russian defensive positions. Evidence of individual unit extreme human sacrifice proliferate the documents—one infantry regiment counted sixty-nine survivors, while only seventeen soldiers of Jäger Battalion 23 remained to fulfill their duties.
At midnight on 14 March the Russians achieved their only notable military success against Fortress Przemyśl by overpowering the perimeter sector at Na Garoch. No counterattack ensued because of the fortress reserve troops’ weak physical condition. The appearance of enemy reinforcements prompted the order to evacuate all forefield positions. General Kusmanek persisted in his choice of potential breakout direction because he realized that his malnourished troops could not march, let alone fight on mountainous terrain.207 He initiated necessary preparations for the garrison’s breakout sortie to begin early on 19 March. The participating troops received the order to inflict maximum damage on enemy bridges, railroads, and ammunition depots as they advanced. Enemy food depots should be in close proximity—a real advantage to the advance direction. General Conrad informed General Falkenhayn of the failed second Carpathian operation, conceding that he had lacked sufficient manpower, but also blamed the overall unfavorable conditions for wreaking havoc on ammunition and food supply delivery, which also contributed to widespread illness, particularly frostbite. Conrad requested two to three German divisions be sent to buttress his collapsing Carpathian front.208 In a letter to Foreign Minister Burian, General Conrad reiterated his explanation for the failure to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. Capitulation appeared to be imminent, restoring the question of neutral Italy and Romania.209
In examining the major causes of the failure of the second Carpathian offensive, one is first struck by the stark contrast between Habsburg Supreme Command’s original high expectations and the tragic outcome of the operation. Conrad’s failed effort had driven the Austro-Hungarian army to the brink of annihilation. The Second Army offensive, launched in haste before all the designated divisions had been deployed, lacked the necessary troop mass and adequate logistical preparations. Again, adequate military planning and preparation had not been accomplished.
Moreover, the direction of the offensive effort raises questions. A more realistic plan for liberating Fortress Przemyśl would have been to launch a flanking attack rather than the frontal assaults. However, Conrad’s obsession to rescue the fortress and the associated time constraints sealed the fortress’s fate. Conrad expected that hard-nosed General Tersztyánsky would overcome the enormous odds against operational success. Meanwhile, the arrival of significant czarist reinforcements between the Dzial ridges and Baligrod indicated that the enemy intended to maintain its regional dominance.
In reaction to the severe manpower shortages caused by enormous casualties, several corps inserted noncombat troops into the front lines. Because of time pressure, they decided to attack the Dzial ridges, a constricted area not suitable for maneuver or supply movement, while the terrain selected for the offensive between the Solinka Brook and Dzial ridges proved unfavorable for offensive action.
The transport of wounded and ill soldiers to rear echelon areas remained an exercise in futility. Even the lightly wounded often succumbed to the White Death. The front remained buried under deep snow, while the icy cover over the snow-laden landscape made movement impossible. Attacking troops advanced to the foot of enemy positions, where they could neither find cover nor prepare defensive positions, becoming easy targets for Russian infantry fire.
Second Army forward units advanced to within fifty kilometers of Fortress Przemyśl’s outer walls, when the offensive was halted along the Baligrod roads. Intelligence sources indicated that the enemy had constructed a further powerful defensive line behind the present front, which did not bode well for relieving the beleaguered fortress even if Second Army managed to overcome enemy resistance at Baligrod.
Skillful Russian counterattacks, launched in terrible weather conditions, short-circuited multiple Second Army offensive efforts. Unit logbooks repeatedly bemoaned the number of artillery batteries languishing behind the mountain ridges and the constant problems encountered attempting
to maintain steady supply delivery. On 4 March a Böhm-Ermolli request for additional field batteries was declined by his Attack Group commander, who had left twenty-seven batteries of his own artillery behind the forward ridges.
In a fateful repeat of the earlier Third Army offensive, Second Army efforts were launched frontally in the same direction as the earlier campaign against well-entrenched enemy positions, but this time on a more restricted front, producing similar tragic results. When severe muddy conditions delayed the Second Army operation, the element of surprise was sacrificed, again providing the Russians with sufficient time to reinforce their outnumbered troops in the anticipated attack area. Their more accessible supply routes and rail connections also ensured a steady flow of supplies and rapid movement of reinforcements.
The insurmountable problems encountered in maintaining supply movement remained unresolved. The single supply roadway for the operation, connecting Zemplenoroszi and Cisna, was continually subjected to the constant movement of troops, pack animals, and supply wagons. The enormous logistical demands combined with the extreme climate and terrain often made the route impassable for traffic.
Second Army efforts initially met with relative success, but the well-entrenched enemy troops repeatedly halted Habsburg efforts. Although the attack direction encompassed the eighteen-kilometer front extending between the Solinka River and the Dzial ridges, the actual attack frontage along the Baligrod roads involved only twelve kilometers, never the entire eighteen-kilometer frontage. Thus, the attack area proved too narrow, although it produced fierce fighting along the confines of the Baligrod roads. Limiting the attack front played a major role in the failure to gain the anticipated victory.