Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  The deep winter mountain conditions called for experienced mountain troop units, but the monarchy’s best alpine troops, such as the XV and XVI Corps, and mountain artillery batteries remained deployed on the Balkan theater. Weather and enemy artillery fire often interrupted battlefield communication, while blizzards aggravated efforts to maintain contact with forward units and supply efforts. Compasses malfunctioned, causing some units to march in circles. Corps, divisions, and Supreme Command maintained their headquarters far from the front, which exacerbated command functions. Such communication problems remained unresolved.

  Now let us turn to a tragic, and perhaps preventable, chapter of the Carpathian campaign, the third Carpathian offensive, a miniature repeat of the earlier disastrous attempts, but just as disastrous for the participants. Only a major offensive had any chance to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. Could Conrad succeed?

  4

  The Third Offensive and Easter Battle

  End of the Carpathian Winter War

  If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.  Sun Tzu, The Art of War

  DESPITE THE FAILURE of his previous two Carpathian winter offensives, Conrad von Hötzendorf pursued the same failed strategy for his third and final campaign. The last phase produced further pointless bloodshed and culminated in the surrender of Fortress Przemyśl on 22 March 1915. The new Habsburg offensive, which was delayed to garner additional artillery support, nevertheless proved inadequate against the well-fortified Russian positions. The plan’s initial objective—to gain control of Loziov swiftly—faltered, and the additional time required to move artillery units forward provided the Russians ample opportunity to counterattack.

  On 22 March 1915, the reinforced Habsburg V Corps prepared its assault; just three days before, a breakout attempt by the Fortress Przemyśl garrison had proved unsuccessful. The Habsburgs should have coordinated the two operations; instead, the isolated V Corps offensive, conducted by weak, recently defeated troops, proved a dismal failure. Once Fortress Przemyśl capitulated, Habsburg Supreme Command’s focus should have shifted to creating a strong reserve force to meet new contingencies, but its failure to do so destroyed any chance for success.

  As in the prior two offensives, Russian numerical superiority bled the attacking Habsburg V Corps white. The Second Army offensive terminated on 14 March, and the next day, the Russians attacked the Dzial ridges, a Stutzpunkt, or stronghold, on the Habsburg front. One after the other, XIX Corps relinquished positions seized earlier at tremendous sacrifice. General Tersztyánsky ordered his group to establish a strong defensive line while facing the daunting task of preventing an extensive retreat.

  Conrad realized that his weak offensive troop strength, further diminished by weather-related illnesses such as frostbite, could not pierce enemy lines.1 The Second Army’s new mission remained unchanged, despite its remote chance for success. Even Conrad’s aide-de-camp noted that Habsburg troops had reached the limit of their endurance and that further exertion could only result in disaster. The Dual Monarchy must either persevere or seek peace.2 Conrad again rationalized the failure to relieve Fortress Przemyśl to Foreign Minister Burian, stressing the problems caused by the unexpected severe winter weather.3 The unfavorable military situation made further negotiations with Rome imperative, and Berlin pressured for their immediate implementation.4

  Group Tersztyánsky’s troops grew apathetic, and Second Army reported increasing physical and moral depression. Conrad’s aide-de-camp reported that Böhm-Ermolli also sank into a state of depression after losing 40,000 of his 95,000 troops. Significantly, and contradicting official casualty sources, only 6,000 of these losses resulted from battle; the rest were from frostbite and sickness.5 Many troops still lacked shelter, and squalid, unhygienic conditions abounded. V Corps recorded widespread intestinal illness among its ranks, while 4 percent of Second Army troops reported to sick call. Frostbite permeated the ranks, and reports of typhus drastically increased.6

  On 15 March Conrad reported to the emperor’s military chancellery that Fortress Przemyśl must surrender by 24 March, and again, he accused his German ally of disloyal conduct in negotiations with Italy. Conrad blamed South Army’s battlefield failures for the sudden reversal of Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s initially successful offensive efforts.7 Fortress Przemyśl could not expect relief; nevertheless, the mobile fortress troops must launch a breakout attempt to join the field army. With little confidence in the effort’s success, Conrad nevertheless refused to surrender the fortress without some honorable k.u.k. military effort.

  Meanwhile, Böhm-Ermolli reported that his attack group could not attain its objective by 22 March. Thus, on 20 March, only V Corps and some Group Szurmay troops (Second Army’s extreme eastern flank) would be available to continue the attempt to relieve the embattled fortress. Success depended on simultaneous offensive action from neighboring units; however, Group Szurmay’s left flank forces unexpectedly could not participate in the new mission because of enemy attacks against it between 17 and 19 March. Group Tersztyánsky, in turn, would merely demonstrate on its front.8

  In a 15 March telegram, General Falkenhayn informed Conrad that he would not be able to transfer the requested German troops to the Carpathian front in time to affect the fate of Fortress Przemyśl. Nonetheless, Falkenhayn continued pressuring Conrad to use his influence in Vienna to encourage Habsburg diplomats to negotiate with Rome and Bucharest. The mood at Habsburg Supreme Headquarters remained somber.9 Foreign Minister Burian had meanwhile decided to back off his hard-line stance toward Italy and consider territorial concessions to Rome.

  Between the termination of the Second Army’s recent offensive efforts on 14 March and Russia’s unanticipated offensive on 20 March, preparations commenced for the V Corps’ right flank attack to coincide with a Fortress Przemyśl breakout attempt. Meanwhile, Second Army troops desperately required rehabilitation to restore their battle worth, but although the second offensive effort had exacted a severe toll, Conrad ordered yet another attack. Traversing the 100 kilometers of mountain terrain to Fortress Przemyśl would prove futile, partially because major Russian defensive forces blocked the Habsburg attack route. Battered Habsburg forces had to cross treacherous mountain terrain in harsh weather conditions against a well-prepared foe. Citing the Fortress Przemyśl crisis, Conrad initially set 16 March for the new offensive launch date. The fortress garrison could reputedly survive one more week, but given the severe time constraints, relieving the besieged fortress seemed impossible.

  As melting snow exacerbated battlefield conditions, there was no rest for Habsburg troops as the Russians continued to hurl superior numbers against XIX Corps positions, forcing further retreat. An overwhelming Russian counterattack compelled the 29th Infantry Division to surrender its positions. On 16 March, Conrad summarized his failed Second Army offensive experience: sixteen and a half divisions (136,000 men), of which nine (72,000 troops) comprised the main attack force, launched an unsuccessful attempt to rescue Fortress Przemyśl. Conrad cited the deplorable conditions as a main obstacle to success, reiterating that frostbite and other weather-related illnesses caused the most losses. He also emphasized the enemy’s tenacity and admitted that if the forthcoming Fortress Przemyśl breakout attempt failed, the fortress would have to surrender.10

  For the next major operation, XIX Corps must consolidate the situation at Wola Michova and renew its offensive after receiving replacement troops. Fourth and South armies needed to bind opposing enemy forces to prevent the diversion of significant troop numbers against the weak Second Army effort. Once Third Army recovered its strength, it must join the offensive endeavors, but it must maintain its present positions until then.11 The volatile nationality issue reappeared: captured Czech prisoners of war in Habsburg uniforms that originally served wit
h Infantry Regiment 36 (10th Infantry Division) now served as czarist reconnaissance troops, wearing Habsburg uniforms to infiltrate their former front lines. Habsburg troops shot them when captured.

  Conrad deemed it essential not to surrender Fortress Przemyśl without a final heroic military action; therefore, the starving garrison must launch a breakout attempt “to maintain the honor of the army.” The futile effort commenced on 19 March, utilizing as many garrison troops as possible. Even the Austrian official history conceded the remote chance of success for such an undertaking. Conrad insisted that an “honorable” military effort was necessary to maintain home front support for the war and soldier and civilian morale. Fearing the political and psychological repercussions of the fortress’ capitulation, Habsburg military leaders made it a primary objective, “cost what it will.”12

  Generals Conrad and Kusmanek exchanged telegrams concerning the fortress breakout direction. Considering the deteriorating garrison food situation and the troops’ declining physical condition, General Kusmanek proposed launching the effort in a southeasterly direction. Conrad disagreed with Kusmanek and pressured him to reconsider his suggestion. Destruction of the fortress works and military equipment would commence on 21 March. The breakout force would consist of twelve to fifteen infantry battalions, each with 700 men.13 Kusmanek initially acknowledged that the Russian deployment configuration would preclude a breakout effort in a southerly direction. On 16 March, however, he altered his decision and announced that he would launch his effort toward Lemberg, scene of the disastrous 1914 opening campaign. Conrad, however, continued to insist that Kusmanek support the forthcoming Second Army relieving offensive, but Kusmanek refused; his troops would advance toward Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s positions in the eastern Carpathian Mountains.

  Conrad, in the interim, ordered the transfer of all possible troops from Second Army’s battered western to its new eastern flank offensive positions. However, the final attack troop numbers proved too inconsequential to achieve battlefield success. Conrad emphasized the importance of coordinating this minioffensive effort with South Army, but an unanticipated Russian attack against XIX Corps prevented the transfer of more than its weakened 31st Infantry Division to V Corps for the offensive mission. The V Corps attack would advance toward the fortress in a northeasterly direction.

  On the eve of the fortress breakout attempt, the garrison troops’ mood was somber, while health conditions continued to deteriorate. No one within the fortress believed that the effort could succeed. Instead, many participating troops hoped to become prisoners of war. Any chance for success required complete surprise, which the Habsburg armies had rarely achieved during the war. As they later learned, the Russians had broken the Habsburg cipher code and thus prepared for each effort.

  The debilitated condition of Kusmanek’s troops influenced his selection of advance direction. Landsturm Infantry Regiment 16 troops reported only 25 to 30 percent in good health. Landsturm Infantry Regiment 9 and only half of Landsturm Infantry Regiment 33 were deemed fit for duty. Given the troops’ poor physical condition, Kusmanek ordered the breakout attempt toward the supposedly weakest sector of the siege front, reputedly defended by czarist third-line national guard units, rather than the difficult mountain terrain Conrad suggested.14 The effort failed when Kusmanek’s troops struck the enemy’s fortified defensive positions.

  With familiar tragic consequences, Fortress Przemyśl again influenced Second Army operations. Conrad realized that timely relief would not be forthcoming; nevertheless, he ordered the mobile fortress troops to launch an ill-fated breakout attempt. The promise of replenishing food supplies at enemy depots along the advance route motivated the famished troops. Attacking soldiers received an extra food ration as well as a rest day before the operation. Meanwhile, between 1 and 10 March, the number of fortress troops that reported to sick call had climbed to 12,140, lightly wounded to 6,900.15 The enemy, aware of the proposed attack details, readjusted their troop and artillery positions accordingly. The ill-fated venture, launched with two infantry divisions and three infantry brigades, resulted in heavy human toll. The Russians later claimed to have captured 110 officers and 4,000 men during the failed attempt. The 23rd Honvéd Infantry Division and Waitzendorfer sacrificed 3,000 men, with the former sustaining an incredible 70 percent casualty rate. The 97th Landsturm Infantry Brigade suffered between 1,500 and 2,000 casualties, while Honvéd Infantry Regiment 2 lost 54 officers and 2,600 men.16

  The Habsburgs publicly portrayed the military fiasco as a heroic deed; the publication of numerous self-serving congratulatory radiograms between the doomed fortress headquarters and the emperor’s military chancellery followed to glorify the senseless sacrifice. Previous battle had already overtaxed fortress medical services before the 19 March endeavor. Now 1,500 wounded troops and 1,000 cholera patients received treatment, while the task of preventing epidemic outbreaks posed enormous burdens for the medical corps personnel. Cholera, typhus, and dysentery permeated the ranks.17 Then the wounded from the failed breakout attempt arrived in dire need of medical attention. The fortress attempted no further missions after the seven-hour heroic battle because of the troops’ utter exhaustion.

  Meanwhile, the Russians pressed into the Solinka and Wetlinska valleys, whereupon Second Army’s mission became to halt further enemy egress into those areas. The third Carpathian offensive’s initial objective remained to seize the enemy position at Loziov, then advance further along the ridgelines.18 In the interim, V Corps attempted to move its main defensive line to the high terrain extending from Polonina–Wetlinska. At these new positions, corps troops enjoyed improved food and supply delivery while gaining some relief from the previous inhospitable environment. The Polonina–Wetlinska position provided a panoramic view of the entire San River Valley with clear weather, contrary to the former Habsburg positions on the northern slope of the Dzial ridge, which lacked shelter and provided inadequate defensive conditions.

  V Corps attack preparations required three days, mainly to transport supporting artillery into the mountains. On 17 March, the corps engaged in a moderate evening firefight while the 31st Infantry Division began assembling for the offensive endeavor.19 Meanwhile, Group Tersztyánsky and XVIII Corps had to maintain their positions. The projected attack front proved too narrow to achieve a timely relief of the embattled fortress. Furthermore, no plans existed to reinforce neighboring Group Szurmay so it could participate in the operation or provide the necessary additional labor units to prepare and maintain roadways for the mission.

  Fourth Army’s reinforced southern flank forces must continue their offensive efforts along both sides of Gorlice–Jaslo. Troops had to transport artillery through deep snow, which retarded its movement.20 After a twenty-four-hour delay, four Fourth Army infantry divisions (8th, 10th, 12th, and 39th Infantry Divisions) attacked at Gorlice, but the effort failed. Enemy defensive positions, as anticipated, proved too strong, and the failure to move artillery forward in a timely manner hindered the attacking infantry. Wasted effort and heavy casualties resulted.21 Just six weeks later, on 2 May 1915, the Central Powers achieved their greatest victory of the war during the Gorlice–Tarnov campaign in the same area. A German army provided the manpower for that successful operation.22

  Third Army’s mission was to prevent the enemy from diverting significant numbers against Fourth Army. Once they assimilated the anticipated replacement troops into the ranks, Third Army would again launch an attack from its right flank positions. Second Army, meanwhile, must maintain its western flank positions until its replacement troops arrived while preparing its inadequate eastern flank forces to launch the attack. South Army would continue its offensive operations while Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin defended its western flank positions and its right flank units advanced to the east.23 Preparations for the new offensive included accelerated road maintenance efforts because of the unfavorable prevailing conditions and the provision of available winter issue uniforms necessary to maintain ba
ttle readiness. The operation commenced days after the fortress’s 19 March breakout effort had failed. Habsburg Supreme Command did not inform Second Army or V Corps of the unsuccessful fortress attempt before their own efforts.24

  During 18 March, persistent melting conditions in the lower valley and heavy snow in the higher elevations ensured that the transport of artillery to the new attack positions remained a daunting task. The vital 1,200 pack animals received inadequate care to keep them healthy. Delays in initiating important operational measures, such as the proper positioning of artillery and the necessity to establish telephone connections for reconnaissance missions, greatly assisted Russian counteractions.

  On 17 March, seven-battalion-strong Group Lieb, assisted by the seven additional artillery batteries, received the mission to attack Loziov, then secure the surrounding high terrain on 20 March.25 Group Szurmay left flank forces demonstrated to support the operation. A Group Felix, also consisting of seven infantry battalions, would follow Group Lieb, while V Corps’ 33rd and 37th Honvéd Infantry Divisions attacked on their front areas. On 19 March, General Conrad ordered strict adherence to the systematic and careful preparations for the new Carpathian offensive. Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin must be reinforced to continue both preventing the Russians from advancing westward and supporting South Army attempts to traverse the mountains.

  On 20 March a glacier snowstorm struck, halting all forward movement. No wounded soldiers could be evacuated because an icy snow cover again blanketed the entire front. A veteran colonel stationed on the front described the situation:

  On 20 March a snowstorm breaks over us with a ferocity found only in glacial regions. All forward movement ceases; no wounded can be evacuated; entire lines of riflemen are covered as if by a white blanket. The icy ground, sanded smooth by storm, is impassible; digging in is impossible; the infantry stands without cover and unable to move in front of the enemy’s defensive works; the artillery is several days march behind.26