Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  Returning to Second Army and its eastern flank retreat movement, which would compromise the vital Uzsok Pass positions, South Army Command strongly protested the possible surrender of this critical position, over which so much blood had spilled. Second Army command, citing heavy casualties and its troops’ extreme fatigue, responded that Group Szurmay had no choice but to retreat.110 South Army’s General Linsingen, however, convinced Conrad to order Second Army not to evacuate the vital pass area. Eventually Conrad transferred South Army to this portion of the Second Army front, once Böhm-Ermolli’s troops had retreated.111 Conrad ordered Group Szurmay to defend the Uzsok Pass area, where it would now join an extended South Army flank position. The group must maintain that front while shifting its left flank positions rearward to maintain contact with retreating Second Army forces. The Second Army retreat also raised the danger of enemy troops being able to maneuver behind the Beskid Mountain ridges south of Mezölaborcz, enabling the Russians to seize the Homonna area. To avert this dangerous possibility, Conrad attempted to transfer four battered and depleted Third Army X Corps divisions (2nd, 21st, 24th, and 45th Infantry Divisions) to the Second Army, but events soon intervened to alter the situation. At the same time, Conrad transferred Group Szurmay (7th, 38th, and 40th Infantry Divisions and Honvéd Infantry Brigade 128) from Second to South Army to hold the Uzsok Pass.112

  The escalating threat to Third Army’s right flank lines delayed the decision of whether their units could transfer to bolster the Second Army. The German Beskiden Corps would eventually relieve the four decimated X Corps infantry divisions on the front lines.113 The German corps deployed, after delays from railroad technical difficulties, at the Third Army’s threatened eastern flank. Meanwhile, major battle erupted in the East Beskid region.114 Successful enemy attacks between the Laborcz and Virava valleys against exhausted defending Habsburg troops raised the question of whether X Corps could maintain its positions until the Beskiden Corps arrived.

  On 2 April, heavy snowfall, interlaced with freezing rain, limited events on the Second Army front. One supply route section that required constant maintenance became impassable for artillery and heavy wagons, while the slippery, frozen terrain rendered it unsuitable for large supply columns. Only lighter Polish wagons and horses could traverse the terrain. All available labor units kept the critical XIX Corps supply route open as front-line soldiers assisted in the thankless efforts.115 A serious and perpetual shortcoming of Habsburg artillery, particularly heavy guns, during the three Carpathian Mountain campaigns resulted in the inability to counter effective Russian heavy artillery. The rapidly deteriorating military situation prompted multiple corps commanders to transfer their artillery units back from the front areas, partially because of shell shortages, the difficulties encountered in weapon emplacement, and the continued retreat movements, which worsened an already untenable situation.

  Group Szurmay and V Corps now must defend Uzsok Pass and the strategic Ung Valley. When 37th Honvéd Infantry Division troops marched to that valley, its 2,600 soldiers desperately required rehabilitation.116 Both V Corps divisions remained in terrible condition; in the meantime, Group Szurmay repulsed multiple enemy attacks. As the Second Army retreat commenced, enemy troops crossed the San River to attack 37th Honvéd Infantry Division positions, forcing it and the 31st Infantry Division to retreat.117 The situation had become so dangerous that ammunition would only be transported to the front when absolutely necessary.118

  Czarist forces smashed into XVIII Corps, defending a nineteen-kilometer front with 14,334 troops. Strong enemy forces then pierced the Polonina–Wetlinska defensive lines. XVIII Corps, possessing only one weak reserve battalion, had to retreat through Cisna. The Russians struck Infantry Regiment 25 during a heavy snowstorm that hindered the defenders’ visibility. The 31st Infantry Division command reported that the overwhelming demands placed on its troops, the precipitous decline in troop numbers, and the lack of either reserve troops or reinforcements made it impossible to maintain its lines. Two meters of snow shrouded mountain positions, while the rocky terrain made it impossible to find shelter, resulting in further cases of frostbite. The combined troop strength of Infantry Regiments 38 and 44 and Bosnian-Herzegovinian Regiment 3 was only 1,000 soldiers. Troop conditions remained deplorable, and the constant battle since 22 January led to physical and moral depression, as well as apathy.119

  Conrad ordered the battered XIX Corps to maintain the high terrain at Kiczera until the 29th Infantry Division could retreat. Corps artillery had to withdraw at night, making its rearward movement much more difficult. The 41st Honvéd Infantry Division also retreated, but it ruptured its connection to the main Beskid ridges.120 Corps Schmidt, defending a thirteen-kilometer front with only 12, 240 troops, joined the retreat movement.

  An interesting sidelight to the deteriorating Habsburg situation involved the personal interchanges between the South Army commander, General Linsingen, and Second Army’s Böhm-Ermolli. As the Second Army retreat commenced on 2 April, Linsingen declared that the army’s retrograde movement was unnecessary. Conrad then offered Linsingen a Second Army division because he would soon extend South Army’s front (Linsingen had consistently attempted to enlarge his command radius and garner additional reinforcements), but he responded that he would not accept a defeated and retreating division from another army.121 Noting the mutual accusations exchanged between Habsburg Second and Third Army commands, Colonel Schneller, section leader of the General Staff Italian Group, scorned the helplessness of the Second Army. Each army blamed the other for its unfavorable situation, leading Schneller to write that the “Big Brother” (the Germans) would resolve the multiple military difficulties.122

  When Conrad approved the transfer of Group Szurmay to General Linsingen’s command, he ordered that it maintain its present positions and not join the Second Army retreat. This extended the South Army front from sixty to one hundred kilometers; its western flank positions now stretched from the Styr River west over Uzsok Pass. Linsingen convinced Conrad that if his left flank units retreated, the Russians could capture the important Ung Valley railroad and roadways connecting to the Uzsok Pass. Group Szurmay therefore shortened its front beside the South Army left flank positions. This specific area witnessed heavy battle during the first week of April, as the Russians’ advance toward the Ung Valley seriously threatened South Army’s flank units.

  Böhm-Ermolli initially intended the Second Army to retreat behind the main Carpathian ridgelines to blockade the critical Ung Valley and Uzsok Pass southwest of Fenyvesvölgy. His extreme right flank positions, in that case, would anchor at the Styr River. Meanwhile, he and his chief of staff protested the transfer of Group Szurmay to the South Army and requested that they both be relieved of their commands, but Conrad flatly denied the request.123 Another rift had occurred between Habsburg and German General Staff officers. On 2 April, the Russians unleashed another major attack against the hapless X Corps. The corps subsequently retreated an additional four kilometers, further depressing the already-low troop morale and increasing the possibility of other divisions having to follow suit.124 The east Laborcz Valley region remained a decisive battlefront. Possessing no reserve forces, the enemy pressure continued to sap any remaining X Corps’ strength; 2nd Infantry Division had again dwindled down to 2,000 men.

  The Beskiden Corps, after its rail delays, finally arrived behind the Third Army rear echelon. The corps troops then navigated a difficult eighteen-kilometer stretch of inhospitable terrain when they approached the X Corps front. The 21st and 24th Infantry Divisions initially held their positions.125 Its 25th Infantry Division buttressed X Corps’ 2nd and 24th Infantry Division inner flanks, while its 35th Reserve and 4th Infantry Divisions assumed positions behind the battered corps to bolster the decimated Habsburg divisions. The German reinforcements thereby formed a barricade to the Beskid invasion route into Hungary. General Marwitz, its corps commander, immediately ordered X Corps to hold its present positions, while his German 2
5th Reserve Division launched a counterattack and quickly advanced.126

  Meanwhile, when the enemy offensive against Third Army finally stalled then halted, Second Army had to resist Russian hammer blows for a few more days. XVIII Corps retreated south of the Wetlina Valley ridgelines without enemy pressure. Troops had to shovel snow along the retreat route while maintaining close contact with X Corps, but the enemy did not immediately cross the Wetlina River. XVIII Corps could barely delay further Russian attacks. Deep snow made footpaths along the ridges dangerous for movement.127 Russian failure to rapidly pursue the retreating troops spared additional serious losses. V Corps’ retreat, aided by foggy conditions and no enemy interference, severed its connections to XVIII Corps.128 Labor units and civilians hastily constructed new defensive positions and attempted to maintain traversable routes. V Corps Command meanwhile submitted inaccurate and misleading reports to army command, while its corps supply trains fled the battle area.129

  The renewed Russian attacks against Third Army’s right flank positions interfered with Second Army’s urgent need for reinforcements from that army. This affected the mentioned V Corps retreat. While repulsing numerous enemy attacks, Group Szurmay also had to secure the gap between it and V Corps positions.130 The question remained whether to transfer Third Army’s battered X Corps’ 2nd, 21st, 24th, and 45th Infantry Divisions to Second Army. The decision depended on whether to launch an offensive against the unrelenting enemy thrust against Third Army or support Second Army in its continuing travail. General Tersztyánsky ordered that his present positions be held as long as possible, so rear-guard units temporarily blocked his forward frontier ridgelines.131 The rearward transfer of artillery units received priority.132 Although more advantageous for Second Army in the present situation, the army’s new resistance lines were not as formidable as the former Beskid ridge positions. The enemy meanwhile attempted to extend its previous military successes by attacking Second Army’s right flank positions.

  Though X Corps’ situation improved somewhat on 3 April, its 21st and 24th Infantry Division positions became dangerously exposed when three-sided enemy fire forced the 2nd Infantry Division to retreat, opening a six-kilometer gap at its flank. The 81st and 82nd Russian Reserve Divisions, participants in the earlier Fortress Przemyśl siege, now compounded X Corps’ desperate situation. The 21st Infantry Division, which received the order to maintain its lines until German reinforcements arrived, had its connection to X Corps severed, making it vulnerable to an enemy flank attack.133 It retreated when the Russians attacked 2nd Infantry Division flanks; heavy losses exacerbated both divisions’ depressed state.134

  Between 1 and 3 April, Group Szurmay encountered many difficulties moving its supplies, ammunition, and, in particular, artillery to the front. The inhospitable forest terrain required significant troop numbers just to maintain the corps positions. General Szurmay’s left flank units retreated with the Second Army rearward movements, but in the interim, South Army’s situation had also become critical.135 As Second Army’s left flank units retreated, the Russians invaded the Ung Valley, seriously threatening both V Corps and Group Szurmay. This caused Szurmay to request reinforcements to prevent the Russians from advancing through Patakafalu in the Ung Valley.136 The Russians also attacked neighboring VII Corps’ 17th Infantry Division lines when X Corps commenced its retreat, also forcing that corps to retreat. Labor crews began to prepare a second retreat route, while just three companies of reserve troops were available to reinforce the threatened lines.137 The Habsburg military situation had become so critical that General Bolfras of the emperor’s military chancellery stated, “We are on the verge of catastrophe, the existence of the monarchy is anyone’s guess.”138

  Difficult terrain conditions on its extended front also contributed to Second Army losses. Army Group Tersztyánsky protected a thirty-kilometer front with 40,000 soldiers, while 5,600 XVIII Corps troops defended a fourteen-kilometer area.139 General Tersztyánsky estimated that his 40,000 soldiers opposed 90,000 enemy troops as battle erupted at his right flank. If his forces must retreat, it would unhinge at least an entire corps front.140 XIX Corps’ 29th, 34th, 41st, and portions of the 9th and 27th Infantry Divisions now consisted of only 25,728 soldiers, or the equivalent of one and a half full-stand divisions. Corps Schmidt’s 13th, 32nd, 43rd, and portions of the 27th, 31st, and 44th Infantry Divisions numbered only 12,240 soldiers (less than one full-stand division). Battle reduced Infantry Regiments 25 and 76 to 5,083 troops on 30 March, then 2,180 by 3 April.141 In the interim, when XIX Corps’ 29th and 43rd Infantry Divisions retreated, its 13th and 41st Honvéd Infantry Division fronts became threatened. The Russians attacked the battle-weary XVII Corps’ 1st Landsturm Brigade, then hurled the corps’ right flank units back, recreating a gap between Third and Fourth armies’ inner flanks. Third Army’s right flank forces withdrew to the next Beskid ridgeline defensive positions.142

  The excessive lack of artillery pieces through loss and damage remained persistent problems. Entire batteries fell silent, either from guns in repair or lack of shells. Ten Second Army field howitzer batteries required repair.143 The lengthy turnaround time for such service signified that many guns remained out of action for long periods. Troops abandoned artillery during their many retreats. A Second Army advantage: after its early April retreat, it had shortened its supply and march approaches, and it could now deploy numerous additional artillery batteries in the forward front lines, at last providing adequate artillery support for the defending troops.

  On 3 April an artillery captain recorded that his troops’ “recent rehabilitation” lasted only one or two days. He bemoaned the enormous Russian artillery numerical superiority, and the fact that even the slightest noise led to knee-jerk reactions by his troops. He related that moving his company’s artillery pieces eight kilometers required twenty-four hours, noting that the Russians were obviously cognizant of Habsburg artillery positions and concentrated their heaviest guns to counter them. This forced periodic battery position changes, which required the preparation and movement to new gun emplacements on inhospitable mountain terrain. Intermittent periods of melting temperatures worsened the situation by turning the ground into a quagmire. During his troops’ short rest period, he normally placed his soldiers in an infection hospital to restore their nerves. The unit desperately needed reinforcements, and its cannons required repair.144

  The shortage of weaponry remained a significant problem. The Austrian Steyr factory produced only 20,000 rifles during March, the lone Hungarian factory 8,000. War Minister Krobatin claimed that with an additional 200,000 weapons, he could transfer a similar number of troops to the front.145 Artillery was also in short supply: only seventy new guns were presently available. Conrad became infuriated with Second Army leadership when repeated localized enemy breakthroughs caused some commanders to surrender entire front positions, immediately threatening neighboring units. Conrad threatened to remove any commander who surrendered his front lines without proper reason.

  Second Army defended its thin lines to protect Hungary until late April. Retreating over major ridgelines during early April, the mountainous terrain separated the various units that would later reunite. When Russian assaults hurled the Third Army left flank positions rearward, only Fourth Army’s right flank threat to the advancing enemy prevented catastrophe. The question remained: could Habsburg troop numbers prove sufficient to halt the unrelenting enemy onslaught? Only the last Hungarian Carpathian frontier ridges now separated Second Army from the enemy.

  XVIII Corps’ battlefield state was indicative of other Carpathian front units. Blizzard conditions prevented the effective corps cooperation necessary to offset Russian numerical superiority. Severe losses devastated the corps, and no hope existed for reinforcements. Deep snow provided some cover for the weary surviving troops, who remained in constant danger of a surprise enemy attack.146 Meanwhile, the increasing emergence of nationality problems exacerbated the situation. On 3 April, Prague Infantry Re
giment 28 numbered approximately 2,000 men. By the evening of 4 April, only 150 men remained. At least three companies of nonwounded soldiers surrendered to the enemy without firing a shot. This created a dangerous situation for the neighboring 8th Infantry Division, whose exposed flank sustained numerous casualties.147 This incident became the most infamous example of reputed Czech treasonable activity and one of the first mass desertions during the war, but contrary to some historiographical accounts, the regimental band did not march across the freezing mountain terrain covered with a meter of snow! In actuality, enemy fire had almost completely decimated the regiment’s officer and noncommissioned officer corps, and the unit received inadequately trained and armed troops. In addition, the Ersatz troops received their rifles upon arrival at the front, where they encountered bitter cold temperatures while in an indefensible position. Archduke Friedrich dissolved the regiment in this early example of mass desertion. Military High Command utilized the incident to attempt to expand its authority over the Bohemian civil administration because it had failed to halt subversive activities.

  On Easter Sunday, unarmed Russian soldiers climbed out of their trenches on the Habsburg Fourth Army front and at Fortress Przemyśl’s perimeter to present gifts to their opponents. The Habsburg soldiers reciprocated on the Orthodox holiday. Conversely, on the Carpathian front, savage battle continued. The case of Infantry Regiment 42 provides important insight on the constant difficulties encountered in transporting supplies, as its trains required five hours to move four kilometers on a 400-meter incline path. The snow-covered Beskid ridges disrupted all operations. By day, troops could find themselves knee-deep in water; by night, they endured bone-chilling conditions. Thousands of animals perished.

  The Habsburg army needed to maintain its positions on 4 April, although Second Army surrendered additional terrain. Superior czarist numbers overpowered Second Army’s vanguard units protecting the main Beskid ridgeline.148 On 4 and 5 April, the Russians stormed the Kobila heights, initiating a week-long bloody battle over that czarist objective. During a strategy meeting to discuss cooperative V and XVIII Corps missions, V Corps commander received orders to prevent an enemy breakthrough into the Ung Valley, specifically at Patakujfalu. Group Szurmay must cooperate with V and XVIII Corps to repel the persistent Russian assaults. With its 14,000 soldiers, V Corps needed to prevent the incessant enemy attempts to break through its positions and establish a foothold in the Uzsok and Patakujfalu basins. The corps must launch counterattacks rather than just remain in a defensive mode, while corps commanders had to utilize the difficult conditions to create confusion at the enemy’s flank and rear positions and drive them out of the wooded terrain.149