Blood on the Snow

by Graydon A Tunstall

  General Ludendorff wrote to Moltke, the former German chief of the General Staff, concerning the Habsburg ally, stating, “In reading the deceitful reports from the Austrian General Staff, the Austrians are not really fighting against numerical superiority. The officer corps is incapable of resistance, the Austrians retreat without battle. We will support them or be beaten; because of the Balkans we cannot allow them to be defeated.”150 This opinion was not unique to Ludendorff; many German officers shared his view.

  On 5 April, Third Army’s middle front suffered further severe setbacks, retreating almost ten kilometers, or half the distance to the important area of Sztropko. Simultaneously, the Russians smashed the Habsburg Third and Fourth armies’ inner flank connections.151 Thus, the overpowering czarist military successes against Third Army also threatened Second Army. The Beskiden Corps commander paid particular attention to the Second Army retreat movement because of its potential effect on his own flank security. All X and Beskiden Corps forces became engaged in battle, but once their situation stabilized, they would transfer the first available Habsburg units to Second Army.152 The enemy progress against Second Army also forced Group Szurmay’s left flank positions rearward. The Russians finally succeeded in breaking into the Ung Valley—their goal was to seize Czeremcha, which finally occurred on 11 April after fierce battle.

  The terrain conditions continued to significantly influence Second Army battlefield events, limiting fighting to skirmishes or small battles. The perceived Russian objective to penetrate the army’s western flank positions demanded that they deploy all available reserve forces behind the XIX Corps’ right flank area to prevent local setbacks that could produce even greater crisis. XVIII Corps received the last available Habsburg reserves, so none remained for XIX Corps’ extended front. The Russians expanded their attack to Kozialta, which developed into a bloody battle.153

  A discussion relative to Group Tersztyánsky’s strategy on 5 April emphasized that it must maintain and improve its positions as well as cooperate with neighboring units. It also needed to utilize terrain features to launch offensive thrusts at enemy flank positions and counterattacks. Conrad and the Second Army commander would not accept passive leadership and made the creation of reserve formations to conduct offensive operations a priority. They would transfer additional artillery units forward since the newly established Second Army defensive terrain favored the deployment of additional guns. Several approach roadways to the army’s new positions became available, expediting supply and troop movement, as well as presenting far better maintenance conditions than experienced earlier along the higher mountain ridgeline elevations. The military situation demanded that the Second Army lines hold regardless of the circumstances.154

  It was crucial that Italy remain neutral to avoid another war theater that could prove fatal to Austria-Hungary. The Habsburgs had no troops to prevent Italy and Romania from invading the Dual Monarchy to gain their perceived irredenta. The present Carpathian Mountain defensive lines must therefore hold, despite Second Army’s crumbling front and South Army Group Szurmay’s buckling defensive positions. Intelligence reports surmised that Italy probably would not declare war during the latter half of April if the present Habsburg lines held. Launching an offensive against Serbia, as suggested again by General Falkenhayn, lacked purpose, particularly in the present dire circumstances. Nor, they argued, would a Western front victory influence Romania and Italy’s stance, whose rapt attention focused on the Carpathian Mountain campaign to determine their further actions.

  In early April, it appeared that the enemy would finally puncture the flimsy lines of Third Army’s X Corps. Between 2 and 5 April, the Russians extended their attacks against the hapless corps, but this time to no avail. Any X Corps or reinforcing Beskiden Corps advance required cooperation with the VII Corps right flank units, but the Russians continued to batter those positions. In addition, the enemy pierced the XIX Corps’ 41st Honvéd Infantry Division’s right flank position and broke through XVII Corps’ front. Possessing no reserve troops, VII Corps could not rectify the situation after the breaching of its 1st Landsturm Brigade lines on 3 April during a snowstorm. The setback created far-reaching effects on the Third Army’s right flank positions, including a twelve-kilometer retreat. VII Corps, although absorbing enormous losses, halted the Russian attacks, but a XVII Corps retreat forced V and VII Corps to follow suit. It became questionable whether the new Second Army defensive line would hold, and it raised the question whether the Beskiden Corps should halt its initial successful offensive effort because of the neighboring army’s (Second) deteriorating situation. On Easter Monday, the Beskiden Corps conquered the eastern Laborcz Valley Kobila position. However, Army Group Tersztyánsky’s repeated setbacks threatened to destabilize the entire Second Army situation. Successful operations hinged on the formation of strong reserve forces, but where would they come from?155 All available troops and auxiliary forces struggled merely to maintain their porous defensive lines. The situation of Second Army’s right flank position remained so critical that they requested replacement troops before they had completed their basic training.

  On 6 April, the Russians began a major offensive against Third Army south of Mezölaborcz and also attacked the Second Army. This resulted in a request for Third Army to transfer its four combat-fatigued X Corps divisions to buttress Böhm-Ermolli’s buckling lines. Meanwhile, just before the Russians seized the important Polonina-Wetlinska positions, the defending infantry received orders to hold the heights positions until the removal of supply trains.156 Only one route existed for the retreating supply trains to Cisna. Corps Schmidt likewise initiated a retreat, while XVIII Corps left flank units retreated without enemy effect.157 The Russians broke through defending lines between Kozialta and Nagypolany.

  The Russians then unleashed a powerful attack against VII Corps positions at Sztropko. Second Army required reinforcements merely to hold its lines, so Conrad ordered Fourth Army to transfer yet another of its divisions as soon as possible. It became the 51st Honvéd Infantry Division.158 In the interim, VII Corps’ 1st Landsturm Brigade, with its lines broken through, increased the danger of a czarist envelopment. Moreover, there were still no available reserve forces.159 Meanwhile, the Beskiden Corps commander ordered that X Corps’ 21st Infantry Division prepare for transfer to Second Army because of its serious setbacks (General Marwitz took command of the X Corps, as well as the German Beskiden Corps). Combat entangled all four X Corps divisions, so none could transfer. Meanwhile, the increasingly dire Third Army situation led to a countermanding order relative to transferring any of its troops to Second Army.160

  Russian attacks also struck the new V Corps left flank defensive positions on the dominating heights northeast of Patakafalu, intended to protect the Ung Valley railroad line and roads. The Russians fully recognized the strategic importance of the area. Meanwhile, the early arrival of the inadequately trained IX and X March Battalions (originally scheduled to arrive on 20 April) led Conrad to contemplate planning a renewed general offensive along the entire Carpathian front. Although the battered Habsburg army required reinforcements just to defend its elastic defense lines, Conrad considered attacking again.

  The Russians meanwhile focused their attention on the Ung Valley, in particular between the Second and South armies’ inner flanks. Enemy forces penetrated Second Army lines at three locations, and on 7, 8, and 11 April, the Russians again stormed Group Szurmay’s positions. The group’s situation remained critical for several days, while on 8 April the enemy launched an assault against its battered forces in the Kiczera area, where they drove the 7th Infantry Division back to the entrance of the pass. Lacking reinforcements, General Szurmay would be unable to maintain his positions much longer, particularly when his middle units retreated to the Uzsok Pass, but the left flank held at Czeremcha.161 Yet by mid April, despite all the repeated crises, Habsburg lines held, setting the stage for the successful early May 1915 Gorlice–Tarnov campaign. On the Russian
side, they no longer possessed adequate reserves to exploit their advantageous position to invade Hungary.

  At the same time, improved weather conditions led to a renewed Russian thrust against Second Army’s western flank positions. The arrival of the 51st Honvéd Infantry Division, however, helped terminate the enemy threat by 13 April. German General Hoffmann, meanwhile, summed up the situation in the Northwest front: “We have constructed strong positions everywhere which enables us to remain on the defensive, although seven divisions have been transferred to the Austrians and we have received few reinforcements from the west.”162

  On 8 April Colonel Schneller, section chief of the “I” (Italian) Group, reported that Italy failed to respond to Vienna’s recent diplomatic proposals, but that he did not consider its activity as indicating a serious escalation of the situation. Rome still awaited further Carpathian battlefield developments, such as a Russian victory, before a final decision. In an 8 April telegram to Conrad, General Falkenhayn insisted that the problematic Italian situation might still turn out favorably, and that the eastern campaign required all of the Habsburg forces for the Russian operation. However, if Italy entered the war, he insisted that its initial military efforts would be limited to attempting to occupy disputed irredenta areas. Therefore, there should be no diversion of significant fighting forces to the Italian theater so that they could obtain a decisive Eastern front victory before having to worry about a third Habsburg front.163

  Conrad, on the contrary, insisted that Italy would not be content to occupy its irredenta objectives, reemphasizing that an Italian military intervention would decide the war. They could only prevent such a potential catastrophe by launching another major offensive against the Russians. Conrad insisted that they could not resist an Italian invasion simply because they lacked the troops necessary to counter invading Italian and Romanian forces because the majority of Habsburg troops remained occupied on the Eastern front. By the end of April, increased Italian and Romanian territorial demands made halting the czarist Carpathian threat even more imperative. As the Russians maintained their attacks, however, k.u.k. troops appeared increasingly incapable of maintaining an effective defense. Conrad again demanded the launching of a major offensive as early as possible and inquired about the creation of German formations as a new strategic reserve.164 He repeated his request for additional German divisions to counter Italy and Romania if they entered the war, but Falkenhayn denied it. Citing the deteriorating military situation, Falkenhayn replied that securing the Carpathian Mountain front took precedence over the Italian or Romanian fronts. Revealing his bitterness concerning the increasing dependence on his German ally, Conrad wrote, “I cannot begin to tell you how disgusted I am with the infiltration of German troops, but the head must rule quietly over the heart.”165 Conrad telegraphed Falkenhayn on 9 April, again requesting German reinforcements so that he could delay an invading Italian force if they declared war. He insisted that the Italians, not Vienna, intentionally dragged out negotiations, intending to intervene in the war at an advantageous moment.166 To his surprise, Falkenhayn then informed Conrad that he could transfer an additional German Corps to the Habsburg front. It would create an allied German-commanded army, but receive its orders from Habsburg Supreme Command.167 In a 10 April telegram to Falkenhayn, Conrad accepted the fact that they must obtain an Eastern front victory before he concerned himself with a potential Italian invasion; nevertheless, he repeated his request for seven German divisions for deployment against Italy. Achieving a rapid Eastern front victory depended upon maintaining the Carpathian front defenses—a much more difficult task after the surrender of Fortress Przemyśl and release of czarist siege troops to deploy on the major battlefield.168

  Meanwhile, as the Carpathian situation continued to deteriorate, the chief German liaison officer at Habsburg Supreme Command informed Conrad that he must maintain his present positions at all cost. General Cramon informed Falkenhayn that the Habsburg army displayed indications of imminent collapse. On the Carpathian front, the commander of a X Corps division panicked, resulting in the entire corps retreating. General Marwitz, commander of Beskiden Corps, relieved the commander of his position and reported to Conrad that both X Corps’ and neighboring Second Army’s morale remained poor because of the troops’ combat fatigue. Conrad then received a welcome telegraph confirming the transfer of German troops to the Carpathian front.169

  Incessant enemy assaults continued against the Second Army front, with some units sustaining 60 percent casualties in the weeklong battle. XIX Corps battled continually reinforced enemy contingents; thus, a counterattack failed, but troops neutralized enemy attacks against V and XVIII Corps. On 8 April, particularly adverse weather conditions intervened to affect the pace of battle.170 A 9 April intelligence report revealed that a czarist corps previously besieging Fortress Przemyśl now fought in the Beskid ridge battle. The enemy had also fielded major reserve forces in the Lupkov area. Russian troop numbers, however, appeared to be declining. Czarist Infantry Regiment 175 reputedly numbered only 40 to 80 soldiers, Regiments 50 and 139 approximately 100 troops, and Infantry Regiment 157 had 120 troops, while Infantry Regiment 13 fielded only 390 soldiers. The czarist enemy encountered increasing difficulties transporting food supplies, artillery, and troops to the front.171

  South Army finally achieved a significant victory after a bitter eight-week battle at the dominating Zvinin mountain range, a stark barrier to Styr River positions. Battle spread to both sides of the river, and the army repulsed additional enemy attacks. The German 1st Infantry Division defended against enemy attempts to regain the Zvinin mountain crest (an almost ten-kilometer-long barren slope) in meter-deep snow at −20°C degrees.172 South Army Command appealed for reinforcements to buttress its battered left flank positions, as the army repulsed relentless day and night enemy attacks.173

  Conrad repeated a threat to negotiate an agreement with the Russians so he could wage war against Italy.174 Meanwhile, on 6 April Falkenhayn, finally switching German emphasis from the Western front, commenced planning for a major Eastern front offensive operation, emphasizing that the major allied objective must now be to settle accounts with Russia. Falkenhayn insisted that Romania would not intervene even if Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary, but Conrad disagreed. He emphasized that if Vienna surrendered any of its German or Slavic territory to Rome, it would destroy the Dual Monarchy’s Great Power status. He reemphasized his request for German divisions to resist an Italian attack, but he thanked Falkenhayn for planning to transfer German troops to the Carpathian front when they became available and promised that he would maintain the present Habsburg defensive lines.175 During early morning on 11 April, the Russians launched yet another attack in the Laborcz and Olyka valleys, and extended their breakthrough in the Ondava Valley. The enemy attack collapsed 100 paces before the defensive barbed wire. The same day, the 41st Honvéd and 29th Infantry Divisions retreated following a powerful enemy thrust after they had initially repulsed several enemy assaults.

  On Army Group Pflanzer-Baltin’s eastern flank, German General Marschall’s newly formed cavalry force repulsed Russian advances. The Russians, by concentrating their military efforts on the Second Army front, ensured that the Germans’ 2 May Gorlice–Tarnov offensive would succeed because they lacked sufficient reserves to defend their rear echelon areas that the offensive targeted. They lacked the reserve forces because of the creation of Ninth Army to counter Pflanzer-Baltin’s success on his front. The new campaign would not commence earlier than the end of April to avoid the regional spring thaws. Replacement troops would also have replenished the severe Habsburg battlefield losses. Falkenhayn notified Conrad that he anticipated a French attack on the Western front, and thus German assistance depended on the “desperate” French offensive and threat of a major British attack. The unrelenting Second Army crisis caused Conrad to request two to three German divisions to ensure that the front held, but many more divisions could become necessary. Falkenhayn reiterated
that the Carpathian Mountain situation made rapid negotiations with Italy necessary, and that if Italy declared war, Romania would not.176

  Back on the battlefield, XIX Corps’ 29th Infantry Division faced potential disaster; it possessed no reserves and experienced heavy losses when the Russians renewed their attack and hurled it back. Meanwhile, the 41st Honvéd Infantry Division fended off enemy storm attacks that reached within a short distance of the defenders’ barbed wire. Possessing only one reserve company raised concern for a successful Habsburg defense of the Ondava Valley. Both divisions’ fronts were in shambles, but the equally exhausted Russians did not press their advantage. Meanwhile, the 51st Honvéd Infantry Division launched a counterattack on 12 April as the Habsburg troop morale consistently declined. Nevertheless, Corps Command ordered them to defend their positions to the point of total sacrifice.177 One can better understand the battlefield carnage by examining Second Army 11 April unit reports. By 10 April, the enormous slaughter of horses led to the deployment of cavalry troops as infantry. Infantry Regiments 81 and 88 numbers dropped 75 percent five days later. On 13 April, one Landwehr Infantry Regiment consisted of only three remaining officers and 340 men.178 The steadily worsening situation only enhanced the nationality problem. Significant numbers of Slavic soldiers deserted to the enemy.