In other words, any black soldiers coming into the 7th Division with an infantry MOS (4745)—the most common MOS coming out of basic training and in the replacement pipeline—would be assigned to 2d Ranger Company with no consideration for their lack of Airborne or Ranger qualifications. More importantly, these replacements would not be volunteers—despite the pleas of Airborne and Ranger recruiters. This was the inauspicious beginning of the era of complete racial integration.
It was well known that troop commanders up to the rank of Brigadier General feared the immediate wrath of General Almond. He had relieved the commander of the 31st Infantry, Colonel Richard P. Overshine, after the Inchon landing. He shook up Major General David Barr, division commander, and put the skids under him after the Hungnan evacuation. Several other commanders had risked mission failure rather than face Almond’s verbal outbursts. It is a wonder that Ferenbaugh skirted Almond’s order by keeping all of his black troops stashed in the 2d Rangers, regardless of MOS (including quartermaster, ordnance, artillery, MP, and bandsmen), rather than sending them back to 8th Army. Perhaps Ferenbaugh guessed that the 7th Division soon would be moved from the control of X Corps, or that MacArthur, Almond’s benefactor, would soon be relieved by President Harry Truman.31 This shift of the 7th Division to the IX Corps, when it happened, was a blessing for the Buffalo Rangers. In retrospect, the fact that 2d Ranger Company remained attached to the 7th ID—a division to which black troops had never before been assigned—and under the benevolent command of Ferenbaugh was downright miraculous.
When the Army began integrating its personnel, men of all races had the opportunity to analyze and respond to myths fabricated by society and examine stereotypes firsthand. Predictions such as Van Houten’s “You people won’t fight when you get to Korea!” were disproved by valiant service in combat. On an individual basis, soldiers began relating to people of different races and began realizing that our main concerns, challenges, and problems usually were very similar. Families, the future of our children, and coming home safely were the top priorities of nearly every soldier—regardless of the color of his skin. Soldiers were beginning to construct their own opinions. As time passed, the Buffalo Rangers dealt with traditional, or alleged, stories that had been told of people of a different color. Direct knowledge and experience provided explanations for those things that previously could only be imagined. We lived and died together, formed friendships together, and established lifelong relationships—particularly with those men of our sister unit, 4th Ranger Company—that often knew no color.
On 1 July 1951, General Ridgway’s proposal to deactivate the 24th Infantry Division and begin integrating the U.S. Army in Korea was approved by the Department of the Army. In order to ensure across-the-board desegregation, the service established a goal that every Army unit in Korea should contain an equal percentage of African American personnel. Within a short time, however, the laudatory goal presented the Army in Korea with a problem: if a disproportionate number of black soldiers were sent to Korea, what should be done with the additional black personnel? The solution was obvious to proponents of desegregation: they should be distributed among and integrated into units throughout the Army worldwide.
Supporters and opponents of integration alike realized that merely desegregating the portion of the Army that was fighting in Korea was logistically impossible. If the military’s system of deployment, training, and personnel rotation was to remain operational, distinctions based on race would either have to be maintained everywhere or nowhere. Thus, barring the cessation of integration entirely, it was only a matter of time before desegregation occurred throughout the Army. Additionally, the success of desegregation in Korea made arguing that integration should not occur elsewhere impossible. With that in mind, the U.S. Army’s European Command in April 1952 began implementing a plan to integrate all of the troops under its jurisdiction, using the Army in Korea as a model. The desegregation of Army units around the world gradually followed. Ironically, as painstakingly slow as this process seemed, by the time the U.S. Supreme Court ruled segregation unconstitutional in its landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision on 17 May 1954, the Armed Forces had already pioneered the road to integration.
Chapter 6
Attack and Defense of Hill 581, 20–21 May 1951
“Ranger Bill Weathersbee and some of his friends were cleaning their weapons when a rifle company from the 7th Infantry Division came through their positions to continue after the Chinese. The rifle company commander was astounded at the level of carnage he found. He halted his company and asked the Rangers questions about the action. The company commander then faced his unit and said in a loud voice, ‘I want all of you to look around. This is what happens to the enemy when soldiers don’t panic.’ The company commander then faced the Rangers and said, ‘Gentlemen, I salute you.’ With a snappy salute, he moved his men on.”
—Rangers in Korea32
The battle for Hill 581 was one of the largest that 2d Ranger Company participated in while attached to the 31st Infantry Regiment. The 31st was nicknamed “The Polar Bears” because its regimental crest contained a polar bear standing in the upright position, with the unit motto, pro patria (“for country” in Latin), inscribed below it.
During its first five months of service in Korea, the 31st Infantry had three commanders: Colonel Richard P. Overshine, who was relieved by General Almond; Colonel Allan D. MacLean, who was killed at Chosin; and Colonel John A. Gavin, a 1932 West Point graduate who didn’t appear to have the “fire and brimstone” needed at the time. In early March 1951, General Almond sent Colonel William J. McCaffrey, who had served on Almond’s staff in the 92d Infantry (Buffalo) Division in Italy during WWII, and was the current X Corps Deputy Chief of Staff, to command the 31st. Although the regiment appeared to be the weakest of the three, its regimental colors carried emblems of historic service from Philippines/Siberia (1916-1920), Philippines/Shanghai (19211945), and Japan/Korea (1946-1949, extended to 1953).
Second Company departed Hill 210, Chipon-ni, by foot march at 1700 hours on 17 May 1951. It arrived at the rear area at 0600 hours on 18 May. Its mission was to attack and hold Hill 581. The attack would begin at approximately 1500 hours. A roster of personnel departing on R&R leave showed only three officers, but actually four—Captain Allen and Lieutenants Pryor, Freeman, and Anthony—departed, with eleven enlisted men. This brought the strength available for line duty down to three officers (Queen, Cliette, and Wilburn) and fewer than eighty men. Wilburn remained with the unit rear detachment to coordinate all supply, mess, and administrative duties, and also to act as XO.
The Rangers were attached to the 1/31st for the attack. Queen doesn’t recall meeting the Battalion CO or anyone from his staff for the attack order. The terrain was familiar to Queen because this was the same hill from which he had executed a night withdrawal about two weeks earlier. The Rangers didn’t have any attachments from the Heavy Weapons Company or a forward observer (Artillery or Mortars). There was only enough manpower to form two platoons, each of approximately 32 men plus a Ranger medic; a 60mm mortar squad; and a small command group. Each platoon had a three-man LMG team with about six BARs per platoon. Queen put Cliette in the lead with his 3d Platoon, followed by the command group, then Master Sergeant George Rankins with a combination 1st/2d Platoon with the mortar squad in the middle of it. The point fire team in Cliette’s platoon contained Privates First Class Isaac Grasty, Jr., Winston M. Jackson, James Hardy, and William K. Mathis. Some of these men were part of the group of ten leg replacements General Ferenbaugh had allowed to be transferred in from the group of more than 400 who were sent to 2d Ranger Company for special training in early April. The ten who remained with 2d Ranger Company made up a fire team trained by Higginbotham. Grasty called Mathis “The Get-Away Man” because he could run so fast. Mathis had been a college track star before enlisting, and his speed made him an asset as a radio operator because his ability to outrun others helped keep the radio secure. Rad
io operators often had to be close to an advancing enemy force in order to radio their exact position back to other Army units, so they sometimes had to make a hasty escape after establishing their position in order to keep themselves and their radio out of enemy hands.
The advance was made in column of platoons. Sergeant Marion Alston, Communication (Commo) Sergeant, was carrying an SCR–300 on the battalion command net. Corporal Ray H. Rhone, Jr., radio operator for Cliette, was also on the battalion command net. During platoon-sized long-range patrol operations along the COPL (Combat Outpost Line), the platoons frequently operated in this manner because they were almost always out of Company range.
Queen remained near the combined platoon because it did not have an officer—not that he had any doubt about Rankins’ ability. But this was the first time that the ten new legs were going into heavy action. Thus far they had performed in a satisfactory manner.
About 1000 hours, Battalion notified Queen that an air strike using P-51 or P-47 aircraft would hit the forward (northwest) slopes of Hill 581. The general direction of the attack was toward the southwest. Mathis put the air-ground identification panel on the back of his pack because his fire team was in the lead. “The Get-Away Man’s” task was to outrun any aircraft that came too close. The air strike was performed by three aircraft that came directly over the long axis of the company’s formation and advance. The air strike dropped napalm about a third of the way up the hill.
The company had worked its way about two-thirds of the way to the top when the point team was surprised by an outpost of two or three Chinese. The enemy popped up only forty yards away and managed to run over the crest and disappear. Queen looked at Mathis, the point man, and exclaimed, “Before the day is over, you are going to regret passing those enemy soldiers!”
When the Rangers reached the top of Hill 581, they reported in to Battalion. The firefight started a little after noon when both sides met at the top of Hill 581. The lead Ranger platoon pushed over the crest and was greeted by a fusillade of automatic fire, mainly from burp guns. The initial flurry of bullets skimmed through the trees at shoulder level, clipping off leaves and branches. The lead troops hit the ground and returned fire. Several men were wounded. The most seriously injured Ranger was Sergeant Kirk P. Adkins, who was hit in the chest and dropped to the right front of the command group. Queen rushed over and dragged him back while Alston ran up to the front, using his M-1 to provide covering fire. Sergeant Leroy White, who frequently carried a camera, also ran up to provide covering fire. Queen gave up Adkins when Rankins and Courts arrived to carry him away. Because 2d Ranger Company lacked attached forward observers, Queen would have handled the fire missions while Captain Allen deployed the company. Since Allen was absent, Queen performed both functions.
Queen got Alston back to his side and radioed Battalion. From a prone position with his field glasses he looked across the front and down into the valley falling away to the south. What appeared to be an enemy battalion was approaching the hill from the southwest. Doc Rabbit (Thomas), the company’s medic, was working on Adkins, whose chest wound was so severe that if he did not get back to the aid station for helicopter evacuation he would likely die.
The firefight continued with small arms through most of the afternoon. Neither side was able to advance, and the enemy seemed to be testing out the Rangers’s strength with advance units. The main force, estimated at battalion strength, was moving into an assembly area for the main attack. While simultaneously attempting to control and deploy the company, Queen called fire missions in to Battalion over the command net by relaying the coordinates and asking for harassment and interdiction fire to break up the enemy firepower.
Unable to advance, Queen was ordered to hold the company in position. He placed Cliette’s 3d Platoon up on the line to the right of the combination 1st/2d Platoon. The 1st and 2d Platoons were located in a heavily wooded area with dense undergrowth. Runners from the 1st Platoon reached the Company CP by walking behind their positions to the left because of the dense vegetation. Cliette warned Queen about an unmarked minefield in the right rear of his position. Cliette remembered the field from a previous mission when 2d Ranger Company had been a covering force for the withdrawal of another battalion. The 1st Platoon covered the left side of the hill. Since this area was open, the mortar squad was placed behind 1st Platoon within Queen’s voice range. The mortars were deployed on a shallow ridge on the reverse slope of the crest. There was no company reserve.
When the Rangers began running low on ammunition, Queen remembered that 2d Ranger Company had buried some extra ammo in the 60mm mortar pits on the hill about two weeks earlier. All he had to do now was find the pits and hope the ammo had not disappeared or been dug up by the enemy. While waiting for a re-supply from Battalion, some machine gun and mortar ammo was found and distributed. Queen told the Rangers hauling the wounded back to the aid station to return with ammo. He didn’t expect the laborers of the civilian Korean Army Service and Labor Corps (KASLC) to come up to their positions because they were non-combatants. He believed that when they saw all of the wounded 2d Ranger Company had suffered, non-combatants would balk at approaching the front unless they had some very close and forceful escorts. With his front spread thin and ammunition running low, Queen tried to organize the men in groups of two or three for mutual support, because no word of weapons attachment had been received or was really expected. Grenade booby traps were rigged to provide a warning to cover any remaining gaps in the line.
The volume of enemy fire and length of contact convinced the experienced Queen that he was facing a reinforced regular enemy battalion and not a guerrilla battalion, and that the enemy was employing a two-company pronged attack. Reinforcements and artillery support would be needed if the enemy mounted a sustained or heavier attack. The ridge was too narrow and steep for a jeep to climb, and it would take another company two to four hours to make a flanking move to support 2d Ranger Company. There was, however, another rifle company behind 2d Ranger Company’s position, and some of the enemy small arms fire was passing over the 2d’s position and hitting the rifle company and Battalion Headquarters strung out behind them lower down on the ridge. Queen contacted Battalion and called in artillery fire to defend the 2d’s flanks. Supporting artillery positions were situated in the valley to their left flank, meaning they fired at a right angle to the 2d’s position. A lot of this fire was either too long or short because of the steep and narrow ridge line where the Rangers had set up their positions. Queen tried to plot pre-arranged defensive concentrations, but to do so he had to close the sheaf (concentrated) or zero in one gun and then have the remainder close on it. Otherwise, the result would be a scattered battery time on target (TOT) that would almost certainly rain friendly fire into the company perimeter. By dusk, Queen had made good adjustment of fire to cover the front and right flank of the 2d’s positions.
During the fighting, Corporal Ralph W. Sutton was shot in the left side of his chest. He died quickly. Sergeants Posey and Weathersbee were detailed to remove Sutton’s body from Hill 581 and take it to the aid station. When they arrived with Sutton’s corpse, they found a re-supply point next to the aid station and a number of Korean laborers with carrying racks—A-frame packs used to carry items on their backs. Posey and Weathersbee loaded the laborers with small arms ammunition, machine gun ammunition, grenades, mortar rounds, and C-rations and departed for Hill 581. When they arrived at the company’s position, they passed out ammunition and food just before dusk fell and returned the Korean laborers to a safe point away from the firing line. The enemy started a series of probing attacks just as the sergeants regained their former positions. The attacks would continue all night with great severity.
About dark (1900-2000 hours), a sergeant from the Battalion Weapons Company reported into the Company CP (a two-man foxhole) with a Machine Gun Section of about eight men. He either had two LMGs or one LMG and one HMG with LMG tripods. Queen told him to take a position in the center bet
ween the two platoons along the hill’s crest. During the first hours of darkness, the enemy continued to probe 2d Ranger Company’s lines, mainly on the right in Cliette’s platoon area. Cliette needed help and called for it, so Queen moved the artillery rounds closer and closer until the shell bursts sent shrapnel into the trees in their immediate area. Although pressed hard, Queen hesitated to call for an air burst because they had not had time to dig in very deep—just slit-trench positions—or to erect overhead shelter. Despite the intensity of the fighting, the 2d suffered only a few light small arms casualties. Not everyone was so fortunate. By midnight, the sergeant from the Battalion Weapons Company made his way to Queen, told him all of his men were wounded, and that he was pulling out.
About 0300 hours, Cliette reported that the enemy had infiltrated into some of his positions. Queen ordered him to pull back to the ridge line by going to the left behind the combined 1st/2d Platoon. Queen then ordered 1st Platoon to draw back on a line with the Company CP (about twenty yards). The enemy was mounting an all-out attack, but without mortar support. Earlier, Queen had gone down to the 60mm mortar position and told Andrade to drop some rounds to the immediate front and over to the front and flank of the 3d Platoon. The mortarmen fired so rapidly that the base cap on the mortar tube blew off and disabled it. Wells, a light machine gun man, discovered his weapon was so hot that the rounds went off as soon as they entered the chamber—without his having to pull the trigger. Wells had fired his weapon from the hip and most of his ammunition was now gone. With his position in peril, Queen gave the word for the company to withdraw down the ridge line to Company A’s area because it was time to call artillery fire in on their current position. All this time Queen’s calls for artillery were being sent over the Battalion Command Radio Net and relayed to the Artillery Liaison Officer. Queen knew he was located close by because he could hear him repeat what he had said. The lieutenant, into whose area Queen had withdrawn, seemed a little frightened by the chaotic nighttime events. Queen’s withdrawal might have looked to him as if the Chinese had broken through. The unnamed lieutenant told Queen that he had taken some casualties from the enemy fire that passed above 2d Ranger Company. Corporals Jacob Mason and Carl Hall manned an LMG on the right flank of 3d Platoon and provided covering fire for the platoon during the Chinese assault and subsequent platoon withdrawal.
Edward L. Posey Page 13
