Aerial border skirmishes with the Luftwaffe continued. Some 36 German bombers penetrated Swiss air space on June 1 and were attacked over Lake Neuchâtel. Swiss Me-109s shot down two German He-111 bombers. Orders found in the downed planes read: “Caution when flying over Swiss territory!”118 The next day, one of several He- 111s coming from Geneva-Rolle was shot down by a Swiss fighter near Yverdon.119
By June 4, the last remnants of the British Army arrived in England after evacuation from Dunkirk. Winston Churchill made his famous speech to the House of Commons that day, in which he declared, “we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be. We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.”120 Having seen almost all of continental Europe swallowed up by tyranny, the Swiss took heart from this cry of defiance. It expressed their attitude precisely.
As Churchill spoke, 29 German planes—He-111 bombers and Me-110 Destroyers—were engaging a dozen Swiss planes, mostly Me- 109s, over Chaux-de-Fonds in western Switzerland. Two of the Luftwaffe planes and one Swiss plane were shot down. This time, the German aircraft had the following order: “Lure the Swiss fighters into battle and shoot down as many as possible.”121
On June 8, it was David against Goliath again: 15 Swiss aircraft engaged 28 Luftwaffe planes, resulting in the downing of an old Swiss biplane and a Swiss Me-109 and on the German side one crash and two forced landings.122 The Germans claimed that the Swiss had attacked first over France, but the claim was inconsistent with evidence of the location of the Luftwaffe crashes. Diplomatic notes threatened that “the German Reich reserves the right to take any measures necessary for the prevention of attacks of this nature,” and warned: “In event of any repetition of such incidents, the Reich will dispense with written communications and resort to other means of safeguarding German interests.”123
The Swiss General Staff replied on June 9 that no Swiss plane had flown over foreign territory. That same day, a Swiss observation plane was shot down ten miles inside Switzerland by six Luftwaffe fighters. A German plane was forced down in the same vicinity. Ten miles west of Bienne, a Swiss pilot was hit by two bullets in a dogfight. Near Triengen, another German plane was forced down.124
On June 9, in Berlin, a memorandum by the Luftwaffe General Staff, entitled “neutrality violation in Switzerland,” noted “the Führer himself has taken care of the further treatment of this issue. The Führer should be supplied directly with all material detailed from Luftwaffe General Staff concerning the dogfights with Swiss planes.”125
In retaliation, Hermann Goering devised “Operation Wartegau,” under which German intelligence sent terrorists to blow up aircraft and other targets. “Wartegau” meant a future Nazi administrative unit. On June 16, seven German and two Swiss saboteurs traveled from Berlin to blow up the Altdorf munitions plant and the Payerne and Dübendorf air bases. The plan was amateurish, and the Swiss apprehended the saboteurs with large amounts of explosives on a train. The terrorists were sentenced to life imprisonment.126
Meanwhile, the Germans unsuccessfully demanded the return of the Messerschmitt aircraft the Swiss had purchased before the war.127 While the Swiss-German air war was not statistically significant in the overall Allied-Axis conflict, the Swiss victories—eleven Luftwaffe aircraft shot down to only three Swiss—inspired confidence and strengthened further the will to resist.128
Five Swiss were killed and fifty injured at Geneva and Renens, near the French border, from bombs accidentally dropped by the British on June 12.129 The British apologized.130
The French government now fled Paris, which was occupied by the Germans on June 14. Not a shot was fired to defend the city.131 The next day, large posters appeared all over Switzerland advising the public of what to do in the event of a parachute invasion.132 On the 16th, Guderian’s panzers circled behind the Maginot Line near the Swiss border.133
For some time, the Gestapo had been spying on the Swiss. Gestapo agents were ordered to gather intelligence on “everything related to the military and political war of the New Europe against the Jewish democracies and Bolshevism” and “the cooperation of the Swiss authorities with our enemies and their intelligence services.”134 As they did for other targeted countries, the Gestapo prepared lists of Swiss citizens to be seized at the beginning of a military occupation that included politicians, journalists, Jews, army officers and any other potentially hostile persons. The individuals were divided among those who would be executed, sent to prison camps or simply kept under close surveillance.135
The Swiss captured one team of Nazi infiltrators, dispatched by Goering. Later in June it was found that other saboteurs had cut cables set by the Swiss to ignite mines under a bridge over the Rhine. Such activities would continue throughout the war. It was assumed that Nazi sabotage would precede a military assault. To pave the way for invasion, public buildings and newspaper offices would be torched, while bombs would explode on trains and rail stations, and in the homes of leaders. Once the fifth column prepared the way, according to Nazi theory, a blitzkrieg would finish off the Swiss.136
On June 17, the new French Premier, Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain, sought an armistice. Hitler replied that he would have to consult with his ally, Mussolini, who had jumped into the war after the Wehrmacht victory was all but complete.137 In Bern that same day, German Minister Otto Köcher and Italian Minister Attilio Tamaro discussed dividing up Switzerland between their two countries.138
The Führer and the Duce met the next day in Munich to discuss their triumph and also the question of Switzerland. They noted that Switzerland would be totally cut off by the occupation of France and should be expected to make accommodations to the new reality in Europe.139 There was discussion and some confusion over possible action against Switzerland.140 Hitler desired its conquest, but Mussolini’s forces had performed badly against the French, especially in the mountainous terrain adjacent to Switzerland. The time was not yet ripe for an assault, at least if the Germans expected to coordinate their attack with the Italians.141
For Hitler, however, the question of the conquest of Switzerland was only a matter of timing. Aside from its democratic ideology and its refusal to acknowledge the inevitable supremacy of the Reich, Switzerland irritated the Führer because of her control of the transportation routes over the Alps, allowing her to restrict Axis traffic.142
Beginning on the 16th, the Germans moving south in France pushed to the Swiss border. Forty-two thousand French and Polish soldiers fleeing the Germans, including the entire Polish 2nd Rifle Division, crossed into Switzerland seeking asylum.143 They brought with them huge quantities of arms and ammunition, which they surrendered to the custody of the Swiss. It was ironic that such a large force would lay down their arms and escape to internment in a country whose soldiers were ordered never to retreat and to fight to the death with the last cartridge and the bayonet. Nevertheless, the Polish division was interned with its formations intact. An officers’ school was established and the Poles continued to train in internment. If Switzerland had been invaded, the Poles would have been quickly rearmed and would have had a chance to fight the Nazis again.
On June 22, 1940, the French government capitulated, the Battle of France having lasted only six weeks.144 The armistice was signed two days later. The final version left Switzerland with only one non- Axis border: the unoccupied area known as Vichy France. The German negotiators received a demand from the Wehrmacht High Command (OKW) just fifteen minutes too late (after the armistice was signed) that German troops occupy French territory adjacent to Switzerland in order “to lock Switzerland completely.”145 Nonetheless, the Swiss were now effectively surrounded and stood in the way of the geographical integration of the Axis powers.
The German SS intelligence service (Sicherheitsdienst, or SD) mocked Switzerland in its internal publication Announcements from the Reich, dated June 24, as a criminal “cheese state” that, bec
ause of her stand against Germany, should “vanish.”146 Three days later, the SD insisted:
One cannot forgive this state, that it has turned into the reservoir of all restless elements, that for years to come will pose the biggest opposition against Germany. Again and again the demand is raised, “Switzerland must quickly be swallowed,” “Switzerland must not be allowed to stay out of the reorganization of Europe.”147
On June 24, the day after his triumphal march into Paris, Adolf Hitler had a celebration. Before the party began, he had been in a rage because Mussolini’s inability to win on the battlefield had meant an equal inability to win in French-Italian negotiations. This obstructed Hitler’s plans to surround Switzerland completely and control her external transit. A rail connection stood intact, giving the Swiss access through Vichy France. Hitler also blamed the OKW, the German military command, for this situation.148 The Germans had been unsuccessful in a last-minute attempt, ordered by Hitler, to destroy the rail connection allowing Switzerland access to the outside world. Saboteurs would continue to try to explode rail bridges but would be unable to halt Swiss trade.149
Since virtually the entire Swiss population could have been expected to fight had the Wehrmacht invaded, one can easily imagine Swiss resistance as infantry units and individual sharpshooters firing at German soldiers from behind rocks in the mountains. While much resistance would have taken this form, army units were often assigned to fixed positions with orders not to retreat or surrender. Many of these fixed positions were fortified.
The principal area of Swiss mountain defenses was bounded by three immense fortified areas at key mountain passes: Sargans in the east, Gotthard in the central south, and St. Maurice in the west.150 Instead of three single forts, each area was a series of fortifications stretching over hundreds of square kilometers, most of which were rugged and impassable mountain terrain.
The eastward stronghold of this Réduit National was the Sargans fortifications. Amid steep mountain rocks jutting up into the sky, the Rhine Valley opens up here at the border with Austria. The tiny principality of Liechtenstein forms part of the border. Construction of the fortifications began with the Austrian Anschluss in 1938 and was completed in 1943. Within the triangle made by these fortifications, all ground was within range of heavy cannon. The cannon, many disguised, peeked out of towering mountain cliffs. No matter how an invader came in, he would be greeted by heavy artillery fire aimed precisely over many kilometers.151
In addition to the large fortifications—which were essentially underground buildings inside mountains with scores of rooms holding hundreds of soldiers and complete with air-ventilation systems and electric generators—there were about 150 medium-sized fortifications and hundreds of small ones, all ready to spew out cannon, mortar, and machine-gun fire. Some of the Sargans fortifications are still used for military training and exercises.
This was definitely not panzer country. Tanks would have had access only through narrow valley routes, with little or no room for maneuver, and the bridges and roads were rigged with explosives. Nor were the fortifications vulnerable to Luftwaffe attacks. Positions were concealed in cliffs and protected by thick steel and several meters of concrete or rock. German espionage secured photographs and maps of some of the Sargans fortifications but were not informed about the extensive munitions reserves. Knowledge of its strength, together with ignorance of what else may have been hidden in the rocks, contributed to deterrence.
What is called the Plain of Sargans could more aptly be called the Valley of Death. German invaders attacking from Austria would have been pummeled from all sides with projectiles ranging from 7.5mm rifle cartridges to 10.5cm heavy-gun shells. The border brigades could be mobilized in a mere 6 to 10 hours and would make use of plentiful natural cover as well as bunkers and blockhouses, many disguised as cottages, from which would spew machine-gun fire.152
Germans coming over the hills from Lake Constance would have found themselves bogged down in a swamp, unable to move and subjected to fire from all sides. The farmland in this area had been a malaria-infested swamp in earlier times, and a system of canals and dikes had been constructed that could release water within hours to flood the entire plain. The army tried the flooding procedure as an experiment in 1940. It worked like a charm—much to the chagrin of the local farmers.
The Gotthard fortifications in central southern Switzerland are in some of the most rugged mountains of the country. The terrain features glaciers at the top, massive cliffs and rock formations, and is more vertical than horizontal. Bunkers for cannon and machine guns are still hidden today on mountainsides over the few passes where an invader could attempt to enter.
Traditionally, commerce through the Gotthard Pass was impossible except across the Devil’s Bridge, near where Russian armies had defeated Napoleonic soldiers nearly two centuries earlier. Built with the help of French and German investors, the Gotthard tunnel opened rail traffic through this harsh environment in 1882. The Swiss threat to destroy the Gotthard tunnel in the event of a German invasion had to be taken very seriously in Berlin.
At the southern tip of the Gotthard, in northern Ticino, loomed Fort Airolo, its long-range guns facing in the direction of any Italian invasion. This was only the beginning of nature’s vast mountain fortresses which, with the firepower of the Swiss infantry, mountain troops and artillery, would have been a death trap for any Axis invaders.
While not of the massive size as those further south, fortifications at the northern borders were extensive and sophisticated. Underground living quarters and munitions storage were built under cannon with precise, long-range firing capacity on hills or mountainsides overlooking the Rhine River. One such fortification, today operated as a private museum open to the public, is Reuenthal, near Baden in northern Switzerland. It was one of a string of fortifications along the Rhine built in September 1939 at roughly the same places where the Romans built forts for protection against barbarians some two thousand years before.153
Cannon in bunkers were ready to fire at crossings of the Rhine. Machine-gun positions surrounded the cannon bunkers. The purpose of the border defense was to slow down the Germans to give the main defense time to form. Despite the losses they would have inflicted had the Germans invaded, it appears likely that the Swiss defenders at these border positions would all have been killed. The soldiers assigned to the border understood their role.
In response to continued German provocations, General Guisan issued an Order of the Day to the troops on June 3 declaring that the Swiss were “an armed people willing to preserve its independence and we must and can defend ourselves.” It warned the people not to be influenced by the war of nerves, apparently referring to German warnings that Swiss attacks on Nazi bombers were being investigated by the Germans to determine whether the planes were over Switzerland or France.154 The order continued:
Nobody can conceive without horror a foreign occupation, and the Swiss can and must defend themselves. The topography of the country is a first-rate ally, and the new methods of warfare will not take the Swiss unprepared. . . . To defeatist propaganda every one should oppose the spirit which animated the mountain-folk, who in 1291, when left to themselves, placed their confidence in themselves and in God. Thus will the country be strong and the Army quite ready. One order is ample: “Hold fast!”155
General Guisan issued a second order on the same day expressing strong religious feelings and reminding the soldiers that “spiritual preparation” was superior to “material preparation.” The General reminded the soldiers of the practice of the medieval warriors: “Our fathers knew this, and they bent the knee praying to God before every battle. If until now, nearly alone among the small countries of Europe, Switzerland has escaped the horrors of invasion, she must attribute it above all to divine protection.”156
Chapter 5
Fall 1940
Target Switzerland
AFTER THE FALL OF FRANCE, THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND immediately ordered preparations for an
invasion to end the existence of neutral Switzerland. It had become apparent that no country in Europe could stand up to a full-blooded Wehrmacht offensive, and the time had come for the vaunted “herdsmen” to see what a blitzkrieg could do. Germany would seize the northern four-fifths of the country, and Italy would seize the area south of a line from the Lake of Geneva to the east, including the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino.1
Swiss intelligence obtained information that, on June 24, 1940, Hitler discussed the question of Switzerland with his principal advisers: Goering, Keitel, Ribbentrop, Hess and Goebbels. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop favored an occupation of Switzerland. General Keitel opined that the goal could be reached through preparatory measures— intimidation—“without risking the sacrifice of some hundred thousand German soldiers with it.” While Swiss intelligence attempted to verify and keep abreast of the planning discussions taking place in Berlin, one fact remained clear: the Führer had his sights set on Switzerland.2
As the Germans celebrated the triumph over their historic antagonist, France, the guns were once again quiet; what nearly every observer and participant had expected to be a long, grueling campaign had instead concluded with an armistice after six weeks. Nevertheless, a concentration of German offensive forces began forming beyond the Swiss border between Geneva and Basel in the weeks following the French armistice. This latest German buildup took place just as the Swiss, responding to the declared armistice and thinking the immediate crisis had passed, were demobilizing to an active troop strength of 150,000.3
Target Switzerland Page 13
