General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, informed his army group commanders about the intended invasion. The attack would be led by General Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, whom Hitler would soon promote to field marshal. Von Leeb, who later commanded Army Group North in Russia, reconnoitered the terrain and gave the command for the “Sonderaufgabe (Special Task) Switzerland” to his Army Group C, which was allotted the 1st, 2nd, and 12th armies for the task. Various deployments proceeded near the border during the following two weeks, including the return of two mountain divisions from northern France.4
On June 25, the effective date of the armistice in France, Otto Wilhelm von Menges, a captain on the German General Staff, submitted a precise plan for an attack on Switzerland to the Army High Command. Proposing a surprise pincer attack by Wehrmacht troops from Germany and France and by Italian troops from the south, the idea was to fragment the Swiss Army and preclude it from being unified for further resistance in rugged mountain terrain. It would have as an objective, for political and strategic reasons, the speedy occupation of the economic resources and arms industry around Solothurn and would deny the Swiss time to destroy railroads, bridges and— especially—Alpine transit routes.5
The invasion plan included a detailed description of the German units and the precise points of their attack. It noted the weakness of the Swiss forces near the French border (by then there were German troops near Geneva and Lyons) and observed that reinforcing them would only weaken Swiss positions at the German border.6
The operation was initially created as a contingency plan that was meant to be carried out only if the armistice with France broke down. However, Swiss intelligence reported the Führer’s outbursts of fury against Switzerland, which also could have led to a sudden order to attack. In either event, Menges’ specific operational plan would have been executed. With the French armistice, the Führer now had sufficient forces to do so.7
On June 28, Leeb noted in his diary that “the 12th Army gets many mobile units and two mountain divisions. Should the total be aimed at Switzerland?” In the ensuing days, he continued to prepare for execution of his plan. At a July 11 General Staff meeting, Leeb noted that maneuvers should not be carried out under the watchful eyes of Swiss customs officials, and that the destroyed railroad bridges leading to the Swiss border had not been restored. He added in a revealing passage that these two points must be rectified “if the special task for Heeresgruppe [Army Group] C, even if at an uncertain time, is still being considered.” The “special task” was, of course, the invasion of Switzerland.8
Always one to play off his generals against one another, Hitler ordered the creation of another plan for invasion, to be prepared by Brigadier General Bernhard von Lossberg, who served on the Wehrmacht General Staff under General Alfred Jodl from 1939 until the end of the war.9 In a postwar book, Lossberg noted that early in the war it was recognized that passage through the Netherlands and Belgium to circle around the Maginot Line would be easier than moving through Switzerland. However, connections between the Axis countries would be better facilitated if the Swiss railroads could be made available not just for economic but also for military transport. Hitler was angry about reports of deliveries of precision engineering products from Switzerland to England. Moreover, he considered Switzerland a center of international espionage against Germany.10
Following Hitler’s orders, Jodl assigned Lossberg the task of developing an alternate plan for an attack on Switzerland. Lossberg recognized the geographic fact that only a small part of the country was militarily accessible: the plateau between the Jura and the Alps located from Basel to Geneva. Strong resistance there was expected from 50,000 soldiers supplemented by reserve forces. Lossberg wrote: “We recognized that the mountain-habituation and the freedom-loving character of the troops would make for stubborn resistance and probably also later small wars to contend with.”11 The study was transmitted to Jodl and, probably after presentation to Hitler, stayed on Jodl’s desk. The war in the East caused Swiss attack plans to be put aside for the moment.12
In France, repression began immediately after the armistice and German occupation. Posters appeared everywhere directing that firearms and radio transmitters be surrendered to the closest German occupation headquarters within 24 hours and also stated: “All those who would disobey this order or would commit any act of violence in the occupied lands against the German Army or against any of its troops will be condemned to death.”13
Partisan groups would disregard these threats and take up arms against the Nazis.14 The severity of the Nazi decree demonstrates how greatly they feared resistance by civilians.
A week before the surrender of France, German troops discovered documents abandoned by French ministers at La Charité-sur- Loire, a town west of Dijon, detailing the secret agreements between the Swiss and French for mutual assistance if the Germans attacked Switzerland, negotiated earlier by General Guisan. Because these documents could be used to challenge the “purity” of Swiss neutrality, the Germans would exploit these documents for political ends.15 At his conference with the Italian Ambassador Dino Alfieri on July 1 in the Führer’s headquarters, Hitler was outraged about the papers found at La Charité.16 In November, German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop discussed the documents with Hitler and cited them to support the plan to liquidate Switzerland. The Swiss became aware that the plans had fallen into German hands, and General Guisan could only wonder through the rest of the war when the secret would be used as a pretext for a Wehrmacht attack.17
On June 25, the future looked gloomy. Not only was Western Europe overrun by Nazis but the Nazi partner in the East—the Soviet Union—had conquered Finland and occupied part of Poland. The demonstrable effect of blitzkrieg warfare was frightening and had so far swept every enemy before it. The Swiss democracy stood alone in a continent of dictatorships.
On the night of June 24–25, 1940, when the German-French armistice became effective, General Guisan met with Chief of Staff Jakob Huber and other General Staff members to plan the defense of Switzerland from the National Redoubt.18 Guisan would write: “What mattered really was that the spiritual decision had been taken: the Chief of Staff and I had to be clear now in our own minds to what extreme degrees we must be prepared for all possible consequences of the Réduit policy.”19
A “Réduit” in the science of fortifications means a fortress built inside another, with the goal of prolonging the defense of the main fortress and driving the aggressor out.20 The strategy of the Réduit had been debated in theory since 1815. Defense at the frontier meant defense of 1,800 kilometers of border and fighting on the plateau, which the French experience against the Germans had earlier proved to be ineffective. The Réduit strategy, in contrast, was absolute and extreme: to concentrate the army in the most favorable defensive position, the Alps. The army would retreat to the Alps and the pre-Alps, extending east and west at the fortified zones of Sargans and Saint- Maurice, with its center the ancient fortification of St. Gotthard. Smaller forces would fight at the frontiers and in the plateau to delay the enemy’s progress. The decisive battle would take place in the Réduit, where the army would defend to the last. This was resistance, not retreat: the Réduit would not be a refuge for the army, but rather its chosen place of engagement.21
However, the Réduit strategy meant abandoning, after a fight by a limited number of troops, four-fifths of the Swiss population, including women and children, most of the industry (which would be destroyed) and a large part of the national heritage—profound considerations indeed for any military planner. The strategy was based on Guisan’s appreciation of the primary strategic motive of the Axis aggressors—to establish a direct territorial liaison between Germany and Italy. The Réduit strategy was based on the idea that the defense would be concentrated on the sector that was the principal objective of the aggressor. Using the strategy, the Swiss would destroy any hope of Axis north-south communication by controlling the St. Gotthard and Simplon pas
ses.22 The risk that the rest of the country would be lost would have to be taken, in view of the deterrent value of the defense plan that would deny the aggressor his most important objective.23
The configuration of the Alpine terrain was favorable for the execution of Guisan’s plan. German blitzkriegs elsewhere in Europe had demonstrated the superiority of modern offensive weapons, especially tanks and planes. Swiss anti-tank and anti-aircraft defenses were insufficient, especially for defense of the plateau, so defensive terrain had to be selected which would effectively counter superior German armaments. The high mountains would make it virtually impossible for the enemy to deploy these armaments with full force.24
The “Army Position” anticipated an attack from German territory, but was no longer viable after the fall of France in 1940. The defense of the Réduit National, ordered by General Guisan on July 17, 1940, concentrated Swiss forces in the Alps.
The Réduit strategy incorporated the previous orders that there would be no surrender. The border troops, who were supplied with ample ammunition, would resist until eliminated. The troops in the Mittelland (the Plateau) would do the same, further slowing the German advance. Finally, the troops in the Réduit would not only hold firm but would also conduct counterattacks in the Plateau and even the Jura. The Réduit was the chosen place of primary engagement and resistance, not a place of retreat.25
In short, as befit a small country facing far more numerous foes, Swiss strategy was one of dissuasion; total victory was not expected. Such a small nation could not win a war with Germany, but it could promise higher losses than would be worth the cost to the aggressor.26 While the Swiss General Staff planned to wage a war in which the army, or at least the forces concentrated in the Réduit, would remain intact, guerrilla war would also have occurred in the Alps and the Jura. No official plans had been made for guerrilla warfare in what would be occupied territory, but it had already been discussed among young officers and even by General Guisan himself.27
On July 12, General Guisan wrote Minister of Defense Minger outlining the new strategy of the Réduit National, which would replace existing plans. In the previous phase of the war, Guisan explained, border troops had been placed in fortifications, while the main Swiss strength was in the “Army Position,” stretching from Sargans in the east to Lake Zurich and the Limmat River, then along the Jura Mountains to Lake Neuchâtel, and finally to Lake Geneva. In case of aggression, prior to this point, help could have been expected from France.28
The fall of France and the entry of Italy into the war changed the situation. Attack could now come from any front, and there would be no assistance from any country. Further, since the signing of the French armistice, Germany and Italy had an increased interest in provoking new conflicts. The German Army in particular was at the height of its power, constantly needing new targets to showcase its strength. Democratic Switzerland already stood out in the redrawn map of Axis-controlled Europe, and both Germany and Italy coveted the transit lines across the Alps. Guisan continued:
Switzerland cannot escape the threat of a direct German attack unless the German high command, while preparing such an attack, becomes convinced that a war against us would be long and expensive, would uselessly and dangerously create a new battleground in the heart of Europe, and thus would jeopardize the execution of its other plans. . . . If we must be dragged into the struggle, we will sell our skin as dear as possible.29
The new military situation made the current division of the army between the Border Position and the Army Position untenable. The value of the border troops and their fortification works remained. However, the Army Position, which had been designed to protect most of the national territory against an attack from the north, would no longer be the crucial line of defense. The risk of an attack over any border, especially using modern methods featuring armored units, required a reduction in the density of forces assigned to fixed lines. Accordingly, General Guisan decided that “the defense of the territory will be organized according to a new principle, that of staggering in depth.” He instituted three main resistance echelons, including:
—the frontier troops, which would preserve their present positions;
—an advanced position of cover, which will use the outline of the present army position between Lake Zurich and the massif of Gempen and which will extend as a western front, bounded generally by the Bernese Jura and Neuchâtel– Morat–La Sarine until it reaches Bulle;
—a position of the Alps, or réduit national, that will be flanked at the east, west and south by fortresses, including Sargans, St. Maurice and the Gotthard.30
The mission of the border troops would be to maintain their position. The troops holding the advanced position would block attacks which sought to penetrate toward the country’s interior. The troops in the Alpine Réduit would hold their positions with the prepared stores, without retreat, for a maximum duration. Guisan also envisaged a fluid resistance:
Between these three echelons, the intermediate defensive system will include support points of anti-tank defense, constituting redoubts or nests of resistance, kept on all fronts. Their methods of combat will be inspired by those of guerrilla warfare as well as of the most recent lessons of the war.31
This mobile, intermediate defense line, in the form of light detachments and territorial troops, would carry out widespread destruction of bridges, roads and factories. As an unavoidable consequence, much of the civil population could not be protected. Some Swiss could be evacuated according to local circumstances, but in no event could the entire population enter the Réduit, which would compromise the success of operations and expend stores.32
Guisan has been recently criticized for planning to “abandon” Swiss civilians to Nazi occupation. To the extent that his strategy was the inverse of the border strategies adopted by other countries under German threat, the accusation against the Swiss commander-in-chief is superficially correct. However, Guisan’s strategy reflected not only the topography of Switzerland but also the reality of the Nazis’ blitzkrieg warfare. The other small countries of Europe, as well as France, that massed their troops in border areas fell within a matter of days or weeks to blitzkrieg tactics. Their armies were quickly defeated and their entire populations subsequently placed under Nazi rule. By conceding that all of Switzerland’s people, particularly those in the north, could not be protected against a Wehrmacht invasion, Guisan’s Réduit strategy ensured that the Swiss Army would be able to continue the fight indefinitely. Considering Clausewitz’s dictum that mere occupation of ground is useless unless the main forces of the enemy have been destroyed, occupation of Switzerland’s plateau would have availed the Germans little if the Swiss Army remained intact, well supplied and capable of operations from inaccessible terrain in the Alps. Guisan’s plan presented a strategic dilemma, in turn, to the German General Staff, which, despite drawing up elaborate plans for conquest in 1940 and in future years, would never confidently advocate a commitment of German forces against the Réduit. Switzerland would remain the only nation among Germany’s neighbors whose military preparations deterred an attempt at annexation or invasion.
The Federal Council approved Guisan’s strategy, and on July 20 Operations Order No. 12 was issued to the corps commanders. Troop lines would extend from the foothills below the Alps around the fortresses of Sargans in the east to St. Maurice in the west. The southerly position would be the high Alpine border near Italy. In the center would be the St. Gotthard Pass, surrounded by valleys with some industry and tunnels filled with munitions and fuel. Only a fifth of the population lived in this area.33
On June 25, the same day that Guisan secretly authorized total resistance in the Réduit, Federal President Marcel Pilet-Golaz delivered a radio address that suggested acceptance of the new reality in Europe and advocated appeasement.34 (One is tempted to call Pilet-Golaz the Chamberlain of Switzerland because of his ambivalence. He alternated between co-signing orders with Guisan and making accommodating remarks about th
e New Order.)
Defeatist in tone and in spirit, the radio speech warned the people to adapt to the new situation and urged the Swiss to rely on the leadership and authority of the Federal Council. This was a chilling recommendation for many Swiss to hear, after they had seen the leaders of nation after nation turn over their countries to the Nazis, sometimes after nothing but a closed-door meeting with Hitler. Swiss soldiers, who favored resistance to the end, questioned precisely to what Pilet-Golaz was advocating that they adapt themselves: National Socialist domination of Europe, or of Switzerland?
Pilet-Golaz’ speech was inconsistent with the April 18 order— which he himself had signed—that Switzerland would never surrender and would persevere at all costs.35 After the Pilet-Golaz statement, those who favored the absolute no-surrender policy repeatedly demanded reissuance of the order, to no avail.36
Even though the order was not formally reissued, it had stated that there would be no surrender no matter what the federal government said. It was not rescinded and thus remained valid until the end of the war. The Federal Council could have surrendered, yet according to the terms of the order, the army would have been obligated to disregard this and would have fought to the end.37
Public support for Federal President Pilet-Golaz’ accommodationist tendencies was weak. A popular pun in Switzerland stated that Pilet-Golaz must go: “den Pilet muss man go la [short for gehen lassen and pronounced “Golaz”].38 A newspaper variation went “Dann muss der Pilet gehen.”39 Many regarded him with suspicion. In any event, the Swiss then and even now do not assign as much importance to the office of national chief executive as we do in the United States.
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