Many began to fear, however, a growing sentiment of defeatism, and rumors spread that German agents planned to prevent General Guisan from issuing the necessary orders for national defense. Instead of the great medieval victories of Morgarten, Sempach, and Morat, it was believed that the Swiss might suffer a repetition of the 1798 French invasion, during which the national polity had been weak and divided. Some began to think of a coup d’état in which young officers would seize power, install a new Federal Council, and announce a new commitment to resist. The effort was unsophisticated and undemocratic but reaffirmed the abhorrence of Nazism among the military, as well as mistrust of the federal government. Sentiment grew among the soldiers to single out any Nazi sympathizers in the army and take any accommodationist officers prisoner.40
Within the military, the Offiziersbund, or L’Alliance des Officiers, a secret society of officers which stood for total resistance, was formed.41 Its members pledged not to obey any orders to surrender. As a secret society, it was considered a breach of discipline when its existence inevitably came to the notice of higher commanders. Twenty of the officer members were arrested on August 3 but were subjected to lenient discipline.
General Guisan reprimanded the officers for not having confidence in him and reassured them of the high command’s commitment to total resistance. Guisan later wrote that “in the event the will of resistance would have been given up under foreign pressure, these officers, by refusing to obey, would not only have been acting completely within their rights, but they also would have followed that which is the highest duty of every soldier.”42 When it became known that the officers had been willing to compromise their military careers in support of a total-resistance policy, and that the General had reassured them of his agreement, the people responded with new confidence in the army.43
Another secret society, the Aktion Nationaler Widerstand, or L’Action de Résistance Nationale, was formed by junior members of the General Staff to support the policy of total resistance. Many officers and nationally prominent citizens joined and signed the promise to refuse any order by the government to surrender. If senior officers did not oppose a German invasion, junior officers would seize their commands. If surrender was ever suggested, these underground groups were pledged to engage in armed revolt.44
Members of the resistance groups committed themselves, in the event of Nazi occupation, to engage in partisan or guerrilla warfare, with all the risks that would have entailed. They planned active resistance to the Gestapo and all potential occupation forces.45
The Aktion movement was a lawful, albeit secret, organization of 500 members from all walks of life: the Parliament, members of all political parties, journalists, soldiers. Its members worked unstintingly to influence public opinion in favor of the policy of absolute resistance. It had meetings but no publications and was not subject to censorship. It lasted until the end of the war.46
Switzerland had imposed limited press censorship to protect national secrets and avoid needlessly provoking Nazi retaliation. This censorship, however, was after-the-fact, not a prior restraint, and weak. Even during the height of the war, the press could speak mostly as it wished and frequently gave great offense to the National Socialists.47 However, not even such minimal restrictions existed regarding individual conversations.
Aktion members included Max Waibel and Captain Hans Hausamann, who operated the “Bureau Ha,” a special component of Swiss intelligence. Contacts were made all over Europe, and in Switzerland the Bureau functioned to instill the spirit of resistance. Its spy network, termed the “Wiking Line” (named after a Swiss spy) reached right into Hitler’s headquarters.48
After the French armistice, a significant portion of the Swiss forces were demobilized. However, on July 2 General Guisan issued an order which included these words: “An armistice is not peace. The war continues between Germany, Italy and Great Britain. . . . Even if we cannot win a direct victory, we will fight.”49
At that point, the Nazis were on the verge of launching the Battle of Britain, a spectacular Luftwaffe offensive across the English Channel that would ultimately fail to pave the way for a land assault. The panzers were still idle. German troops were again concentrated at the Swiss border.50
On American Independence Day in 1940, William Shirer was not celebrating. In Geneva with his wife and baby, the famous correspondent confided to his diary:
Everyone here is full of talk about the “new Europe,” a theme that brings shudders to most people. The Swiss, who mobilized more men per capita than any other country in the world, are demobilizing partially. They see their situation as pretty hopeless, surrounded as they are by the victorious totalitarians, from whom henceforth they must beg facilities for bringing in their food and other supplies. None have any illusions about the kind of treatment they will get from the dictators.
The newspapers advised preparing for hardship and loss of freedom. “The Swiss do not realize what the dictators really have in store for them,” wrote Shirer, adding: “And now that France has completely collapsed and the Germans and Italians surround Switzerland, a military struggle in self-defense is hopeless.”51 Demoralization had infected not only many Swiss, but also one of America’s leading correspondents. But in the face of such defeatism, General Guisan developed additional plans.
To instill and reaffirm the will to resist, General Guisan decided to muster the army’s key leadership—commanders, higher officers, and the Chief of the General Staff—on July 25 at the Rütli Meadow.52 The officers rallied at and disembarked from Lucerne, all traveling on the same boat. Despite the risk of sabotage, Guisan did not want to divide them.53
The eastern side of Lake Lucerne is an area surrounded by steep bluffs. From a dock, a footpath proceeds up to the Rütli Meadow. According to tradition, it was here that in 1291 Switzerland was founded.
On a beautiful day, Guisan faced the senior officers of the army standing in a semicircle on the Rütli Meadow, facing the lake. Canton Uri’s flag of the Battalion 87 flew above. Addressing the measures taken “for the resistance in the réduit,” Guisan ordered “resistance to all aggression coming from the outside, and to the various internal dangers, laxity, defeatism, as well as confidence in the value of this resistance.”54 He continued:
Here, soldiers of 1940, we will inspire ourselves with the lesson and spirit of the past to envisage resolution of the present and future of the country, to hear the mysterious call that pervades this meadow.55
Guisan then gave the officers an order to pass on to the troops. Noting the importance of secrecy to a disciplined army and to the national defense, Guisan stated that many questioned the reason for recent modifications in the grouping of the forces and their mobilization. Recalling that on August 29, 1939, the Federal Council had ordered the mobilization of border troops, and soon thereafter the general mobilization, he continued that the army must safeguard the country’s independence. Their neighbors, he said, had “respected this independence so far, but we must see to it that it is respected to the end.” He warned:
Currently there are, beyond our borders, more troops—and excellent troops—than ever before. We can be attacked on all fronts at the same time, which was not really conceivable a few weeks ago. The army must adapt itself to this new situation and take a position that allows it to hold on to all the fronts. It will thus fulfill its invariable, historic mission.56
Guisan prophetically stated: “In Europe, for a long time to come, millions of men will remain under arms, and as considerable forces can attack us from one moment to the next, the army must remain ready.” Complimenting the army on the value of its past efforts and disdaining doubters, he urged renewed confidence in “the effectiveness of our resistance.”57
Guisan later reflected: “The spirits and hearts were brought closer by the magnitude of the place, the cohesion and the camaraderie of leaders in this grand assembly.” That evening, each returned to his command post or his home reminded that “the task is hardly begun.�
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Portions of the speech were broadcast on the radio and printed in newspapers.59 New hope arose as the military directives took shape and additional fortifications were constructed. The Nazis were incensed that Guisan insinuated the Wehrmacht might attack and that he had defiantly asserted that any aggression would be stoutly resisted.60 Any German hopes that Switzerland would surrender without a fight, or would give up after brief resistance, were shattered.61
On July 30, German Minister Köcher wired Berlin from Bern that a strong protest should be lodged against this “renewed incitement of Swiss public opinion against Germany and Italy.” Both Axis capitals did so shortly thereafter. A few weeks later, Köcher met with Pilet-Golaz, who replied that Guisan at Rütli had not sought to “describe Germany as the possible attacker or to incite public opinion against Germany,” but only intended “to exhort officers and men to the unqualified fulfillment of their duties.”62 Yet both men knew this statement bordered on the ridiculous, when the Axis powers posed the only possible threat to Switzerland.
On August 1, Swiss National Day, hundreds of fires, the historic symbol of Swiss independence, blazed from Alpine peaks as leaders expressed their determination to defend the nation.63 General Guisan and President Pilet-Golaz pledged that the armed forces and the government would fight “to the end.”64
At the National Day celebration at the ongoing World’s Fair in New York, speakers “compared the Swiss ideals of liberty, tolerance and neutrality to those of the United States.” Swiss Consul General Victor Nef noted that the Swiss had their own militia for defense, “and they always have relied exclusively on [their] own strength. These people follow the good-neighbor policy [and] exchange spiritual as well as tangible goods with their neighbors. Otherwise they would starve.” New York City’s Mayor LaGuardia issued the following statement to Dr. Nef:
The determined and long-continued aloofness of Switzerland from the turmoils of Europe tells the story of the greatness of your people, towering above the jealousies and selfish greeds of nations even as your mountains tower above their neighbors. Peace and liberty, these are almost synonymous in Switzerland. It is my prayer, shared by my countrymen everywhere, that the peace and liberty which you enjoy may remain as constant and secure as your Jungfrau and your Matterhorn.65
Meanwhile the Führer’s Luftwaffe pounded away at London. Frustrated by the efforts of the RAF, and because it had become too late in the season to launch an invasion, the Germans had resorted to wreaking havoc on the great city on the Thames. International skier Arnold Lunn, referring to “the creeping leprosy of the Nazi infection,” expressed the common attitude of English and Swiss alike as follows:
When France fell and when we watched the fires of burning dockland on the night of September 7th, 1940, and wondered whether England could continue to take it, second only to the supreme horror of Hitler’s evil face gloating over conquered London from the balcony of Buckingham Palace was the possibility that the swastika might fly from the roofs of Bern.66
As the military situation and the location of German troops changed, so too did German plans to invade Switzerland. Hitler was constantly changing his mind. It behooved the German General Staff to continue to update attack plans against Switzerland, in case the command should come unexpectedly. A revised plan of the German Army high command, the OKH, dated August 8, conceded: “The single [Swiss] soldier is a tough fighter and a good shot.” Nine German divisions and additional Italian forces would be used.67
Captain Menges, drafter of the June 25 plan, submitted a revised plan entitled “The German Attack Against Switzerland” to the High Command on August 12. It again proposed a simultaneous Wehrmacht attack from Germany and France along with an attack from the south by the Italians. It would be a lightning invasion from several directions with the same goals as before: fragmentation of the Swiss Army and prevention of its withdrawal into the Réduit; seizure of the industry and arms production around Solothurn and Zurich; and preservation of the transportation system from destruction by the Swiss.68
Menges described the Swiss Army—underestimating it—as having a strength of 220,000 soldiers divided into six infantry divisions, three mountain divisions, three mountain brigades, one border brigade and a border battalion. It had no tank troop, and its air force was weak. Because of internal politics and economic factors, further demobilization would continue. However, remobilization could take place quickly, and the Swiss needed only five hours to mobilize the border troops. Menges proceeded to describe Swiss defenses in great detail:
[The Swiss have] a functionally organized and quickly mobilized armed force. The level of training will have been raised by the long time they have been mobilized. Leaders only theoretically schooled. Methodical leadership. Shortcomings in weaponry (artillery, tanks, anti-tank defenses, air force, anti-aircraft guns). The individual soldier is a tough fighter and a good sharpshooter. The mountain troops are said to be better than those of their southern neighbor. The fighting value of the western Swiss (French type) is limited, while those living south of Constance (Communists) will be bitter enemies. Final evaluation: an army suitable only for defensive purposes and completely inferior to its German counterpart.69
The plan for a German attack from the north and west and an Italian attack from the south, submitted by Captain Otto Wilhelm von Menges of the General Staff to the German Army High Command on August 12, 1940. (Adapted from Fuhrer, “Renseignement,” Relations Internationales, Summer 1994, No. 78, 236.)
Menges also mentioned that, in armistice commission discussions, the Germans had attempted to persuade Vichy France to change the demarcation line to allow the Germans to envelop Switzerland. Vichy refused.70
It was reported from Bern on September 16 that the Swiss were anxiously awaiting the results of the Vichy-Berlin negotiations. Completely surrounded by Axis powers and their conquered territories, the Swiss feared loss of trade access with the nonbelligerent world. Economic strangulation was believed to be as likely as armed invasion. Still, that same day, the Federal Council approved a referendum for an amendment to the Constitution to make premilitary training a requirement for all males over 16, setting December 1 for the public vote.71
For some time the Germans had been thoroughly angered by General Guisan—for his secret agreement with the French for a joint defense against a Wehrmacht invasion, for his influence in keeping troops mobilized, and for his known determination to wage total war against any German aggression. Max Waibel, head of the Swiss “N1” intelligence unit, learned that Berlin was attempting to hatch an intrigue against Guisan, whom the Germans found “unbearable,” and to replace him with a commander-in-chief who was more friendly to Germany. German Minister Otto Köcher attempted to instigate a cabal in Bern against Guisan and to convince the government to demobilize the troops.72 Not surprisingly, this unsuccessful effort coincided with the preparation of more invasion plans against Switzerland.
A series of plans codenamed “Tannenbaum” was drafted for the German General Staff. On August 26, General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff, ordered planning for an assault to be undertaken by Field Marshal von Leeb’s Army Group C.73 At least two plans resulted from this command.
The operations plan dated September 6 recognized that Switzerland would resist with all her might. The 12th Army under Field Marshal Wilhelm von List would spearhead the German attack, which would include winged movements centered on Bern.74 In contrast, the plan of October 4, to be executed by von Leeb, would have used extraordinarily short deployment times but relied on 21 divisions.75 While driving along the Swiss border from Germany to France on October 6, General Halder reflected:
The Jura frontier offers no favorable base for an attack. Switzerland rises, in successive waves of wood-covered terrain, across the axis of an attack. The crossing points on the river Doubs and the border are few; the Swiss frontier position is strong.76
The next day, Operation Tannenbaum was sent to the General Staff, which, after reviewi
ng it, ordered a new study that would use only half as many German divisions.77
Besides all the foregoing plans, there was the “Plan Zimmerman” of October 4, prepared for the German High Command, which did not even acknowledge the existence of the plan of the same date for Army Group C. This study realistically anticipated that resistance and fighting would continue under a German occupation.78
General Halder, as is known by his October 17 note, continued to focus on an invasion of Switzerland. He contemplated two major operational zones using eleven divisions. First, an infantry attack would be feinted in the Jura to pin down the Swiss Army, which would then be cut off from the Alps by a new assault and smashed on the plateau. The concept was not unlike the plan that defeated France, which involved an initial assault into Belgium to flush out French and British forces, while the main thrust emerged on their rear flank from the Ardennes. According to the plan against the Swiss, army remnants in the Gotthard and other parts of the Réduit would initially be left alone, for they could not survive over time.79
However, the Swiss Army was already concentrating arms and supplies in the Réduit, about which General Halder stated: “The immobilization, for an indefinite time, of powerful forces without hope surrounding the central position of Switzerland, and the certainty of being deprived of a vital, favorable liaison with the Italian ally is insupportable.”80 The Chief of the German General Staff clearly preferred the benefits of limited usage to the complete cessation of transit across the Alps.
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