All of these invasion plans were being developed during a period of intense focus on Switzerland by Hitler and Mussolini. The two met at the Brenner Pass on October 4, and the Duce wrote the Führer on the 19th: “I am sure you will not be surprised to find Switzerland on my list of remaining English outposts on the continent. With its incomprehensible hostility, Switzerland poses itself the problem of its existence.”81
In sum, at least five separate German attack plans were devised in 1940. Three of the plans would have been directed from the north, east and west and placed the center of gravity in the pre-Alps in order to attempt to separate the Swiss Army from the Alps and destroy it in the Plateau. The Germans knew that if the Swiss Army were in the Alps, its infantry would be extremely difficult to dislodge.82
The other two attack plans, “Operation Switzerland” of August 12, and the Zimmerman study of October 4, would have been launched against western Switzerland from France in the rear of the Limmat River position of the Swiss Army.83 There were also attack plans from Italy, including the plan of General Vercellino of June 10 and others. The Duce intended to seize large parts of southern Switzerland.84
The German attack plans variously called for between 10 and 21 divisions, each division typically including some 12,000 to 15,000 soldiers. If 15 Italian divisions were added, that would make between 25 and 36 divisions.85 Thus, the Axis would have found it necessary to attack Switzerland with 300,000 to 500,000 trained men—a massive force in contrast to previous German invasions of small countries.
The Wehrmacht invasion plans were drafted by at least three different groups working independently of one another and with differing hypotheses. The plans differed dramatically on the capacity of the Swiss for resistance, the size of the forces necessary for an invasion, and the foreseeable duration of the campaign. The Germans agreed, however, that the Swiss Army would put up a strong, albeit unsuccessful, resistance, expressed a marked respect for the mountains, and feared popular resistance after hostilities officially ended. On the whole, the German experts advised against an attack, knowing that a war in the mountains would be a long-term enterprise with doubtful results.86
On October 19 the Swiss Army announced that home defense soldiers, including men aged 42–60, were being recalled to relieve younger troops who had been on duty since the war started.87 On October 26, the Swiss government announced the arrest of officials and employees of the Swiss Union of Friends of Authoritative Democracy, a Nazi group directed from Germany. Federal police simultaneously conducted raids in several cities.88
At the same time, Germany was tightening its economic stranglehold on Switzerland. The United States was still not in the war, allowing William Shirer to continue reporting from Berlin. His wife and baby living in Geneva, to which he commuted regularly, were subject to the same privations as the Swiss, which Shirer described:
This winter the Germans, to show their power to discipline the sturdy, democratic Swiss, are refusing to send Switzerland even the small amount of coal necessary for the Swiss people to heat their homes. The Germans are also allowing very little food into Switzerland, for the same shabby reason. Life in Switzerland this winter will be hard.89
Scarcities led to the imposition of rationing in early November. The “cultivation battle,” a plan authored by Dr. F.T. Wahlen, chief of crop production for the Federal war bureau, was initiated to employ every available town square, yard, soccer field and other piece of land in food production. Virtually every family participated with great enthusiasm and a sense of patriotism. A typical family might transform the backyard into a potato, bean or tomato field and plant herbs in the flower beds.
In the fall, townspeople would harvest wheat and corn planted outside town. In the evening, they would return with a pound of ground flour which they received in return for their harvest, a welcome supplement to their meager rations. With these efforts land cultivation almost doubled. The cultivation battle, often waged by women and children while the father (and for rural families, the horse too) was away on a mobilization order, was an essential part of the program of spiritual national defense and led to sizable crops throughout the war years.90
On November 9, the Italian press and radio denounced the Swiss for allegedly allowing flights of British RAF bombers over Switzerland on their way to Italian targets. Basel’s National Zeitung quoted the Italian radio: “The Swiss must not think themselves inviolable—this is our last warning.” The Swiss high command confirmed that the British had violated Swiss air space and noted that Swiss anti-aircraft guns had fired at the planes. Swiss newspapers also asked why the Swiss should be blamed for the half-hour flights over their territory if the Axis could not stop the RAF pilots in their three-hour flight over German-occupied territory.91
On November 15, 1940, a petition with 105 names was filed with the Federal Council advocating appeasement of Germany. By April 1941, it had 173 signatures, although it came to be known as the infamous “Petition of the Two Hundred.” Its demands included abolition of a free press and revocation of criminal sentences for pro- German treason.92 The Federal Council never responded to the petition, and its signers were subjected to criminal investigation. The petition had the opposite of its intended effect—it outraged the press and the majority of Swiss, who reacted with an increased determination to resist.93
The same day the petition was submitted—November 15, 1940—the fifth-column Nationale Bewegung der Schweiz (NBS, or National Movement of Switzerland) issued an “ultimatum” to the Federal Council and President Pilet-Golaz.94 The NBS ultimatum was referred to the Department of Justice and Police. Police had already acted against this organization four times earlier in the year, but it kept reappearing under different names. It was believed that the group, which brought leaflets into Switzerland attacking the Federal Council and advocating the triumph of National Socialism, would be prosecuted for subversion.
On November 17, General Guisan reported that the NBS did in fact endanger the security of the state.95 Two days later, the Federal Council dissolved the NBS. Finding that the organization was attempting to overthrow democracy, the Federal Council forbade its activities, prohibited its publications and prohibited it from reorganizing under a different name. Violators would be tried under the decree of December 5, 1938, which meant trial before military tribunals. A recent military tribunal had sentenced seven defendants to life terms at hard labor for plotting to sabotage the country’s defense.96 Switzerland’s action in banning the NBS at the height of Nazi power took courage in the face of Berlin’s military might.
On November 27, the Federal Council also banned the Communist Party and any branches or renamed groups as a threat to democracy. Like the Nazis, the Communists were weak and not represented in the Parliament.97
The German press continued to wage a propaganda campaign against Swiss neutrality and its free press. Nazi journalists denounced the reporting in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung of German night bombings of England while ignoring British bombing of German hospitals and civilian targets. In a headline article entitled “Switzerland in Churchill’s Service,” the Frankfurter Zeitung stated:
Never will the German people forget the attitude of the Swiss during this war. A nation of 80,000,000, while fighting for bare existence, finds itself almost uninterruptedly attacked, insulted and slandered by the newspapers of a tiny State whose Government claims to be neutral.98
The Strassburger Neueste Nachrichten (New Evening News), claiming that Switzerland was once part of the Reich and was now within the “field of force” of the Third Reich, similarly stated that “Switzerland cannot prevent the penetration of the idea of the new order of Europe.” European politics would no longer be dominated by the British policy of the balance of power but would be based on an “unbalance,” under Axis leadership. To this new order, Swiss neutrality must bow, since Europe “is no longer interested, especially from the strategic and political viewpoint, in maintaining the isolation of certain anomalous regions.”99
Few military analysts believe that Switzerland, outside the Réduit, could have held out for long against a multi-directional, combined-arms attack by Germany and Italy, no matter how bravely the Swiss fought. Occupying the country afterwards, of course, would have been a different problem for the fascists. An unidentified Swiss officer expressed the sentiment in his country as follows: “Even if Germany was irresistible, we were determined to resist. It was a character test. Are we men or dirty dogs?”
Defeat would be only a matter of months, perhaps weeks, but the Swiss believed that they could kill 200,000 Nazis before surrendering and thus contribute a noble service to the cause of all free men. And even in 1940, when it seemed as if resistance was futile and Hitler invincible, the Swiss took the long view and knew that they would not die in vain, if they preferred death to surrender. Their children and their children’s children would still be proud to be Swiss, and from the seed of their pride would flower the spirit of resistance that would one day liberate enslaved Europe from the Nazi tyranny.100
Consistent with this theme, a publication of the SSV (Swiss Shooting Federation) ended the tension-filled year with the question, “What happens now?” The simple answer: “Learn to shoot, Swiss, learn to shoot.”101
Chapter 6
1941
The New Order in Europe
FEDERAL COUNCILLOR ERNST WETTER, SWITZERLAND’S PRESIDENT for 1941, opened the new year with the commitment that the country’s 650-year tradition of independence would survive the “dark future.”1 The new year also saw the retirement of Rudolf Minger, the tough head of the Military Department who had been responsible for ever stronger defensive measures since the Third Reich came into existence in 1933. An accomplished marksman, Minger also had promoted rifle competitions throughout the country for defense training and readiness.2
From 1941 until the war was nearly over, Switzerland would be encircled by the Axis powers, subjected to regular air-raid alarms, and isolated from the outside world. The country remained subject to a Nazi media barrage, which, although meant to intimidate the Swiss, only engendered a stronger spirit of resistance involving not only marksmanship but also comradeship. “These weapons and these ties will never fail,” the SSV’s publication insisted.3 It was the soldier and his morale, not the blitzkrieg or the Luftwaffe, that were decisive.4
In February 1941, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent apologies to the Swiss for bombs accidentally dropped over the Swiss border. Four civilians were killed in Basel and eleven other people in Zurich.5 Eden wrote that the British were “anxious to maintain in all circumstances the ancient ties of friendship and goodwill” with the Swiss. He asked for the forbearance of the Swiss to the British, “fighting as they are for the traditions of freedom and resistance to tyranny, of which the Swiss Confederation has in former times been the protagonist in European history.”6
On March 22, Federal President Wetter told his party in Bern that the government would cooperate economically with the new European order, but only on Swiss terms. “In accepting economic collaboration with the rest of Europe we would not be accepting any new ideal.” New restrictions had been placed on the former policies of world trade and a liberal trade policy. “But we can make the condition that the new order be based on the principle of collaboration of free States.”7
A group of eleven Swiss journalists touring the Reich made it clear that Switzerland was not eager to join the New Order. This led Nazi Propaganda Minister Goebbels to deliver a speech on March 25 in which he stated: “If Switzerland has decided to remain outside of our orbit under any circumstances, I cannot prevent it, but in that case Switzerland should remember that it will be excluded from all the advantages which the New Order will give to Europe.” The Bern Nation responded: “We hope that Dr. Goebbels will keep his word. That would be the most beautiful message possible for our country, which has only one desire—to be left alone.”8
Meanwhile, the Soviets supported and praised Hitler’s conquests. The U.S.S.R. was grabbing up the parts of Eastern Europe awarded it in the Nazi-Soviet Pact and German-Soviet trade continued. Stalin, despite irritating the Germans with his avarice for territory, made every effort to solidify his relationship with Hitler.9 During this period, Communist agitation had also heated up in Switzerland, with Moscow’s agents instigating dissent and calling for the overthrow of the Swiss government.10
On March 26, 1941, the government in Yugoslavia entered into a pact with the Axis and was promptly deposed in a coup with popular support. The new government proclaimed unconditional neutrality.11 The Swiss vocally supported the coup.
One Socialist newspaper urged Swiss Foreign Minister (one-time Federal President) Pilet-Golaz to “take note” of the revolt in Yugoslavia and warned against “dangerous pilgrimages,” such as to Berlin. “The people and army form one indivisible thing, so that even in small countries strong diplomats are nothing,” said the paper. The article quoted a warning from a Swiss folk song: “Today you proudly ride your horse; tomorrow you are shot in the chest.”12
The elation of the Swiss people at being joined in their defiance of Nazi Germany by the Yugoslavs was unfortunately short-lived. On April 6, German, Italian and Hungarian armies invaded Yugoslavia; at the same time, Germans (from Bulgaria) and the Italians (from Albania) attacked Greece.
The Swiss press and people condemned the invasions and cheered on the beleaguered states.13 The Yugoslavs had a million men under arms, as well as mountainous terrain that should have greatly assisted their defense. Nevertheless, their army collapsed in the face of the assault, and by the 17th, after only 11 days, the country had capitulated. The Yugoslavs had bravely, if foolishly, deployed their army to defend their entire 1,000-mile border—a tailor-made opportunity for blitzkrieg. Once the panzers cut through selected points of impact, outflanked or surrounded Yugoslav divisions panicked, thus prompting a general collapse. Elements of the Yugoslavian confederation, primarily from Slovenia and Croatia, declared for the Nazis when the attack began, further hastening the dissolution of resistance.
In the light of the Yugoslavian debacle, General Guisan’s plan to fight at the border, delay in the Plateau and pre-Alps, and concentrate in the Réduit National, seemed more astute than ever. The cliché “he who defends everything defends nothing” was entirely applicable to defense against blitzkrieg, and though the Swiss military strategy would have “cold-bloodedly” conceded large portions of the country and large civilian population centers to Nazi domination, such pragmatism would have assisted greatly had it been applied to the Yugoslav cause.
The Wehrmacht, which lost only 151 men killed in the entire campaign against Yugoslavia, had a harder time against Greece, which was backed by three full-strength British divisions with modern equipment. Unfortunately, giving the lie to the admonition against trying to defend everything, the Greeks had cleverly arrayed their strength against anticipated points of Axis attack. But they had no defenses on their Yugoslavian border. When the panzers came streaming down on their left flank, after the sudden collapse of their neighbor, the Greek defense became unhinged. Hard fighting took place in the retreat down the Greek peninsula, including a brief stand at Thermopylae, and then the survivors of the British divisions performed another Dunkirk-like retreat, to Crete. Athens surrendered on April 27.
The evening after the Greek surrender, Athens radio called on all residents “to surrender all arms immediately and to fly the German flag wherever the Greek flag is flown.”14 In Switzerland, many citizens were despondent at what seemed to be the invincibility of the Third Reich and its allies and its growing network of conquered territory.15
Karl Megerle, a Nazi commentator, had warned Switzerland in the April 9 issue of Berlin’s Börsen Zeitung “to take note of what has happened to Yugoslavia.” Megerle claimed that civil unrest in Yugoslavia had “sabotaged a foreign policy of common sense.” He attacked a recent article in the Swiss press which praised the honor and bravery of the Yugoslavs and warned that Switzerland m
ight find herself in a situation similar to Yugoslavia’s. Switzerland, he argued, could not be truly neutral if her press was allowed to continue to express “resentment and enmity toward Germany.”16
The Swiss, however, remained unshaken in their desire for unconditional independence and continued to place great faith in the power of the individual citizen soldier to preserve the country’s freedom. The Swiss Shooting Federation, ever on the scene, exhorted:
The best and first guarantor of our neutrality and our independent existence is the defensive will of the people, the well-trained and armed army, and the proverbial marksmanship of the Swiss shooter. Each soldier a good marksman! Each shot a hit!17
Heer und Haus (Armée et Foyer—“Army and Home”), an information and communications center, was initiated by the Aktion Nationaler Widerstand (the secret national resistance society) to focus the will of the people to resist and to further cement the bond between citizen and soldier.18
Heer und Haus entertained soldiers, but its real function was to instill the spirit of resistance into soldiers and the public alike. Conceived by intelligence operative Hans Hausamann and the journalist August Lindt, Heer und Haus was headed by Oscar Frey, a vocal spokesman in favor of resistance against Hitler’s New Europe. Private lectures were not subject to censorship, and every Saturday afternoon and Sunday through the rest of the war, lectures would be held on subjects such as the military situation, the Réduit concept, and the will to fight. Lecturers stated explicitly that Hitler was the enemy. Persons who attended lectures spread the word. Thus, an entire communications network, free of censorship, pervaded the country.19
The April National Geographic featured a picture of a Swiss couple in their home, with the heading “Swiss ‘Minutemen’ Keep Their Guns at Home, Ready for Instant Action.” The caption read: “Under his wife’s supervision, this citizen soldier sews on a uniform button and inspects rifle, helmet, and cartridge bandoleer.” “A Sword Symbolizes His Ancient Right to Vote and Bear Arms” ran the caption on another picture, with the explanation: “The custom dates back to the days when only those entitled to vote were permitted to carry arms in peacetime.”20
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